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 My  thesis  explores  the  notion,  originally  developed  by  sociologists  such  as  Goffman  and 
Charmaz, that a person’s identity undergoes a difficult and painful metamorphosis in response 
to the effects of serious long-term impairment or chronic illness. I argue that existing methods of 
researching what I have come to call “the disabled identity” generally avoid a deeper exploration 
of the social context in which this kind of marginalisation occurs. To address this absence, I 
develop  a  research  methodology  which  combines  an  intensive  exploration  of  the  personal 
experience of disability with a critical analysis of the social and historical context in which the 
disabling  of  identity  occurs.  I  approach  the  former  through  grounded  theory  and  the  latter 
through a Foucaultian analytics of genealogy and governmentality. These are informed by the 
theoretical insights surrounding the “social model” of disability which claims that “disability” is 
not a physical problem based on personal tragedy but is a social imposition based on exclusion 
and stigmatisation.  
 
In  accordance  with  this,  the  thesis  proceeds  in  three  successive  stages.  First,  I  apply  a 
genealogical analysis to disability in general, then more specifically to the disabled identity, to 
provide the background for my qualitative research. The purpose of genealogy is to reveal that 
the concept under investigation is not a self-evident “given” but a social construction which has 
developed to serve varying interests over time. Through this process it becomes evident that 
disability has evolved as a concept which performs as a counterpoint to the norm and, as such, 
provides a measure of “what not to be” in terms of contemporary neoliberal citizenship.  
 
Next, I engage in a grounded theory study which draws on the stories of disabled people to 
explore how their self-perceptions and the attitudes of those around them have been affected by 
disability.  These  stories  stem  from  a  variety  of  data  sources,  including  my  dialogues  with 
participants,  written  stories  from  participants,  and  published  autobiographies.  Their analysis 
results in the emergence of the following themes: independence, occupational identity, and 
sexuality/appearance. Each theme is discussed in a separate chapter which attempts to let the 
stories speak for themselves by way of lengthy excerpts from the participants and texts, and 
combines them, where relevant, with my own insights and experiences as a disabled person. 
 
In the final stage, I use a governmentality analysis to explore these themes and to place them in 
their current social and historical context. Here I suggest that independence, work and sexuality 
are key factors which are used to divide the affiliated from the marginalised in contemporary 
neoliberal societies. I argue that the two “technologies” which currently have the most impact on 
how independence, work and sexuality are governed in relation to disability are welfare reform 
and sexual rehabilitation. Here I explore the available primary sources - particularly the last five 
years of Australian government policy on welfare reform and a selection of sexual rehabilitation 
texts  -  to  reveal  how  governance  seeks  to  operate  as  a  liberatory  force  while  remaining 
oppressive due to its paternalism and reinforcement of normative prescriptions.  
 The final chapter further problematises disability in relation to the governmental concepts of 
“self-esteem”  and  “empowerment”  in  an  attempt  to  unpick  what  can  be  claimed  to  be 
emancipatory  from  what  remains  embedded  in  the  dominant  discourse.  By  ‘deconstructing 
necessity’ and exploring the root causes of oppression through what Foucault refers to as ‘the 
disinterment of subjugated knowledges’, the thesis outlines an alternative discourse in relation 
to “disability” and opens up new possibilities for the creation of more positive identities.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
How could this happen to me? My image of myself, constructed with effort to live, to 
survive, to face others - with its inevitable share of masks and pretences, with the no 
less inevitable and necessary repressions - blurs, trembles, even cracks. I thought I was 
like this . . . and look what I've become! I thought people saw me like that . . . and look 
how I'll seem now! I thought myself charged with life, rich in potential . . . and look what 
I've produced!.. I have to start all over again . . . and in solitude, even if I am surrounded. 
Because it is my vision that is being wiped out - with its illusions and its reference points 
- and no one can understand or reconstruct it for me… Friendships, acquaintanceships, 
even  those  that  were  sincere  and  rewarding,  come undone.  Our  loves - even if we 
thought them without end - bend and sometimes break. Personal confidences are lost. 
Ideals  and  facile hopes  erode.  And  then,  when  hope  is  reborn,  when  the  taste  for 
life returns, when new relationships are formed, it is not without a bitter smile that I hear 
again talk of happiness or the announcement of brighter futures. Nothing, nothing, is left 
but a vague and cold tension not to fall apart. I face my fear  (Stiker 1999: 2). 
 
Being me in a changed image almost became unbearable. Except the image did not 
belong to me.  It was created by the external world as if it wanted to obliterate the 
original version of me.  My unique pattern was redundant - surplus to requirement. The 
past was irrelevant.  Never mind that my spirit - my very essence - thrived on physical 
expression.  My relationship to the world and the thing which gave it meaning was 
translated through the physical.  . .  My internal world was imprisoned with all this 
unexpressed movement. I had lost my dominant language and had not yet learnt the 
new one (Slack 1999: 29). 
 
The four most far-reaching changes in the consciousness of the disabled are: lowered 
self-esteem;  the  invasion  and  occupation  of  thought  by  physical  deficits;  a  strong 
undercurrent of anger; and the acquisition of a new, total, and undesirable identity.  I can 
only liken the situation to a curious kind of "invasion of the body snatchers", in which the 
alien intruder and the old occupant coexist in mutual hostility in the same body.  It is also 
a metamorphosis in the exact sense (Murphy 1987: 108). 
 
Each of these excerpts represent an attempt to describe the feelings of overwhelming loss 
which accompany the onset of disability, feelings that I identify with as they are an intensely 
accurate description of my own experience of disability. What they share is the recognition that 
disability involves not only the physical limitations that are associated with a body that ceases to 
function  in  an  ordinary  way,  but  that  it  also  constitutes  an  identity  crisis  which  severs  the 
disabled person's sense of self from its former anchorage. This is hardly surprising: after all, 
who are we if we cannot do or be all the things which once defined us? Thus, the disabled 
person needs to learn to do and be other things, to develop a new identity to accommodate his 
or her physical limitations. What isn't so obvious, however, is how this process is engineered, 
how it is embedded in a social, political and historical context which governs its existence. This is where I diverge from mainstream, professional responses to disability. I propose that the 
identity loss which results from disablement, far from being a psychological reaction to physical 
loss which can be remedied by the adoption of individual coping mechanisms, is in actuality 
created by a social system which privileges some people at the expense of others.  
 
My desire to research this topic from this particular angle emerges, firstly, from an academic 
perspective grounded in the belief that our identities, whether they be defined in relation to 
gender, race, age or disability, are socially constructed, and, secondly, from my own personal 
experience of disability. This combination of factors, the social and the personal, informs my 
work at every level. I am disabled and a woman and recognise that this disempowers me on 
certain levels, but at the same time I am a white, middle class, tertiary educated person living in 
a wealthy Western country and I acknowledge that this privileges me over and above most 
people in the world. I have come to see that it is vital to take into account how this combination 
of positions constructs how I see the world, the research I chose to undertake and how I will 
perceive the data at my disposal. Rather than believing, as I was once encouraged to do, that 
these particularities must be excised in their entirety from my perspective as a sociological 
researcher, I now realise that my work will be enriched by their inclusion. Moreover, it is now my 
contention, inspired in particular by feminist research methodology, that it is farcical to pretend 
that it is possible to do otherwise.  
 
I will reserve my discussion of the epistemological significance of a subjective approach for 
Chapter One where I will be outlining my overall methodology, but I feel it is important at this 
point to share the parts of my personal story which are relevant to my research. In 1983 I 
graduated from Hawkesbury Agricultural College with a degree in applied science and a desire 
to grow things. My qualification and my choice of occupation had a definite bearing on how I 
was ultimately to deal with the onset of disability seven years later. Firstly, science had attracted 
me  as  a  field  of  knowledge because it promised to furnish me with the answers to all my 
questions and initially it didn't disappoint me because it appeared that, via the application of the 
scientific method, I could be sure to discover the truths behind many of life's mysteries. And, 
secondly, my career choice in horticulture was based on a desire to lead a very physical life 
which reinforced an identity which was already heavily reliant on strength, agility and a sense of 
communion with the outdoors.  
 
When I eventually sustained a severe and permanent back injury through my work in 1990, my 
distress stemmed from my losses in both areas. The most immediate loss revolved around my 
incapacity to be physical in the ways I always had been which led to the loss of my occupation, 
my  hobbies,  my  home,  my  pets,  my  garden,  access  to  my  friends  (and  some  friendships 
altogether) and most of all I lost myself. My partner gave up on me and I was shunted off to my 
childhood home at the age of 32 to live with a mother who was already struggling to care for my 
father who was seriously disabled due to a stroke. My life was shattered and by far the worst part of the experience for me was that no-one understood. I was completely, utterly alone and 
from behind the sheet of glass that separated me from the rest of the world I could not make 
myself heard. I had become, to all intents and purposes, invisible, without a voice and it is this 
kind of isolation that I want to break down by inviting disabled people to raise their voices 
through my research.  
 
My other great loss, on an entirely different level, was that science had failed me. Not only was 
medical  knowledge unable to help me to heal, those who practiced its arts were singularly 
unsympathetic and came to judge me harshly for the ongoing nature of my condition. But, more 
than that, the application of positivist science to my problems only served to render me even 
more helpless in the face of them. For the answers didn't lie within the blacks and whites, truths 
and  falsities  of  the  science  that  I  knew;  they  existed  in  the  blurred  and  murky  regions  of 
humanity which defy simple explanation. I began to study within the social sciences because I 
had  always  been  interested  in  why  people  are  the  way  they  are,  but,  while  initially  I  was 
attracted to the field of psychology because of its individualist focus and its scientific rigour, I 
gradually found myself seduced by the more subtle and complex explanations and explorations 
that were possible through the disciplines of politics, philosophy and sociology. By applying an 
interdisciplinary perspective within this area of the social sciences I was no longer stuck with 
such scientific "proofs" for "facts" such that men are more rational than women, that chronic 
pain  is  a  behavioural  problem,  and  that illness, poverty and rape are matters of individual 
responsibility. I had, conversely, entered a field that allowed for the understanding of personal 
problems as socially created and politically remediable.  
 
Indeed, through the development of an understanding of the ways in which personal experience 
is grounded in social structures, I have discovered the remedy that medicine denied me. For it 
has been my experience that to unearth the social origins of our personal problems can allow us 
to let go of the feelings of guilt and shame and helplessness that are part of owning a negative 
identity and to provide the tools for challenging it. This belief forms the heart of my research and 
designates  the  shape  and  the  direction  it  must  take.  To  be  able  to  effectively  explore  the 
development of the "disabled identity", and to devise mechanisms of resistance which promise 
to loosen the ties that bind us to negative self perceptions, I believe that it is necessary to move 
beyond the current methodological dichotomy which necessitates making a choice between a 
macro- and a micro-sociological approach. I will be arguing that it is necessary to combine both 
these approaches because this will create the means for joining the insights that can be gained 
from a structural analysis with the voices of the people whose lives and experiences form the 
subject matter being studied.  
 
It is not my intention to give a detailed description of the new road I take with my methodology 
here because Chapter One will be dedicated to this task and I wish to use this opening section 
to discuss matters concerning definitions and boundaries and to describe more clearly what I aim  to  achieve  with  my  research.  But,  for  now  it  will  suffice  to  say  that,  by  combining  a 
Foucaultian analysis of the social and historical context in which disability has been constructed 
with a qualitative research design which aims to delve into the experiences of disabled people 
themselves, I hope to provide an analytical lens through which disability can be viewed in its 
dual contexts as both a social imposition and an experience of deep personal loss.  
 
At this point it is necessary for me to clarify what I mean by "disability". I originally believed that 
this would be a relatively simple task because I subscribe to the definition which is specified by 
the social model of disability (see, for example, Barnes 1998a; Oliver 1990; Priestley 2003). 
According  to  this  perspective,  "disability"  does  not  refer  to  the  physical  incapacity  usually 
defined in this way, but to the state of social disadvantage which has come to accompany it. 
However,  although  my  thesis  will  be  dedicated  to  demonstrating  that  an  understanding  of 
disability as a social construction rather than a physical reality will make it possible to challenge 
its  oppressive  consequences,  there  are  times  when  I  need  to  use  the  word  "disability"  in 
something like its conventional sense. For example, when I explore the historical evolution of 
the concept of disability in Chapter Two I am mainly referring to the development of the term 
and its associated meanings as they have been traditionally understood. It is vital that I do this 
as, if I attempted to replace "disability" with the word "impairment", which is the social model's 
preferred descriptor for the physical problem which underlies the socially imposed disability, 
then I would not be tracing the ways in which the term "disability" has been constructed as an 
oppressive category. 
 
I believe that my analysis of language in Chapter Three will help to explain that these problems 
are unavoidable because language is not a stable entity and the continual deferral of meaning 
which frames our linguistic heritage performs a necessary function in the development and 
usage of language. Therefore, in keeping with an awareness of the fluid nature of language, it is 
necessary for me to be able to use "disability" in two distinct ways: firstly, in its traditional sense 
as a category of physical malfunction which has served to divide those who can from those who 
cannot do certain things, and, secondly, in relation to a set of exclusionary conditions, attitudes 
and practices which are imposed on top of such physical conditions. Nevertheless, although I 
will be arguing, in keeping with the social model of disability, that disability results from the 
existence of social barriers which exclude people who are physically limited from full social 
participation, I must make clear that I diverge from the social model in two significant ways, 
firstly, by challenging its grounding in essentialist logics which, up until recently, has excluded 
identity  from  the  realm  of  analysis  encompassed  by  disability  studies,  and,  secondly,  by 
including  chronic  illness  in  the  category  of  conditions  which  can  be  claimed  to  lead  to 
"disability". 
 
The purpose of the social model of disability has been to distinguish between the physical state 
of "impairment" and the socially imposed condition of "disability". This has proven to be a very useful distinction because it has opened up the recognition that physical incapacity need not 
entail  exclusion  from  the  workforce  or  access  to  public  spaces  or  the  opportunity  to  live 
independently outside of institutions. However, I argue in Chapter One that the social model, by 
dichotomising  social  cause  and  personal  experience,  retains  an  essentialist  perspective 
grounded in the liberal philosophical assumption that our inner worlds are private realms for 
which  we  are  entirely  responsible.  This  is  a  highly  problematic  theoretical  stance,  the 
ramifications of which are discussed in depth in Chapters Three and Four, because it denies the 
disabling  consequences  of  many  illnesses  and  impairments and can leave disabled people 
feeling responsible for their subjugation. I argue, conversely, that the internalised oppression 
and marginalised social status which accompany serious physical limitations are equally social 
creations and that they result in what I refer to as the "disabled identity". Thus, in keeping with 
its constructionist foundations, I argue that the term "disabled identity" relates to more than the 
identity possessed by a disabled person, it points to an identity, a state of subjecthood and 
subjectivity,  which  has  been  disabled,  incapacitated,  rendered  inferior  by  prevailing  social 
conditions and attitudes.  
 
I also feel it is necessary to challenge the tendency within the field of disability studies and the 
disability  rights  movement  to  exclude  those  who  have  chronic  illnesses.  In  attempting  to 
challenge the medicalisation of disability, social model theorists have gone to great lengths to 
divorce  themselves  from  any  association  with  illness  (see  Oliver  1996:  33-37  and  Barnes, 
Mercer and Shakespeare 1999: 54). However, as Ahmad (2000) argues, 'although disability 
does not necessarily entail chronic illness, chronic illnesses are almost always disabling' (5). 
Furthermore, as Wendell (1996) points out, many more people 'are disabled by arthritis, heart or 
respiratory disease, or diabetes than by blindness and paraplegia' (20), and, as Bury (1997) 
states, 'though not all forms of disability are caused by chronic illness, most are' (120). Although 
these theorists appear to be using the terms "disability" and "disabled" in their conventional 
sense, I argue that these physically debilitating conditions provide the foundations upon which 
disability, in its social model sense, is built. 
 
In my own case, my disability arises from both an impairment and a combination of chronic 
illnesses, and, like de Wolfe (2002) who laments that her inability to be vigorous and mobile like 
many of those who are at the forefront of the disability rights movement has made her feel that 
she cannot claim 'legitimate membership' (257), I too have felt that I have belonged in neither 
the world of the able-bodied nor the group which defines itself as disabled. Yet my physical 
state and its consequences are highly problematic. My back injury does not allow me to sit or 
bend  or  lift  anything  heavy,  I  need  to spend most of my time lying down, and pain is my 
constant companion, fluctuating between a blinding agony that shatters my ability to engage 
with the rest of the world and a dull, throbbing ache which I try to ignore. The fatigue which is 
the legacy of a post-viral illness has been even more debilitating than my back injury in some 
ways because it severely compromises my ability to think and to communicate and, at its worst, it  makes  the  simplest  task,  like  cleaning  my  teeth  or  walking  to  the  mail  box,  absolutely 
exhausting. Yet, although my physical limitations are very different from most of the disabled 
activists and theorists I read about, I recognise that my problems have led to the same feelings 
of exclusion that have brought these people together in an acknowledgement of their shared 
oppression. 
 
I see my task in the following chapters as attempting to derive emancipatory insights from a 
combination of poststructural analysis and qualitative research. I will endeavour to demonstrate 
that both elements are vital to the creation of a method of research which is capable not only of 
providing a deep structural analysis which does not fall into the modernist trap of claiming to 
represent universal truths, but which also utilises personal narratives to exemplify the political 
nature of individual experience, to contribute additional and alternative "texts" to the secondary 
sources which are usually the focus of poststructural analysis, and to help guide the structural 
component so that it retains a firm connection to the lived experience it is claiming to illuminate. 
I strongly believe that this methodological merger will be capable of foregrounding the social 
and political nature of what has otherwise appeared to be an entirely personal experience, and, 
by bringing to light the social construction of the disabled identity, I believe it will be possible to 
devise  alternative  modes  of  identity  construction  which  do  not  rely  on  the  existence  of 
hierarchical binaries which privilege some people at the expense of others. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
 
Grounding Genealogy: 
Questions of Theory and Method 
 
The  problem  of  disability  is  a bit  like  the  shard  of  pottery  discovered  during  an 
archaeological  dig that  justifies  important  observations  on  the  culture  of  which  it  is 
the vestige. To change our imagery, it is a bit like the cliff-side view over a whole valley 
or the obstacle that tests the condition of the athlete or, finally, the barometric reading 
that tells us the weather (Stiker 1999: 172). 
 
My reasons for choosing disability as the subject of my research are complex and most of them 
do  not  belong  in  a  discussion  involving  methodological  issues.  However,  I  feel  that  it  is 
necessary to open this methodological discussion by bringing to the forefront my contention that 
disability is more than just a "topic" or a research category. It is a pivotal cultural construction, 
the understanding of which, I believe, can provide the possibility for illuminating other research 
based on identity; challenge more broadly the sociological study of "personal troubles" in their 
social contexts; and unearth the largely unquestioned assumptions that frame our world views 
which stem from the interaction of scientific knowledge and the diffuse networks of power which 
govern our lives. This will be possible, I argue, because disability is part of a fundamental 
dichotomy which separates what is deemed to be socially acceptable from what is not and, as 
such, is a particularly pertinent position from which to better understand the divisions which 
exclude certain people from enjoying full and equitable participation in society. 
 
While, as Meekosha (2003: 66) contends, ‘[w]ithin broader progressive social movements, the 
disability movement appears to remain both unimagined and uninvited’, disability is gradually 
being accorded its place in sociological inquiries which focus on the issues of gender, race, and 
ethnicity (De Pauw 1996; Hill 1994; Barnes, Mercer and Shakespeare 1999; Vernon 1999). This 
has  gone  some  way  toward remedying the ableist assumptions which once rendered these 
movements discriminatory in relation to disability. However, I would argue that disability boasts 
an even more rudimentary significance as an organising concept than either gender or race, 
firstly,  because  at  certain  historical  points  it  has  been  used  to  justify  sexual  and  racial 
discrimination and therefore, in these respects, can be said to provide a common denominator 
for  the  understanding  of  oppressive  identifications  in  general,  and,  secondly,  it  provides  a 
unique position from which to explore the process of subjugation because those who acquire 
disabilities have been thrust from a more acceptable to a less acceptable social location and are 
thus privy to the dual perspective that this provides. 
Baynton (2001) thus supports that, over the last two centuries, the attempts to rationalize the 
oppression of women and marginalised racial groups was made under the guise that they were 
disabled.   
Disability was a significant factor in the three great citizenship debates of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries: women's suffrage, African American freedom and civil rights, and 
the  restriction  of  immigration.  When  categories  of  citizenship  were  questioned, 
challenged, and disrupted, disability was called on to clarify and define who deserved, 
and who was deservedly excluded from, citizenship (Baynton 2001: 33).  
 
It was women's supposed 'irrationality, excessive emotionality, [and] physical weakness' and the 
'feeble-mindedness, mental illness, deafness, blindness, and other disabilities in particular races 
and ethnic groups' which were cited in defence of their exclusion. However, those who fought 
against these kinds of discrimination did not challenge the premise that disability was a valid 
justification for excluding people from political participation and access to social and economic 
resources (op cit. 34).  
 
Disability, it would appear, has been synonymous with this kind of exclusion in the modern era 
and I argue that its construction is fundamental to other forms of oppression because they are 
ultimately based on the idea that certain people are biologically incapable of participating as 
fully fledged citizens. Accordingly, I believe that the category of disability, when understood as a 
fundamental conceptual tool for the analysis of current forms of oppression, needs to be given a 
central  focus  when  developing  methods  for  studying  the  social  construction  of  subjugated 
identities.  Wilson  (2000)  uses  disability  as  the  primary  construct  from  which  to  critique 
contemporary science and argues that disability 'can become a "critical modality," a site and a 
methodology  with  which  to  investigate  the  mechanism  by  which  scientific  language, 
masquerading as technology, encodes and transmits a social agenda' (157). This is precisely 
how I wish to use disability in my research, as a critical modality which can bring to light the 
structure of our contemporary identities in such a way as to not only provide possibilities for 
liberating those who are "disabled" by society's view of them, but also those who, in striving to 
maintain their "normality", are similarly trapped within an identity which limits their possibilities 
for self-definition (Wendell 1997: 275). 
 
I believe that the critical function which the concept of disability presently plays in structuring 
oppression can best be revealed at the point at which a person becomes disabled. This is what 
Denzin (1992) refers to as an 'epiphanal moment,' when a subject 'moves from one social world 
to another' (91). Denzin (1989) believes that the study of epiphanies or crises makes it possible 
to 'uncover [the] complex interrelationship between the universal and the singular, between 
private troubles and public issues in the person's life' (19), and it is this connection between 
what Denzin refers to as the 'biographical and the historical' that I wish to explore because I 
believe  it  can  bring  to  the  surface  the deeply entrenched influence that disability wields in 
defining the boundary between who is accorded social privilege and who is not (33-34).  
 Hence,  one  of  the  reasons  I  am  focusing  on  acquired  disability  is  because  I  believe  that 
becoming disabled results in an dramatic identity shift during which the person is 'between 
interpretive  frameworks  (Denzin  1992:  91).  Denzin  suggests  that  when  this  happens, 
experience  is  described  in  words  which  are  yet  to  be  contaminated  by  the  cultural 
understanding of the new group' (ibid). I also believe that, in the longer term, this identity shift 
reveals both the norms which remained hidden and unquestioned before the person lost access 
to them and the opposing identity structure which is thrust upon the person when he or she 
becomes  physically  incapacitated.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  disability  can  be  imposed  in 
adulthood is another factor which separates it from gender and race, both of which are socially 
imposed  at  birth.  Hence,  the  onset  of  disability  provides  the  same  kind  of  potential  for 
heightened  awareness  that  would  theoretically  be  possible  for  a  white  man  who  suddenly 
awoke to find he was black or a woman. This kind of Kafka-esque metamorphosis would allow 
the  changeling  to  reflect  on  the  privileges  lost  and  the  stigma  gained  from  the  downward 
exchange of social status. Yet, whereas a person does not suddenly, or at least involuntarily, 
change gender or skin colour, it is possible for disability to strike anybody at any time and it is 
this unique state of identity transformation which creates such a fertile location from which to 
study the process of subjectification. 
 
Healing the Rift Between the Personal and the Political 
 
A methodology which is capable of effectively exploring the construction of the disabled identity 
will need to move beyond traditional research paradigms because, although it can be shown 
that  there  has  been  a  movement  toward a more critical analytical framework, the study of 
disability still neglects to take both the social and the personal into account in a balanced way. 
What has occurred has been, in effect, a full one hundred and eighty degree turn from a purely 
individualistic focus which neglected to explore the social origins of disability at all, to one which 
has gone too far in the other direction, in that, although it gives due attention to the social 
barriers which function to create disability, it denies that the inner experience of oppression 
which accompanies disability is of social significance. What I will be attempting to do in this next 
section is to show where each of these approaches is lacking and to outline the requirements 
for the kind of research model which I believe will be capable of healing the rift between the 
personal and the political in disability research.  
 
The  methodology  which  has  predominated  in  the  study,  and,  I  would  add,  the  creation  of 
disability  since  the  early  nineteenth  century  has  been  the  positivistic  approach  adopted  by 
medical science. Positivism is the hallmark of the objective, value neutral scientific method 
which is based on the belief that science is capable of discovering the "truth" about natural 
objects by studying them from a safe distance which does not interfere with their functioning. As 
Liggett (1997) argues: 
 For positivism, disability presents itself as a problem of definition. The issue becomes 
one of indicating the relevant physical impairment. A disabled individual is one who has 
some "medically" observable impairment; and medical science is not considered to be 
an interpretative system, but a value free mode of measuring physical impairment (181). 
 
The medical model is criticised both by mainstream sociology for its lack of consideration of the 
subjective experience of disability and from within disability studies for its individualistic focus on 
disability as a personal tragedy rather than a social imposition . 
 
In  attempting  to  redress  the  limitations  of  the  medical  model,  sociology  has  applied  a 
phenomenological approach to the study of disability and chronic illness. This work, which has 
emanated primarily from the school of symbolic interactionism, has been of enormous value to 
the understanding of the experience of disability because it has gone beyond the functional 
accounts  of  medicine  to  an  exploration  of  what  happens  to  people's  identities  when  they 
become  disabled.  Goffman's  (1963)  Stigma:  Notes  on  the Management of Spoiled Identity, 
which  analyses his observations on the effect that disability has on people's identities, and 
Charmaz's (1983; 1991; 1995) extensive qualitative research projects, which have given voice 
to hundreds of chronically ill and disabled people in regard to their experiences of identity loss 
and reconstruction, represent the seminal work in this field and have given us the personal 
stories which medicine shunned. This research provides invaluable insights into the worlds of 
those who have become marginalised due to disability, but nevertheless ignores the social and 
structural conditions which have systematically given rise to disability. 
 
This individualistic focus has been contested from within the area of academic inquiry known as 
disability studies, a burgeoning field of social research which, like women's studies, has its roots 
in the civil rights movements of 1960s and 1970s. In developing the "social model" of disability, 
which provides a historical materialist account of the development of disability within capitalist 
society,  disability  theorists  have  redefined  disability  as  '[t]he  disadvantage  or  restriction  of 
activity caused by a contemporary social organisation which takes no or little account of people 
who  have  physical  impairments  and  thus  excludes  them  from  mainstream  social  activities' 
(UPIAS  1976: 3-4). This distinction between "disability" as a socially induced condition and 
"impairment" as the state of physical incapacity which underlies it has opened the way for the 
development  of  an  approach  which  can  work  towards  social  change  because  of  the 
understanding that 'the fundamental issue is not one of an individual's inabilities or limitations, 
but rather, a hostile and unadaptive society' (Barton, 1999: xi). 
 
In recent times the social model has been challenged from within the ranks of disability theory in 
relation to its essentialist claims about impairment (Patterson and Hughes 1997, 1999, 2000), 
its  resistance  to accommodating new ways of thinking (Davis 2000), and its neglect of the 
issues surrounding gender, race and ethnicity (Shakespeare 1999). I do not believe that these 
criticisms in any way spell doom for the social model. They can only contribute to the evolution of disability theory in accordance with the conditions affecting liberatory movements within a 
postmodern society. As Corker (1999a) argues, instead of trying ' ”to stretch the social model 
further than it is intended to go" (Oliver 1996) with totalising claims about its explanatory power, 
we should view it as one strand in an emerging social theory of disability and consider that there 
may well be other strands, some of which have not yet been fully developed' (629). 
 
It is my aim to contribute one of these strands by attempting to include the inner experience of 
disability within a methodological framework which is still founded on the social model's basic 
premise, that disability is a social construction which can only be challenged by working for 
social change. Yet, to do this I will need to disturb one of the fundamental assumptions on 
which  the  social  model  has rested. To remove itself from the individualism inherent in the 
medical model, it has been thought to be necessary to divorce the socially imposed "disability" 
from the experience of pain, suffering and inner turmoil that often accompanies "impairment". 
Barnes  (1998b)  refers  to  those  who  do  try  to  cross  the  line  into  the  personal  realm  of 
disablement as 'the true confessions brigade', a criticism which 'suggests that only collective 
analysis  is  "serious  political  analysis"'  (Corker  and  French  1999:  6).  Shakespeare  (1992) 
expresses  his  concern  with  this:  '[t]o  mention  biology,  to  admit  pain,  to  confront  our 
impairments, has been to risk the oppressors seizing on evidence that disability is "really" about 
physical limitation after all' (40).  
 
A growing number of disability theorists are beginning to form a cohesive platform from which to 
challenge the assumption that personal experience belongs outside the analytical framework of 
the social model (see, for example, Corker 1999 a, b; Darling 2003; Galvin 2003a, b, c, 2004a, 
b, 2005; Humphrey 2000; Meekosha 2003; Thomas 1997, 1999a, b; Wan 2003; Watson 2002). 
In  keeping  with this critique, I argue that the traditional view of the social model, although 
focused on overcoming the individualistic assumptions of past disability research, threatens to 
remain trapped within the same suppositions that it is designed to critique. By claiming that 
individual experience is not socially relevant, the social model inadvertently aligns itself with the 
individualistic liberal paradigm which posits that our identities are stable, unitary entities which 
exist prior to our social experience and that our inner states are, therefore, a matter of our own 
responsibility. I, conversely, believe that our inner experience is built from within our social 
relations and am, therefore in complete agreement with Thomas (1999b) when she argues: 
 
The psycho-emotional dimensions of disability are a just as "social" in origin as other 
"restrictions  of  activities"  experienced  in  the  labour  market,  in  transportation,  in 
education, in housing, in leisure pursuits, or wherever. Thus, spending most of one's 
time at home because one feels ashamed of a facial disfigurement, or not telling a 
boyfriend  girlfriend  about  one's  epilepsy  for  fear  of  a  hostile  reaction,  are  also 
manifestations  of  disablism  alongside  its  more  familiar  consequences:  not  being 
shortlisted for a job, or not being able to get one's wheel chair into a shop (47-48) 
 I believe that the potential for healing the rift which has separated the social from the personal 
within disability research resides in the recognition that the social model needs to be redefined 
within a fully constructionist perspective. For, by acknowledging that our individual experience is 
heavily influenced by social forces, we can allow for a return of the phenomenological elements 
of lived experience to the social exploration of "disability" without sacrificing its commitment to 
emancipation through social change. 
 
Enter Foucault 
 
The methodological solution I will be proposing is based on my preference for poststructural 
theory and qualitative research methods, more specifically, Foucaultian analysis and grounded 
theory. I admit that they are unlikely bed fellows as, on the one hand, poststructuralism is based 
on the belief that that 'the subject is "dead" because, rather than being the source of meaning, it 
is produced by discourses, institutions and relations of power' (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 
1996: 116) and that, therefore, the only worthy objects of analysis are texts. On the other hand, 
grounded theory stems from a symbolic interactionist perspective which has traditionally been 
wary of structural analysis because of its reification of the social and its subsequent exclusion of 
lived experience. I argue, however, that personal narratives are an equally relevant site for 
deconstruction  because,  as  Mutua  (2001)  argues,  'the  human  being  is  a  text',  a  cultural 
construction  which  can  be  "read"  in  a  similar  manner  to  any  other  kind  of  text  (106)  and, 
consequently, the postmodern subject provides a rich source of the multiplicitous narratives 
which define situated individuality and are referred to variously as 'heteroglossia' (Bahktin 1986; 
Rabinow  1986),  'multi-dimensional  textualisation'  (Fischer  1986)  and  'multi-verisimilitude' 
(Denzin 1997).  
 
Conversely, there exists no inherent inconsistency in trying to apply a structural perspective to 
studies which are based on the principles of symbolic interactionism, because, although it has 
traditionally functioned as a micro-sociological site of research, its fundamental premise is that 
the 'self is not an object that has inherent meaning, but is a construct … mediated by the 
relationships,  situations,  and  cultures  in  which  she  or  he  is  embedded'  (Fine  1993:  82). 
Therefore,  symbolic  interactionism  is  a  realm  of  theory  which  is  ripe  for  the  addition  of 
poststructural  analysis.  Over  the  last  decade,  many  theorists  from  within  the  symbolic 
interactionist school of thought have been arguing for a combination of agency and structure in 
their work. Attempts have even been made to create hybrid fields of study which aim to meld 
the two, such as, "interpretive interactionism" (Denzin 1992), "synthetic interactionism" (Fine 
1993) and "late-modern interactionism" (Katovich and Reece II 1993) and, more recently, there 
has been an upsurge in the number of symbolic interactionist studies which seek to include 
poststructural insights (Castellani 1999; Clarke 1998; Gayne and Tewksbury 1999; Oliva 2000; 
Weisinger and Salipante 2000). 
 I  differ  from  these  researchers  in  that  I  am  coming  from  a  Foucaultian  approach  and, 
consequently, my analysis of power and social forces will remain paramount. In his extensive 
analysis  of  the  creation  of  the  modern  subject  through  its  interaction  with  the  intensely 
imbricated structures of power and knowledge, Foucault provides a historical perspective which 
contextualises what is assumed to be necessary and reveals its contingency. In conversation 
with Foucault (1977 [1972)], Deleuze suggests that these modes of analysis and the theories 
they tease out are like 'a box of tools' (208) and it is from within this box of tools that I intend to 
select  two  of  Foucault's  most  potent  implements  of  investigation,  genealogy  and 
governmentality.  I  believe  that  grounded  theory  will  complement  these  analytical  tools  so 
effectively  because  it  is  capable  of translating the "texts" which are embedded in personal 
narratives into a format which can then be subjected to critical analysis. Each approach will feed 
into the other: the genealogical analysis will provide the historical context for the interviews, and 
the stories which emerge from the interviews will give birth to the themes which will be inserted 
into the governmentality component. 
 
In keeping with their Foucaultian heritage, genealogical analyses and governmentality studies 
are methodologically similar approaches. They both allow for the historicisation of taken-for-
granted concepts so as to situate them in their particular contexts, they rely on the belief that 
subjectivity  is  a  construct  which is mediated by power relations and systems of knowledge 
creation, and, by challenging essentialism, necessity and universal "truths", they open the way 
for other possibilities. Genealogy, however, involves a deep historical analysis which usually 
focuses on the emergence of the object of study in relation to several concomitant historical 
events - the rise of the administrative state, the birth of capitalism, and the development of 
liberal philosophy and positivist science - events which can be said to have merged to form 
modernity. Foucault (1988j) stated that, by locating these kinds of concepts in their historical 
contexts, he wanted to explore how 'madness, sexuality, and delinquency may enter into a 
certain play of the truth, and also how, through this insertion of human practice, of behaviour, in 
the play of truth, the subject himself is affected' (48). Thus, by deconstructing scientific and 
philosophical  "truths"  and  demonstrating  their  contingency  and  their  immersion  in  vested 
interests, he aimed to explore the processes by which the modern subject has been created.  
 
Governmentality studies are built from the insights which emerge from such genealogies, but 
they maintain a specific focus on contemporary political rationalities and how these influence 
individual behaviour through the subtle neoliberal technologies of individual self-management. 
They could be defined as a sub-category of the overall genealogical method because they draw 
from the historicisation of problematic concepts and intensify this contextualisation in relation to 
contemporary  governmental  structures.  Their  main  difference,  however,  lies  not  in  their 
analytical  frameworks,  which  are  very  closely  linked,  but  in  the  fact  that,  while  Foucault 
personally undertook the major genealogical studies from which we draw most of our insights 
into his analytics of power, governmentality studies can be understood as 'a rather ambiguous methodological legacy' (Stenson 1998: 335), an extrapolation of Foucault's (1991h) analytical 
insights with regard to contemporary forms of rule into a 'zone of research' which has been 
developed after his death (Gordon 1991: 2).  
 
An example of a social research project which combines genealogy and governmentality is my 
analysis  of  chronic  illness  as  an  instrument  of  governance  (Galvin  2000,  2002).  This 
combination of Foucaultian modes of analysis provides a powerful challenge to the taken-for-
granted nature of our notions of health and illness and, by unseating the scientific "truths" which 
have defined them, paves the way for other modes of thinking and acting. However, by not 
including the stories and the insights of the people I was researching I denied not only their 
potential to provide invaluable 'experiential data' for analysis (Strauss 1987: 10), but also the 
opportunity to utilise my research as a vehicle for the raising of individual voices, voices which 
have formerly been suppressed by the very social structures that were the focus of my analysis. 
I now conclude that while my work helped to illuminate an area which had previously received 
little attention, it could not be said to be emancipatory in anything but an abstract way. 
 
It is this inadequacy that I aim to overcome in this thesis. I begin in Chapters One to Four by 
engaging in a genealogical analysis of the construction of disability in Western society and then, 
more specifically, of the disabled identity, an identity which I will argue has been created by 
social forces in keeping with particular institutional and governmental objectives. In Chapters 
Five to Eight, I build on the insights which have been generated in the genealogical phase by 
developing a qualitative research project around the concept of the disabled identity. Grounded 
theory is particularly suited to this kind of linkage because it is based on the belief that it is vital 
to acknowledge how one's theoretical stance, as well as one's personal experience, influence 
the  research  at  hand,  and  it  is  geared  toward  providing  categories  of  analysis  which  can 
become the fodder for theory generation. It is these categories which will indicate the most 
salient  features  of  the  disabled  identity  and  will  thus  provide  the  areas  of  analysis  for  the 
governmentality phase in Chapters Nine to Eleven. In the rest of this chapter I will explore in 
more  depth  how  each  of  these  components  of  the  thesis  will  function,  separately  and  in 
combination. What I hope to achieve in bringing them together is not to create a methodological 
space  which  claims  to  generate  universal  truths  but,  as  was  Foucault's  (1988c)  desire,  'to 
present instruments and tools that people might find useful' in exploring the creation of the 
contemporary subject (197). 
 
The First Step: Historicising the Disabled Identity - [Chapters One to Four] 
 
It seems to me, that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the 
working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them 
in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely 
through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them (Foucault as quoted in 
Rabinow 1991: 6).  
An increasing number of disability theorists are beginning to include Foucaultian insights and 
analytics in their research (Campbell 1998, 1999; Corker 1998, 1999; Grosz 1991, 1996; Hughs 
1999; Liggett 1997; Meekosha 1998; Price 1995; Reeve 2002; Tremain 2001). Their use of 
Foucault’s work range from brief references to more detailed utilisations of his insights into 
power, knowledge and subjectivity, but, so far, only Tremain (2001) has attempted to historicise 
disability  within  a  genealogical  framework.  Tremain  focuses on the contentious category of 
"impairment"  and  demonstrates  that,  in  contrast  to  the  social  model  view,  impairment  is 
inseparable from disability as a creation of biopower through which individuals are governed. I 
concur  with  Tremain  and  respond  to  her  call  for  genealogical  research  on  disability  which 
functions as a 'critical ontology of ourselves' (632).* 
 
A conventional, "history of ideas" approach to disability would assume that disability, because of 
its physical nature, has always existed in one form or another, and would attempt to outline its 
existence from early times, explore how it has been dealt with during these historical periods, 
and trace the ways in which medical discoveries have improved the lives of disabled people. 
Conversely, a genealogy or "history of the present" will not assume that disability is a natural 
physical category, but will explore it as a concept which has been immersed in a system of 
"truth" creation which interacts with power. The history traced by genealogy is not a stable, 
continuous  progression  but  is  rather  'an  unstable  assemblage  of  faults,  fissures,  and 
heterogeneous layers that 
 
*  Tremain  is  currently  editing  a  book  which  is  built  on  the  contributions  of  disability  theorists  who  are  applying  a 
governmentality approach to disability. It is not due for publication until late 2004 and I have been unable to discover the 
content. 
threaten the fragile inheritor from within and from underneath' (Foucault 1991g: 80). A history of 
the present, according to Bunton and Peterson (1997), 
 
directs attention to discontinuities and ruptures in thought and involves recognition of 
multiple  determinations  and  the  role  of  chance.  It  is  a  method  that  has  an  explicit 
theoretical and political goal: to disrupt the taken-for-grantedness of the present and to 
show how things could be different.... it is not an attempt to understand the past from the 
point of view of the present, but rather to disturb the self-evident present with the past 
(4). 
 
Accordingly, genealogy does not seek to confirm the present by constructing a neat chain of 
events which are supposedly grounded in objectivist truths. Rather it attempts to shake up our 
complacency about what is, by intimating what could have been. It does not strive for neat 
solutions. It seeks to disrupt the very foundations upon which our beliefs, values and scientific 
"truths" lie. And, in exploring a concept such as disability, it will throw up questions, such as: 
Who has benefited and who has been excluded by the conceptual form disability has taken? Within which discourses has disability been developed in this form? What would the world have 
looked like if disability had not been defined as an unacceptable physical difference? 
 
Our traditional epistemological foundation is based on the belief that human beings are rational 
and that our inner natures can be tapped empirically by objectively determining the facts which 
underlie  our  psychological  and  physical  nature.  In  contrast,  through  genealogy,  'reason  is 
revealed  as  only  contingently  so,  neutral  (scientific)  knowledge  is  exposed  as  a  massive 
exercise in power, [and] the unique individual is rewritten as a messy historical production' 
(Brown  1998  38-39).  Genealogy,  then,  is  an  ideal  way  of  exploring  the  'messy  historical 
production' that is the disabled identity because it strips away the essentialist belief in an a priori 
self and reveals its conditional philosophical heritage.  
 
An important starting point in the genealogical investigation of a particular form of identity is the 
recognition  that  the  processes  of  subject  formation  are  immersed  in  the  creation  of  deep 
divisions between certain groups of people. Foucault (1982) coined the term 'dividing practices' 
to name one of the major 'modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects' 
(208).  The dividing practices which have been developed to separate, for example, 'the mad 
and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and "the good boys"' originated in the 
creation of institutions of exclusion such as leper colonies, asylums and prisons, but they have 
become increasingly subtle over time and are now operated primarily through processes of 
naming which are validated by science and disseminated through discourses and cultural forms 
(ibid). Indeed, I argue that the creation of the concept of dis-ability is a dividing practice within 
itself, for, by carving a dichotomous division between those who can and those who cannot 
participate fully in society, a naming practice is sanctioned which is designed to separate and, in 
fact, create those who Rose (1996c) refers to as 'the affiliated and the marginalised' (340). 
 
It is the potential to be emancipatory which makes genealogy such a powerful tool for critical 
analysis. Without promising a liberatory theory which can reveal the real "truths" which have 
formerly been suppressed by power, genealogy provides a fluid space in which to create other 
"truths" (McNay 1992) and to 'separate out from the contingency that has made us what we are, 
the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think' (Foucault 1991f: 
45-46).  Genealogy  is  able  to  loosen  the  grip  that  functionalist  accounts  have  over  our 
perceptions and our apparent possibilities by exposing 'those blocks of historical knowledge 
which  were  present  but  disguised  within  the body of functionalist and systematising theory' 
(Foucault 1980d: 81). Therefore, instead of remaining trapped within the spaces carved out by 
conventional histories and scientific accounts, we can be given access to the histories which 
have  formerly  been  masked  'by  functionalist  or  systematising  thought'  and  become free to 
delineate other spaces for the development of self-understanding (ibid).  
 Even more important, according to Foucault, are the other forms of subjugated knowledges 
unearthed by genealogy, those which represent the individual voices silenced by hegemony. 
Foucault describes these in terms of 'a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as 
inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the 
hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity' (82). These are the suppressed 
voices of 'the psychiatric patient, the ill person, …the delinquent' etc., which are representative 
of  'a  popular  knowledge  …a  particular,  local,  regional  knowledge,  a  differential  knowledge 
incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed 
by everything surrounding it' (ibid). It is these voices that I wish to liberate and to draw from in 
the qualitative component of my research. For too long the functionalist account of the medical 
model  has  spoken  for  disabled  people,  molding  them  into  objects  of  rehabilitation,  people 
defined by their tragic losses and physical differences. I believe that the development of critical 
theory surrounding disability can map out a space from within which disabled people can speak. 
 
Genealogy's  potential  to  liberate  lies  in  its  capacity  to  disinter  both  forms  of  subjugated 
knowledge. Both 'the buried knowledges of erudition and those disqualified from the hierarchy of 
knowledges and sciences' need to be allowed to rise to the surface of critical analysis and to be 
developed in alliance for a new space of meaning creation to be made possible. Genealogy is, 
in effect, 'the union of erudite knowledge and local memories' (Foucault 1980d: 83). The next 
stage of my research, the phase which is focused on giving disabled people a voice, is not 
actually  separate  from  the  genealogical  phase,  it  is  an  integral  part  of  it,  informed  by  the 
counter-histories which have been unearthed via the process of historicisation. As Foucault 
points  out,  what  genealogy  really  does  is  ‘to  entertain  the  claims  to  attention  of  local, 
discontinuous,  disqualified,  illegitimate  knowledges  against  the  claims  of  a  unitary  body  of 
theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and 
some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects' (84).  
 
In  Chapter  Two  I  begin  the  genealogical  process  at  the  level  of  erudite  knowledges  by 
historicising  disability  in  the  modern  era.  I  begin  by  combining  the  historical  materialist 
perspective of the social model, which has revealed the emergence of the concept of disability 
as a form of physical malfunction serving to exclude the impaired person from work, with a 
Foucaultian analysis of how this act of categorisation has participated in the development of a 
normalising society. Chapter Three proceeds from this and narrows its focus to the investigation 
of the disabled identity. I argue here that the emergence of disability as a fundamental concept 
used to divide the affiliated from the marginalised in contemporary society has largely been due 
to  the  dichotomous  structure  of  language  itself.  I  seek  to  demonstrate  that  through  an 
understanding of the semiotic, semantic and discursive structures of language it is possible to 
overcome  these  dichotomies  by  launching  linguistic  challenges.  Chapter  Four  moves  from 
language to culture and explores the problems involved with mobilising around a collective 
identity which is built from the same exclusionary logics as it seeks to challenge. These insights into  the  historical  roots  of  disability,  the  linguistic  origins  of  the  disabled  identity  and  the 
problems inherent in claiming a unified site of oppression aims to provide a theoretical backdrop 
against which the narratives can be contextualised. 
 
The Second Step: Giving People a Voice - [Chapters Five to Eight] 
 
One of the features of oppression is the loss not only of voice but of the tools to find it 
(Zola 1994: 65).  
 
In developing grounded theory as a methodological practice, Glaser and Strauss (1967) stated 
that one of their main aims was to narrow 'the embarrassing gap between theory and empirical 
research' (vii). It is now thirty five years on and I would argue that there still exists a cavernous 
gulf between the production of abstract theory and the reality of lived experience (Roulstone 
1994; Thomas 1999b). I believe, however, that the key to reuniting theory and practice lies 
within genealogy's capacity to initiate 'an insurrection of subjugated knowledges' based on both 
the  'erudite'  alternative  histories  that  critical  analysis  can  reveal  and  the  'naïve',  local 
knowledges of formerly silenced individuals (Foucault 1980d: 81). The following discussion will 
be devoted to the exploration of the latter component. I will not be outlining the functional 
aspects of grounded theory as a methodology here as this will be dealt with in detail in Part 
Three. Instead I will be focusing on the methodological issues which stem from attempting to 
combine personal accounts with a poststructural analysis and on how these narratives perform 
a key function in forging a truly emancipatory research model.  
 
In conversation with Foucault (1977 [1972]), Deleuze delivers a compelling argument for the 
inseparable nature of theory and practice. He believes that, in the process of their development, 
theories  continually  encounter  obstacles  which  cannot  be  overcome  without  the  theorist 
referring back to the practical objects being researched. 'Practice is a set of relays from one 
theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another. No theory can 
develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall' 
(Foucault 1977 [1972]: 205-206). Foucault makes it clear that his engagement with theory is 
only aimed at 'struggling against the forms of power' which 'block, prohibit, and invalidate' the 
knowledge of the oppressed, and, as both a critical theorist and an activist, his object was 'to 
create conditions that permit[ted them] to speak' (207). This made him wary of bringing theory 
and practice together because he felt that '[t]he role of the intellectual does not consist in telling 
others  what  they  must  do'  (Foucault  1991a:  11)  as  this  would  involve  a  descent  into  the 
proliferation  of  absolute  "truths",  the  very  concept  of  which  is  antithetical  to  poststructural 
thought. 
 
I  concur  with  Foucault’s  insistence  that  theory  should  not  be  used  to  create  universalising 
prescriptions  and  that  the  role  of  the  researcher  should  not  be  one  of  'complacency  and arrogance' (Moore et al. 1998: 97). However, in avoiding the elitism of the ivory tower, it is vital 
to  recognise  the  need  for  a  reversal  of  this  "top-down"  view  of  critical  analysis  and  to 
acknowledge that personal experience is a vital component in the development of theory. In 
other words, the subjugated knowledges which exist at the level of personal experience can 
provide what Gill and Hertz (1999) refer to as 'rich mines of data' which are capable of being 
tapped to provide the raw material for critical analysis. Thomas (1999b) argues that 'personal 
accounts are singular in their power to illustrate and illuminate', and that they 'inject a down-to-
earth quality into what would otherwise be a very abstract discussion of ideas and concepts' (7). 
Hence, although it may well be the case that we should guard against the hegemonic use of 
theory, this does not mean that, conversely, personal accounts should not be drawn on to great 
advantage in the development of theory.  
 
Yet, Foucault's aversion toward any attempt to contain individual experience within the fixed 
boundaries of theory remains important. If the individual voices contained in personal narratives 
are  claimed  to  represent  an  entire  group  of  people,  in  this  case  disabled  people;  if  the 
alternative "truths" which emerge are claimed to be absolute; if they are not understood to be 
"texts"  which  are  themselves  interpretations  made  within  a  particular  social  and  historical 
context; and if they are filtered through hegemonic assumptions which suppress their capacity 
to speak outside of them, then these narratives are being viewed through a modernist lens 
which is at risk of 'recolonising and re-codifying' them. As Foucault (1980d) argues in relation to 
the subjugated knowledges unearthed through genealogy, 'those unitary discourses, which first 
disqualified and then ignored them when they made their appearance, are, it seems, quite ready 
now to annex them, take them back within the fold of their own discourse and to invest them 
with everything this implies in terms of the effects of knowledge and power' (86). And we, as 
theorists, are also in danger of using these recently disinterred knowledges to create our own 
universalising "truths". 
 
I  would  argue,  however,  that  these  analytical  difficulties  need  not  necessarily  be  seen  as 
weaknesses in the use of personal narratives, but, rather, as the foundations for applying a 
poststructural  approach  in  their  analysis.  I  believe  it  is  possible  to  allow  for  the  raising  of 
individual voices within the field of critical social inquiry without inviting a collapse into modernist 
assumptions. To do so, it is extremely important to grasp the concept discussed by Couzens 
Hoy (1998) in relation to genealogy, that the outcome of analysis 'is the reinterpretation of what 
is  always  already  an  interpretation'  (30).  As  Thomas  (1999b)  states  in  relation  to  her  own 
research on disability: 
 
Narratives are representations involving interpretation and selection in their construction 
(the  "telling"),  in  their  consumption  (my  "reading"),  in  their  reproduction  (my  "re-
presentation"), and in their further interpretation (your "reading") (7).  
 In  a  more  classic  sense,  Denzin  (1989)  refers  to  this  as  the  'hermeneutical  circle  of 
interpretation'  and  argues  that  'this  means  that  scholars  must  state  beforehand  their  prior 
interpretations of the phenomenon being investigated. Unless these meanings and values are 
clarified, their effects on subsequent interpretations remain clouded and often misunderstood'  
(23). And, I would reiterate, in keeping with this recognition, that it is essential to acknowledge 
that the narratives we are attempting to interpret are cultural texts which can be read in many 
ways. If we follow these methodological precautions, there is no reason why personal accounts 
should be not be considered as valid a site of analysis as written texts.  
 
When personal narratives can be seen as cultural texts which, like all texts, have the power to 
illustrate, analyse, question and subvert, it is possible to see them as truly liberatory devices. As 
has already been argued, personal accounts can be emancipatory as they have the potential to 
inform theories which are capable of challenging the dominant knowledges which have formerly 
silenced the subaltern voices which are buried within the realm of subjugated knowledges. Yet, 
these narratives do not necessarily need to be fed back through a theoretical framework and 
processed via the interpretative practices of critical analysis to be emancipatory. Indeed, the 
telling of one's story can be liberatory in itself and it can be argued that the production of 
personal narratives has an extremely therapeutic effect on the "author" because it encourages a 
re-storying process which allows for the development of new forms of self-understanding.  
hooks (1995), for example, who writes from a black feminist perspective, is a firm believer in the 
power of narrative and states that '[w]riting the autobiographical narrative enabled me to look at 
my past from a different perspective and to use this knowledge as a means of self-growth and 
change in a practical way' (7). In writing autobiographically, she sought to 'kill' the 'self' she used 
to be, the one who had been spawned from the pain of marginalisation, but instead she found 
that she 'rescued' this part of herself. In referring to this earlier self, she writes: 
 
She was no longer the enemy within, the little girl who had to be annihilated for the 
woman to come into being. In writing about her, I reclaimed that part of myself I had long 
ago rejected, left uncared for, just as she had often felt alone and uncared for as a child.  
Remembering was part of a cycle of reunion, a joining of fragments, '"the bits and pieces 
of my heart" that the narrative made whole again (ibid).  
 
In a similar vein, Ware (2001) discusses the power of re-storying within pedagogic discourse. 
She has developed a course for disabled children in which they are encouraged to “rewrite their 
identities” through questioning their alterity, and White and Epston (1990) have been working 
within the field of psychology to develop what they call 'narrative therapy' which is designed to 
help  their  'clients  to  re-author  their  lives,  that  is,  to  learn  to  think  of  their  lives  within  the 
framework of different stories' (3). Furthermore, Weeber (1999a) has found within her qualitative 
research  on  disability  that  her  participants  have  reported  how  'reflection  can  deepen  new 
insights' stimulated by the telling of their stories (107).  
 These  alternative  stories  have  the  potential  of  being  developed  as  'counter-narratives', 
narratives  which  can  be  used  to  resist  the  dominant  view  (Thomas  1999b:  53).  The 
development  of  counter-narratives  is  not  a  straightforward  process  because  it  is  extremely 
difficult, some would say impossible, to speak outside of hegemonic discourse. However, in 
allowing for the voices of oppressed people to be raised in ways that have formerly been denied 
them, qualitative research provides the space for articulating this form of oppositional narrative 
and for helping to create the more positive identities they engender.  
 
Perhaps the key point is that, without the counter-narratives of others who challenge 
social  "norms"  we,  as  isolated  individuals,  are  trapped  within  the  story-lines  of  the 
prevailing narratives. If we do re-write our own identities then we strengthen the counter-
narrative, and the dominant and oppressive social narratives begin to crumble (ibid). 
 
Hence, it is within these seditious stories that the potential for resistance lies. As bell hooks 
(1995) contends, 'oppressed people resist by identifying themselves as subjects, by defining 
their reality, shaping their new identity, naming their history, telling their story' (as quoted in 
Plummer 1995: 30). Conversely, narratives which exemplify the status quo provide detailed 
explications of the nature and the power of the norm. 
 
In concluding this discussion on the addition of the phenomenological to the poststructural, it is 
vital to reinforce the fundamental significance of my belief that the personal is always embedded 
in  a  social  framework.  According  to  this  way  of  thinking,  the  personal  is  never  a  singular, 
isolated experience, and, therefore, it is representative, like any text, of the social, political and 
historical conditions which have created it. This is why personal narratives contain so much 
power  to  reveal  sociological  insights.  As  Stanley  (1993)  argues,  'from  one  person  we  can 
recover social processes and social structure, networks, social change and so forth, for people 
are located in a social and cultural environment which constructs and shapes not only what we 
see but also how we see it' (italics original) (45). When seen in this light, personal narratives can 
be  appreciated  as  so  much  more  than  the  'true  confessions'  that  Barnes  (1998b)  believes 
should be excised from disability studies, they are political accounts which can be drawn on to 
both illuminate and emancipate.  
 
The narratives which form the backbone of the thesis stem from a variety of data sources, 
including  my  dialogues  with  participants,  written  stories  from  participants,  and  published 
autobiographies.  Their  analysis  results  in  the  emergence  of  the  following  themes: 
independence, occupational identity, and sexuality/appearance. Each theme is discussed in a 
separate  chapter,  from  Chapters  Five  to  Eight,  and  attempts  to  let  the  stories  speak  for 
themselves by way of lengthy excerpts from the participants and texts, and combines them, 
where relevant, with my own insights and experiences as a disabled person. 
 
 The Final Step: Governmentality - [Chapters Nine to Eleven] 
 
Governmentality is both a concept and a tool of analysis. As a concept it describes the ways in 
which  our  most  personal  thoughts  and  deeds  are  connected  to  a  diffuse  system  of  power 
relations mediated by discourse, and as an analytical tool it is capable of contextualising our 
everyday experiences within a governmental framework. Through governmentality, Foucault 
challenges political science's desire to encapsulate the workings of power in a "theory of the 
state" which views power as 'a centralised locus of rule' (O'Malley et al. 1997: 502). Indeed, Kerr 
(1999) argues that 'he refrained from a theory of the state in the sense that one abstains from 
an indigestible meal' (175). What is so important about this departure from conventional notions 
of power is that it breaks down the dichotomy between the public and the private, the political 
and the personal, and acknowledges that the most appropriate site of political analysis exists 
'within the encounters that make up the everyday experience of individuals' (Rose 1996b: 37). 
 
Within a conventional political analysis, disability would be viewed as a medical problem which 
is  mediated  by  political  programmes  that  allocate  funds  for  pensions,  social  services,  and 
medical treatment. Critique within this analysis would focus on any blocks in the flow of service 
delivery predicated by changes in political policy. Conversely, Foucault's notion of "government" 
enjoys much wider connotations and is understood to be not simply the workings of political 
institutions, but in a broader sense as 'the conduct of conduct: a form of activity aiming to 
shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons' (Gordon, 1991: 2). Government, 
thus, does not reside in the halls of power which mete out favours or punishments, it exists as 'a 
contact point between technologies of the self (self-subjection) and technologies of domination 
(societal regulation)' (Petersen 1997: 202-3).  
 
From  this  understanding  of  government,  Foucault  (1991h)  devised  the  neologism 
governmentality from the union of "government" and "mentality". Governmentality, Rose (1996b) 
explains, is 'a kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a 
way that it is amenable to political programming' (42). Genealogy gives us a firm grounding in 
how these ways of thinking are developed via the intellectual mechanisms of liberal philosophy 
and  positivist  science,  and  the  notion  of  governmentality  take  us  one  step  further  by 
demonstrating how these mentalities become immersed in contemporary regimes of power. 
 
Governmentality studies attempt to make sense of the development and operation of the 
ways in which populations are rendered thinkable and measurable for the purposes of 
government. They focus on the 'mentalities' of rule, understood as the self-scrutinising 
intellectual linkages forged between abstract political rationalities and the strategies and 
technologies through which they are implemented  (Stenson 1998: 333).  
 
When viewed as a function of governmentality, disability can be seen a concept which justifies 
surveillance  and intervention, and, even more importantly, it forms a conceptual distinction between those who can and those who cannot fully participate in political life. In consequence, 
those who are found lacking according to the definitions devised within existing mentalities of 
rule become subject to a series of technological interventions which serve to exemplify which 
qualities are to be sought after in late modern liberal democratic societies.  
 
The dominant mentality of rule which informs the mechanisms of government in contemporary 
Western democracies is neoliberalism, a political rationality which 'has emerged over the past 
two decades from a union of classical liberal thought and a new set of ideals which are relevant 
to  an  increasingly  individuated  society  based  on  autonomy,  choice  and  economic  primacy' 
(Galvin 2002: 118). Rose (1992) argues that 'neoliberalism is more than a phenomenon at the 
level of political philosophy. It constitutes our mentalities of government, the conception of how 
authorities should use their powers in order to improve national well-being, the ends they should 
seek, the evils they should avoid, the means they should use and, crucially, the nature of the 
persons upon whom they must act' (italics mine) (145). Disability, as a category of government, 
has been reconstituted as an identity which is antithetical to the attributes of the ideal neoliberal 
citizen. Those who are defined, or taken for granted, as able-bodied are believed to be capable 
of achieving such lifestyle goals as wealth, independence, health, fitness, employment, market 
participation, and a range of leisure pursuits which help to define their individuality. Conversely, 
those who are disabled are seen to be so because they are defined in relation to their lack in 
these areas of achievement. 
 
Governmentality thus provides the ideal framework through which to understand and challenge 
the  construction  of  the  disabled  identity  in  contemporary  times.  Because  governmentality 
studies  have  been  'designed  to  form  a  mid-range  explanatory  level between the history of 
political philosophy and an empirical study of social relations', they are firmly grounded in 'the 
nexus  between  everyday  practices  …and  more  abstract  technologies  and  broader  political 
rationalities'  so  they  avoid  'the  political  insulation  characteristic  of  many  micro-focused 
frameworks' (O'Malley et al. 1997: 505, 503). However, although this methodological melding of 
the political and the personal, 'the totalising and the individualising' (Gordon 1991: 36), forms an 
analytical mechanism which should be conducive to the questioning of governmental practices 
which privilege some identities at the expense of others, governmentality studies have largely 
been confined 'to gestures of formal support for political contestation' and have demonstrated 'a 
lack of interest in transferring knowledge beyond the limits of academic audiences' (O'Malley et 
al. 1997: 503, 504) and, thus, they have not been engaging in the kind of emancipatory work I 
believe them to be capable of informing.  
 
Gane and Johnson (1993) note that the genealogical project 'seems after Foucault's death to 
have become detached from its original and practical matrix and to have become, perhaps 
inevitably, abstract and academic' (7). I believe, in keeping with my methodological stance, that 
this is largely due to the fact that these studies have distanced themselves from the voices of the very people  whose governance they seek to analyse. O'Malley et al. (1997) argue that, 
because of 'its emphasis on the programmatic nature of rule', the governmentality literature 
emphasises the analysis of texts at the expense of what they refer to as 'the messy actualities' 
of governance (503). This results, Weir (1996) argues in the erasure of 'counter discourses' and 
a subsequent severing of the 'relation [of genealogies] to subjugated knowledges' (388). This, I 
argue, is a fundamental problem with any form of analysis which retains a "top-down" approach. 
Kerr (1999) states that 'while this work addresses important issues, it does so in a way that 
limits its critical and emancipatory potential. Governmentality is seen to be based on a "top-
down" and dualist conception of power, one that externalizes and marginalizes contradiction 
and struggle to become a theory of social reproduction rather than of transcendence' (179). 
 
O'Malley et al. (1997) suggest that this separation of political analysis from the lived experience 
of the people it is directed towards may have been reinforced by Foucault's earlier distinction 
between 'serious statements' and 'everyday discourses' in his “archaeological” work (512). They 
argue, however, that to ignore everyday language and experiences is to deny governmentality 
studies their potential to feed into liberatory strategies because '[r]esistance is a form of social 
antagonism that commonly occurs at the boundary between serious statements and everyday 
statements' (ibid). Therefore, they consider it essential that 'a broader range of social institutions 
and actors needs to be accepted as sources' (ibid). Stenson (1998) concurs with this view and 
argues  against  the  'narrow  focus  on  texts'  within  the  governmentality  literature,  which, 
furthermore, is based, he believes, on the depiction of mentalities of rule 'as tidy, univocal 
constructions, at the expense of analysing the complexity of voices and interplay between talk 
and text in political discourse and practices' (334).  
 
My methodological framework has been specifically designed to overcome these problems. I 
envisage that the personal narratives, which are to be analysed during the qualitative stage of 
my research, will perform their role as cultural texts which will complement the host of other 
texts drawn upon during the governmentality phase. I believe that the abstract nature of the 
governmentality  literature  and  its  suspicion  of  empirical  research  have  not  existed  as 
epistemological necessities. Rather, they have performed an important yet short-term role in the 
development of poststructural analytics in which the need to reinforce its distance from both the 
creation of absolutes and the fixity and essentialism of the liberal individualist subject has been 
required  to  remain  uppermost  while  a  new  framework  could  be developed which would be 
capable of contesting social injustice without falling back into modernist assumptions. What I 
hope to achieve in using governmentality to locate the inner experience of individuals in its 
social and political context is an innovative response to Stenson's (1998) call for the dismantling 
of  the  'boundaries  between  the  study  of  the  intellectual  dimensions  of  [governmental] 
phenomena and the study of the messiness of human practices' (350). 
 Within Chapters Nine to Eleven, I use a governmentality analysis to explore the core categories 
and  to  place  them  in  their  current  social  and  historical  context.  Here  I  suggest  that 
independence, work and sexuality are key factors which are used to divide the affiliated from 
the marginalised in contemporary neoliberal societies. I argue that the two “technologies” which 
currently  have  the  most impact on how independence, work and sexuality are governed in 
relation to disability are welfare reform and sexual rehabilitation. In Chapters Nine and Ten, I 
explore the available primary sources - particularly the last five years of Australian government 
policy  on  welfare  reform  and  a  selection  of  sexual  rehabilitation  texts  -  to  reveal  how 
governance  seeks  to  operate  as  a  liberatory  force  while  remaining  oppressive  due  to  its 
paternalism and reinforcement of normative prescriptions. Chapter Eleven further problematises 
disability in relation to the governmental concepts of “self-esteem” and “empowerment” in an 
attempt to unpick what can be claimed to be emancipatory from what remains embedded in the 
dominant discourse. Ultimately, by bringing to the surface the mechanisms for the construction 
of the disabled identity and the intricate connections between power and subjectivity, I aim to 
demonstrate that agency is possible. 
 
Toward an Effective Emancipatory Research Model 
 
I  propose  that  the  methodology  I  have  just  outlined  allows  us  to  move  one  step  closer  to 
achieving the emancipatory ideals of disability research because it builds a link between theory 
and practice which has the potential of bringing poststructural analysis out of the academy and 
into the "messy actualities" of human existence without sacrificing its theoretical rigour. I argue 
that  this  approach  avoids  the  problems  of  both  "top-down"  approaches,  which  ignore  the 
political nature of personal life, and "bottom-up" approaches, which remain trapped within the 
hegemonic paradigms they strive to break free from, because it is representative of a coalition 
based on reciprocity where both the "top-down" and "bottom-up" elements can usefully coexist. 
To achieve this union requires that the theoretical and practical elements continually feed into 
one  other.  In other words, it is vital that the voices which are raised during the qualitative 
component  are  used  to  inform  the  academic analysis, and, conversely, that the theoretical 
insights which are developed via the process of critical analysis are made accessible to the 
subjects of the research (both the participants and the general group being focused upon, in this 
case, disabled people) so that they can make use of them in improving their lives.  
 
I originally viewed genealogy as a distinct approach which I sought to combine with grounded 
theory in the hope of providing the narratives with a critical historical framework which would 
allow  for  the  problematisation  of  the  central  conceptual  components  of  my  research.  It  is 
certainly true that genealogy does in fact perform this function, but I have come to see that 
genealogy is more than that. It is a way of seeing things and exploring them, and, through this 
vision and this mode of investigation, it overarches all of my work in such a way that I have 
come to think of my methodology in terms of "grounded genealogy". By grounding genealogy in local knowledges as well as drawing from academic critique, I hope to demonstrate that it is 
possible to avoid such prescriptions and modernist assumptions, while bringing critical analysis 
in touch with the people it is attempting to better understand and, ultimately, to liberate. I believe 
that  emancipation  becomes  possible  when  theory  both  draws  from  and  informs  lived 
experience, in other words, when it becomes grounded in real life. 
 
A genealogical approach to disability research does not offer yet another methodology which 
promises to deliver a more accurate set of "truths" than the medical and social science models 
which have gone before. Instead, it provides a critique of the very assumptions upon which 
these forms of "scientific" research rest. Therefore, what emerges is the recognition that it was 
not merely the kinds of "truths" that these research models offered which were in error. The 
problem  lay  rather  in  their  belief  that  they  could  offer  singular,  universal  truths  at  all. 
Historicising the evolution of the medical and social sciences unseats the dominant view that 
they are objective, value-neutral mechanisms for determining the "truth". Instead, what we see 
is that science is based on a system of values which personalises and essentialises what are 
actually social problems, and, by demonstrating that what has been claimed to be scientific 
knowledge is actually just one of many possible interpretations based on certain assumptions, a 
genealogical perspective can pave the way for other interpretations which do not claim to be 
more accurate, simply that they remain open to the questioning of their own assumptions.  
 
The basic aims of emancipatory research are to challenge the oppressive features of existing 
research into disability and to prioritise the needs and interests of disabled people. It should be 
clear by now that much existing research on disability has been inherently oppressive because 
it has not acknowledged the social causes of disability. However, some of the research which 
has focused on deriving data from disabled people has been oppressive in much more serious 
ways and is being referred to in terms of a 'rape model of research' because it is 'alienating, and 
disempowers  and  disenfranchises  disabled research participants by placing their knowledge 
into the hands of the researcher to interpret and make recommendations on their behalf' and 
'that researchers are compounding the oppression of disabled respondents through exploitation 
for  academic  gain'  (Kitchin  2000:  26).  A  classic  example  of  this  kind  of  research  was 
perpetrated  by  Miller  and  Gwyne  (1972)  when  they  attempted  to  analyse  the  situation  of 
disabled people in institutions. They concluded, Finklestein (1998) states, 'that the function of 
the residential institution was to provide the "socially dead" with transitional care until natural 
death  occurred'  (38).  Research  which  studies  disability  from  a  mainstream  social  science 
perspective may not be as overtly discriminatory as Miller and Gwynne's, yet, there is still a 
great  deal  which  can  be  considered  'intrusive  and  disempowering  …and  which  serves  the 
damaging and oppressive purposes of a service system over which [disabled people] can exert 
little or no influence or control' (Beresford 1999: 3).  
 Disability researchers maintain that the most important features of emancipatory research are 
that it prioritises the needs and well-being of its participants (Gibbs 1999; Goodley and Moore 
2000), that it listens to and respects the voices of disabled people (Barton 1996; Gilson, Tusler 
and Gill 1997; Moore et al. 1998), and  that it aims to raise the status of disabled people in 
general (Anspach 1979;; Couzer 1997; Barnes, Mercer and Shakespeare 1999). When Kitchen 
(2000)  asked  disabled  people  about  their  preferences  for  research  techniques,  there  was 
'strong support for qualitative methods of research, particularly interviews because they allow 
respondents to express and contextualise their true feelings, rather than having them pidgeon-
hold [sic] into boxes with no or little opportunity for contextual explanation' (43). Carspecken and 
Apple  (1992)  also  add  that  what  they  refer  to  as  'dialogical  data  generation'  allows  the 
participants  some  'control  over  the  research  process,  yielding  a  more  democratic  form  of 
knowledge production' and they conclude that: 
 
dialogical methods are empowering to the groups being studied. Sensitive questioning 
can often help people articulate features of their culture, and their feelings, for the very 
first-time. Since articulating formerly tacit conditions helps one to distance one's identity 
from  the  structures  within  which  it  is  frequently  embedded,  this  method  can  be 
empowering to the subjects of study, and it can change the ways in which they routinely 
act (531). 
 
This kind of distancing from hegemonic discourses involves a very similar technique to that 
which was basic to the development of "consciousness raising" by second wave feminists in the 
1970s,  involving  the  gradual  process  of  group  identification  and  the  articulation  of  shared 
problems.  
 
I believe that it is also possible to generate this kind of consciousness raising process through 
research which is based on dialogue between disabled people because the narratives which 
emerge are usually built on the realisation that their problems are not the result of individual 
aberration but of shared oppression. I quote Haber (1994) here at length because what she has 
to  say  about  this  process  reflects  exactly  what  I  believe  it  is  possible  to  achieve  through 
emancipatory research based on the sharing of stories. 
 
The recognition of similarity with others is crucial in denying and recognising the harmful 
political implications of the public/private split. It is the recognition of the similarity of my 
pain or oppression in someone else that allows me to deny the idiosyncratic nature of 
my experience, and to deny my guilt at being different from the "norm." Coming to this 
recognition,  identifying  a  "personal"  pain  with  a  pain  belonging  to  others,  and  the 
consequent recognition of the ideological nature of these pains, is what makes [certain 
emancipatory]  novels...  so  effective  in  voicing  marginalised  identities,  raising 
consciousnesses,  and  galvanising  opposition.  The  recognition  of  similarity  and  the 
possibility of solidarity wakes us from the stupefaction of normalising and disciplinary discourse.  The  fact  that  such  similarities  and  solidarities  are  partial  and  perhaps 
temporary does not lessen their fundamental importance (133). 
 
In acknowledging the momentary and partial nature of these similarities we break down one of 
the walls which has kept poststructural analysis separate from qualitative research techniques. 
It is not necessary nor is it desirable to claim that, in sharing our narratives, we will come up with 
one superior master narrative which will name the oppressor and solve everything. What we 
can aim for, however, is the opening up of a space where a multitude of counter-narratives can 
be developed, listened to, and respected. 
 
In concluding this chapter, I would like to reiterate that my prime objective in developing the 
methodological  framework  I  have  outlined  herein  is  to  attempt  to  devise  an  emancipatory 
research  model  which  is  capable  of  utilising  theory  and  practice  in  a  reciprocal  manner. 
Throughout  my  discussion  I  have  attempted  to  address  the  many  arguments  which  have 
conventionally been drawn upon to keep these areas clearly separated, but I have not, as yet, 
outlined the very personal choices upon which this methodological merger relies. Three points 
are of particular relevance here. Firstly, I take a subjective stance in my work, acknowledging 
that my beliefs, values, objectives, and personal experiences have an enormous influence on 
the way I choose to approach my research and how I will interpret what I discover during the 
process. Secondly, and closely related to this, is the fact that I am disabled, something which I 
believe puts me in a much stronger position to select and interpret issues which are of value to 
other disabled people. And, finally, I believe it is vital that I attempt to make my work accessible 
to disabled people, specifically to my participants, but, in general, to anyone who identifies 
themselves as disabled and is looking for ways to escape their marginalised status.  
 
When I attempted my first, major academic treatise, I only mentioned my own situation briefly 
and felt extremely uncomfortable about doing so. I still find it difficult because all of my training, 
up until recently, has demanded that I divorce myself from the topic of study and become an 
objective observer. However, the logic of my own methodological position means that it is not 
only vital that I acknowledge how my subjective stance will affect my research, it would be 
absurd, as well as hugely inconsistent, to pretend that I am capable of being anything other than 
subjective. In keeping with this recognition, Aldridge (1993) criticises what she refers to as ‘the 
simplistic epistemological ideas assumed’ in such positivistic frameworks which ‘actually hinge 
on complex writing conventions that “textually disembody” the knowledge contained from its 
time,  place and person of production’ (54). Ribbens (1996) describes these conventions as 
‘linguistic  disappearing  acts’  based  on  a  ‘hollow  …  claim  to  objectivity’  (81)  and  Plummer 
(1983), one of the first sociologists to argue for the reintroduction of a subjective approach, 
proposes that the objectivist stance which has come to be expected results in ‘research reports 
[which] have often been written as if they have been executed by machines’ (57). In contrast, 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to the personal experiences of the researcher as 'experiential data'  and  argue  that 'it should not be ignored due to the usual canons governing research 
(which regard personal experience and data as likely to bias the research), for these canons 
lead to the squashing of valuable experiential data. We say, rather, "mine your experience, 
there is potential gold there!"' (11).  
 
It is becoming more common for disability theorists to locate themselves within their research 
and to specify how this affects their position. Shakespeare (1996), in discussing his approach to 
disability research, makes it clear that he is firmly committed to working towards positive change 
in the lives of disabled people. He declares, ‘I support the cause of disability rights, I support the 
principle of self organisation and I support the disability movement. This is an ethical or political 
position which informs everything I do, professionally and personally. I think it is clear from my 
published work that I am not a disinterested observer, but a participant in the process I describe'  
(117). I wish to take this one step further through drawing on my own autobiographical writing 
during  the  grounded  theory  phase  of  my  research.  In  this  sense  I  will  be  participating 
simultaneously, or alternately, as researcher and researched. I find the idea to be extremely 
intimidating, but I strongly believe that my own story will help to illuminate the areas I wish to 
analyse and my willingness to tell it should make clear that I am prepared to renounce the last 
vestiges of my belief in the necessity, indeed the possibility, of attaining an objective stance.  
 
To  do  so,  however,  is  not  without  its  problems.  For,  although  the  use  of  ‘systematic 
autobiography’ can be traced back as far as Cooley and can also be found in the writings of C. 
Wright Mills, Goudner and Berger (as discussed by Ribbens 1996: 87), it can nevertheless be 
argued that the practice of including subjective descriptions and/or autobiographical material is 
self-indulgent (Cotterill & Letherby 1993; Ribbens 1996), interferes with sociology’s fundamental 
focus on the collective (Evans 1993), makes criticism difficult (Cotterill & Letherby 1993), and/or 
leads  to  the  production  of  ‘lifeless  character  sketches’  or  ‘guilt-ridden,  scab-picking,  self-
explorations’ (Brandt et al. 2001: 46).  
 
Against this, those who subscribe to autobiographical positioning and inclusions argue for their 
articulation within a strong theoretical framework. The techniques for achieving this particular 
form of marriage between theory and practice have been described variously as ‘intellectual 
autobiography’  (Stanley  1990:  120),  ‘personal  criticism’  (Miller  1991:  1),  ‘interpretive  and 
analytic autobiography’ (Aldridge 1993: 55), and, more generally, ‘systematic autobiography’ 
(Goodwin 1973: 27). Although Aldridge (1993) believes that this should not involve ‘the issuing 
of personal data along with the writing up of the research’, in my case, it will. As my process of 
data  generation  is  dialogical  and  because  my  personal  experience with disability has been 
impacted upon so intensely by my theoretical engagement (and vice versa), my voice and my 
experiences will be brought to the surface where relevant. I believe, in keeping with Callan 
(1984), that the social nature of the personal can be drawn out in theoretically relevant and rigorous ways by engaging in a ‘disciplined monitoring’ of individual experience  (as quoted by 
Ribbens 1996: 87). 
 
Stemming from the consideration of my subjective position, I feel it is vital to acknowledge the 
role  that  being  disabled  plays  in  my  research.  There  is  currently a debate going on within 
disability studies as to whether non-disabled researchers should be allowed to conduct disability 
research  at  all  (Bricher  2000).  I  do  not  agree  that  excluding  non-disabled  researchers  is 
advisable,  but  I  do  suspect  that  disabled  researchers  may  be  better  equipped  to  conduct 
qualitative research projects which aim for emancipatory outcomes. Kitchin (2000) interviewed a 
range of disabled people in relation to their research experiences and many of her participants 
reported  that  they  felt  that  non-disabled  people  'potentially  misrepresent  and  misinterpret 
disabled  people's  experiences  and  knowledge  because  they  themselves  have  never 
experienced what it is like to be disabled' (33) and that 'disabled people will only tell partial 
stories to a non-disabled researcher for fear of embarrassment or lack of empathy' (34). In the 
case of my own research, I have found that my participants are excited about its potential and 
that we are building a relationship based on empathy and shared experience rather than one of 
the  all-knowing  researcher  and  the passive object of research. And, as I discussed earlier, 
dialogue  between  disabled  people can result in a consciousness raising process which can 
facilitate the healing of damaged identities. 
 
Finally, I reiterate that my research will have little chance of being emancipatory in any kind of 
practical sense if it is not made accessible to the people it focuses on. I recognise that the 
development of theory is a vital element in challenging oppression and that the insights which 
emerge  from  theory  have  the  potential  to  enter  the  systems  of  knowledge  which  inform 
emancipatory movements. However, it seems to me that much of this vital information is kept 
locked in a form that is only accessible to an elite few and that the same notions of "trickle 
down" that are used to justify economic rationalism are assumed to join theory to practice within 
the social sciences. Thus, I am in complete agreement with Germon (1998) when she argues 
that  '[i]t  is  contradictory  to  promote  empowerment  and  emancipatory  approaches  when  the 
findings are inevitably inaccessible to an audience of disabled activists'  (251) and, I would add, 
to disabled people in general.  
 
Moore et al. (1998) discuss the importance of aiming research at the needs of disabled people 
and presenting it in ways that are accessible to them. They made a choice which favoured 
maximising the relevance of their research for disabled people at the expense of maintaining 
the standards required for publication in refereed academic journals. I applaud them for their 
decision to remain true to their participants. However, I have attempted to devise a means of 
being able to present the findings of my research to both an academic and a non-academic 
audience by using two formats in my writing. As well as my dissertation and the academic 
publications which are drawn from it, I intend to prepare two documents which will be aimed at sharing my research with a non-academic audience. I have notified my participants that I will be 
sending  them  a  report  which  translates  the  results  of  my  theoretical  analysis  into  more 
accessible language and that, additionally, I will be writing a book which will use their stories to 
provide insights to disabled people in general. Transforming my academic work into everyday 
language is a skill I am keen to develop because I believe that my work will be of greatly 
reduced value if it cannot be fed back into the lives it is based upon. 
 
More generally I believe this kind of critical research has the potential to provide emancipatory 
insights to a larger audience than that represented by disabled people, for it is not only they who 
are  disadvantaged  by  the  dividing  practices  which  separate  the  desired  "norm"  from  the 
undesirable deviation from it. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the norm is such a 
pervasive and virtually impossible standard to fully attain that it has become a trap within which 
all people who strive to become "good citizens" are caught. Disabled people may well suffer 
from inferior social locations because of their perceived incapacities, but for those who struggle 
to maintain their normality, the constant state of guilt, worry and uncertainty over such things as 
which foods to eat, how much exercise to do, how to parent effectively, and how to develop 
good self-esteems derives from the same logics which serve to police the boundaries between 
the affiliated and the marginalised (Harris 1994). The fear associated with becoming one of 
"them", one of the unacceptably different, is, I believe, a more powerful force for shaping human 
behaviour  and,  consequently,  denying  people  any  sense  of  real  freedom,  than  the  most 
autocratic form of government.  
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 CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Fractured Collage of Disability 
 
There is no history of thought outside the history of systems of thought. There is no 
speech outside systems of languages. . . There is no disability, no disabled, outside 
precise social and cultural constructions; there is no attitude toward disability outside a 
series of societal references and constructs. Disability has not always been seen in the 
same way (Stiker 1999: 14). 
 
[It was] constituted by all that was said, in all the statements that named it, divided up, 
described  it,  explained  it,  traced  its  development,  indicated  its  various  correlations, 
judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were 
to be taken as its own (Foucault 1972: 32). 
 
There can be no doubt that bodies denied of perfect function have always existed, bodies which 
lurch or move unbidden or not at all, twisted bodies, broken bodies, bodies whose physical 
differences  have  exceeded  acceptable  limits.  In  contemporary  times  we  have  devised  a 
category which we have named "disability" to describe such bodies and in this chapter I discuss 
the origins of this process of naming. The roots of disability as currently defined are difficult to 
tease out as they do not radiate from a common point of origin. Rather they are tangled, broken, 
elusive and illusionary. Conventional histories do not recognise the seismic ruptures that have 
carved gaping fault lines in the landscape from which humanity has continued to erupt, as these 
histories are built on the assumption that the contemporary concepts they seek to trace have 
always existed and have developed in an unbroken form and in an evolutionary fashion. When 
applied to disability this approach would have us believe that disability as we know it has always 
been  recognised  as  a  culturally  relevant  category  and  that  modernity  has  introduced 
progressive  elements  which  have  gradually  improved  the  conditions  under  which  disabled 
people live. A genealogical approach, however, reveals a vastly different conceptual trajectory 
because  it  is  capable  of  demonstrating  the  contingent  and  fractured  heritage  of  the  social 
construction of disability.  
 
The historical rupture which created the conditions for the emergence of disability as we now 
know  it  was  riven  by  the  massive  upheaval  that  spanned  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth 
centuries in Western societies. During this time monarchies fell one after another and were 
replaced  by  the  huge,  sprawling  bureaucratic  network  of  the  modern  administrative  state; 
industrialisation swept the countryside drawing into its vortex the rural peasantry and, leaving in 
its  wake,  charred,  smoke  filled  cities  built  on,  for  and  by  the  human cogs essential to the 
functioning of the new machinery of capitalist production; and a whole new way of thinking 
about people, how they should see themselves and shape their lives was made possible by the development of liberal philosophy and positivist science. It was during this time that disability 
became a category which both reflected and was vital for the creation of the ideas, processes, 
strategies  and  techniques  that  have  evolved  into  our  current  modes  of  "government"  in  a 
Foucaultian sense. Disability became administrative, medicalised, institutionalised, calibrated, 
and ontologically vital for the definition of the modern subject. It became a tool to be deployed 
which not only affected those who were defined within its bounds, but which has impacted on all 
people as a measure of their compliance to cultural conventions.  
 
Davis touches on this time of rupture when he argues that '[a]lthough there may have been a 
great number of people with disabilities, one must, however, assume that disability was not an 
operative category before the eighteenth century' (Davis 2000 57). Indeed, historians have a 
great deal of difficulty in documenting disability before this time as it is not referred to in the 
same way and sometimes seems to escape mention at all.  
 
Obviously  this  is  not  because persons  with  disabilities  were  lacking.  Indeed,  it  is 
probable that the figure of 15 percent, now generally accepted as the percentage of 
people with disabilities in the United States and throughout the world, would have held 
in the  past.  In  fact  we  might  estimate  upward  of  25  percent  of  the  population was 
disabled, given the lack of modern medicine and so on (ibid). 
 
It is here that etymology can assist the critical historian. The Oxford English Dictionary shows 
that the word "disability" was used in a very different way prior to industrialisation. For example, 
in 1580, Lupton refers to 'his disabilitie to perform his promise' which is a usage more akin to 
our general term of in-ability. The same applies to Milton's reference in 1645 to 'disabilities to 
perform what was covenanted'. In these two cases the word may still refer to an inability to 
perform a certain function but it is not being linked to physical impairment. It would seem that 
anyone could be disabled now and then, depending on the circumstances. It is not until well into 
the eighteenth century that we see references to disability which reflect its contemporary form. 
In 1768 Tucker writes of 'inconveniences, disabilities, pains, and mental disorders' which places 
it in a much more familiar setting, and when Anderson in 1870 uses the phrase 'crippled by the 
disability' it is clear that he is referring to the kind of functional impediment which currently 
circumscribes our notions of disability (italics mine). 
 
However, the question remains that, if disability as a case of functional impairment existed, as it 
surely must have,  prior to its current conceptualisation, what words were used to describe it 
and how was it perceived? Davis (2000) argues that '[r]ather than disability, what is called to 
readers' attention before the eighteenth century is deformity. The word seems to have been in 
use since the beginning of print, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, and is the operative 
word in defining some aspects of physical disability' (58). According to this perspective, prior to 
the eighteenth century, what achieved attention as a negative distinguishing feature had more 
to do with appearance than function. Even so, Davis (2000) demonstrates that deformity and other forms of physical difference which would now be classed as disabilities seemed to blend 
into society and be granted a greater level of acceptance in the centuries preceding the 1700s. 
 
Samuel  Johnson  (1709-1784)  provides  a  particularly  vivid  example  of  Davis's  point  that 
disability  was  largely  ignored  in  earlier  times.  Johnson,  a  celebrated  author,  had  multiple 
disabilities,  which,  if  he  had  lived  in  the  twentieth  century  would  have  resulted  in 
institutionalisation, discrimination and pathologisation. He was almost blind, partially deaf, was 
severely  scarred  by  small  pox  and  evinced  the  behaviour  now  referred  to  as  Tourette 
Syndrome, yet his contemporaries saw him 'as a brilliant man who had some oddities rather 
than as a seriously disabled person' (Davis 2000 55). Davis argues that this casual view of 
Johnson's disabilities is representative of the liminal period in which he lived where 'we can see 
the contradiction of an earlier sense in which disability per se did not exist and a latter one in 
which disability is a modality used to explain a great deal' (56). While his disabilities were not 
completely ignored, neither were they thought to be of any great importance.  
 
However, the liminal period reflected in Johnson's experience was soon to draw to a close and 
disability was to become a mode of classification which heralded not only a whole new way of 
viewing physical difference, but a revolution in the largest sense possible in relation to what 
could be thought, said and done. In suggesting that disability took on a certain shape due to the 
interplay of capitalism, industrialisation, and liberalism, the rise of medicine and other forms of 
expertise,  and  the  creation  and  consolidation  of  administrative  government,  I  am  not 
overlooking that it has been deployed in the service of varying, sometimes conflicting, interests 
over this time. What I will be attempting to demonstrate, however, is that these interests have 
been formed within a system of rationalities and technologies which have been constitutive of 
what we have come to classify as modernity where disability has been come to be understood 
as the inferior side of a dichotomy which casts "able-bodiedness" as the norm.  
 
The Imperative of Labour 
 
The ruptures and fragmentary connections from which the category of disability originally grew  
were most clearly linked to the conditions surrounding the mechanisation of labour and the 
ways in which these came to interact with systems of governance. Industrialisation tended to 
undermine  traditional  kinship  ties  and  community  support  structures  because  of  the  social 
dislocation, rapid urbanisation and increasing geographic mobility which ensued, and, alongside 
and in keeping with the advent of the modern workforce, a whole new range of disciplinary 
mechanisms came into play. Foucault argues throughout his genealogical work that this mode 
of discipline was grounded in a growing surveillance of the population and an accompanying 
redistribution of individuals in space. Fundamental to this change in the operation of power, he 
maintains, was the development of ‘dividing practices’ whose primary purpose was to cleave a dichotomy, both physical and symbolic, between those who could and those who could not 
respond favourably to the ‘imperative of labour’ (Foucault 1991b: 128). 
 
Proponents of the social model argue that, prior to industrialisation and the demands of factory 
production, it was possible for people who had a range of functional and sensory impairments to 
engage in productive activities because their differences could be accommodated and their 
skills utilised (Barnes, Mercer and Shakespeare 1999; Linton 1998; Oliver 1990). This allowed 
them  to  blend  into  their  communities  and,  as  such,  '[d]isabled  people  did  not  constitute  a 
socially recognised group' (Patterson and Hughes 2000:  36). However, with the onset of large 
scale factory production, came the requirement for workers to fit the mold stamped out by 
mechanisation and the timetable, and this put people who lacked the qualities necessary for this 
kind of labour at a distinct disadvantage. As Marks (1999) argues, '[m]echanised production 
required  a  uniform  workforce  .  .  .  and  work  was  not  organised  to  cater  for  the  range  of 
intellectual and bodily differences between people' (80). “Disabled” thereafter became the term 
used to describe those who could not perform in accordance with the demands of the modern 
labour force. 
 
Obviously work has always been an important factor in defining people's lives and ensuring their 
survival. The difference in the modern era is that work has taken on a new shape and become 
immersed in a particular ideological framework and regime of disciplinary mechanisms. Foucault 
(1980a) argues that, while work has always had a productive function, in the modern era it has 
taken  on  two  additional  functions,  'the  symbolic  function  and  the  function  of  dressage,  or 
discipline' (161). Those who could not participate in this new social realm could only be seen to 
be lacking the symbolic and disciplinary qualities of the autonomous, rational, market-driven 
liberal subject and thus were defined as aberrant. As Jolly (2000) argues, '[t]he administrative 
categories  of  "able  to  work"  and  "unable  to  work"  [were  developed]  to  identify  those  who 
because they did not, or could not, participate in the central system of work were a threat to the 
social order. In short, those who did not work for whatever reason were a social problem' (796).  
 
This dichotomous formation of the "able to work" and the "unable to work" resulted in those from 
the latter category being reduced to poverty and forced into a life of mendicancy because their 
former means of survival had been lost in the social transition. The fear and distaste that this 
destitution caused the growing middle class is reflected in the amendments to the Poor Laws of 
England  in  1834  which,  by  withholding  relief  outside  of  institutions,  ignited  the  process  of 
segregation which, by physically removing disabled people from sight, served to reify the social 
exclusion that had already been constructed around their new categorisation (Winzer 1997: 98-
99). Originally the poor, the sick and the disabled were rounded up and housed in leprosaria 
which had been abandoned due to the decline in leprosy (Foucault 1973), but their numbers 
grew so rapidly - Barnes et al. (1999) estimate that in Britain '[t]he [general] asylum population 
rose  from  three  per  ten  thousand  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  to  thirty  per thousand at its end' (19-20) - that the building of new institutions became an industry of its own 
over the next two centuries.  
 
The purpose of this process of exclusion, which Foucault (1991b) calls the ‘great confinement’, 
was not simply a matter of ridding the streets of poor people or of providing care to those who 
needed it. It was, he argues, a ‘dividing practice’ whose primary purpose was to 'revis[e] the 
distinctions between the affiliated and the marginalised' (Rose 1996c: 340) and to ensure  that 
'the  subject  [was]  objectified  by  a  process  of  division  either  within  himself  or  from  others' 
(Foucault 1982: 208). As such, a key purpose in creating the category of disability has been to 
provide a clear demonstration of what not to be and, accordingly, as Davis (1998) suggests in 
relation to the confinement of disabled people in early modernity, ‘as a deterrent to the able-
bodied’ (1). 
 
While  the  institutionalisation  of  disabled  people  from  the  eighteenth  century  onwards  was 
ostensibly geared at providing relief for those who could not work, confinement was not, in 
reality,  designed  for  compassionate  reasons.  As  Foucault  (1991b)  argues,  ‘[w]hat  made  it 
necessary was an imperative of labour … Our philanthropy prefers to recognise the signs of a 
benevolence toward sickness where there was only a condemnation of idleness' (128). Hence, 
as Davis (1998) points out, by the time 'the Poor Law was amended in 1834, the majority of 
workhouse inmates were in fact… the physically and mentally disabled, the aged, the orphan 
and a wide variety of sick' (1). One such institution in France bore a plaque on which was 
written: 'If wild beasts can be broken to the yoke, it must not be despaired of correcting the man 
who has strayed'  (quoted in Foucault 1991b: 139). Unable conform to the moral imperative 
implicit  in  the  modern  configuration  of  labour,  centred  as it was around the tyranny of the 
timetable and the excision of any opportunity to disrupt the rhythms of the productive process, 
the disabled body could not be disciplined and was thus relegated to life on the margins of 
society. 
 
Foucault  (1977c)  argues  that  the  rationalities  surrounding  institutionalisation  rested  on  a 
combination of principles which had sprung from the differing historical measures designed for 
the treatment of lepers and plague victims. 'If it is true that the leper gave rise to rituals of 
exclusion,  which  to  a  certain  extent  provided  the  model  for  and  general  form of the great 
confinement, then the plague gave rise to disciplinary projects' (198). According to this logic, the 
disabled person was marked as inferior and excluded in the same way as the leper of the 
middle ages, but the rise of the institution also reflected a way of controlling bodies in space that 
had  been  inspired by the conditions of the great plagues and which relied on surveillance, 
observation, individuation and training. It was this combination of exclusion and discipline which 
formed the ideological basis for what was to become the single most defining feature of the 
construction and oppression of the disabled, the 'hegemony of normalcy' (Davis 1997a: 23). 
 The Hegemony of the Norm 
 
The constant division between the normal and the abnormal, to which every individual is 
subjected…[applied] the binary branding and exile of the leper to quite different objects; 
the existence of a whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, supervising 
and correcting the abnormal brings into play the disciplinary mechanisms to which the 
fear  of  the  plague  gave  rise.  All  the  mechanisms  of  power  which,  even  today,  are 
dispersed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him, are composed 
of those two forms from which they distantly derive (Foucault 1977c: 199). 
 
That disability is considered to exist in opposition to some kind of more privileged state is 
apparent in its linguistic structure. Dis-ability, mal-formation, de-bility, im-pairment, in-valid, de-
formed,  dis-figured.  'All  these  words,  curiously  negative  (negating what?),  evoke  a  fear' 
(Stiker 1999: 4). In posing the question, 'negating what?' Stiker points to the way that disability 
has been constructed as "the other" in a dualistic category which is set against the "the norm". 
So, then, what is this "norm" and why does disability fall foul of it? 
 
In his etymological analysis, Davis (1997a) explores the history of 'the constellation of words 
describing [the] concept "normal," "normalcy," "normality," "norm," "average," "abnormal"' (10). 
The word "normal" only appeared in the English language in 1840 in its current form, where it is 
defined as ‘constituting, conforming to, not deviating or different from, the common type or 
standard, regular, usual'. Prior to that it meant 'perpendicular'. Similarly, 'the word "norm," in the 
modern  sense,  has  only  been  in  use  since  around  1855,  and  "normality"  and  "normalcy" 
appeared in 1849 and 1857, respectively’ (ibid). The entry of the concept of the norm into the 
English language at this stage reflects a way of thinking and a means for controlling bodies 
which had been developing for almost a century. 'Like surveillance and with it, normalisation 
becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age' (Foucault 1977c: 
184). 
 
This  insertion  into language of what had already been developing as a concept was made 
possible by the emergence of the field known as statistics. Statistics was to provide a system of 
measurement which was to link the inculcation of values with the supposedly objective, value-
neutral mechanisms of the evolving human sciences (Hacking 1991). The ability to quantify the 
division  between  what  was  desirable  and  what  was  not,  proved  to  be  a  potent  tool  in  the 
administration of populations. It was the French statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1847) who 
managed to solidify the norm by linking it to the bell curve, the graph which shows the "normal 
distribution", the majority and its margins, of any population. When Baynton (2001) discusses 
the  nature  of  this  majority,  he  points  out  that  '[a]lthough  normality  ostensibly  denoted  the 
average, the usual, and the ordinary, in actual usage it functioned as an ideal and excluded only 
those defined as below average' (36). It was in this way that the rising arch of the curve seemed 
to, paradoxically, denote the superiority of the unexceptional.   
Davis (1997a) argues that, prior to the construction of the norm, there was the "ideal". For 
example, in classical culture there existed the concept of the ideal body which was symbolised 
in painting and sculpture. The difference between the ideal and the norm is that, while people 
may greatly admire the ideal, nobody is expected to achieve such standards of perfection. 
Everyone necessarily falls short of the ideal. Conversely, the idea of the norm is the standard to 
which everyone is expected to conform and anyone who falls outside its precincts is considered 
to be deviant. In this way, the norm becomes a much more tyrannical concept than the ideal 
and, in fact, becomes a new kind of ideal, one which, unlike its classical forebear, is thought to 
be  within  reach  of  most  people  (Davis  1997a:  11).  As  Quetelet  wrote,  'an  individual  who 
epitomised in himself, at a given time, all the qualities of the average man, would represent at 
once all the greatness, beauty and goodness of that being' (quoted in Davis 1997a: 12). 
 
Disability is obviously antithetical to the norm on a great many levels. Those who are disabled 
often fall short of the norm in relation to the characteristics of appearance, strength, mobility, 
wealth,  and  independence  and  this  has  resulted  in  their  symbolic  as  well  as their physical 
exclusion from mainstream society. In the latter part of the twentieth century these departures 
from the norm lay at the heart of the eugenics movement. Here, Davis (1997a) draws our 
attention to the macabre 'coincidence' that the most prominent statisticians of the nineteenth 
century were also leading lights in the eugenics movement. Put simply, these people believed 
that the ultimate form of normalisation was in ridding the population of its defectives (18).  
 
Francis  Galton,  a  cousin  of  Charles  Darwin,  introduced  the  term  eugenics  in  1883  as  'the 
science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race' (Cocks and 
Stehlick 1996: 15). His ideas on human perfectibility were drawn from Darwin's The Descent of 
Man soon after its publication in 1871: 
 
we civilised men... do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums  
for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws and our medical men 
exert their utmost skills to save the life of everyone to the last moment.... Thus the weak 
members of society propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of 
domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man (Darwin 
as quoted in Marks 1999: 33-34). 
 
Prior  to  it  becoming  unthinkable  after  the  mass  extermination  of  the  disabled  and  racially 
different in Nazi Germany, eugenics was a very popular and reputable concept. It was validated 
by the scientific principles of the day and among its proponents were prominent figures like 
John D. Rockefeller, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Theodore Roosevelt, H. G. Wells, 
John Maynard Keynes, and H.J. Laski. Moreover, Galton was knighted for his work in 1909 and 
received many prestigious academic awards for it (Davis 1997a: 19). Despite its fall from favour, 
eugenic practices still exist today in Western countries in the form of sterilisation, euthanasia and genetic engineering (Barnes, Mercer and Shakespeare 1999; Drake 1999; Russell 1998; 
Shakespeare  1998).  Eugenics  could  well  be  seen  as  the  social  exclusion  of  people  with 
disabilities taken to its logical conclusion.  
 
However, the oppression of disabled people through their definition as "other” usually involves 
much  more  subtle  process  of  "social  death"    (Finklestein  1998:  38)  with  its  fundamental 
principles interiorised by disabled people in the form of a "psychological eugenics" which keeps 
the borders between the normal and the abnormal sharply defined. Even outside of institutions 
this delineation is, as Thomson (1997) describes it, intense. 
 
As a departure from a norm made neutral by an environment created to accommodate it, 
disability  becomes  intense,  extravagant,  and  problematic  embodiment.  It  is  the 
unorthodox made flesh . . . The cripple before the stairs, the blind before the printed 
page, the deaf before the radio, the amputee before the typewriter, and the dwarf before 
the counter - all testify with their particular bodies to the fact that the myriad structures 
and practices of material, daily life enforce the cultural expectation of a certain standard, 
universal subject before whom all others appear inferior (283). 
 
As  already  indicated,  this  enforced  alterity is built on a hierarchical dualism, disabled/able-
bodied, which, like those of man/woman and white/black, exclude the margins by privileging the 
unexamined centre. Thomson (1997) has developed a new term for the superior pole of this 
binary,  the  'normate'  which  'usefully  designates  the  social  figure  through  which  people can 
represent themselves as definitive human beings'. She goes on to say 'this neologism names 
the failed subject position of cultural self, the figure outlined by the array of deviant others 
whose marked bodies shore up the normate's boundary' ( 8).  
 
In other words, in terms of a disability discourse, the social identities of those who 
consider themselves to be normal (or non-disabled or able-bodied) are secured only 
through a process which involves the systematic social exclusion and marginalisation of 
others (' the disabled '), who are identified in terms of their deviance from an imagined 
ideal (Swain and Cameron 1999: 75). 
 
The ways in which we tend to exclude the disabled body from what is deemed preferable and 
powerful reveals much about what we value and will form a central platform of analysis in 
Chapter Three when disability as an identity is interrogated. But for now it will suffice to say that, 
although the oppression of disabled people may well have begun with their exclusion from 
standard forms of social life, it has been driven down deep into their inner cores. 
 
 
 
 Health as a Key Norm 
 
The concept of "health" is central to the development of our understanding of "disability" as it is 
one of the basic criteria, alongside the ability to work, for being considered able-bodied. To 
properly comprehend disability as a concept which has been devised to suit the purposes of 
particular social and political aims, it is vital to understand the category against which it has 
been defined. Apart from the fact that a healthy body is usually considered to be an able body, it 
can  be  argued  that  health  is  fundamental  to  the  achievement  of  all  other  norms.  George 
Canguilhem argues that 'Man [sic] does not feel in good health - which is the definition of health 
-  except  when  feeling  not  only  normal  -  adapted  to  one's  milieu  and  its  demands  -  but 
normative, capable that is of pursuing new norms of life. The ill person is ill by incapacity to 
tolerate more than a single norm... abnormal not because of the absence of norm, but because 
of the incapacity to be normative' (as quoted in Gordon 1998: 183). Viewed in this way, health 
can be said to be a key norm, a necessary factor in the attainment of all other social norms 
(Osborne 1997).  
 
To  explore  the  concept  of  health  via  the  techniques  of  genealogy  requires  a  process  that 
Foucault (1991c) refers to as 'eventalisation'. This involves unseating the belief that historical 
'events', in this case the birth of health as a concept, follow an ineluctable pattern of cause and 
effect. This is achieved by what Foucault refers to as a 'breach of self-evidence' by which it can 
be demonstrated that 'things weren't as necessary as all that' (83). The often taken-for-granted 
assumption about health is that it was always a problem whose logical solution involved the 
surveillance and examination of individual bodies. However, the process of eventalisation can 
reveal that it wasn't a matter of course that health became perceived and treated the way that it 
did, that it was, in fact, the result of a 'multiplicity and plural[ity] of causes' which were formed in 
the 'connection, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on' (84) 
which comprise the conditions which came together to influence the operation of early liberal 
government.  
 
While health is classically defined as a state of individual well-being, its main utility from the 
nineteenth century onwards has been in the maintenance of a newly constructed workforce 
(Henriques et al. 1984: 132). Liberalism's commitments to economic freedom and the creation 
of wealth were tied to the development of capitalism, and both liberalism and capitalism were in 
agreement that the creation of wealth relied on the existence of a healthy pool of labourers. 
Rabinow (1991) argues that 'the relationship between the economic changes that resulted in the 
accumulation of capital and the political changes that resulted in the accumulation of power' (17) 
is  complex  and  cannot be explained in terms which prioritise one over the other. Foucault 
believes that 'each makes the other possible and necessary; each provide the model for the 
other'  (Foucault  as  quoted  in  Rabinow  1991:  17).  In  either  case,  the  powers  which  liberal 
government  developed  to  control  the  health  of  its  citizenry  'was,  without  question,  an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible 
without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of 
the phenomena of population to economic processes' (Foucault 1978: 140-141). 
 
The surveillance of bodies which was necessary to the ends sought by government and industry 
was achieved through the development of a new concept, that of the population (Pasquino 
1991: 115-116). 'Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or 
even  with  a  "people,"  but  with  a  "population,"  with  its  specific  phenomena and its peculiar 
variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses, 
patterns  of  diet  and  habitation'    (Foucault  1980g:  125).  To  be  able  to  govern  effectively 
necessitated the development of intricate networks of knowledge surrounding the condition of 
its  people.  As  Rose  (1996b)  states,  the  belief  was  that:  'legitimate  government  will  not  be 
arbitrary government, but will be based upon intelligence concerning those whose well-being it 
is  mandated  to  enhance'  (44). This knowledge is then reframed in relation to the way that 
government interacts with its subjects, both through its policies and in its influence, via medical 
intervention, over individual behaviour. As Foucault (1980b) described it, health became an 
imperative, 'at once the duty and objective of all' (170).  
 
The series of interventions and regulatory controls which were necessary to the surveillance 
and control of this newly formed category of human life was achieved by way of 'a biopolitics of 
the population' (Foucault 1978: 139). Whereas sovereign power had been symbolised by its 
ability to put to death those who fell out of line, "biopower" functioned by exercising control over 
life (140). This was achieved in two ways, first by 'the spread of normalisation [which] operates 
through  the  creation  of  abnormalities which it then must treat and reform' and, second, by 
keeping constant watch over the population and devising ways of measuring any deviations 
from the norm (Rabinow and Dreyfus 1982: 196). It is the latter which will be the focus of the 
following section, the purpose of which will be to demonstrate how the exercise of power has 
come to depend on the accumulation of knowledge, knowledge which, although it is purported 
to simply reveal existing “truths” in relation to its objects of study, actually creates the objects 
about which it speaks. 
 
Power, Knowledge and Disability 
  
... power will be exercised by virtue of the mere fact of things being known and people 
being seen in a sort of immediate, collective and anonymous gaze  (Foucault 1980a: 
154). 
 
Systems of government have not achieved their constructions of disability in a purely arbitrary 
fashion, nor have they had to enforce them by violent means. Rather, in the manner of the 
liberal administrative state, they have operated through a field of discourse created within the 
human sciences to name the problem and to devise ways of dealing with it. To understand how this operates, we need to briefly review Foucault’s arguments about the relationship between 
power  and  truth.  When  Foucault  (1977c)  argues  '[t]here  is  no  power  relation  without  the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge' (27), he is referring to a relationship which is not 
easy  to  grasp  because  it  flies  in  the  face  of  the  humanist  belief  that  power  suppresses 
knowledge and, thus, that "the truth" can only emerge when oppressive power regimes are 
overthrown (Foucault 1980c: 52). Yet, Foucault makes the case that power and knowledge 
cannot be separated in this way because, fundamental to the exercise of power is the ability to 
create "the truth". In the case of absolutist rule, the penalties for challenging prevailing systems 
of belief are high. Consider the Inquisition which burned dissenters at the stake and declared 
Galileo  a  heretic  in  1633  for  proposing  that  the  earth  revolved  around  the  sun.  Liberal 
democracies, however, rely on a much more subtle and complex relationship between power 
and knowledge which operates in both directions.  
 
The exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge 
and accumulates new bodies of information…and, conversely, knowledge constantly 
induces effects of power…It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, 
it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power…The two are not depicted as 
having an independent existence. They are coterminous (Townley 1993: 20).  
 
It  is  through  discourse  that  power  and  knowledge  are  joined.  'In  the  end,  we  are  judged, 
condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or 
dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the areas of the specific effects of power' 
(Foucault 1980d: 95). It is possible to govern a people without force by devising ways of thinking 
which become unquestionable. The belief, for example, that certain people cannot work or are 
otherwise dysfunctional has been rendered authentic by the definition and diagnoses of medical 
professionals  who  are  guided  by  medical  discourse.  This  knowledge  has  resulted  in  the 
development of various points for the insertion of power in the lives of people thus categorised 
as dis-abled, such as excluding them from mainstream society, subjecting them to constant 
surveillance, educating them in certain ways, and defining how they should think and act so as 
to attain the highest degree of normality possible.  
 
A central point here is that, in its modern configuration, power achieves its potency, not through 
repression, but by generating new ideas, definitions and practices. Foucault (1977c) expresses 
it thus: 'We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
'"excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals". In fact, power 
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual 
and the knowledge that may be gained of him [sic] belong to this production' (194). In keeping 
with  this  view,  the  disabled  individual  has  been  produced  through  various  discourses.  By 
developing  a  field  of  knowledge  which  is  based  on  the  observation,  measurement,  and 
partitioning of bodies, new ways of controlling people’s movements have been devised and 
justified.  Eventually  this  control is no longer overtly disciplinary, it functions at the level of personal interest, and disabled people begin to see themselves as defined through their own 
choices. 'If... power is strong this is because, as we are beginning to realise, it produces effects 
at the level of desire (Foucault 1980e: 59). 
 
The medical discourse which has provided the knowledge base for our current understanding of 
disability has its origins in the "germ theory" of disease. Prior to the discovery of a biological 
mechanism  of  disease,  ill  health  and  disability  were  thought  to  have  been  the  result  of 
supernatural causes. But with the emergence of a natural object of causation which could be 
studied  and  controlled  came  a  whole  new  understanding  of  physical  impairment.  Disability 
became medicalised and those who were "afflicted" could be diagnosed and treated and, even if 
their conditions were resistant to intervention, they would remain within the realm of surveillance 
of the medical "gaze". They would be counted, compared, categorised, examined, experimented 
upon, named, and passed judgment upon and they would see themselves and be seen in whole 
new ways.  
 
As has already been discussed, the most potent of the medical techniques which have been 
used to construct disability as a governable entity has been the process of naming it. What was 
formerly a disparate collection of physical differences which were largely absorbed by the small 
rural communities that prevailed in pre-industrial times, emerged as a social category which 
linked those who were impaired to growing systems of medical care and excluded them from 
access to the labour market. Initially, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this process 
was  performed  by  doctors  in  their  role  of  distinguishing  between  the  "deserving"  and 
"undeserving" poor which, as Hahn (1986) argues, was based on assumptions which were 'little 
more than a "cultural invention"' (131). This practice of naming disability may have created 
different definitions to suit the particular purposes of different times, but it has been uniform in 
its capacity to ensure that physicians 'have exercised cultural and social authority' (Donahue 
and McGuire 1995: 51).  
 
This  ability  to  affect  the  "conduct  of  conduct"  on  an  individual  and  social  level  has  had a 
massive impact on the people declared disabled over the last three centuries.  Some of these 
have been discussed earlier in this chapter where the institutional separation of able-bodied and 
disabled  bodies  was  described.  Medicine  played  a  vital  role  here,  with  disabled  people 
becoming  both  the  subjects  and  objects  of  expert  knowledges.  This  was  intensified  when 
rehabilitation entered the spaces of confinement in the early twentieth century, securing a place 
for medicine as 'the principle agency charged with the restoration of impaired labour power' 
(Patterson and Hughes 2000: 38). In casting disability as a "problem" that could be "fixed", or at 
the very least ameliorated, medical discourse led the transition from the period exemplified by 
the  "freak show" where 'extraordinary bodies' were seen as indelible reminders of what lay 
beyond the boundaries of normality (Thomson 1997) to a new era where what was constituted 
as abnormal invited an infinite range of interventions.   
Trent (1998) demonstrates this shift in perspective in his analysis of the display of 'primitives 
and defectives' at the St Louis World Trade Fair in 1904. While the bodies which drew crowds to 
freak shows 'produced a generalised icon of corporeal and cultural otherness that verified the 
socio-political  status  quo  and  the  figure  of  the  unmarked  normate,  the  ideal  subject  of 
democracy' (Thomson 1998: 79-80), the same kinds of physical differences were portrayed in 
the World Trade Fair of 1904 as social problems which could be shown to respond favourably to 
the modalities of medicine, education and a flourishing array of social sciences. It is not that the 
human exhibits at the World Trade Fair were considered any less of a reminder of what the 
ideal citizen must avoid being or appearing to be. What was added, however, was the premise 
that  science could intervene and resolve the abnormalities which stemmed from disparities 
based on race, gender, form and function. While doctors had been able to utilise "freaks" as 
examples of abnormal physiology to shore up the norm, their power became limitless when the 
norm became defined as attainable by all with the help of medical technology (Trent 1998: 210). 
 
The  growing  confidence  that  disability  could  be  brought  under  control  coincided  with  the 
emergence  of  a  range  of  professions  which  expanded  the  knowledge  base  and  with  it the 
number of points at which regulatory and exploratory measures could be brought to intervene in 
the lives of disabled people. During the twentieth century disability began to be administered by 
government programmes based on the knowledge being produced within the human science 
disciplines of economics, sociology, psychology, psychiatry and statistics. The transformation of 
this knowledge into disciplinary procedures marked the development of the less tangible yet 
more powerful connection between the state and the disabled, and was carried out by a new 
band of experts such as psychologists, social workers, occupational therapists, rehabilitation 
counsellors,  physiotherapists  and  special  education  teachers.  This  growing  infiltration  of 
disciplinary  measures  into  the  lives  of disabled people meant that there was less need for 
incarceration,  a  procedure  which,  as  the  demands  for  more  humane  treatment  increased, 
became  too  expensive  to  maintain.  And  as  disabled  people  'emerge[d]  from  the  closed 
fortresses in which they once functioned and [began] to circulate in a "free" state', the 'methods 
of control' over their lives became more flexible and more subtle (Foucault 1977c: 211). 
 
The rise of the "helping professions" as an adjunct to medical discourse has not only suited the 
liberal democratic mechanism of governing at a distance, but also the associated belief that 
market forces should prevail. Disabled people have become clients in a range of services, 
initially  embedded  in  state  sponsored  welfare  programmes,  but  increasingly  run  by  private 
enterprise, and, under the gaze of a team of experts, are being encouraged to take more and 
more responsibility for their own welfare.  
 
There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An 
inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to 
the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself.  A superb formula: power exercised continuously and for 
what turns out to be a minimal cost (Foucault 1980a 155). 
 
The surveillance which both produces knowledge and ensures its insertion in people's lives is 
the  vital  link  between  power  and  the  "truths"  it  creates  and  rests  upon.  Disability,  now  a 
seemingly  self-evident  physiological  fact,  has  in  reality  been  developed  under  the  gaze  of 
experts and is continually being recreated to serve particular political aims. Yet it is no longer 
necessary to engage in the dividing practice of institutionalisation to ensure that the partitioning 
between "the norm" and "the other" remains intact as the knowledge which is produced by the 
human sciences filters down into what is considered to be common sense such that all people, 
including and especially disabled people, collude in the process of ideological segregation. 
 
The Ideology of Rehabilitation 
 
To conclude the genealogical analysis of disability it is important to highlight what Anspach 
(1979) has referred to as 'the ideology of rehabilitation' (771). I suggest that rehabilitation is a 
concept which epitomises all of the basic elements which have come together in the constitution 
of disability. It is embedded in the idea that citizens must achieve productivity through the 
disciplines that stem from employment and the timetable, it works to govern individuals at a 
distance by immersing them in a field of expertise which serves to guide their aims and actions, 
and it is representative of the imperative placed on each and every citizen of advanced liberal 
democracies to strive to emulate the norm. When I use the term "ideology" here I do not intend 
it  to  be understood in the traditional sociological sense of a tool wielded by an oppressive 
regime, but rather as a rationality, a way of thinking which has permeated our Weltanschauung 
via the diffuse network of power relations fundamental to contemporary liberal societies. 
 
Rehabilitation is based on a principle of reform very similar in many ways to that which has 
informed the operation of the penitentiary system as explored by Foucault (1977c) in Discipline 
and  Punish.  In  both  these  contexts,  rehabilitation's  significance  relies,  not  on  its  ability  to 
actually eliminate the problems it is supposedly designed to address, but to reinforce a system 
of disciplinary power based on such classifications.  
 
One would be forced to suppose that the prison, and no doubt punishment in general, is 
not intended to eliminate offences, but rather to distinguish them, to distribute them, to 
use them: that it is not so much that they render docile those who are liable to transgress 
the law but that they tend to assimilate the transgression of the laws in a general tactic of 
subjection (Foucault  1977c: 44). 
 
In keeping with the above, Rabinow & Dreyfus (1982) argue that '[p]enitentiaries, and perhaps 
all normalising power succeed when they are only partially successful' (196). This is just as 
pertinent  to  the  physical,  behavioural  and  psychological rehabilitation that is imposed upon disabled people as it is to the "moral rehabilitation" designed to reform criminals. The ideology 
of rehabilitation can only continue to be justified as a principle for reinforcing certain standards if 
those standards consistently fail to be met.  
 
In this way it can be argued that the "delinquent" and the "disabled person" serve a similar 
purpose in society. Both classifications are based on the idea of deviation from acceptable 
standards  and  are  seen  to  justify  disciplinary  measures  which  range from surveillance and 
incarceration to self-government through the guidance of experts. Foucault (1977c) argues that 
‘[t]he prison cannot fail to produce delinquents' (266). This is because the punitive system relies 
on  the  naming  of  a  group  formerly  not  conceived  and  then  proceeds  to  marginalise  its 
constitutive population in such a way as to leave them with no alternative other than to behave 
in the ways prescribed by their classification. Foucault (1991e) argues further that: 
 
For the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute 
the hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency… So 
successful has the prison been that, after a century and a half of "failures," the prison 
still exists, producing the same results, and there is the greatest reluctance to dispense 
with it… (231, 232). 
 
The  same  can  be  said  for  the  relationship  that  has  developed  between  rehabilitation  and 
disability  in  that  rehabilitation  has  been  extremely  successful in producing and reproducing 
"disability" in its contemporary form. True to its grounding in medical discourse, rehabilitation 
focuses  on  disability  as  an  individual  problem  which  requires  individual  change.  As  with 
delinquency, which is seen to be an individual aberration rather than a phenomenon which has 
its roots in social inequality, the social origins of disability are largely ignored. Consider the 
following very recent description of the aims of rehabilitation: 
 
Rehabilitation is a goal-oriented and time-limited process aimed at enabling an impaired 
person  to  reach  the  optimum  mental,  physical  and/or  social  functional  level,  thus 
providing  the  individual  with  the  tools  to  change  her  or  his  own  life. It can involve 
measures intended to compensate for a loss of function or a functional limitation (for 
example, by technical aids) and other measures intended to facilitate social adjustment 
or re-adjustment  (Healey 2000: 2). 
 
Under this definition, disability is located within the individual and remedial action is diverted to 
the person concerned as a matter of individual responsibility. There is no consideration that 
disability is created by a social environment which excludes people who do not fit the norm and, 
as such, rehabilitation is assured of maintaining its power to define and marginalise. 
 
When viewed from Foucault’s (1977b) perspective that the world as we understand it today has 
been  built,  not  from  a  firm  and  sequential  continuity,  but  from  a  fragile  and  discontinuous lineage of 'accident and succession' (142), rehabilitation can be understood as the result of a 
collision of elements which, if the conditions for their fusion had not been as they were, may 
have dispersed or merged in a different way. Yet, due to a series of not always connected, yet 
mutually  reinforcing,  events,  such  as  the  advent  of  modern  warfare,  the  development  of 
workers' compensation legislation, the expansion of medical discourse, the birth of the welfare 
state, and the emergence of a range of health and welfare professionals whose purpose was to 
facilitate the lives of the disadvantaged, rehabilitation evolved as a potent governmental tool. 
Although  work-related  accidents  had  already  started  to  attract  attention  by  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth century, it was not until the First World War that rehabilitation became a primary 
governmental aim. Thousands of men who would once have died on the battlefield were saved 
to  become  amputees  and  otherwise  disabled  veterans  and,  with  the  boom  created  by  the 
wartime upsurge in manufacturing, there was a greater need than ever to restore as many 
people as possible to their place within the system of disciplines that comprises the labour 
force.  
 
The  response  to  the  disabilities incurred during the first world war was largely mechanical. 
Technology could be utilised to restore the function of those wounded by battle. Prior to this the 
only aids available to the "cripple" were the wooden leg and the crutch, but after the horrendous 
casualties wrought by the war in Europe, the replacement of body parts became big business.  
 
But prosthesis is not only the pieces of wood, iron, now plastic that replace the missing 
hand or foot. It is also the very idea that you can replace. The image of the maimed 
person  and  of  the  society around  him  becomes  prosthetic.  Replacement,  re-
establishment  of the  prior  situation,  substitution,  compensation  -  all  this  now 
becomes possible language (Stiker 1999: 123-124).  
 
Indeed, prosthetics formed part of what was to become a larger rationale. Rehabilitation was to 
develop into a complex field of expertise covering a wide range of discourses whose purpose 
was not only to restore the patient's former appearance and function, but also to emphasise 
ways of thinking and behaving which were consistent with "normality". 
 
The  emergence  of  the  social  survey  in  the  late  1940s  helped  to  bring  chronic  illness  and 
disability even more fully under the gaze of medicine and its associated discourses (Armstrong 
1983, 1995). With this influx of statistical input, the knowledge base of these new fields was 
able  to  expand  very  rapidly  and  it  was  at  this  time  that  the  professions  associated  with 
rehabilitation gained a foothold within the institutions of higher learning. A course for social work 
was set up at the London School of Economics in 1954 (Drake 1999: 53), a World Federation of 
Occupational Therapists was formed in 1952, and in 1954 the first international congress of 
occupational therapists was held at Edinburgh (Pound et al. 1997). Since then, occupational 
therapy has occupied a key place in the assembly of rehabilitation professions given its focus 
on returning the disabled or chronically ill person to a state of normality in relation to both work and living skills, and its 'knowledge of anatomy, physiology, medicine, surgery, psychiatry, and 
psychology'  (ibid. 335).  
 
This growth of professional intervention into the lives of disabled people was accompanied by 
an  explosion  of  the  literature  on  rehabilitation.  Barker  et  al.  (1953)  refer  to  'an  annotated 
bibliography of 5000 items issued during the years 1940-1946' and remark that 'the publication 
has certainly not been less in later years' (366). Anspach (1979) suggests that these texts are 
'infused with optimism and a belief in human perfectibility, imbued with a belief in the efficacy of 
individual effort' and, in consequence, 'rehabilitation agents promulgated a rhetoric of "coping" 
with disability and "adjustment" to the prevailing normative structure' (771). While the words 
"coping" and "adjustment" may seem an innocent enough description of the processes through 
which a disabled person must pass to overcome his or her disadvantage, they are loaded with 
assumptions based on the belief that disability is a personal deficit to be overcome from within.  
 
The ways in which these assumptions enter texts - even those supposed to take issue with the 
medical model -  can be illustrated by the work of Anselm Strauss (1984 [1975]), a sociologist of 
some standing. Strauss’s text on the experience of chronic illness and disability intended to 
educate  the  full  gamut  of  health  professionals  who  were  increasingly  engaging  in  the 
rehabilitation business. In his discussion of ‘normalisation’, for example, he observes that those 
who successfully adjust: 
 
… simply come to accept, on a long-term basis, whatever restrictions are placed on their 
lives. Like Franklin Roosevelt, with his polio-caused disability, they live perfectly normal 
(even supernormal!) lives in all respects except for whatever handicaps may derive from 
their symptoms or their medical regimens. To keep interaction normal, they need only 
develop the requisite skills to make others ignore the differences between each other in 
just that unimportant regard (87). 
 
Strauss's work is to be applauded, along with the work of other symbolic interactionists such as 
Goffman (1963) and Charmaz (1983, 1987), for its challenge to medicine's preoccupation with 
the  functional  aspects  of  disability  at  the  expense  of  the  ways  in  which  people  actually 
experience it. However, while such authors focus on the personal ramifications of disability, they 
neglect to analyse its social construction and, as Armstrong (1983) argues, 'the effect of their 
stance is to have strengthened the power of the gaze of the new medicine to the essentially 
subjective' (115).  
 
Over the past three or four decades the concepts of “rehabilitation” and “normalisation” have 
become virtually synonymous. The term “normalisation” was first used in Scandinavia in the 
1950s by Karl Grunewald and Bengt Nirje in Sweden and Nils Bank-Mikkelsen in Denmark 
(Cocks and Stehlik 1996: 19-20). It began as a concept used to describe the assimilation of 
intellectually disabled people into the community as a function of deinstitutionalisation, but it was  picked  up  by  Wolfensberger  in  the  late  1960s  and  has  continued  to  influence  the 
development  of  general  rehabilitation  policy  in  English  speaking  countries  since  that  time 
(Wolfensberger 1969, 1972, 1992). In essence, "normalisation" is an open acknowledgment of 
rehabilitation’s aim to reinforce certain standards of behaviour, function and appearance among 
those to be assisted and reformed.  
 
Another feature of normalisation is that it invariably falls short of its stated goals with the result 
that disabled people continue to present a cogent reminder of the other side of normality. Two 
recent studies illustrate this. The first, by Ochs and Roessler (2001), concludes that people with 
disabilities have not been as successful as their non-disabled cohorts in finding employment 
because they lack the characteristics of 'career maturity' and 'personal flexibility' (170). The 
students in this study were measured for these competencies using a range of scales which 
attach numerical values to the qualities being assessed. From these measures it was concluded 
that disabled students need to be taught new skills which will enhance their inferior levels of 
'career  decision-making  self-efficacy  beliefs',  'career  outcome  expectations',  'intentions  to 
engage in career exploratory beliefs' and 'vocational identity' (175). Nowhere is it mentioned that 
disabled people may in fact be faced with lower employment rates due to job discrimination 
and/or social and environmental constraints. The assumption is, as always, that the problem, 
and therefore the solution, lies within the individual. 
 
The second study by Livneh (2001) explores the ways in which disabled people adapt to their 
conditions and circumstances according to another quantitative measure, a very popular one 
these days, the QOL (pronounced quoll). QOL is an acronym for "quality of life" and is based on 
a variety of scales which ascertain 'one's ability to effectively re-establish and manage both the 
external  environment  and  one's  inner  experiences  (cognitions,  feelings,  behaviors)'  (156). 
Someone with a high QOL is performing well in a normative sense and is seen to be adapting 
comfortably to disability or chronic illness. On the other hand, someone with a low QOL is 
exhibiting thoughts and behaviours which are problematic for their rehabilitation. Once again, 
the emphasis here is on personal adjustment which completely neglects the political context in 
which disability is played out. The calibration of individuals according to these precepts serves 
the purpose of reinforcing the norm, not of actually offering disabled people a better "quality of 
life".  
 
Studies such as these demonstrate that the quantification of human attributes and experience 
has come a long way since its instigation in demographic statistics in the eighteenth century. 
Now calculations are made, not just about the more abstract category of the population, but also 
in relation to individuals, marking their inadequacies, mapping their desires and delineating their 
needs. When numerical values are attached to concepts such as 'career maturity', 'personal 
flexibility', 'vocational identity', 'coping', 'adjustment', and, more broadly speaking, 'quality of life', 
they tend to become indelible measures of disabled people's identities, abilities and possibilities. And, as with the IQ test, it is difficult or even impossible to escape their definition once one is 
marked by these scores. 
 
Thus it comes about, through the development of modern forms of governance and the fields of 
knowledge and expertise that fuel them, that those who are viewed as physically incapacitated 
are assigned an identity and a social location which marks them as Other. To recognise, via 
genealogy, that this identity is a social construction is to present a serious challenge to the 
biomedical/ psychological view which assumes that the inner distress and self-esteem problems 
which accompany disability are natural reactions to personal tragedy which must be remedied 
by  way  of  expert  guidance.  A  genealogical  view  of  the  disabled  identity  demonstrates, 
conversely,  that these scientifically based "responses" to illnesses and impairments are, in 
actuality,  the  basis  for  the  creation  of  the  category  of  disability  and  the  imposition  of  a 
marginalised status on those medically defined as "disabled". The disabled identity, therefore, 
does not stem from an aberration of the individual psyche, it emerges from the calibrations, 
inscriptions  and  disciplinary  logics  which  have  been  devised  to  influence  the  shaping  of  a 
preferred way of living and being and, as such, is not immutable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Making of the Disabled Identity 
 
Disability  is  a  form  of  social  oppression  involving  …  the  socially  engendered 
undermining of [disabled people's] psycho-emotional well-being (Thomas 1999b: 60). 
 
The genealogical analysis framing Chapter Two provides a historical perspective of disability 
which reveals its construction as a counterpoint to the norm. What should be apparent from this 
analysis is how the structural oppression of people with impairments has come about in modern 
times through the exclusionary practices and discriminatory views which are grounded in this 
conceptual division. What remains to be explored are the effects that this kind of marginalisation 
has on the inner lives of disabled people. At the heart of my thesis is the belief that people who 
acquire  disabilities,  whether  it  be  through  sudden  injury  or  accident  or  the  gradual 
encroachment of chronic illness, are faced with identity crises or 'biographical disruptions' (Bury 
1982) which are directly linked to the social construction of disability as an inferior status. In 
other words, due to its socio-political evolution as an unacceptable physical difference which is 
believed to exist in direct opposition to much of what is most valued in contemporary society, 
impairment results not only in physical suffering such as pain and incapacity, it brings with it a 
'spoiled identity' (Goffman 1963) which multiplies this suffering many times over. 
 
Prior to becoming disabled, certain privileges and statuses are taken for granted. Much in the 
same way that "whiteness" is an invisible insignia of the norm, "ablebodiedness" is also an 
unquestioned,  unremarked  upon  state  which  only  becomes  notable  in  its  absence,  the 
difference being, of course, that one can become disabled, while race, gender and ethnicity are 
imposed at birth. To become disabled is to be relegated to a marginalised status in society and 
brings into high relief for the disabled person the advantages accorded those who inhabit the 
unacknowledged "centre". To become disabled is to lose access to these privileges and, in so 
doing, to begin to be defined in very different ways. These processes are subtle. One is not 
initiated into the ranks of the disabled by being subjected to the undisguised hatred that met 
those  marked  by  the  Star  of  David  in  Hitler's  Germany  (Russell  1998:  18-19).  Rather, the 
recruitment  of  disabled  subjects  into  inferior  subject  positions  derives  from  the  creation  of 
identities  which  seem  natural  and  very  much  the  responsibility  of  the  individual  psyche. 
Although the loss of one's comparatively privileged subject position may be very sudden and 
momentous  according  to  the  particular  nature  of  the  accident,  illness  or  injury,  the  overall 
summoning to a new level of identification is a gradual process whereby the doubts from within, 
the  stares  and  snubs  from  without,  and  the  lack  of  access  to  previously  available  social 
locations and resources erode one's prior claim to social acceptability. 
 'Typically, with the onset of disability, the impaired feel an acute sense of displacement, living as 
they do in a culture that privileges strength, beauty, and health over frailty, deformity, and 
illness.  They  correctly  perceive  that  cripples  generate  discomfort,  that  wounds disturb, that 
damaged bodies affront' (Rinaldi 1996: 821). Nevertheless, non-disabled people rarely admit 
that they harbour negative feelings towards those who are disabled. 'Public, verbalised attitudes 
toward disabled persons are on the average mildly favourable'. However, '[i]ndirect evidence 
suggests that deeper unverbalised attitudes are more frequently hostile' (Barker et al. 1953: 84). 
Young (1990) corroborates the existence of such subconscious discrimination and explains that 
it results in 'avoidance, aversion, expressions of nervousness, condescension, and stereotyping' 
(133). Because this behaviour is often subtle, it leaves the recipient feeling disturbed but with no 
means of redress, and even if a challenge is made it 'is met with denial and powerful gestures of 
silencing, which can make oppressed people feel slightly crazy' (134). 
 
Alongside  and  often  resulting  from  this  kind  of  negative  treatment  is  the  development  of 
internalised  oppression,  that  is,  the  'feelings  of  inadequacy,  self-doubt,  worthlessness  and 
inferiority  which  frequently  accompany  the  onset  of  impairment'  (Barnes,  Mercer  and 
Shakespeare  1999:  178).  According  to  the  medical  model,  these  feelings  are  part  of  an 
individual  psychological  reaction  to  loss  and  personal  tragedy  and  can  only  be  remedied 
through  the  disabled  person  learning  to  cope.  However,  when  viewed  from  a  social 
constructionist perspective, internalised oppression can be seen to result from the imposition of 
a marginalised identity. 
 
Internalised  oppression  is  not  the  cause  of our mistreatment, it is the result of our 
mistreatment.  It would not exist without the real external oppression that forms the 
social climate in which we exist.  Once oppression has been internalised, little force is 
needed to keep us submissive. We harbour inside ourselves the pain and the memories, 
the fears and the confusion, the negative self images and the low expectations, turning 
them into weapons with which to re-injure ourselves, every day of our lives (Mason as 
quoted in Marks 1999: 25). 
 
The recognition that the identity loss which accompanies disability is not a personal crisis, but 
rather the result of social forces which benefit from the construction of disability as an inferior 
status, is the first step in devising an appropriate remedy. For the solution to this loss lies not in 
learning  to  "cope"  with  it,  but  through  challenging  it  at  its  roots  by  recognising  that  the 
possession of an inferior identity is both contingent and expedient and need not be that way at 
all.   
 
'The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to 
commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define a unique threshold of emergence, the 
homeland  to  which  meta-physicians  promise  us  return;  it  seeks  to  make  visible  all  those 
discontinuities that cross us' (Foucault 1977b: 161). Herein lies the real power of genealogy. By acknowledging that we do not contain an essential core of identity which has been masked by 
oppression  but  rather  that  we  have  been  defined  through  structures  of  normalisation,  it 
becomes evident that our liberation from these structures does not lie in overturning this power 
but in harnessing it for our own self-definition. I quote liberally from Connolly (1998) because he 
expresses this point so well: 
 
If you think that a stubborn source of evil resides in the paradoxical relation of identity to 
the differences through which it is constituted, you might deploy genealogy to expose 
the constructed, contingent and relational character of established identities. Doing so to 
contest  the  conversion  of  difference  into  otherness  by  individuals  and  collectivities 
striving to erase evidence of dependency on the differences they contest. Doing so to 
open up other relational possibilities between interdependence, to contending identities 
by subtracting the sense of necessity from every identity  (110). 
 
It is the 'subtracting [of] the sense of necessity from every identity' that is vital to my objectives. 
It is my contention that, if we can discover through the inspirations of Foucault's genealogical 
method that the ways we see ourselves and are perceived by the world are but a convenient 
construction devised to aid in mechanisms of "government", then we can choose to think and 
feel in different ways. 
 
Identity in Crisis 
 
It is commonly agreed by social theorists that identity as a concept is in crisis (Anderson 1997: 
5; Rose 1996a: 169). It is a term which we all use very loosely to describe certain aspects of 
ourselves and our location within society. Indeed, its ubiquity is such that Weigert et al. (1986) 
refer to it as a 'cultural cliché' whose meaning has become so vague and all-encompassing as 
to render it almost useless as a sociological concept (21). But its state of crisis goes much 
deeper than this and is due to the fact that its modernist associations with unity, continuity, and 
autonomy have been severely challenged within the practices of deconstruction. Thus, as Hall 
(1996)  admits,  identity  is  a  concept  which  is operating 'under erasure', that it is 'no longer 
serviceable - good to think with - in [its] originary and unreconstructed form' (1). However, as he 
goes on to argue, 'what this decentring requires - as the evolution of Foucault's work clearly 
shows - is not an abandonment or abolition of "the subject" but a reconceptualisation - thinking it 
in its new, displaced or decentred position within the paradigm' (2).  
 
I concur with Hall and argue that, although the declaration that the subject is dead contributes to 
the recognition that our identities are created through discourse, it is vital to acknowledge how 
the view of the self as an essential, unified, interiorised being still affects the way we think. 
Deleuze (1988) touches on this process of transition when he reminds us that '[w]e continue to 
produce ourselves as a subject on the basis of old modes which do not correspond to our 
problems' (107). We live in a state of tension between the experience of ourselves 'as a series of flows, energies, movements, and capacities, a series of fragments or segments capable of 
being linked together in ways other than those that congeal it into an identity' (Grosz 1994: 197-
8)  and  the  deep  connection  we  have  to  a  unified,  continuous,  stable  conception  of  self.  I 
contend that the resolution of this tension does not lie in forfeiting one for the other, it requires 
understanding each of them in their historical contexts. 
 
Descartes’ famous statement, 'cogito ergo sum' - 'I think, therefore I am', is the fundamental 
premise for the liberal argument 'for a unified self, a knowing subject, that is transparent to itself, 
and for clear rational thought as the source of control, and autonomy' (Griffiths 1995: 79). This 
concept of unity, of the sameness and continuity of an individual through time, is featured in the 
lexical origins of the word "identity" from the Latin idem which means "same". Locke (1969) 
followed  on  from this idea of a continuity of consciousness and argued that 'as far as this 
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the 
identity of that person' (212). An essential feature of the construction of identity by the early 
liberal philosophers, then, was the belief that we are cohesive, accountable beings. 
 
In  addition  to  the  belief  that  identity  is based on “sameness” and continuity, the traditional 
humanist understanding of identity also places it in terms of its distinctness, a view which is 
based on the belief that we exist in isolation from any social influence, that we possess an 
essential identity that is prior to and distinct from the outside world. As Dunne (1995) argues the 
“self” is believed to be ‘immediately, transparently and irrefutably present to itself as a pure 
extensionless  consciousness,  already  established  in  being,  without  a  body  and  with  no 
acknowledged complicity in language, culture, or community' (Dunne 1995: 138). The origins of 
this concept of distinctness can be traced through the etymology of the word "self" which comes 
from the Latin ipse which, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is meant 'to indicate 
emphatically that the reference is to the person or thing mentioned and not, or not merely, to 
some other'.  
 
Elias (2000) argues that the idea of the self as a unified and distinct entity, separated from all 
around it, originated in Rousseau's Confessions. Rousseau's self-narrative explorations reveal 
an individualised and autonomous self that had previously remained 'below the threshold of 
description' (287). And from this came the increasingly differentiated concept of the human 
being that still wields so much influence today. 
 
The conception of the individual as homo clausus, a little world in himself who ultimately 
exists quite independently of the great world outside, determines the image of man in 
general.  Every other human being is likewise seen as homo clausus; his core, his being, 
his true self appears likewise as something divided within him by an invisible wall from 
everything outside, including every other human being (ibid.). 
 This wall between one's "true identity" and the social and material world underscores the view 
that positivist science takes towards the study of human beings. The philosophical and scientific 
construction of this wall 'did not appear to those thinking about it at this stage as an act of 
distancing  but  as  a  distance  actually  present,  as  an  eternal  condition  of  spatial  separation 
between a mental apparatus apparently locked “inside” man and “understanding” or “reason”, 
and the objects “outside” and divided from it by an invisible wall' (Elias 200: 292). 
 
The understanding of identity in relation to its philosophical origins can shed a great deal of light 
on  how  the  "disabled  identity"  is  experienced.  The  notion  that  identity  is  unified  is  a  very 
convincing one as it is reinforced constantly by the way our experiences appear to connect in a 
logical progression. Our identities can be felt to exist as narratives, stories which link together 
who-we-are-now  with  who-we-were  and  who-we-will-become.  Although  in  actuality  these 
narratives have to be very flexible to accommodate the diverse range of new inputs which enter 
a person's realm of experience, they appear to be very stable and unitary. The person who 
becomes disabled experiences a massive rupture to the stability and flow of this narrative and 
this results in the 'biographical disruption' that Bury (1982) describes in relation to the onset and 
negotiation of disability and chronic illness. If it were not for the assumption that our identities 
have a stable and continuous form, bodily disruptions would more easily join the multitude of 
other variations which constantly redefine our lives. 
 
How  then  can  the  decentred,  fragmentary  identity  which  is  integral  to  the  postmodern  self 
become reconciled with its modernist counterpart? Sarup (1996) engages with this issue by 
suggesting that '[i]dentities are stitched together out of discontinuous forms and practices. The 
representation  of  identity  is  an  ongoing  process,  undertaken  on  many  levels,  in  different 
practices and sites of experience. Identity is articulated in multiple modalities - the moment of 
experience, the mode of writing or representation . . . and the theoretical modality' (Sarup 1996: 
40).  Within  this  description  there is a recognition that these multiple identities are 'stitched 
together', even though the fabric from which they are joined may be woven from threads of 
vastly different textures. Ewing also points to this coexistence of representational forms when 
she  argues  that  'as  long  as  an  individual  is  able  to  maintain  contextually  appropriate  self-
representations  in  interaction  with  others,  he  or  she  may  experience  a  sense  of  continuity 
despite the existence of multiple, unintegrated or partially integrated self-representations' (as 
quoted in Sands 1996: 177). 
 
In keeping with the recognition that identity exists as both a fabrication and a perceived "truth" 
that we find difficult to shake, Sands (1996) 'recommend[s] that we assume the postmodern 
stance of "positionality," that is, assume that the self/identity both exists and does not exist (as 
an "essence"), depending on the context in which we are using the concept. In making this 
assumption,  we  recognise  that  self/identity  can be "multiple, contradictory, and in process"' 
(177).  This  brings  to  mind  the  quantum  theory  of  mechanics  which  attempts  to  solve  the dilemma of matter which sometimes appears to behave as a wave and at other times a particle. 
Identity  is metaphorically similar. It is simultaneously a diverse set of fluid identities and a 
stability which people build into a narrative which makes them feel whole.  
 
Rose (1996a) expands the discussion of the dual nature of identity by pointing to 'the peculiar 
fact that at the very moment when this image of the human being is pronounced passé by social 
theorists, regulatory practices seek to govern individuals in a way more tied to their "selfhood" 
than ever before, and the ideas of identity and its cognates have acquired an increased salience 
in so many of the practices in which human beings engage' (169). This intensification of the 
focus on the individualised self is more than a harking back to traditional modes of thinking 
about the subject, it is representative of a system of power relations which is disguised by the 
very notions that it disrupts. 
 
What makes us such an effective 'vehicle' for power is the very fact that we seek to see 
ourselves  as  free  of  it  and  naturally  occurring.  For  Foucault,  Rousseau's  free  and 
autonomous individual is not merely an alternative, outmoded theory of subjectivity, a 
quaint forerunner to contemporary discussions. This very model is the one that allows 
power to conceal itself, and to operate so effectively (Mansfield 2000: 55). 
 
This is why it is so difficult to shift the modernist conception of the self. Our ongoing belief that 
we are unified beings who are free to choose from the multitude of available lifestyles on offer in 
contemporary neoliberal society is the key to our ultimate subjection. 
 
Foucault (1982) illuminates the power relations involved in the formation of subjectivity when he 
supports that '[t]here are two meanings of the word subject... subject to someone else by control 
and  dependence,  and  tied  to  his  own  identity  by  a  conscience  or  self-knowledge.  Both 
meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to' (212). Foucault 
refers  to  this  twofold  signification  as  assujetissiment,  a  French  word  which  has  no  English 
equivalent  and  has  been  translated  variously  as  'subjectivation'  (Butler  1997:  11), 
'subjectification'  (Minson  1985:  44),  and  'subjectivisation'  (Connolly  1998:  155).  I  choose 
"subjectification" as it is a word already in existence which means 'the action of making or being 
made  subjective'  (OED)  which  seems  to  suit  very  well  Foucault's  statement:  'I  will  call 
assujetissement  the  procedure  by  which  one  obtains  the  constitution  of a subject, or more 
precisely, of a subjectivity which is of course only one of the given possibilities of organisation of 
our self-consciousness'  (Foucault 1988i: 253). 
 
Regardless of which word we choose to exchange for assujetissement, its importance lies in its 
expression  of  the  dual  nature  of  the  subject  and  the  insistence  this  places  on  its  social 
construction. In defining the subject as such, Foucault at once unseats the assumptions which 
have supported the belief that the liberal democratic citizen is a free, self-initiating atom, and at 
the same time demonstrates how these beliefs are tied in with the systems of power responsible for this lack of agency. In keeping with Foucault's definition of the subject, I propose a set of 
working definitions for the concepts "identity" and 'subjectivity" which place them at either end of 
Foucault's continuum of subjection. They are very difficult terms to separate and are often used 
interchangeably. However, while, as in any continuum, there is a great deal of overlap, in their 
purest, largely theoretical form, they speak of different states, like the particle and the wave. 
Subjectivity is a term which refers to our inner world, our thoughts and feelings, while identity is 
representative of the external influences, the labels which are imposed from without. 
 
Woodward (1997), in exploring the constitution of identity through difference, approaches the 
distinction  between  identity  and  subjectivity  in  a  way  that  is  conducive  to  the  particular 
understanding of the process of subjectification that I wish to pursue here. 
 
Subjectivity  includes  our  sense  of  self.  It  involves  the  conscious  and  unconscious 
thoughts and emotions which constitute our sense of 'who we are' and the feelings which 
are brought to different positions within culture. Subjectivity involves our most personal 
feelings  and  thoughts.  Yet  we  experience  our  subjectivity  in  a social context where 
language and culture give meaning to experience of ourselves and where we adopt an 
identity. Discourses, whatever sets of meaning they construct, can only be effective if 
they recruit subjects…The divisions which we take up and identify with constitute our 
identities (39). 
 
This touches on the distinction I am trying to draw between identity and subjectivity, but it falls 
short of locating them in their political context. Carspecken and Apple (1992) come closer to this 
kind of analysis when they state that '[i]dentities are constantly claimed, alongside norms and 
values, in human interactions. In fact, they are internally bound to them. Participants use norms 
and values to claim identities' (526). For it is the system of norms which define the identities 
accessible to a particular individual. 
 
It is my contention that identity is the key mechanism for inserting social meaning into personal 
experience and, as such, can be defined as the main conduit linking power to subjectivity. How 
we see ourselves and how we feel we are judged by others is a very powerful point of influence 
and confluence. And it is all the more powerful because we tend to own it completely in terms of 
"personal" qualities such as self-esteem and empowerment, viewing it as a matter of personal 
growth and choice, rather than as an artefact of power, a creation of expert knowledges, a 
potential trap from which it is difficult to escape. Identity is a tool of government, a very powerful 
organising concept which is pivotal to the technologies of the self which govern our beliefs and 
behaviours by way of our apparent "choices" and "freedoms". 
 
'Of all the ways of becoming "other" in our society, disability is the only one that can happen to 
anyone, in an instant, transforming that person's life and identity forever' (King 1993: 75). It is 
therefore  a  unique  site  of  subjectification,  one  which  can  exemplify  with  great  clarity  and intensity  the  ways  in  which  identity  as  a  process  of  labelling,  differentiation  and  social 
positioning joins the personal to the political, the subjective to that which subjugates. Sullivan 
(1996), for example, suggests that the person who suffers from a spinal cord injury 'becomes 
part of the medical discourse on paraplegia which maintains the person as a particular subject, 
knowing and experiencing its body in a highly medicalised way, and having the possibilities as a 
subject  constrained  by  the  disciplinary  techniques  this  knowledge  imposes'  (as  quoted  in 
Sullivan and Munford 1998: 187). Minson (1985) goes to the heart of the issue here with his 
suggestion that '[s]ubjectivities are constituted by, and rendered instrumental to, a particular 
form of power through the medium of the knowledges or technical savoir fair 'immanent' to that 
form of power' (45). I wish to extend this by investigating the role of language in mediating the 
interaction between knowledge and power. Indeed, because language is built on the process of 
"othering" it constitutes a naming process which defines identity through difference.  
 
A  useful  starting  point  in  this  respect  is  Hughes’  (2000)  description  of  the  construction  of 
disability as a process of 'invalidation', an 'othering process that has both produced and "spoilt" 
disability as an identity' (558). He goes on to argue: 
 
Validity is at the heart of the process of othering. It is the question posed by it and 
cultural meanings about what constitutes 'the natural' - conceived as the inescapably 
true - is the ground upon which validity is assessed. To be or become invalid is to be 
defined as flawed or in deficit in terms of the unforgiving tribunal nature and necessity, 
normality and abnormality over which medical science presides (ibid.). 
 
Recognising how the “valid” and the “invalid” are created reveals how closely woven are our 
discourses  and  the  words  we  use  to  frame  them.  Much  can  be  gained  from  exploring  the 
etymology of such words. 
 
Both  meanings  of  invalid,  the  noun  which  defines  a  sick  or  weak    person  and  the 
adjective which means 'not valid' - where valid means sound or true -  are based on the 
same Latin word invalidus which means not strong. When applied to the chronically ill [or 
disabled person], this sense of physical weakness is often extended by the able-bodied 
to mean weak in character and the connotation of the adjective invalid as worthless is 
superimposed on the [disabled] person (Galvin 2000: 47). 
 
Our words are very powerful tools of representation which are accorded even more potency 
when they are taken for granted as transparent symbols of "reality". I believe that the "loosening 
of the ties to our identities", which is the objective of the genealogical approach, can only be 
fully realised through the development of a clear understanding of the fundamental role that 
language plays in naming what is "normal" and what is "other'.  
 
There are many social theorists who argue for the connection between language and identity 
(Danziger 1997; Haber 1994; Hall 1997) and a growing number who are beginning to include this link in their analysis of the disabled identity (Corker 1998, 1999, 2000; Hedlund 2000; Linton 
1998;  Marks  1999).  Indeed,  the  view  that  identity  is  created  through  language  has  a  long 
history,  beginning  with  Baldwin  (1897),  Cooley  (1902)  and  Mead  (1934),  founders  of  the 
sociological field of symbolic interaction, who based their theories on the premise that 'the self is 
primarily a social construction crafted through linguistic exchanges (i.e., symbolic interactions) 
with others' (Harter 1999: 677). In the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to contribute to the 
sociological study of language in relation to disability in the following ways. First, I map the 
theoretical analyses of the construction of language through difference, from Saussure through 
Lacan to Derrida. Following this I argue that the semiotic dichotomy of identity/difference is 
basic to our modes of subjectification and, accordingly, that identity is formed through symbolic 
systems  which  rely  on  the  creation  of  an  antithetical Other. I then place this analysis in a 
Foucaultian framework which recognises the significance of discourse, power and normalisation 
in  the  creation  of  subjects  through  language.  Finally,  I  attempt  to  demonstrate  how  those 
identified as Other are denied a voice within the system of language which defines them and I 
develop a critique around current forms of linguistic challenge to explore the possibilities for 
healing the disabled identity through the subversion of language.  
 
What's in a Name? 
 
Isn't the first question, the one that misfortune itself causes us to forget, this one: why is 
disability called "dis-ability"? Why are those who are born or become different referred to 
by all these various names? Why so many categories? Why even such dramatics in the 
face of what happens . . . which can happen to any of us?… To name, designate, point 
out, is to make exist. Our natural assumption is to believe that language expresses the 
real…  But, quite to the contrary, language operates, transforms, creates. In one sense, 
there is no other reality than language. The institution of language is the primary social 
institution in which all the others are inscribed and, indeed, where they originate (Stiker 
1999: 5, 153). 
 
The  institution  of  an  identity,  which  can  be  a  title  of  nobility  or  of  stigma...  is  the 
imposition  of  a  name,  i.e.  a  social  essence.  To  institute,  to  assign  an  essence,  a 
competence, is to impose a right to be that is an obligation of being so (or to be so) 
(Bourdieu 1991: 120). 
 
…by calling them so, people make them so (Rogers et al. 2001: 259) 
 
The idea that the subject is created in the process of naming is central to the work of Althusser 
(1971) who coined the term 'interpellation' to describe how the practice of subjectification is 
facilitated by locating the subject in language (146). 'Ideology... "recruits" subjects among the 
individuals...  or  "transforms"  the  individuals...  by  the  very  mechanism  I  have  called 
interpellations or "hailing'"' (ibid.). He goes on to explain: 
 Interpellation... can be imagined along the lines of the most common place everyday 
police (or other hailing: ' Hey, you there!  '...). The hailed individual will turn around. By 
this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. 
Why?  Because he has recognised that the hail was "really" addressed to him, and that 
"it was really him who was hailed" (and not someone else) (163).  
 
The response of recognition implicit in the concept of interpellation demonstrates the power of 
the name, the label. It connects our sense of self with society's definition. 'Thus, our occupation 
of a subject-position, such as that of a patriotic [or disabled] citizen, is not a matter simply of 
conscious  personal  choice  but  of  our  having  been  recruited  into  that  position  through 
recognition of it within a system of representation, and of making an investment in it' (Woodward 
1997: 43). The concept of interpellation is helpful, not only because it paves the way for an 
understanding of the creation of the subject through language, but because it points to the 
internalisation  of  oppressive  language  which  is  fundamental  to  the creation of the disabled 
identity. The language we use and the labels we identify with become so taken for granted that 
we eventually feel that we actually, inherently are what we have been named. Therefore, to 
create  the  possibility  for  challenging  this  deeply  embedded  subjugation,  it  is  necessary  to 
historicise  the  process  of  identification  through  language  and,  in  so  doing,  to  unseat  its 
hegemonic hold.  
 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) founded his linguistic theories on three main premises, 
each of which are relevant to the development of a better understanding of the creation of the 
disabled subject through language. He argued that language is socially constructed, that the 
symbols we use to create meaning are arbitrary, and, most importantly for our purposes, that we 
can only understand the meaning of these symbols through contrasting them with what they are 
not. When Saussure argues that 'language is not a function of the speaking subject' (quoted in 
Derrida 2000: 91), he is stating the basic semiotic principle that language is predetermined in its 
possibilities by the structure, already in place, by which a particular culture governs its realm of 
linguistic signification. He refers to this structure as la langue which Hall (1997) describes as 
'the underlying rule-governed structure of language…the language system' (34). Alternately, 
there exists la parole which is the individual speech act which expresses itself through this 
system.  Hedley  (1999)  refers  to  langue  and    parole  as  'the  two  different  modes  in  which 
language  exists  for  us  simultaneously:  as  a  system  of  already  encoded  meanings  and  as 
ongoing open-ended meaning-making activity' (102). 
 
This concept of the system of language and the speaking subject is analogous to Foucault's 
(1972) explication of the two forms of subjectification, i.e., subjection and subjectivity. Being 
'subject to someone else by control and dependence' can be said to rely on the existence of la 
langue, a socially governed system of linguistic possibilities, while being 'tied to [one's] own 
identity by a conscience or self-knowledge' is similarly related to the individual speech act, la 
parole (212). In his earlier work, Foucault (1970) argued that these two realms of language and, thereby, subjecthood, are connected by simple discourse which transmits politically accepted 
definitions. When he states that 'between these two regions [language and parole], so distant 
from one another, lies a domain which, even though its role is mainly an intermediary one, is 
nonetheless fundamental' (xx) I believe that he refers to the space where subjectification takes 
place, between the set of discourses which overarch our political rationalities and the location of 
our inner thoughts, guided by our apparent "freedom of choice".  
 
A  semiotic  perspective  is  also  useful  to  the  analysis  of  subjectification  through  language 
because it demonstrates that meaning is not transparent, that is, that the language we use to 
describe  things  does  not  mirror  reality.  Saussure (1959) expresses it thus: 'a linguistic sign 
unites not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image' (166). According to this 
argument, words are arbitrary, they have no inherent connection to the thing they describe. It is 
the meaning behind the words, the concepts they bring to mind when they are spoken, that 
gives them their power. This is why “politically correct” language may be unable to dislodge 
oppressive identifications, for, if the concepts behind the words remain unchanged, then the 
new  words  end  up  being  just  as  negative  in  their  connotations.  Saussure  points  to  this 
phenomenon  when  he  draws  an  analogy  between  language  and  a  chess  game,  a  unit  of 
language and a chess piece: 
 
Suppose that during a game this piece gets lost or destroyed. Can it be replaced? Of 
course it can. Not only by some other knight, but even by an object of quite a different 
shape, which can be counted as a knight, provided it is assigned the same value as the 
missing piece (Saussure 1983: 153-4). 
 
Thus, if new, "politically correct" language begins to take on the meaning of the word it replaces, 
then the game remains unchanged. For language to liberate, new meanings must emerge, be 
represented. To stay with the chess analogy, it must be capable of making new "moves". 
 
Saussure uses the terms "sign", "signifier" and "signified" to denote the relationship between the 
"referent" (the thing itself), the word used to describe it and the concept this word is intended to 
relay. A sign is the combination of a word (the signifier) with a concept (the signified). Therefore 
signs contain meanings which go well beyond the material reality of the referent. Bradac (2000) 
follows  on from this by describing the political connotations this kind of meaning formation 
makes feasible . 
 
A sign links expression to thought, so an interesting possibility is that by influencing 
expression,  one  can  influence,  or  ultimately  control,  thought.  Also,  by  encouraging 
particular signifier-signified associations and discouraging others, groups can gain or 
maintain power by channeling thoughts in a power-enhancing direction. If the slogan 
"war is good" is used often enough, a sign may come to exist that is constituted by the 
signifier "war" and the signified [good] (500).   
I believe that it is this kind of relationship between the signifier, "disability" (and all the other 
words and phrases which are used to describe impairment), and the very negative concept 
which is signified, which creates an undesirable identity for disabled people. When someone is 
named  "disabled",  they are not being accorded a tag which simply describes a physical or 
material condition, they are being ascribed a set of oppressive associations which stem from the 
hypostatisation of an abstract concept.  
 
Finally,  and  most  importantly,  Saussure  (1959)  suspected  that  'in  language  there  are  only 
differences' (117). This fits together closely with the stipulation that the symbols we use as 
signifiers are arbitrary, that they have no inherent relationship with the thing being described. 
Because of this, a word can only begin to have meaning when it is contrasted with what it is not. 
From  this  comes  the  practice,  vital  to  the  mechanics  of  normalisation,  of  defining  what  is 
"normal"  against  that  which  is  "other"  through  the  construction  of  binary  oppositions.  It  is 
because the politically desirable identity can only be defined in relation to its antithesis, and 
because this formulation negates any differences that may conceivably exist between these two 
extremes,  that  the  subjectification  of  those  who  fall  outside  the  prescriptions  of  the  norm 
becomes such a win or lose affair. Thus, when Saussure (1983) argues that '[t]he mechanism of 
a  language  turns  entirely  on  identities  and  differences'  (151)  he  is  accurately  observing  a 
system  of  identification  which  has  no  room  for  the  recognition  of all the greys which exist 
between "white" and "black".  
 
Lacan  drew  from  Saussure  to  develop  a  psychoanalytical  theory  of  subjectification  which 
proposed  that  the  subject  only  comes  into  being  through  language  and  that  this  process 
coincides  with  and  is  dependent  upon  the  self  being  contrasted  with  what  is  Other. 
Fundamentally, he proposes that '[m]an speaks,... but it is because the symbol has made him 
man' (Lacan 1977: 65). When Lacan argues that words or symbols 'envelope the life of the man 
in a network so total ... that they bring to his birth ... the shape of his destiny' (68), he reinforces 
the argument, developed above, that our identities are created by the imposition of arbitrary and 
hierarchical significations. He adds a different dimension to this, however, because he deals 
directly with the creation of identities and devises a framework within which the original coming 
into subjecthood of the child can be understood.  
 
According to Lacan, the subject comes into being at the stage when the child first recognises 
that it is a separate entity. He refers to this as "the mirror phase", occurring at the time when the 
child, at around six months of age, realises that the image in the mirror is his or her image, and 
that, therefore, he or she is separate from all other people. This coincides, Lacan argues, with 
the child's initiation into the world of language, the symbolic order, and it is in this way that 
language  is  seen  to  be  connected  to  the  creation  of  the  subject  against  a  background  of 
otherness (Rose 2000: 52-53).    
What is important about the mirror stage is that the child comes to recognise itself in 
something that is other to it, in a reflection outside of itself. This means that the image it 
comes  to  call  "I"  or  "myself"  contains,  and  depends  upon,  what  is  not  itself.  This 
otherness  is  recognised  in  the  difference  between  what  the  child  experiences  as  a 
fragmented, uncontrolled body and the close unity of the image with which it is faced as 
the "self" (Hendricks and Oliver 1999: 24). 
 
From that time onwards, Lacan argues, the subject holds tightly onto his or her desire for unity 
and, through language, attempts to create a secure space of identity. This attempt to achieve 
unity through language is highly precarious because, as Saussure has revealed, language is 
arbitrary and words only have meaning in contrast with what they are not.  
 
In fact, this image of language as a system of communication is one of the ruses of the 
symbolic order, its perpetual offering of a stable meaning that perpetually eludes us. 
Language is an unstable and obscure system, offering us identities and simultaneously 
drawing them away from us. It seems to offer us imaginary individual completion, while 
entangling us in a shared symbolic order (Mansfield: 2000 47). 
 
Mansfield’s point takes us to postmodern notions relating to the decentring of the self and the 
slippage of meaning in language, both of which will be dealt with later in the chapter. What is 
important  for  now  is  that,  because  language  and,  accordingly,  the  subject,  are  articulated 
through difference, the existence of the Other is a vital determinant of identity. 
 
Lacan refers to the self in relation to "the other" in two different ways. The first is the other (with 
a lower-case "o") which is representative of the image that the child sees in the mirror. This 
"other" is part of the self, but at the same time separate from it, bringing with it the sense of self 
to the individual at the same time as fragmenting it. The Other (with a capital "O") is used by 
Lacan to refer to those who are "not-me", those others who provide the contrast against which 
we can define ourselves (Lazar 2001: 285). Yet, while Lacan believes that the subject desires to 
merge with the Other to return to its original, pre-lingual sense of stability and security, my 
proposition is that, to gain this sense of unity, the subject responds in such a way as to spurn 
the Other. For, while we are socialised to affiliate with what Mead (1962 [1934]: 56) refers to as 
the 'generalised other', all that which is outside a comfortable structuring of identity is seen as 
threatening and undesirable, and it is through language, built on binary oppositions, that the 
subject creates a safe space to dwell in opposition to that which lives outside the norm. 
 
Butler (1997a) points to the importance of language in constructing identity when she argues 
that '[t]he subject is called a name, but "who" the subject is depends as much on the names that 
he or she is never called: the possibilities for linguistic life are both inaugurated and foreclosed 
through the name' (Butler 1997a: 41). A symbolic system, such as the English language, which achieves its meanings through the construction of binary oppositions can only really identify 
subjects of discourse by locating them as members or non-members of culturally desirable 
categories. This is why disability cannot be defined as multiple variations of an acceptable 
identity. It can only be seen as not-able, not-normal, not-enfranchised, that is, unacceptably 
different,  antithetical  to  the  norm.  Yet,  it  is  more  than  individual  words  which  frame  the 
derogatory  concepts  which  are  associated  with  Otherness.  Oppression  is  born  and  takes 
residence in the patterns and rhythms of language in the larger sense of its signification.  
 
Semantics and Disability Discourse 
 
Racist  language  is  significant  only  within  a  context  that  sanctions  wide  varieties of 
disparate treatment of members of races deemed lesser, including social and economic 
isolation, harassment, violence, and even genocide. These practices are the core - the 
threat and the reality - of racism. Without their cultural and material "back-up," words like 
the derogatory terms we are considering would not have force they do (Tirrell 1999: 45). 
 
Words have no proper meaning, because no meaning can be said to 'belong' to them; 
and they do not possess any meaning in themselves, because it is discourse, taken as a 
whole, that carries the meaning, itself an undivided whole (Ricoeur 1978: 77). 
 
While it is vital to understand language from a semiotic perspective, that is, to discover how 
meaning  is  created through individual signs, this is only one side of the equation. What is 
signified by a particular signifier or, in other words, which concept is attached to a certain word 
in a particular context, is reliant on more than the image associated with that word. It depends 
on the context in which the word is used. Ricoeur (1978) draws on Beneventiste to argue that 
this relies on an understanding of semantics. 
 
The sign is the unit of semiotics while the sentence is the unit of semantics. As these 
units belong to different orders, semiotics and semantics hold sway over different arenas 
and take on restricted meanings. To say with de Saussure that language is a system of 
signs is to characterise language in just one of its aspects and not in its total reality (68). 
 
Words alone have limited power. It is only in combination that they develop the complex, often 
subtle  meanings  through  which  they  wield  their  real  influence.  'The sentence is realised in 
words, but the words are not simply segments of it. A sentence constitutes a whole which is not 
reducible to the sum of its parts; the meaning inherent in this whole is distributed over the 
ensemble of its constituents' (Benveniste as quoted in Ricoeur 1978: 66). 
 
Merleau Ponty (1964a) points to the deficiency that exists in an approach which only focuses on 
individual signs. Like Ricoeur, he argues that '[t]he reason why a language finally intends to say 
and does say something is not that each sign is the vehicle for a signification which allegedly 
belongs to it, but that all the signs together allude to a signification which is always in abeyance when they are considered singly' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 88). He believes that the sign 'does not 
so much express a meaning as mark a divergence of meaning between itself and other signs' 
and that, because signs are only definable in contrast to what they are not, they can only have 
true meaning in combination (39). 'As far as language is concerned, it is the lateral relation of 
one sign to another which makes each of them significant, so that meaning appears only at the 
intersection of and as it were in the interval between words' (42). 
 
Going one step further into a political analysis of language, Lyotard (1988) argues that semantic 
meaning is encapsulated in what he calls 'phrase regimens' (28-29). For Lyotard, as Hammer 
(1997) argues, ‘[t]he primary unit of discourse is the phrase which is constituted by a set of rules 
called  "regimens"  which  define the properties and uses of the phrase' (482). Lyotard, thus, 
believes in the primacy of word chains for the creation of meaning, and he extends the analysis 
to incorporate different kinds of phrase structures such as those which are based on 'reasoning, 
knowing,  describing,  recounting,  questioning,  showing,  ordering,  etc'  and  which  create 
meanings in different ways (ibid.). He also argues that the way phrases are linked is vital to their 
signification and that it is the combination of "phrase regimens" and "linkages" that determines 
the power of the speaker in relation to what can be said and what cannot. Haber (1994) argues, 
in line with Lyotard, that the limitations in the number of possibilities for speech through such 
structures  results  in  'the  silencing  of  the  voice  of  the Other; the Other becomes a plaintiff 
divested of the means to argue and becomes, on that account, a victim' (20). 
 
Semantics is vital to the study of language and identity because it links the individual symbols 
which  affect  our  labelling  processes  with  the  discourses  which  inform  them.  It  is  certainly 
significant that single words express very strong ideas about what is desirable and undesirable 
in  a  particular  culture.  The  words  "disabled",  "cripple",  "spastic",  "invalid",  "weak"  and 
"abnormal" evoke very intense, very negative images. However, it is the framework within which 
these words are embedded, the sentences, the discourses which inform their use and their 
possibilities, which bring us to the heart of the connection between language and power. The 
word "disability", for example, conjures up the images it does because it mediates between the 
recipient of the word and the larger discourse within which disability is framed. This discourse 
includes medical knowledge, media imagery, sociological discourse, the education syllabus and 
political programmes, to name just a few sites of knowledge creation and/or dissemination. 
Therefore we need to understand not only how language functions symbolically, but also how 
these symbols are tied, through discourse, to systems of power.   
 
Danaher et al. (1996) argue that '[f]or Foucault, one of the most significant forces shaping our 
experiences is language' (31). This statement needs some qualification. Foucault's (1970; 1972) 
early, "archaeological" work is strongly in favour of an approach which focuses on language, but 
even then he was careful to always speak of language in the context of discourse. Later, in his 
genealogical  investigations,  he  often  wrote  scathingly  of  the  semiotic  approach  because  it lacked teeth, that is, it ignored or did not explore the connection between language and power. 
Foucault (1980g) wanted it to be known that he had moved beyond a sanitised exploration of 
language and had entered the field, ‘violent, bloody and lethal’, of power relations. 
 
Here I believe one's point of reference should not be to the great model of language 
(langue) and signs, but to that of war and battle… Neither the dialectic, as logic of 
contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the 
intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts. 'Dialectic' is a way of evading the always open and 
hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and 'semiology' is a 
way of avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic 
form of language and dialogue (114). 
 
This does not entail, however, a rejection of the importance of language as a whole. Discourse 
is, after all, both built from language and responsible for the tone that it takes. Indeed, it is 
impossible to think about discourse without taking into account the language that forms it, a fact 
that Foucault himself observes: 
 
Discourse - the mere fact of speaking, of employing words, of using the words of others 
(even if it means returning them), words that the others understand and accept (and, 
possibly, return from their side) - this fact in itself is a force (Foucault as quoted by 
Davidson (1997): 4). 
 
In Hall’s (1997) view, '[t]he main point to get hold of here is the way discourse, representation, 
knowledge and ' truth ' are radically historicised by Foucault, in contrast to the rather ahistorical 
tendency in semiotics' (46). And in placing language in its historical context, Foucault creates a 
space within which other possibilities can be imagined. 
 
For  Foucault,  discourses  are  'practices  that  systematically  form  the  objects  of  which  they 
speak... Discourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and 
in the practice of doing so conceal their own intervention' (Foucault 1972: 49). In this sense, 
discourses are ways of thinking which have been institutionalised through culturally approved 
apparatuses of power. Hall (1997) states that Foucault sees discourse as 'a group of statements 
which provide a language for talking about - a way of representing the knowledge about - a 
particular  topic  in  a  particular  historical  moment...  Discourse  is  about  the  production  of 
knowledge through language. But... since all social practices entail meaning, and meanings 
shape and influence what we do - our conduct - all practices have a discursive aspect' (44).  
 
When  discussing  the  relationship  that  exists  between  his  various  genealogical  projects, 
Foucault (1982) declares that his objective 'has been to create a history of the different modes 
by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects' (208). He achieves this by exploring 
the three axes of subjectification: truth, power and ethics, and argues that he wishes 'to know how the reflexivity of the subject and discourse are linked' (Foucault 1988g: 38). The social 
nexus  which  connects  discourse  and  the  subject  is  fundamental  to  both  Madness  and 
Civilisation and The History of Sexuality. 
 
Regarding madness, my problem was to find out how the question of madness could be 
made to operate in terms of discourses of truth, that is to say, discourses having the 
status and function of true discourses. In the West that means scientific discourse. That 
was also the angle from which I wanted to approach the question of sexuality (Foucault 
1980h: 210). 
 
Indeed, it would not be an overstatement to suggest that Foucault believed that identities such 
as the madman, the criminal, the homosexual, the hysterical woman and, in fact, all identities as 
we know them, would not exist outside of discourse. 'Foucault argues that since we only have a 
knowledge of things if they have a meaning, it is discourse - not the things-in-themselves - 
which  produces  knowledge.  Subjects  like  'madness',  'punishment'  and  'sexuality'  only  exist 
meaningfully within the discourses about them' (Hall 1997: 45-46). 
 
The same applies to disability. Disability is created through a range of discourses which interact 
to produce the disabled identity. In an elegant and incisive study of the connections between 
disability  and  discourse  in  Australia,  Price  (1995)  draws  on  Foucault's  belief  'that  in  every 
society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed 
by a certain number of procedures' (7). Three of the procedures which Price argues are relevant 
to the discursive construction of disability are 'prohibitions', 'truths' and 'rules'. According to 
Price, prohibitions are enacted through impositions which limit how disability is to be talked 
about. What is allowed and what is prohibited in and through disability discourse depends on 
the 'truths' that have evolved via the interaction of the human sciences and policy rhetoric, and 
the 'rules' which govern who can gain entry to the discourse. 
 
So it is that the individual is subject to a number of discursive practices. A multiplicity of 
discourses occur, and it is these groups of knowledge or understandings which sanction 
particular social practices. These discursive practices are the nexus of society. In the 
area  of  disability,  service  providers,  consumers,  and  policy  text  are  all  constructed 
through these discursive practices. They both contribute to, and yet are determined by, 
the discourses which circumscribe and delimit their social practices (Price 1995: 9). 
 
Madden and Hogan (1997), authors of the government publication, The Definition of Disability in 
Australia: Moving Towards National Consistency, focus on the evolution of terminology used to 
describe disability within government programmes. They do not write from a critical perspective. 
Rather, their analysis follows the prescriptions called for within the discourses they explore. Yet, 
this  makes  their  statements  even  more  revealing  in  relation  to  how  power  works  through 
language,  concealed  by  "truth".  They  state  that  '[t]erminology  has  played  a  crucial  role  in achieving changed policy and perceptions in the disability field. Good terminology unearths and 
crystallises  basic  concepts.  Ideally  it  is  also  stable  and  consistent  enough  to  help  people 
communicate'  (65).  This,  I  would  argue,  is  an  innocent  description  of  how  language  is 
manoeuvred  to  serve  particular  purposes.  Thus,  when  Madden  &  Hogan  (1997)  state  that 
'definitions at best reflect "true" underlying concepts and are consistent with current terminology' 
(op cit.) they refer to a “truth” created through discourse. Most revealing of all is their closing 
statement: 'terminology [is] the flag bearer of vision and sometimes change' (ibid). One need 
only ask, whose vision and what kind of change? 
 
Governmental  terminology  creates  images  of  disability  through  such  symbolic  locations  as 
eligibility criteria which define disability as the inability to work, disabled parking signs which 
reduce  disability  to  the  notion  of  wheelchairs,  and  "support  services"  which  emphasise 
dependence and inertia. The language and the images produced through the discourse which 
informs and is created by political programmes are, however, only one strand in the complex 
web of discourse which produces the disabled identity. Medical and social science knowledge, 
educational  paradigms  and  cultural  images  disseminated  through  literature  and  the 
communications media are likewise involved in the creation of disability and are thus a function 
of what Foucault (1977c) refers to as the 'multiplicity of discursive elements that come into play' 
in creating subjectivity (100). None of the discourses which are embedded in these areas of 
knowledge production can be distinctly separated from any of the others as they all interact 
within an overarching framework or rationality, but it is possible to tease out their individual 
contributions to the formation of the disabled subject so as to 'reconstruct… the things said and 
those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden' in the reification of disability 
(ibid). 
 
Chief among these contributions is medical discourse. Because it is based on a humanist model 
of personhood, it focuses on the individual and not the social structure and, therefore, leads to 
the view that disability is a personal tragedy rather than a socially created problem. Sullivan and 
Munford (1998) elaborate: 
 
A central technology of power that operates to create disabled people is the medical 
discourse on impairment.  Discourse functions to regulate the way individuals think 
about the world and live their lives. Lived practices are, in turn, regulated through ideas, 
language,  institutional  behaviour,  rituals  and  social  relationships.    In  this  sense… 
[m]edical discourse determines the ways in which disabled people are perceived and 
socially located (187). 
 
The perceptions that are developed around disability and the disabled identity through medical 
discourse involve not only the assumption that the person who becomes disabled is physically 
damaged, but that they become socially unacceptable as well. Hughes (2000) expresses it thus: 
'[The medical] model is far from socially benign, since for disabled people, it is based on the disabling  extrapolation  that  bio-physical  'maladaption'  -  to  use  the  ubiquitous  evolutionary 
terminology - leads to social maladaption' (555). 
 
In  a  study  which  focuses  on  the  rehabilitation  of  people  who  have  had  limbs  amputated, 
Gallagher and McLachlan (1999) refer to 'psychological and social adjustment problems' such 
as 'shock, denial, grief [and] depression' which must be addressed by the disabled person in 
'learning to cope with their loss' (118). This study is typical of the prevailing attitudes towards 
disability  which  exist  within  the  health  and  social  sciences  and  emphasise  individual 
psychological change in terms of "coping", "adjustment", and "adaptation". Rather than focus on 
why disability causes such shock, grief and depression, the emphasis is on what McNamee 
(1996) refers to as 'identity adjustment' which relies on teaching the disabled person to accept 
their oppressive identifications (145). This attitude is rife throughout the literature informing 
psychology,  psychotherapy,  sociology,  medicine  and  rehabilitation.  Barnes,  Mercer  and 
Shakespeare (1999) argue that, due to its definition within medical discourse, 'the "disability" 
takes over the individual's identity and constrains "unrealistic" hopes and ambitions. Those with 
a perceived impairment accept being defined as not "normal" and in some ways "defective"… 
[and thus] are socialised into a traditional disabled role and identity, and expected to submit to 
professional intervention in order to facilitate their adjustment to their "personal tragedy"' (25). 
 
School-based  pedagogic  discourse  is  another  area  where  pervasive  views  of  disability  are 
developed and disseminated. Both the ways in which mainstream schools present the concept 
of disability to their able-bodied students and the methods by which special schools operate to 
socialise  children  into  disabled  roles influence how disability is perceived and experienced. 
Clarke et al. (1998), in their exploration of special education discourse, argue that it is based on 
psychological  and  medical  perspectives  of  disability  and  thus  focuses  on  individual  deficit. 
Moreover, Saini (2001) in her semiotic study of mothers’ wish to place their children in non-
segregated  schools,  shows  how  the  exclusion  inherent  in  special  education  facilitates  the 
creation of subordinate identities. In parallel to this, Sleeter and Grant (1991) conclude that 
disabled people are either absent from or symbolised as powerless within a range of social 
studies, maths, science and English mainstream text books. They argue that: 
 
In this way, curriculum usually serves as a means of social control. It legitimates existing 
social relations and the status of those who dominate, and it does so in a way that 
implies that there are no alternative versions of the world, and that the interpretation 
being taught in school is, indeed, undisputed fact. Knowledge helps shape power and 
social activity (or lack of it) (80). 
 
Discourse evolving within and dispersed throughout the educational environment is perhaps 
one of the most influential locations for the linking of power to subjectivity because it is a major 
site of socialisation for the young (Kenway 1995: 132). The idea that disability is an inferior and 
pitiable condition is introduced at a very early stage to both disabled and non-disabled children.  
The  discourses  of  medicine,  social  science  and  education  certainly  provide  a  very  fertile 
environment for the propagation of demeaning representations of disability. Yet, while in earlier 
times  these  discourses were introduced into the lives of disabled individuals through either 
direct contact with medical professionals or the common-sense understandings which derived 
from medical and scientific knowledge, over the past few decades a myriad of cultural forms 
have emerged through the rapid growth in communications media and multiplied the sites for 
identity creation and reinforcement. While the novel has been producing questionable images of 
disability for centuries, the endless repetition of images made possible by electronic media 
sources has increased and intensified the impact of  the technologies of subjectification. Karpf 
(1988), in her book Doctoring the Media, devotes a chapter to what she refers to as 'crippling 
images', those images which marginalise the disabled identity via popular culture. The kind of 
images which can be considered "crippling" include 'the media fondness for cure stories; the 
role of charity appeals; the invisibility of disabled people on television; the stereotyped portrayal 
of  disabled  characters  in  screen  drama;  the  under  employment  of  disabled  people  in 
broadcasting' (Davis 1997a: 23).  
 
The discourses discussed here bind the subjective fate of those who become disabled in a knot 
so tight and yet so elusive that it is extremely difficult to loosen its grip. The resistance of these 
bonds to any interference is a function of what Marx called "ideology" and Gramsci "hegemony" 
where both concepts allude to the invisible nature of the shackle and thus the complicity of the 
subject. Langman (1998) discusses how this complicity is achieved in his exploration of the 
connections between hegemony, identity and subjectivity. 
 
With language and reflexivity, the colonisation of subjectivity has the insinuated elite 
interests within the person… Thus hegemony secures 'willing assent' in so far as it is 
secured by socially based desires and mediated through identities. The constitution of 
such identities serves to colonise agency in such ways that the continual enactment of 
daily routines, interactions and the logics of understanding that the micro-social level of 
reproduce the social structure (188). 
 
Foucault's rejection of the humanist belief in totalising power structures made him resistant to 
such concepts as hegemony and ideology, but, as Sarup (1996) points out, in developing the 
concept of discourse, he was able to address the 'problems with the ideology/truth opposition' 
and thus 'short circuit [these] epistemological problems' (69). And, ultimately, I believe that this 
has made possible an understanding of how identity, as a concept created through language, 
has come to form an invisible conduit between power and subjectivity. 
 
 
 
 Spoiled Identities and Muted Voices 
 
The first and most important thing to remember about discussions of language and 
disability is that they arise because disabled people experience discrimination daily and 
are denied the same rights and opportunities as the rest of the population. Apart from 
the fact that words can be deeply hurtful to disabled individuals, they have power and 
are used extensively to justify oppression (Barnes 1993: 8). 
 
I  now  wish  to  focus  more  specifically  on  the  implications  of  my  theoretical  discussion  in 
exploring how language stands to affect disabled people in their daily lives. As has already been 
discussed, language can impact on the way that disabled people experience the world in two 
ways: 'through macro-linguistic strategies, involving whole narratives [or discourses], or through 
micro-linguistic  practices,  in  which  short  phrases  and  even  single  words  carry  ideological 
significance' (Priestley 1999: 93). In unravelling this, I focus on the ways that individual words 
stigmatise and discourses silence. On a semiotic level, words which have negative connotations 
are used to label and, consequently, stigmatise disabled people. Alongside this, discourses put 
signs in their political contexts, delimit what can and cannot be said and, in so doing, privilege 
the norm and silence the margins. Both these processes of stigmatisation and silencing, which 
are, of course, not so neatly separable as this might suggest, need to be understood to properly 
appreciate the production of the inferior status accorded disabled people. 
 
 Goffman's (1963) Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity serves to illuminate, on 
several different levels, our understanding of the creation of the disabled identity through the 
stigmatising properties of language. Goffman was a brilliant observer of social interaction and 
his research into the effects of disability on the inner worlds and outward behaviour of disabled 
people, as well as the reactions of non-disabled individuals to impairment, still provides a great 
deal of insight into how stigma operates in society. At the same time, he also represents a 
micro-sociological  viewpoint  which  focuses on individual perceptions but not their structural 
causes, leading to the belief, in keeping with the medical model, that disabled people must deal 
with their stigmatisation by learning to cope with it, not by challenging its structural origins. And, 
lastly, he speaks in the language of the culture at large without being the least bit critical of it, for 
example, when he uses such terms as "affliction," "victim," and "cripple," and introduces people 
as "cases". In this way, Goffman educates us in more ways than one, because, while he maps 
the existence and performance of stigma with great precision, he also enunciates with complete 
innocence and, therefore, equal precision, the attitudes which propagate it.  
 
Goffman (1963) defines stigma as 'the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full 
social acceptance' (9) and states that people who are stigmatised are seen as 'not quite human' 
and 'reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one' (5). He 
argues that, fundamental to learning to live with disability or other forms of stigmatisation 'is 
learning the normal point of view and learning that he is disqualified according to it. Presumably the next phase consists of his learning to cope with the way others treat the kind of person he 
can be shown to be' (101). From this view, disability not only involves the production of an 
extremely negative identity, it also demands that the disabled person take full responsibility for 
defusing it, as when Goffman suggests:  
 
Normals mean no harm; when they do, it is because they don't know better. They should 
therefore be tactfully helped to act nicely.  Slights, snubs and untactful remarks should 
not be answered in kind. Either no notice should be taken or the stigmatised individual 
should make an effort at sympathetic re-education of the normal showing him, point for 
point, quietly and with delicacy, that in spite of appearances the stigmatised individual is, 
fundamentally, a fully human being (146). 
 
According to this view, a view which remains almost unchallenged even today, the existence of 
stigma  is  unavoidable  and  proceeds  naturally  from  the  possession  of  an  identity  which  is 
considered unacceptably different. 
 
Peters (1999) makes the connection between stigma and discriminatory language and argues 
that 'people with disabilities experience invasion of their disability identity through the practices 
of labelling and hegemonic language usage detrimental to their images' (103). The primary 
mechanism whereby this labelling is achieved is through the creation of stereotypical identities. 
In this way, key words, such as "cripple", "disabled" or "handicapped", are attached to a set of 
images which, regardless of whether they in fact describe the person in question, are assumed 
to do so because they are associated with disabled people in general. In semiotic terms, the 
signifier, "disabled," becomes attached to a range of significatory concepts (signifieds) such as 
weak, passive, dependent, unintelligent, worthless and problematic, so that when the word is 
spoken, a negative, even if partially subconscious, feeling is evoked.   
 
Stigma as a form of negative stereotyping has a way of neutralising positive qualities 
and undermining the identity of stigmatised individuals This kind of social categorisation 
has also been described by one sociologist as a "discordance with personal attributes". 
Thus, many stigmatised people are not expected to be intelligent, attractive, or upper 
class (Coleman 1997: 221 -222). 
 
It is this "discordance with personal attributes" which can be the most frightening factor in the 
experience of stigmatisation, because it creates an existential crisis which often can only be 
resolved by internalising the view of the oppressor.  
 
Quasthoff (1989) comments that stereotypes are ‘emotionally evaluative’, are  ‘characterised by 
persistence and rigidity’ and are ‘resistant to change in societies as well as in individuals' (182). 
They are, thus, very powerful political tools in their concise and incisive ability to subjectify. They 
both emanate from and contribute to the process of normalisation through the construction of binary  oppositions,  with  the  norm  represented  by  "stereotypical"  images  of  activity, 
independence and achievement. The threat wielded by the negative stereotype can be a strong 
deterrent  against  bucking  the  system  and  those  who,  like  disabled  people,  cannot  avoid 
becoming Other become exemplary, through their stereotypical representation, of what not to 
be. 
 
Stereotyping, in other words, is part of the maintenance of the social and symbolic order.  
It sets up a symbolic frontier between the 'normal' and the 'deviant', the 'normal' and the 
'pathological,' the 'acceptable' and the 'unacceptable', what 'belongs' and what does not 
or is 'Other', between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', Us and Them. It facilitates the 'binding' or 
bonding together of all of Us who are 'normal' into one 'imagined community'; and it 
sends into symbolic exile all of Them - ' the Others' - us who are in some way different - 
'beyond the pale' (Hall 1997: 258). 
 
In this way, and, as Hall (op. cit.) argues '[s]tereotyping is a key element in [the] exercise of 
symbolic violence' (259). This symbolic violence operates nowhere more clearly than in the fact 
that stereotyping results in the disabled person being allocated a 'master status' (Becker 1963: 
32-33)  or  a  label  of  'primary  potency'  (Singh  1999:  88).  In  this  way,  the  diversity  which 
characterises any group of disabled people slips below the plane of sight. Robert Murphy (1990) 
whose  book  The  Body  Silent    is  a  testament  to  the  systematic  dismantling  of  a  disabled 
person's identity, writes that '[s]tigmatization is less a by-product of disability than its substance. 
The greatest impediment to a person's taking full part in this society are not his physical flaws, 
but  rather  the tissue of myths, fears, and misunderstandings that society attaches to them' 
(113). 
 
But, it is once again necessary to go back to our fundamental question of how this process of 
"naming," of being allocated an identity, is tied to discourse. One fruitful way of approaching this 
is through the concept of "performativity." The term "performative" was originally coined by 
Austin (1962: 6-7) to describe words which perform an action by way of their utterance and has 
been used extensively by theorists such as Bourdieu, Derrida and Butler to demonstrate how 
subjects are formed through the ceaseless repetition of their identification through language and 
the  performance  of  their  identities.  A  clear  example  of  a  performative  phrase  is  the 
announcement, upon the birth of a baby: "It's a girl!" The mere uttering of these words imposes 
an identity upon the child that will impact on her for the rest of her life. I argue that "disability" 
has a similarly performative effect, because, by naming the person "disabled", he or she inherits 
all the connotations that have been accorded disability through the discourses discussed earlier. 
In other words, being called "disabled" effectively disables and, in so doing, is a term which 
performs  an  action.  These  words  are  so  effective  at  concealing  their  powers  of  institution 
because they appear to be what Austin referred to as "constative", words which merely describe 
an existing reality. But, as Bourdieu (1991b) argues, these terms are actually 'prescriptive' in that  they  create what they pretend only to mirror (134). 'Become what you are: that is the 
principle behind the performative magic of all acts of institution' (Bourdieu 1991: 122). 
 
Butler  (1990)  defines  performativity  as  'the  reiterative  power  of  discourse  to  produce  the 
phenomena  that  it  regulates  and  constrains'  (33).  It  is  through  the  repetition  of  words  and 
associated images mediated by discourse that disability takes on its current meaning. Disability 
and its counterpoint "able-bodiedness" are performed through a variety of ritualised techniques 
embedded in language which come to define them as instances of privileged or marginalised 
identity. Derrida (1977) points out that the reiteration of an identity does not rely on having 
something stable or "real" to copy from, a certified original, but depends, alternately, on having a 
sanctioned  pattern  of  repetition  associated  with  its  performance,  'a  "coded"  or  iterable 
utterance…identifiable in some way as a "citation"'(18). 
 
If a performative provisionally succeeds (and I will suggest that "success " is always and 
only provisional), then it is not because an intention successfully governs the action of 
speech, but only because that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of 
authority through the repetition or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices. What 
this means, then, is that a performative "works" to the extent that it draws on and covers 
over the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilised (italics original) (Butler 1993: 
227). 
 
In relation to disability, this means that there is no original form or example of disability to copy 
from: there is always only the copy which has been circulated under the guise of an essential 
quality. This is how disability becomes a concept which is taken for granted as a physically 
governed, rather than a socially constituted, reality. Drawing from Baudrillard (1983) it is then 
possible to view disability as a 'simulacrum', a replication of a representation or an image which 
has been constructed to give the category "normal" substance (4). 
 
Discourse silences disabled people in many ways. It leaves them with no language with which 
to express themselves, it invalidates their narratives and, therefore, their subjective realities, 
and it renders them invisible. When Foucault (1988g) was asked whether he had any intention 
of trying to rehabilitate the Other through raising the profile of subjugated language, he replied: 
'How can the truth of the sick subject ever be told?' (29). Discourse, in creating the space for 
subject formation by marking the boundaries of exclusion, leaves us with silent subjects who 
have no way of telling their stories and articulating their subjecthood or lack of it. Thus, the 
possibilities for how disabled people will be able to see themselves and their situations are 
defined  by  what  Sapir  refers  to  as  'the  tyrannical  hold  that  linguistic  form  has  upon  our 
orientation in the world' (as quoted in Muhlhausler and Harre 1990: 4).  
 Yet, even for those who can see beyond the dominant rationality to question their oppression, 
the opportunities for them to articulate their objections are strictly limited within the framework 
which governs acceptable patterns of thought and speech.  
 
People who question the dominant ideology often appear not to make sense; what they 
say won't sound logical to anyone who holds that ideology. In extreme cases, people 
who ask such questions may even appear mad. So while it is possible to question the 
dominant culture there is often a price to be paid for doing so (Jones and Wareing 1999: 
34). 
 
Young (1990) argues similarly that when people who are classed as Other attempt to voice any 
objections to their identification they are 'met with denial and powerful gestures of silencing, 
which  can make oppressed people feel slightly crazy' (134). This resonates with Foucault's 
(1988c)  discussion  of  madness  in  terms  of  'forbidden  speech'  (179).  In  this  way,  madness 
operates as a punishment and a deterrent, a warning to those who might attempt to speak 
outside of acceptable discourse. 
 
Arguably,  the  worst  of  all  the ways one can be silenced is to be ignored altogether, to be 
rendered invisible. 'Indeed, one can be interpellated, put in place, given a place through silence, 
through  not  being  addressed,  and  this  becomes  painfully  clear  when  we  find  ourselves 
preferring the occasion of being derogated to the one of not being addressed at all' (Butler 
1997a: 27). Witkin (1998) writes of the extreme kind of invisibility which is experienced by those 
with 'severe or multiple disabilities' who 'do not participate in the mainstream of community life' 
(294). Yet, even more insidious in some ways because of its subtlety is the invisibility which 
accompanies being identified as disabled ahead of anything else, of being patronised, ignored, 
devalued, and rejected, and of not being heard no matter how hard one tries to be understood.  
 
Those silenced through discourse have been variously described in terms of "abject bodies" 
(Butler 1990), "subaltern voices" (Spivak 1988), "the differend" (Lyotard 1988) and, as already 
discussed at length, "subjugated knowledges" (Foucault 1980d: 82). Each of these terms refers 
to  their  exclusion  from  language  and  explores  this  silencing  in  the  context  of  dominant 
discourses. Butler (1990) argues that "normative injunctions" constitute the privileged subject 
and result in the abjection of those constructed outside the domain of acceptability (144-149) 
and suggests that '[t]he abjection of certain kinds of bodies, their inadmissibility to codes of 
intelligibility, does make itself known in policy and politics, and to live as such a body in the 
world is to live in the shadowy regions of ontology' (Butler as quoted in Meijer and Prins 1998: 
280). It is this ‘shadowy region of ontology’ that Mutua (2001) refers to when he writes of the 
invisibility of disabled people in Kenya, referring to them as 'nameless shadows' (107).  
 
Similarly, Spivak’s term "subaltern voices" refers to the suppression of the ability to express 
one's marginalisation, but this time from a postcolonial perspective where the oppressed in question  are  those  who  have  been  subjected  to  the  cultural  imperialism  of  the  colonial 
oppressor. Spivak (1988) poses the question in her article of the same name: 'Can the subaltern 
speak?' to which her answer is a resounding "no!" Davidson (2001) emphasises that Spivak 
‘ground[s] her argument in a consideration of the issue of sati - widow burning - in colonial India, 
maintaining that subaltern women's voices are completely absent in extant records because 
colonial and indigenous manipulation of female agency silenced them’ and goes on to argue 
that, for Spivak, ’there is no possibility of the subaltern ever coming to voice or of anyone else 
ever speaking for her' (Davidson 2001: 170).  
 
In developing the notion of the differend, Lyotard (1988) constructs a new way of understanding 
how  silencing  occurs.  As  discussed  above,  the  numbers  and  kinds  of  "phrase  regimens" 
available limits what can be said and results in the creation of the “differend”, an excess of 
meaning which cannot be expressed. Lyotard (1988) argues that this excess results in 'the case 
where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim' (9).  
 
In the differend, something asks to be put into phrases and suffers from the injustice of 
not being able to be instantly put into phrases. This is when human beings who thought 
they could use language as an instrument of communication learned through a feeling of 
pain which accompanied silence (and of pleasure which accompanied the invention of a 
new vision), that they are surrounded by language... to recognise that what remains to 
be phrased exceeds what they can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed to 
institute idioms which may not yet exist (10). 
 
Lyotard, like Spivak, gives a way of understanding the process of muting that accompanies 
subjectification, but suggests that there may be ways of creating new language, new "idioms", 
which  constitute  the  ultimate  hope  for  building  a  resistance  against  the  hegemonic  use  of 
language. In what remains of this chapter, I will discuss how the raising of the subaltern voices 
of  disabled  people  is  currently  occurring  through  the  development  of  new  idioms  through 
slippage and metaphor, the inherent difficulties in doing so, and how these can be overcome. 
 
Challenging Disabling Discourse: Finding a Voice 
 
Coining a new word is more like driving a wedge into a crack in a wall than putting a 
torch on a previously unilluminated part of the stone work (Griffiths 1995: 169). 
 
Tomorrow I am going to re-write the English language 
I will discard all those striving ambulist metaphors 
Of power and success 
And construct new images to describe my strength 
My new, different strength. 
Then I won't have to feel dependent 
Because I can't stand on my own two feet And I will refuse to feel a failure 
When I don't stay one step ahead. 
I won't feel inadequate if I can't 
Stand up for myself 
Or illogical when I don't 
Take it one step at a time. 
 
I will make them understand that it is a very male way 
To describe the world 
All this walking tall 
And making great strides. 
 
Yes, tomorrow I am going to re-write the English Language, 
Creating the world in my own image. 
Mine will be a gentler, more womanly way 
To describe my progress. 
I will wheel, cover and encircle 
Somehow I will learn to say it all.                                                  Lois Keith 1994: 57 
 
As I have attempted to demonstrate, language is constructed with the purpose of representing 
and perpetuating certain systems of meaning and it is from within these conceptual structures or 
discourses that the disabled person has been molded. Therefore, in line with Kristeva (1986), I 
argue that our greatest chance for being able to reform the cultural landscape from which the 
concept of disability has been carved lies within the theoretical project of 'reshaping the status 
of meaning within social exchanges' (32). This linguistic reform can be approached on a variety 
of levels: that of the individual word, label or symbol; at the semantic level; or at the level of 
discourse. I believe that, although each of these approaches are vital for the elevation of the 
social status and the subjective liberation of disabled people, they must be taken in combination 
because  each  comprise  an  essential  layer  in  the  overall  system  of  meaning  creation.  In 
philosophical terms, each factor is necessary but not sufficient for the development of positive 
identifications. 
 
The political significance of language as a tool for resistance has been well documented in 
studies of nationalism and national identity, particularly in relation to struggles for independence 
(Heywood 1992: 136-142). For example, prior to the incidence of Western imperialism in the 
East Indies, the peoples who inhabited this extensive network of islands possessed no cultural 
bonds  and  their  languages  were  diverse.  However,  in  forming  together  as  Indonesians  to 
overcome colonial rule, their adoption of bazaar Malay as their common language 'not only 
allowed people to formulate concepts of nationalism, but became one of the symbols of national 
vigour'  (Mackerras  1994:  519).  In  keeping  with  this,  Oliver  (1989b)  suggests  that  ‘[p]idgin, 
dialect, slang, anti-sexist and anti-racist language and sign language are not, therefore, quaint 
and  archaic  forms  of  language  use  but  forms  of  cultural  resistance’  (37).  To  succeed  in achieving  cultural  resistance  through  the  creation  of  new  language,  however,  requires  an 
understanding of the obstacles inherent in the structure of language itself. 
 
The simplest form of resistance which has been developed by disabled people to challenge 
their linguistic subjugation involves what I call an “elementary semiotic approach”, focused on 
challenging negative labels. Put simply, this approach derives from the notion that certain words 
used to describe disability have taken on derogatory connotations and therefore need to be 
replaced with terms which evoke a more positive image. Words such as 'freak, gimp, spastic, 
spaz, cripple, cretin, handicapped, monster, mongoloid, invalid, idiot, retard, defective, dumb, 
mute,' are extremely negative labels which should be resisted at all costs (Russell 1998: 14). 
The  problem,  however,  with  simply  replacing  them  with  more  politically  correct  terms,  like 
"disabled",  "impaired",  "developmentally  delayed",  "intellectually  disabled",  and  "hearing 
impaired"
1, is that the assignment of new labels does not address the oppressive concepts 
which gave these words their negative connotations in the first place. As Barnes (1992) points 
out, 'there's nothing inherently wrong with these words…"cripple," "spastic," and "idiot"…it is 
simply that their meaning has been substantially devalued by societal perceptions of disabled 
people'. And, unfortunately, the new words developed to describe impairments and the people 
who bear them have quickly become tainted with the associations carried by the old ones.  
 
Even worse, Marks (1999) argues, is that the introduction of the new terminology sometimes 
actually  serves  to  mask  some  of  the  more  deeply  oppressive  realities  that  frame  disabled 
people's  lives.  She  discusses  how  the  adoption  of  terms  such  as  "special  needs"  for  the 
resources required by disabled people to function independently, and "self-advocate" for people 
who have intellectual impairments can conceal the very real problems faced by disabled people 
given their implicit suggestion that equity is being realised. In essence, then, the elementary 
semiotic approach is doomed to failure because the introduction of new words on their own 
cannot dismantle deeply rooted discrimination. And the reason for this is explained by Saussure 
himself in his chess analogy, mentioned earlier. The swapping of a rook for a piece of a different 
shape does not change anything if this new piece operates like a rook. It is the rules of the 
game which must change for the new piece to be capable of new moves. 
 
Furthermore, many of the new words developed to describe disabled people have not been 
chosen by disabled people themselves and are not seen by them to reflect their identities or 
political  desires.  Words  such  as  "physically  challenged,"  "able  disabled,"  "handicapable," 
"special people/ children," "differently abled," and "people with differing abilities" are all attempts 
to raise the status of disabled people by providing more positive sounding labels but they have 
been rejected by disabled people as undesirable. Linton (1998) refers to these kinds of terms as 
'nice words.' 'They are rarely used by disabled activists and scholars (except with palpable 
irony).  Instead,  in  the  view  of  many,  they  convey  the  boosterism  and  do-gooder  mentality endemic to the paternalistic agencies that control many disabled people's lives' (Linton 1998: 
14). Gilson, Tusler and Gill (1997) also speak out strongly against the use of such terms when 
they argue that 'these  
euphemisms have the effect of depoliticising our own terminology and devaluing our own view 
of ourselves as disabled people' (9). 
 
Disabled people who are working for change, both activists and scholars, have attempted to 
address linguistic discrimination on a deeper level. In this respect they have investigated the 
ways in which apparently technical or neutral language inflicts negative connotations in a widely 
pervasive but less obvious way. Medical definitions which ascribe disabled people the labels of  
"patients" and "cases" are allied to descriptors such as "afflicted by," "suffering from," "stricken 
with," and "a victim of", all of which infer weakness, lack of agency, martyrdom and/or individual 
responsibility.  Also  detrimental  to the image of disabled people is the use of adjectives as 
nouns, as in "the deaf," "the blind," "the mentally retarded," "the handicapped," "the disabled," 
"the developmentally disabled" and "the chronically ill".  
 
All of these adjectives used as abstract nouns contribute to the process of stigmatization 
by reinforcing the tendency to "see" persons with disabilities only in terms of those 
disabilities. These labels rivet attention on what is usually the most visible or apparent 
characteristic of the person. They obscure all other characteristics behind that one and 
swallow up the social identity of the individual within that restrictive category (Dajani 
2001: 198-199). 
 
The same problems apply to the habit of referring to people in terms of their illness or disability. 
To refer to someone as a paraplegic, an epileptic or an arthritic is not so different from calling 
them a cripple as it paints the disability as the primary label of identification, in effect 'engulfing a 
person's social identity' (ibid.). Barnes (1992) points out that '[w]here it is absolutely necessary 
to refer to an individual's impairment it is better to say "has epilepsy" or "has arthritis"'. Overall, 
to  attempt  to  change  these  discriminatory  practices  of  representation  goes  beyond  the 
swapping  of  labels  and  requires  addressing  the  formation  of  meaning  through  semantic 
structure so that it is possible to dismantle the concepts behind the labels. 
 
The linguistic challenge launched by disability theorists and activists through the social model 
has  involved  the  twin  aim  of  challenging  the  oppressive nature of current terminology and 
revealing how euphemisms mask the very real problems faced by those who are disabled. This 
has  entailed  ensuring  that  'the  terms  which  have  been  unquestioningly  used  come  to  be 
critically  scrutinised  by  those  so  labelled,  and  are  either  rejected  or  "owned"  but  radically 
redefined (italics added) (Thomas 1999b: 13). In this way, for example, British disability activists 
who had begun to demand the development of a socially based definition of disability in the late 
                                                                                                                                                     
1 Thorick, Roberts and Battistone (2001) object to the term "hearing impaired", pointing out that ' we do not label a Black 
person "white impaired," and we would not call a man a "female-impaired" person' (191). 1960s  to  early  1970s,  were  not  impressed  by  the  WHO's  attempt  to  include  social 
considerations  in  their  definitions  through  the  concept  of  "handicap”  in  their  international 
Classification of Impairment, Disability and Handicap (ICIDH). Marks (1999) paraphrases the 
ICIDH as follows. 
 
'Impairment'  refers  to  any  loss  or  abnormality  of  psychological,  physiological  or 
anatomical structure or function. 'Disability' is any restriction or lack - resulting from an 
impairment - of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered 
normal for a human being. Finally 'handicap' denotes any disadvantage to an individual 
resulting from an impairment or disability that limits or prevents the fulfilment of a role 
that is normal (depending on age, sex, social and cultural factors) for the individual (54). 
 
Instead,  the  British  activists  preferred  to  build  on  the  principles  behind  the  redefinition  of 
"disability" and "impairment" first articulated by the Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation (1976) in their publication, Fundamental Principles of Disability. Here, impairment 
was  defined  as    '[l]acking  part  or  all  of  a  limb,  or  having  a  defective  limb,  organism  or 
mechanism of the body' and disability as '[t]he disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a 
contemporary social organisation which takes no or little account of people who have physical 
impairments  and  thus  excludes  them  from  mainstream  social  activities'  (3-4).  What  was 
revolutionary about this reclassification was that the physical component of "impairment" was 
separated from the socially imposed component of "disability", so that it could be recognised 
that social exclusion was the fundamental issue, not physical limitation or personal tragedy. 
 
More recently, disability rights activists and scholars subscribing to the social model have also 
criticised the use of the terms "handicapped" and "people with disabilities". The rejection of 
"handicapped" is a straightforward one and has been met with universal agreement. 'Referring 
to disabled people as "handicapped" stems from the notion that the whole of life is a competition 
-  as  in  horseracing  or  in  golf  -  and  implies that they will not do well. Also "handicap" has 
allusions to "cap in hand" and begging. Neither term is acceptable to the disabled community' 
(Barnes 1992). However, the expulsion of the signifier "people with disabilities" derives from a 
more complex argument and has been met with mixed reactions. The original intention behind 
the use of "people with disabilities" was to challenge the assignment of a 'master status' (Becker 
1963: 32-3) or a label of 'primary potency' (Singh 1999: 88). However, proponents of the social  
model have largely agreed upon the use of "disabled person" because people cannot "have" a 
disability under the social model's definition of the word.
2  People can have impairments, but 
                                                   
2 Barnes (1992) states the full argument against the use of "people with disabilities" as follows: 
 
"Firstly, 'people with disabilities' assumes that disability is the property of the individual and not of society. Here the 
terms 'disability' and 'disabilities' refers to a medical condition; and 'person with the disability' can easily be substituted 
by 'person with cerebral palsy' or 'person with multiple sclerosis' etc.  As we have seen disabled people and their 
organisations have rejected the implications of the medical model of disability. 
 
"Secondly, by linking  disability' to 'impairment' this phrase conveniently side-steps the consequences of institutional 
discrimination against disabled people - poverty, dependence and social isolation - and, by implication, the need for 
change. they are disabled by society. As Darke (1998a) argues, 'there is no such group as people with 
disabilities; there are people with impairments and disabled people, but they are quite distinct 
things: linguistically, politically and theoretically' (224). 
 
The  linguistic  challenge  raised  by proponents of the social model has been adopted within 
disability studies and remains the key principle in working for change on both an academic and 
an activist level. It has proven to be an effective method for challenging hegemonic discourse 
and it overcomes the problems of replacing "nasty" words with "nice" ones because it takes 
existing terminology and disrupts it so that it comes to signify new, more politically desirable 
concepts.  It  nevertheless  faces  difficulties  in  retaining  the  words  "disability"  and  "disabled" 
because, outside the activist/academic discourse, most people still understand them to signify 
"physical impairment" and they still carry all the negative connotations that  were associated 
with "cripple" and "crippled”. But this is not proof that it is not a worthwhile project, as 'disability, 
like most dimensions of experience is polysemic - that is ambiguous and unstable in meaning - 
as well as a mixture of "truth" and "fiction" that depends on who says what, to whom, when and 
where' (Corker as quoted by Bricher 2000: 784).  
 
‘Language, then, is not a system of signs with fixed meanings with which everyone agrees, but 
a site of variation, contention and potential conflict' (Corker 1998: 226). Thus, injecting new 
meaning into an existing term requires perseverance. Hillyer (1993) suggests that this means 
that we have to exercise constant vigilance and to constantly define our terms. 'Instead of taking 
for  granted  the  meanings  assigned  by one or another political group, we can struggle with 
distinguishing our own definitions from theirs. The process is awkward; it slows down talk; it is 
uncomfortable. It slows down thought and increases its complexity' (46). Changing language 
can be a painstaking process, but it is a vital one if we are to break down the prejudices which 
are concealed within existing language. 
 
One of the difficulties of the social model's distinction between disability and impairment is that it 
ignores  the  possibility  that  impairment  is  likewise  embedded  in  social, particularly medical, 
assumptions.  In  this  respect,  there  are  a  growing  number  of  theorists  who  argue  that 
impairment is socially constructed and, as such, is as relevant a category for linguistic and 
discursive  analysis  as  disability  (Corker  1999a;  Patterson  and  Hughes  1997,1999,  2000; 
Thomas 1999b; Wendell 1996). Thus, Thomas (1999b) argues that: 
 
First, the term impairment, like any other linguistic category, is a social product, and as 
such possesses a cultural history… With this in mind, 'impairments' can be understood 
to be those variations in the structure, function and workings of bodies which, in Western 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
"Thirdly, it is an explicit denial of a political or 'disabled identity'. Since the emergence of the disability rights movement 
the words 'disabled' before 'people' or 'persons' has come to signify identification with this collective identity. Phrases 
such as 'people with disabilities' undermine that identity." 
 culture, are medically defined as significant abnormalities or pathology… Second, in my 
view it is too limiting to think of impairments as connected with a biological substratum, 
'the human body', which is fixed… Rather, this 'biological substratum' is itself a social 
product, as well as a physically changing ' biological ' entity (italics original) (8,9).  
 
Once again though, this does not lead to a rejection of the arguments of the proponents of the 
social model. It simply points to the need to recognise the dynamic nature of language and the 
complex, ongoing requirements of linguistic change. Hence, the importance of a poststructural 
perspective, informed by semiotics, as it allows us to acknowledge that, because meaning is 
fluid  and  multiplicitous,  it  is  in the slippage of meaning within and between words that the 
potential for resistance lies. Corker (1998), a disability theorist who has adopted a linguistic 
approach to challenge the inadequacies of the social model, concurs with this and states that 
'[p]oststructuralism deals specifically with language and discourse and, as such, is bound up 
with issues of meaning, representation and identity. Its main premise is that meaning can never 
be fixed because human discourse is constantly evolving and therefore continually engaged in 
creating new meanings' (224). Being liberated from essentialist views means that it is possible 
to change just about anything about ourselves and our situations because nothing is fixed or 
foundational.  As  Foucault  (1991f)  argues  in  relation  to  genealogical  analysis,  this  kind  of 
approach allows us to ''separate out from the contingency that has made us what we are, the 
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think' (45-46). 
 
Drawing on Metaphor, Subversion and Slippage 
 
To be able to effectively devise new ways of speaking, new ways of being understood and 
identified, it is necessary to first understand how language operates. This, as I have suggested 
throughout, involves an appreciation of the fundamentals of Saussure's arguments as this helps 
us to understand that signs are arbitrary and that they have been developed within an overall 
system of language or langue. This gives us the key to understanding the social construction of 
identities and the potential for challenging them. But, I have also intimated that it is necessary to 
move beyond Saussure, because his interest in developing these principles was to demonstrate 
that there is a solid, stable structure of language, la langue, which predetermines and therefore 
delimits our choices of individual speech, la parole. In this way, the idea that speakers could 
become  agents  in  creating  new  speech  was  antithetical  to  Saussure's  need  for  fixity. 
Paradoxically, however, his principles pave the way for a deeper understanding of just how 
individual speakers can and do create new language and in this respect I draw attention to the 
work of Merleau Ponty.  
 
It was Merleau Ponty (1964a) who was to draw from the foundations of Saussurean linguistics 
the possibility for what he refers to as 'truly expressive speech' (46). He concurs with Saussure 
that  there  exists  'a  sedimented  language  that  tends  to  consolidate, formalise, and regulate 
established meaning' but unlike Saussure he sees speech as a form 'which desires to break out of  these  limiting  circumstances'  (Koukal  2000:  602).  Thus  he  argues  that,  although  it  is 
necessary that language be stable enough a system to guarantee relatively fixed meanings that 
can be understood over time, '[it] must nevertheless remain open to the initiatives of the subject’ 
(Merleau Ponty 1964b: 87). Pivotal to his recipe for "truly expressive speech" is the premise that 
new speech does not exist outside of the existing language structure, it lies within it, silently 
waiting to be brought to life. 
 
A language sometimes remains a long time pregnant with transformations which are to 
come…  since  those  which  fall  into  disuse  continue  to  lead  a diminished life in the 
language and since the place of those which are to replace them is sometimes already 
marked out - even if only in the form of a gap, a need, or a tendency (Merleau-Ponty 
1964a: 41). 
 
I argue that it is within these "gaps" that the silenced voices of those who bear the mark of the 
Other can find the words and phrases to express the concepts which already frame their lives.
3 
Just because the words are yet to be found does not mean that the experiences, the feelings, 
and the subjugated knowledges which mark out their oppression are any less real. It is merely 
an indication that the dominant discourse, the sedimented langue, is retaining its hegemony.  
 
Merleau Ponty (1962a) refers to these gaps as 'the threads of silence that speech is mixed 
together with' and argues that it is by uncovering these spaces between existing words that we 
can find ways of expressing the formerly inexpressible (46).
4 He advocates the use of imagery, 
metaphor in particular, to overcome the limitations of existing language and refers to this kind of 
innovation as 'shaking the linguistic or narrative apparatus in order to tear a new sound from it' 
(ibid.). Koukal (2000) describes Merleau Ponty's proposed use of metaphor in the creation of 
linguistic innovation: 
 
Metaphors invest one object with the emotional or imaginative qualities of another object 
in order to disrupt the sedimented meaning of instituted language so that the first object 
can  be  seen  a  new  way…    Metaphor  is  only  one of the many tropes employed to 
achieve an evocative turn on the meaning of commonplace words. What all tropes have 
in common is an ability to "surprise" us, to "jolt" us, to "shake us up"… in a way that 
allows a new meaning to tumble from language (611,612). 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I will suggest how metaphor can be and, in some cases has 
already been, used to redefine the disabled identity in ways which promise to loosen its ties to 
oppressive concepts. Added to metaphor, I argue, are other techniques for drawing from the 
"gaps" and  
                                                   
3 I am extremely indebted to Rebecca Caines, my colleague and friend, who introduced me to the postmodern 
perspective and the possibility for resistance through gaps and silences. Our endless conversations in relation to  the 
radical postmodern view  which structures her work has allowed me a deeper understanding of the issues involved than 
I could ever have gained through struggling alone with such difficult texts.  
 
"threads of silence" new ways of speaking about disability and those who are defined within its 
precincts. These are the processes of "subversion" and "slippage" which also utilise language's 
fluid and polysemic nature to bring forth alternative narratives, subaltern voices, subjugated 
knowledges.  
 
Linguistically, one of the important things to recognise in relation to "gaps" is that '[t]he absence 
of a sign can be a sign' (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 44). Within hegemonic discourse there are many 
concepts which are taken for granted, identities which remain unnamed and thus exist within 
"linguistic gaps," because they are considered to be part of the norm. As opposed to gender 
which  represents  two  possible  positions,  male  and  female,  disability,  like  race,  exists  in  a 
dichotomy where the opposing category is not named. People do not consider "whiteness" or 
"ablebodiedness" or "heterosexuality" as part of their identities, while being "black", "disabled" 
or "homosexual" can figure largely for those identified as such. To address this, disability rights 
activists and theorists have created new metaphors which express what was previously taken 
for granted. The terms "nondisabled", "able-bodied" and "ablebodiedness" are used to describe 
the  position  or  condition  of  those  who  have  previously  not  been  defined.  Linton  (1998) 
discusses how effective this kind of metaphor is. 
 
The use of non-disabled is strategic: to centre disability… This action is similar to the 
strategy of marking and articulating "whiteness".  The assumed position in scholarship 
has always been the male, white, non-disabled scholar; it is the default category. As 
recent scholarship has shown, these positions are not only presumptively hegemonic 
because they are the assumed universal stance, as well as the presumed neutral or 
objective  stance,  but  also  under  theorised.  The  non-disabled  stance,  like  the  white 
stance, is veiled.  "White cannot be said quite out loud, or it loses its crucial position as a 
precondition of vision and becomes the object of scrutiny" (Haraway 1989). Therefore, 
centring the disabled position and labelling its opposite non-disabled focuses attention 
on both the structure of knowledge and the structure of society (13-14). 
 
In this way, from Merleau Ponty's "threads of silence" are drawn new ways of looking at the 
world, new ways of defining the structure of dissonance which makes disabled people feel like 
lesser human beings. The gaps in language, the silence of the Other, are already filled with the 
sense of something "not quite right" and it is by allowing for its articulation that the opportunity 
for change is given breath. As Hughs and Patterson (1997) say so forcefully, the use of the term 
“nondisabled”  allows  us  to  '  to  reverse  the  stigma  of  "otherness"  and  throw  it  back  at  the 
oppressor' (333). In parallel with this, disability theorists have developed words like “disablism” 
and “ableism” to describe the social oppression to which disabled people are subject. “Ableism”  
                                                                                                                                                     
4 For the rich understanding I now have of the beauty and power of metaphor I also have Rebecca Caines to thank. Her 
work and her life is based on a clear recognition that we need to develop metaphor to "express the inexpressible".  is probably the more accurate descriptor for the kind of oppression experienced by disabled 
people because it is built from the generic term in the same way that "sexism" and "racism" are, 
but both are in use and either will suffice at this stage to get the message across. Linton (1998) 
points out that we are more clear about what can be construed as sexist and racist language 
than what is "ableist", but that this is probably due to the fact that 'the nature of the oppression 
of disabled people is not yet as widely understood' (9).  
 
I  have  attempted  to  draw  upon  metaphor,  or  what  Ricoeur  (1978)  refers  to  as  'semantic 
innovation'  (98),  in  developing  the  expression  "disabled  identity"  to  frame  the  concept  of 
oppression which I believe is responsible for the low status and damaged self-esteem which 
characteristically  accompanies  serious,  ongoing  impairment  and  illness.  I  believe  that  the 
bringing  together  of  the  words  "disabled"  and  "identity",  as  contentious  as  they  both  are 
individually,  extends  the  recognition  inherent  in  the  social  model  that  disability  is  socially 
invoked by forcing us to focus on internalised oppression as similarly constructed. The notion 
that  identity  can  be  "disabled"  emphasises  the  fact  that  disablism  entails  more  than  the 
exclusion of disabled people from employment and public spaces, but that it also involves the 
denial of a desirable identity. My intention is to challenge the belief, constructed within medical 
discourse, that people who feel denigrated and worthless when they become incapacitated are 
merely displaying symptoms of poor adjustment to adverse personal circumstances. I wish to 
demonstrate, conversely, that this subjugated identity is socially imposed. This new linking of 
words to suggest a concept which has formerly been given little credence, if it has been given 
any at all, involves 'a semantic event that takes place at the point where several semantic fields 
intersect', which is Ricoeur's (1978) definition for metaphor (99). As such, reframing disability in 
terms of the "disabled identity" provides a building block in the gradual development of new 
meanings.  It  is  bound  to  be  superseded  by  more  evolved  metaphors  as  disability  theory 
progresses, but I see it as a stepping stone toward a recognition of why disabled people have to 
suffer from the additional hardship of internalised oppression. 
 
The making of metaphors is a difficult process, however, and is often fraught with the problems 
associated with the elementary semiotic approach where new terms are often rejected due to 
their euphemistic nature or lack of effect. An intermediary phase is required where we work 
within  the  language  that already exists by subverting it, disturbing it, giving old words new 
meanings, so that oppression is fought within existing logics while new language can undergo 
its halting burgeoning evolution. When disability theorists and activists redefined the meaning of 
disability and disabled, they were effectively subverting the meanings that these words had 
inherited from medical discourse (Thomas 1999b: 13). A more strident example of subversion is 
present in the use of "cripple" and "crip" within the disability rights movement. Like the words 
"nigger" and "queer", cripple has been symbolic of oppression and, for similar reasons, activists 
from across these areas of identity politics have been 'taking the bigot's labels of "cripple", 
"nigger"  and  "queer"  and  turning  them  around  to  become  badges  of  strength  and solidarity' (Corbett 1997: 95). Thomson (1997) writes of Nancy Mairs and her decision to take 
on the appellation "cripple" because it forces people to 'acknowledge the particularity of her 
body' (25). 
 
'People . . . wince at the word "cripple"', Mairs contends. Even though she retains what 
has been a derogatory term, she insists on determining its significance herself: 'Perhaps 
I want them to wince. l want them to see me as a tough customer, one to whom the 
fates/gods/viruses have not been kind, but who can face the brutal truth of her existence 
squarely. As a cripple, I swagger' (ibid.).  
 
Claiming ownership over a word which was previously used in derogatory ways and investing it 
with new, more positive meanings leads not only to a new show of strength to those outside the 
liberatory discourse, it protects the individuals so named from being hurt any longer by the 
negative connotations that may still be inherent in other people's use of the term. This kind of 
subversion can therefore function to heal identities at the same time as attempting to re-educate 
society and revitalise language. 
 
To fully understand the process of subversion, it is necessary to recall Butler’s (1990; 1992) 
argument  that    identities,  such  as  gender  and  sexual  identities,  are  created  through 
performative repetition. However, Butler also believes that these identities can be subverted 
through  reiterative  practices  which  demonstrate  that  they  are  not  real,  but  are  only  ever 
performances. Thus she sees the performance of "drag", which imitates gender, as a parody of 
a parody as there was nothing real or essential to copy. Similarly, she argues that taking on the 
title of "queer" reverses its oppressive identifications at the same time as it plays them out, owns 
them, disturbs them.  
 
 Within queer politics, indeed, within the very signification that is "queer," we read a re-
signifying practice in which the desanctioning power of the name "queer" is reversed to 
sanction a contestation of the terms of sexual legitimacy. Paradoxically, but also with 
great promise, the subject who is "queered" into public discourse through homophobic 
interpellations of various kinds takes up or cites that very term as the discursive basis for 
an opposition. This kind of citation will emerge as theatrical to the extent that it mimes 
and renders hyperbolic the discursive convention that it also reverses (Butler 1993: 232). 
 
 
The same applies to the subversion of "cripple" as it also provides a theatrical challenge to its 
former meanings. According to Uprety (1997), those who have been forced to exist on the 
margins of society are in a unique position to subvert language and culture because of their 
'hybrid identities' formed on the edge, both inside and outside the dominant culture. 'From their 
vantage  point  of  "double  vision,"  those  with  hybrid  identities  can  perceive  they  have  an understanding of multiple cultures, and they can use that understanding to create new forms of 
thought, new ways of aesthetic and political expression' (Uprety 1997: 369). 
 
A particular instance of this is the way in which deaf activists have rejected the term "deaf", a 
term which represents the idea of hearing loss or impairment, and replaced it with "Deaf" with a 
capital D, which describes those who - as users of sign language in preference to the spoken 
word - are part of a linguistic minority. This involves an extreme subversion of the original 
concept of deafness and has resulted in the creation of a whole new culture, "Deaf culture". 
Corker (1998) points out that "deaf" became associated not only with hearing loss or impairment 
but was 'broadened to refer to any person who, regardless of whether they could hear or not, 
ignored, refused to listen or to comply to something or someone, and likewise, dumb became 
equated with stupidity' (225). The use of Deaf therefore subverts the original derogatory form of 
the word and, like the subversions of "disabled" and "cripple", functions to foster what is now 
referred to as "disability pride" (Corker 1999a: 203; Gill 1997: 45-46; Gilson, Tusler and Gill 
1997: 16). 
 
To be able to 'shake the chain of language' (Merleau Ponty 1964: 46) by drawing from 'the 
threads of silence' or 'gaps' new ways of saying things, either by building new metaphors or 
subverting existing terminology, it is vital to grasp the semiotic concept of "slippage". Perhaps 
Saussure's  greatest  legacy  was  his  recognition that words are arbitrary and hence bear no 
essential  connection  to  the  meanings  they  express.  In  other  words,  the  signifier  and  the 
signified are not linked by any natural or inevitable relationship. The only way that words take on 
any meaning at all is through their difference from other terms and this results in 'a constant 
sliding of meaning in all interpretation' because, in language, nothing can be fixed (Hall 1997: 
33). This concept of slippage comes from Derrida's (2000 [1972]) development of the idea of 
différance, the neologism with which he captures the two meanings of the French verb, différer - 
to differ and to defer (87). By drawing on the idea of différance, Derrida extends Saussure's 
premise that words can only be defined in contrast to what they are not by demonstrating that 
this definition through difference or dissimilarity leads to a constant state of deferral of meaning. 
'The sign represents the present in its absence.  It takes the place of the present. When we 
cannot grasp or show the thing, state the present, the being-present, when the present cannot 
be presented, we signify, we go through the detour of the sign. We take or give signs. The 
signal. The sign, in this sense, is deferred presence' (ibid.). 
 
This concept of slippage or deferral is useful to our linguistic excursion in two ways. It can help 
to explain how the words we have used to describe physical impairment have come to take on 
derogatory meanings and it can provide the theoretical basis for challenging language through 
metaphor and subversion. Consider, for example, the term "handicap" and the reasons for its 
rejection from the lexicon of disability theory. Why was "disability" chosen to be subverted rather 
than "handicap"? I suggest that this was because the word "handicap" was too tainted from the "traces"  of  it  former  usage.  Stiker  (1999)  touches  on  this  view  in  his  exploration  of  the 
replacement of infirmité with handicap in France. 
 
In a single jump we have passed from a game of chance, the luck of the draw, and thus 
from a kind of natural fatality to a possible regulation, a will to master circumstance. A 
slight displacement of vocabulary and we have two different worlds in opposition: the 
world of disability, of insurmountable incapacity, and the world of handicap, of affliction 
compensated  for…  This  image  of  horse racing  corresponds  exactly  to  that  of  the 
handicapped person who has to catch up, rejoin the normal and normalized group, be 
one of them. The horse racing application of the word is the right one. Handicap as a 
designation of disadvantage, illness, amputation, loss is secondary in comparison to 
handicap signifying competition, rivalry, participation in a trial (italics added) (146). 
 
What Stiker is actually referring to when he speaks of 'displacement' is the slippage that occurs 
when  handicap  is  transformed  from  its  horse  racing  connotations  into  a  new  metaphor  for 
describing disability. In its deferral from one meaning to another it changes signification 'without 
erasing the trace of its other meanings' (Hall 1990: 228). This is true of all words. In their fluidity 
and plurality they remain slippery and hard to pin down. According to Hall (1997), they always 
say  'something  in  excess  of  what  we  intend  to  say'  and  retain  a  fragility  in  which  'other 
meanings overshadow the statement or the text, where other associations are awakened to life, 
giving what we say a different twist' (33). 
 
This lack of fixity is also the key to language change. Indeed, slippage is a primary device for 
both locating and negotiating the gaps in language. It is because meanings do not remain stable 
that it is possible to bridge the gaps and the silences with significations which have the potential 
to transcend existing realms of expression. For example, in my use of the metaphor, "disabled 
identity", I am relying on the polysemic nature of both these words. Firstly, by using "disabled" I 
not only draw on the social model's perspective that to be disabled is to be oppressed by a 
society which undervalues and does not accommodate for people who have impairments, I also 
make  use  of  its  former  traces  which  suggest  denigration  and  vulnerability  because  the 
experience of internalised oppression includes these impositions. Secondly, it is the slippery 
nature of "identity" that is precisely the concept I want to suggest, for, while the idea of a fixed 
identity has been central to the construction of the Other, it is the postmodern notion of the fluid, 
pluralistic self which offers the possibility for choosing other ways of being. And through playing 
with  language  it  has  been  my  intention  to  demonstrate  that the disabled identity has been 
constituted as such precisely because the dominant identity, the norm, can only achieve its 
shape through contrasting itself with what it is not. In other words, it is because of slippage that 
identity must define itself in relation to the Other.  
 
For  identity  is  a  will-o-the-wisp,  essentially  nothing  on  its  own.  As  Redman  (2000)  argues, 
'identities take their definition only from that which they are not, implying, for example, that the identity of the supposedly 'civilised European' is constructed in relation to a range of 'different' 
others: the 'barbaric' African, the 'exotic' oriental and so on. Disturbingly, this forces us to think 
of these differential identities as inherently unstable. From the perspective of différance, the 
identity of the 'civilised' European is constantly haunted by the liminal presence of the 'black' 
and 'oriental' others against which it defines itself and into which it continually threatens to 
collapse' (Redman 2000: 12). But, as with the fluidity of language offering us a multitude of 
ways to redefine our position, the instability of identity provides the potential for challenging it at 
its roots. This is why disability is feared and frowned upon by Thomson's (1997) 'normates'. 
'People who have an impairment can act as a reminder of our own frailty, our own susceptibility 
to  morbidity  and  mortality'  (Watson  1998:  147).  And  any  attempt  by  disability  activists  to 
challenge,  through  language,  the  authenticity  of  the  border  between  normality  and  alterity 
threatens to dissolve all the claims which shore up normality in the first place. 
 
Contesting  oppressive  language  can  be  fraught  with  difficulty, however. Not only are there 
problems  inherent  in  the  transferral  of  negative  traces  from  one  word  to  another,  but  the 
dominant  ideology  bears  a  deep  resistance  to  change.  Griffiths  (1995)  argues  that  the 
normative group will fight tooth and nail to retain its position and that this is why politically 
correct  language  has often been referred to so scathingly and turned into a joke. Foucault 
(1985) acknowledges this resistance to change in his use of the ancient Greek parrhesia to 
describe the kind of 'free speech' with which is necessary to defy the norm. Foucault considers 
parrhesiests to be those who are in a position 'less powerful than the one with whom he or she 
speaks. The parrhesia comes from "below", as it were, and is directed towards "above"'. The act 
of parrhesia is critical in nature and incurs risk or danger on the individual who is attempting to 
speak new truths.  
 
In his later work Foucault (1988j) developed the notion that it is possible to develop ways of 
formulating our own subjectivities through stripping away universal "truths" and replacing them 
with our own personal truths, truths built on our recognition of how we would like to define 
ourselves outside of hegemonic discourse (15). For Foucault, parrhesia provides the means 
with which to reach this goal and it is in keeping with this understanding of 'free speaking' that I 
adopt  the  concept  of  parrhesia  to  encapsulate  the  processes  of  metaphor,  subversion  and 
slippage described above. For, it is only by being critical of what they are asked to take for 
granted and by being willing to risk the condescension, disbelief and harsh judgments of those 
who collude with the system as it stands that disabled people can attempt to redefine their 
positions and their identities. It is not that parrhesia will unearth a real "truth" which has been 
concealed by power, it is that it allows for the formulation of alternative truths, the means for 
articulating the subjugated knowledges that have formerly been denied a voice.  
 
The struggle to devise new ways of articulating identity through parrhesia will only be effective, 
however,  if  it  manages  'to  enter  into  mainstream  society  and  to  struggle  with  hegemonic discourses which mark the domains of its social reproduction' (Corker 2000: 447). As I have 
attempted  to  outline  throughout  this  chapter,  the  formation  of  meaning  through  language 
operates simultaneously at the level of semiotics, semantics and discourse and it will only be 
through working for changes at each of these levels that linguistic innovation and, accordingly, 
the resignification of marginalised identities can be achieved. I believe that the most powerful 
way to sum up the fact that our subjugation and our chances to resist it are tied up in the 
discourses which define us comes from Foucault. 
 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any 
more than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process 
whereby  discourse  can  be  both  an  instrument  and  an  effect  of  power,  but  also  a 
hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines 
and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (Foucault 1980d: 
100). 
 
It is thus within language and discourse that the potential to unshackle the disabled identity lies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Paradox of Disability Culture: 
The Need to Combine Versus the Imperative to Let Go 
 
Politics  that  ignores  our  identities,  that  makes  them  "private,"  is  useless;  but 
nonnegotiable identities will enslave us whether they are imposed from within or without 
(Phelan, 1989: 170). 
 
What  has  become  evident  to  me  as  my  project  unfolds  is  that  my  research  relies  on  the 
existence of, or possibilities for fostering, some kind of group identification between disabled 
people. Both in my attempt to delineate a sample of people whose stories are assumed to 
contain  common  themes  and  my  belief  that  from  these  stories  will  emerge  emancipatory 
insights which have the potential to inspire and liberate other people who have experienced 
similar kinds of internalised oppression, I rely on the notion of a group of people, disabled 
people, who, like women and non-white racial groups, can be shown to share a subjugated 
identity. However, the attempt to articulate a collective experience between similarly oppressed 
peoples rests on a paradox which cannot be easily solved. For, how can we claim unity without 
falling  into  the  same  exclusionary  practices  which  have  served  to  create  our  divisive 
identifications  in  the  first  place?  And,  conversely,  how  can  we  relinquish  the  practices  of 
identification which are based on binary oppositions without losing the ability to claim identities 
at all?  
 
The articulation or imagining of a disability culture which can be seen as 'a kinship based on 
identification of shared understandings of common life experiences' (Neath and Schriner 1998: 
218) has powerful implications. It enables a sense of connectedness which can break down the 
feelings of isolation and alienation that stem from the belief that disability is a personal tragedy 
which necessarily excludes the disabled person from full social participation, it offers empathy 
and  acceptance  between  group  members,  and  it  provides  a  space  within  which  positive 
identities  can  be  constructed.  Gilson,  Tusler  and  Gill  (1997)  name  the  benefits  of  group 
recognition for disabled people as follows.  
 
Learning to feel self pride in being disabled, identifying and supporting role models, 
encouraging    exposure  to  and  interaction  with  other  disabled  children  and disabled 
adults,  developing  coalitions  for  change,  learning  the  skills  of  self  advocacy, 
…confronting  our  own prejudices about one another while we build our self-esteem 
…[and encouraging disabled people] to determine and relate their own stories (11, 16). 
 
Moreover, as Robert Murphy (1987) points out, the most important effect of identifying with 
disability culture is 'the transformations of consciousness' it makes possible. This new way of seeing oneself and one's situation is, as Murphy claims, 'one of the best available forms of 
rehabilitation' (157-158). 
 
Yet, if creating a sense of group affiliation between disabled people is such a positive and 
empowering practice, why then do so many of the people whom I would define as disabled, 
those who have impairments or illnesses which lead to their social exclusion, choose not to 
identify themselves as such? Moreover, if joining together in response to a sense of shared 
experience and common purpose is such an effective tool of resistance, then why does there 
exist  so  much  tension  around  the  concept  of  identity  politics?  Why do some theorists and 
activists  argue  that  the  declaration  of  a  common  identity  is  as  disempowering  as  the 
exclusionary  logics  it  attempts  to  replace?  And,  if  as  its  critics  claim,  identity  politics  has 
remained trapped within a modernist paradigm which essentialises difference and retains the 
dichotomies which are responsible for exclusionary discourses and practices in the first place, 
what  are  the  alternatives?  This  chapter  will  be  dedicated  to  exploring  these  problems  and 
reframing them, not as insurmountable obstacles, but as vital indicators which point the way 
towards  an  effective  means  by  which  disability  culture can be reconstituted as a liberatory 
device. 
 
Denying the Disabled Identity 
 
The failure of most people with disabilities to identify with other people with disabilities is, 
I believe, the principal contradiction that limits the DRM's [Disability Rights Movement's] 
potential influence and power (Chariton 1998: 78). 
 
It is easy to understand why a great many people who are ill or otherwise incapacitated would 
attempt to escape the label of disability. For, as it has already been demonstrated, to be thought 
of as disabled is to be seen, as Goffman (1963) reminds us, as 'not quite human' (15). There 
are  those  who  can  hide  their  disabling  conditions  by  attempting  to  appear  as  "normal"  as 
possible, disguising the overt manifestations of their impairments and doing everything they can 
to keep up with the pace and expectations of an able-bodied world. And, even for those whose 
disabilities cannot be concealed, it is still possible to avoid identifying with other disabled people 
by attempting to overcome their disabilities and maintaining their former identities and kinships 
as much as possible. Yet, there are also other reasons for not identifying as part of a culture of 
disabled people which have more to do with the lack of cultural roots and sense of unity that are 
evident in other groups which are founded on the shared experience of subjugation. 
 
Unlike women and non-white racial groups who have relatively clear boundaries defining their 
cultural groups and close connections with other members, people who become disabled often 
have no ties or sense of relationship with other disabled people at all. Whereas women, for 
example, are usually surrounded by other females who can provide empathy, role models and a 
shared  heritage  in  women's  stories,  those  who  become  disabled  have  usually  grown  up  in families which did not include disabled members and, because they have been socialised into 
the belief that disabled people are unacceptably different, they are more likely to experience a 
sense of alienation than affiliation when disability occurs. As Gilson, Tusler and Gill (1997) 
explain: 
 
For  many  of  us  who  acquire  a  disability  after  childhood,  we  have  no  friends  with 
disabilities, before or after gaining our disability identity. Many of us growing up with 
disabilities  have  few  peers  with  disability.  We  do  not  have  play  mates,  friends,  or, 
confidants  who  share  our  unique  identities  and  perspectives.    Lacking  positive, 
successful disabled role models we choose to appear, act, and behave as non-disabled 
as possible in order to survive (8).  
 
This lack of cultural history and interaction can be seen to be similar to that experienced by 
lesbians  and  gay  men  because  being  socialised  within  an  able-bodied,  heterosexual 
environment can only lead to intense feelings of isolation and alienation when either of these 
unspoken prescriptions can no longer be performed (Scheer 1994: 252-253).  
 
Added  to  this  lack  of  cultural  heritage,  the  likelihood  of  being  able  to  see  disability  as  a 
phenomenon which overarches a great many people's experience is reduced by the tendency 
within medicine, political programmes and charitable organisations to divide disabilities into 
distinct categories which are seen to be mutually exclusive (Bryan 2001: 326). After all, what 
could the experiences of blindness and chronic fatigue possibly have in common? This kind of 
thinking, however, stems from the tendency to focus on the impairment, the physical problem, 
rather  than  the  disability, the social outcome, and leads disabled people to feeling trapped 
within a purely physical, personal situation. Swain and Cameron (1999) also argue that this 
separation is an integral part of normalising discourse. 
 
The separation of disabled people into impairment-specific categories has also served to 
reinforce the impact of the individualising discourse, creating a situation in which people 
have identified themselves as more or less disabled. The less disabled an identity that 
someone has of herself, the more she has been able to aspire towards "normalcy" and 
the less bound she has felt herself to associate herself in her own mind with other 
disabled people (76). 
 
This kind of division which leaves disabled people feeling isolated and disconnected from most 
other people with impairments results in 'a politically powerless and diffuse class of people who 
are unable to coalesce with other groups of disabled people' (Oliver and Zarb 1997: 196) and 
often  leaves  intact  the  tendency  for  disabled  people  to  retain  their  discriminatory  attitudes 
towards other people who have impairments. 
 Those who acquire disabilities have usually imbibed the prevailing attitudes about disability  
during their former able-bodied lives and these prejudices do not magically disappear when a 
person becomes disabled. Neither the internalised oppression that results from disability nor the 
impetus, via rehabilitation, to overcome it and regain a normal life challenge the negative views 
which surround the notion of disability. Karen, one of Thomas's (1999b) research participants 
declares that '[a]lthough I am extremely embarrassed to admit it now I was reluctant to define 
myself as disabled, carrying as I did all of the prejudices I had somehow adopted in my able-
bodied days' (53). Another research participant expresses these kinds of prejudices even more 
vividly. 
 
The thing about M. S. [multiple sclerosis] and being disabled is that it takes you away 
from your normal peers ... The normal peers are replaced or people try to get you to 
replace them with these grotesque others, with whom under normal circumstances you 
have nothing to do with and still have nothing in common with except disability (as 
quoted in Charmaz 1987: 299). 
 
These kinds of prejudices are very difficult to shake and, as was discussed in Chapter Three, 
they  are  internalised  by  the  disabled  person  in  the  creation  of  the  disabled  identity.  Such 
negative attitudes serve to keep the disabled person isolated, not only from the rest of society, 
but from  those who could provide comfort and inspiration by way of their shared knowledge in 
relation to the experience of disability. 
 
Much of the prejudice which has led to the denial of any kind of culture of disability has been 
exacerbated by the fact that, up until fairly recent times, any notion of a collective identity has 
been devised by the able-bodied and foisted on disabled people in ways which have not been 
welcomed by them. This is due to the fact that disability is representative of a group defined by 
the practices of cultural imperialism and is 'identified by outsiders without those so identified 
having any specific consciousness of themselves as a group' (Young 1990: 38). This kind of 
external identification which results in people being thrust together in ways that are uninvited is 
evident in two of the essays written for Paul Hunt's book in 1966: The Experience of Disability. 
In one, Ford (1966), a man with muscular dystrophy, complained that he had often been forced 
to attend meetings which were comprised solely of other people with muscular dystrophy. 
 
While it is undeniable that for many who might otherwise be housebound and completely 
cut-off, such meetings do provide opportunities and facilities for social contacts … We do 
not want to be segregated into insulated groups of individuals who may have nothing in 
common except their physical condition (36). 
 
In the other, Chalmers (1966), who was forced to attend group outings with other people with 
polio, similarly lamented that 'it seems odd that people are expected to enjoy being together 
merely because they are all incapacitated' (25). He goes on to state, in keeping with his clearly held belief in the necessity to rehabilitate and normalise, 'I am convinced that such dwelling on 
one's disease is wrong, and that the whole endeavour of the victim should be directed towards 
getting back, if not into step, at least into the company again of his own calculated pace' (ibid). 
 
These kinds of attitudes are completely understandable in the context of the medical model of 
disability which informs them. According to this view, disability is an individual problem which 
must  be  solved  by  individual  effort  and  the  desire  to  return  to  as  normal  an  existence  as 
possible. Not only was the idea of group identity thrust on these people from without, it was a 
notion that was in complete contradiction to their understanding of the recovery process. The 
medical view of disability does not foster a group consciousness based on the idea of shared 
oppression. It was not until the last two decades that disabled people began to join together in 
response to their common experience of subjugation and, subsequently, to seek a different form 
of "recovery" and "rehabilitation", one based on a social understanding of disability. 
 
Nevertheless, although a group consciousness has been growing among disabled people, the 
majority are still loathe to identify themselves as disabled if it can be at all avoided. As Hahn 
(1985) argues, disabled people 'are understandably reluctant to focus on that aspect of their 
identity that is most negatively stigmatised by the rest of society and to mobilise politically 
around it' and they 'experience difficulty in developing a sense of identity with an attribute of 
themselves  that  they  have  been  taught  to  "overcome"  '  (310).  To  deal  with  such negative 
perceptions,  both  their  own  and  others',  many  disabled  people  choose  to  pass,  a  coping 
mechanism defined by Hillyer (1993) as the ability 'to present yourself or let yourself be taken 
for a member of a more privileged group' (136), a choice which Goffman (1963) believes to be 
irresistible 'because of the great rewards in being considered normal' (95). Passing as an able-
bodied person or, when passing is impossible, 'covering' the disability as much as possible 
(Goffman  1963:  125),  exacts  huge  costs  from  the  disabled  person  in the form of 'emotive 
dissonance' (Hillyer 1993: 150) 'anguish' (Linton 1998), and in purely physical terms. It also 
effectively forecloses any desire or ability to affiliate with other disabled people because the 
category is seen to be unacceptable. 
 
Even for those who eventually identify as disabled, the choice to pass may well form part of a 
transitional phase in which the disabled person comes to terms with his or her spoiled identity. 
As Tepper (1999) explains, hiding one's disability and pretending to be "normal" is similar to 
keeping in the closet one's lesbian or gay identity. The distress and discordance this double life 
creates for the person who is suppressing such a major part of themselves, however, often 
leads to the decision to "come out".  
 
Coming out, then, for disabled people, is a process of redefinition of one's personal 
identity through rejecting the tyranny of the normate, positive recognition of impairment 
and embracing disability as a valid social identity. Having come out, the disabled person 
no longer regards disability as a reason for self-disgust, or as something to be denied or hidden,  but  rather  as  an  imposed  oppressive  social  category  to  be  challenged and 
broken down (Swain and Cameron 1999: 76). 
 
It is important to note that the process of identifying as disabled does not involve passively 
accepting a negative identity. It requires challenging these negative notions at their very roots. 
As Gilson, Tusler and Gill (1997) argue, '[o]nce we begin to transfer from the world of the non-
disabled to affiliation with the disability community, the meaning of disability and of having a 
disability shifts for us' (8). I would argue that this shift in meaning stems from the reciprocal 
linkage which ties culture to language. As I suggested in Chapter Three, being part of a culture 
which is built from emancipatory ideals involves being able to develop new words, or to attach 
new meanings to old ones, in the attempt to forge a positive group identity. 
 
This  process  of  coming  out  and  coming  together  as group of people bound by the shared 
experience of oppression can be extremely liberating. By bringing together a formerly disparate 
collection of people who were isolated and powerless, alienated and ashamed, it is possible to 
develop  a  group  consciousness  based  on  the  recognition  that  what  was  once  seen  as  an 
individual tragedy is in fact a social creation that can be challenged and changed. The sense of 
kinship which grows from the emergence of a disability culture allows for the breaking down of 
past  prejudices  and  the  creation  of  new  stories  which  can  be  built  from  the  subjugated 
knowledges which were formerly buried beneath the medical model's assumption that to hide 
one's  disability  and  pretend  to  be  as  normal  as  possible  is  the  best  way  to  cope.  This 
experience of finding a voice, rearticulating what it means to be disabled, and throwing off the 
shackles of individualising discourse allows for the healing of the disabled identity. The words of 
Joy Weeber (1999b), a woman who spent most of her life in a state of emotional discordance 
until she discovered a sense of kinship with other disabled people, express this process of 
healing with great beauty and clarity. I thus choose to conclude this section by quoting from her 
at length. 
 
I have come to know the healing of belonging, of being understood without a word in a 
community of people who validate my feelings. I did not know how fragmented I was, 
and I needed other disabled people to teach me to love myself wholly! I had needed 
them to teach me how to embrace that part of myself that society so devalues. I needed 
them to show me the commonalities between our experiences of ableism and others' 
experiences of racism. I needed them to give words to the feelings I had never had 
reflected back to myself in my nondisabled world… 
 
I am proud to have found my way home to the disability community. I am now able to 
"hang out on the porch" and hear stories from the elders of how their visions of equal 
justice for all took shape, how legislation acknowledging our civil rights was passed. And 
although it is true that we continue to struggle to define our own lives and live it on our 
own  terms,  we  have  also  begun  to  create  a  culture  that  brings  us  together  and 
celebrates our unique ways of being in the world. I am moved when I hear poetry that speaks my truth and read books that truly reflect my life experiences. I am healed when I 
see  unflinchingly  honest  performances  dealing  with  the  reality  and  pain  caused  by 
ableism. I now know that I have indeed experienced the pain of ableism and I know why 
I felt the pain of racism when I had words for neither. I now also know the liberating 
power of embracing my disability and of celebrating who I am because of it. (22, 23). 
 
Overcoming the Paradox of Identity Politics 
 
As empowering as the creation of a sense of disability culture has been for people who were 
once trapped in the net of individualism which masked their oppression under the guise of 
personal troubles, it is based on a notion of identity politics which 'has become a double-edged 
sword' (Humphrey 1999: 174). "Identity politics" is the term used to describe movements and 
theories, such as those predicated on feminist and anti-racist sentiments, which are based on 
the recognition of shared oppression and among whose major goals 'are forging a [positive] 
image or conception of self and propagating this self to attentive publics'  (Anspach 1979: 766). 
In outlining the paradox which troubles the celebration of an identity hewn from oppression, 
Humphrey  (1999)  concedes  that  identity  politics  'is  an  inescapable necessity for oppressed 
peoples,  offering  itself  as  a  safe  space  in  which  people  who  share  similar  conditions  of 
existence can heal from the wounds inflicted by the world, debate the societal origins of their 
affliction, and grow into survivors with the strength to fight back' (ibid). Yet he also warns that 'if 
it  becomes  the  ultimate  destiny  for  oppressed  peoples,  it  will  also  metamorphose  into  an 
inescapable tomb' because it relies for its existence and its potency on the exclusionary logics 
which created it in the first place (ibid). 
 
The problems inherent in claiming a collective identity to work for social change have been 
discussed by social theorists at length over the past decade, most notably perhaps by Judith 
Butler (1990) in her exposition of the problems inherent in declaring gender a unified and unitary 
identity from which to launch an emancipatory politics for women. She posed several probing 
questions which I believe serve to articulate the problems that all theories based on identity 
politics share. 
 
Is  the  construction  of  the  category  of  women  as  a  coherent  and  stable  subject  an 
unwitting regulation and reification of gender relations? And is not such a reification 
precisely contrary to feminist aims? …If a stable notion of gender no longer proves to be 
the foundational premise of feminist politics, perhaps a new sort of feminist politics is 
now desirable to contest the very reification of gender and identity …[and] to formulate 
within this constituted frame a critique of the categories of identity that contemporary 
juridical structures engender, naturalise, and immobilise (5). 
 
These concerns are equally relevant to the problematisation of disability culture as envisaged 
by disability theorists and activists, because, to rely on an identity based on the reification of an oppressive  category  imposed  by  hegemonic  discourse  does  not  challenge  the assumptions 
upon which it is based. 
 
It is now commonly accepted within the field of disability studies that the possibilities inherent in 
the  structure  of  disability  culture  to  reinforce  oppression  must  be  properly  understood  and 
remedied. Davis (1998) warns against the tendency to base emancipatory action on 'the notion 
of wounded identities' (29). He quotes Brown's reading of Nietzsche to argue that the ontology 
of  the  coming  into  being  of  wounded  identities  is  an  'effect  of  domination  that  reiterates 
impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, 
powerlessness, and rejection' (ibid). In this way a collective identity based on shared oppression 
is based on 'remembering and reinvoking the pain caused by oppression' (ibid) and, as such, it 
'installs its pain  ...in the very foundation of its political claim, in its demand for recognition as 
identity ...by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics' (Brown as 
quoted in Davis 1998: 29).  
 
A great many disability theorists are working to clarify the issues which articulate the paradox 
which is born from relying on a sense of a stable, unified identity when this claim to stability and 
unity is in actuality the source of oppression for people who have been declared inferior (Corker 
1998, 1999, 2000; Davis 1998; Linton 1998; Meekosha 2003; Scheer 1994; Thomas 1999a, 
1999b). In drawing from their insights and attempting to weave them together into a coherent 
narrative, I argue that this paradox rests on the fact that identity politics bases its claims on 
essentialist  assumptions  which  result  in  the  maintenance  of  the  modernist,  dichotomous 
thinking which has been responsible for the creation of dividing practices in the first place.  
 
This essentialist belief that identities have a natural origin manifests itself in two ways, both of 
which trouble the emancipatory potential of disability culture. The first and most commonly cited 
is biological essentialism which posits that identities stem from innate biological causes, such as 
sex-related  physiology,  genetically  explicable  racial  differences,  or  physical  damage  which 
leads to incapacity. Alternatively, and equally problematic, is the form of essentialism which is 
defined by Laws (1995) as 'humanist essentialism' (116) which relies on the modernist belief, 
discussed  in  Chapter  Three,  that  identities  are  stable,  unified  and  continuous  entities 
(Woodward 1997: 11). In the following two sections I seek to demonstrate that each of these 
brands of essentialism are responsible for keeping the possibilities for collective action and 
redefinition ensnared within the oppressive binaries that negate the value of difference and 
diversity, and I will conclude this chapter by arguing for the relinquishment of the desire for fixity 
and permanence within categories of identification.  
 
 
 
 Getting Underneath the Skin 
 
Escaping from the essentialist assumptions which haunted early forms of emancipatory struggle 
has been one of the prime tasks of feminists, anti-racial activists, and disability theorists over 
the past two decades. For, by accepting that their identities had a biological basis, women, non-
whites, and disabled people faced an early stalemate in their development of liberatory theories 
because they were restricted to the argument that their differences made them "naturally" or 
essentially  better  people  than  those  who  had  defined  them  as  inferior.  Thus,  women  who 
claimed that their innate ability to nurture, be maternal and to form close relationships provided 
the  tools  for  overcoming  the  oppressive  and  hierarchical  nature  of  patriarchal  rule,  while 
understandably  trying  to  develop positive identities based on their shared oppression, were 
missing the point that the differential nature of these qualities was in fact constructed as the 
roots of their subjugation. The recognition that their oppression had relied on the construction of 
a  subjugated  female  identity  led  to  the  development  of  the  distinction  between  sex,  the 
biological category, and gender, the social construction, a position which appeared at first to 
effectively oust its essentialist assumptions.  
 
I  would  argue  that  disability  studies  has  traversed  a parallel pathway to feminism and has 
undergone a similar theoretical evolution in its attempt to deal with the problems involved in 
claiming a collective identity. Indeed, disability studies and feminism are founded on very similar 
ideals, as Thomson (1996) outlines: 
 
[Both] challenge existing social relations; both resist interpretations of certain bodily 
configurations and functioning as deviant; both question the ways that differences are 
invested with meaning; both examine the enforcement of universalising norms; both 
interrogate the politics of appearance; both explore the politics of naming; both forge 
positive identities (22). 
 
And,  I  would  argue,  both  have  had  to  negotiate  the  problems  which  have  stemmed  from 
claiming a biological origin for their political categorisation. As has already been discussed in 
earlier  chapters,  disability  studies  has  attempted  to  overcome  the  biological  determinism 
inherent in medical discourse by developing the social model of disability which distinguishes 
between the physical reality of "impairment" and the social creation of "disability" and I believe it 
has  achieved  great  theoretical  strides  by  being  able  to  argue  from  a  more  constructionist 
perspective. However, the problems of situating impairment outside social and historical debate 
mirrors the problems which Butler (1990) brought to light within feminism when she questioned 
the feasibility of dividing off gender from sex, a socially created identity from the body upon 
which it has been inscribed. What, she asks: 
 
… circumscribes that site as "the female body"? Is "the body" or "the sexed body" the 
firm foundation on which gender and systems of compulsory sexuality operate? Or is "the body" itself shaped by political forces with strategic interests in keeping that body 
bounded and constituted by the markers of sex? (129). 
 
The  dividing  off  of  impairment  from  disability  as  social  construction  is  a  similarly  troubled 
concept. It leaves impairment, and the pain and suffering which accompany it, as untouchable 
areas of experience, which, as I have argued throughout, disallows theoretical analysis from 
getting  underneath  our  skins  to  the  source  of  some  of  the  most  distressing  facets  of  our 
oppression. As Meekosha (2003) argues, proponents of the social model risk the creation of a 
‘new binary … - impairment/disability - as the theory attempts to remove an older powerful 
binary - normal/disabled’ (64). 
 
Paterson & Hughes (1997) have argued that, by ignoring the social construction of the impaired 
body, the social model converges in a dangerous synchrony with the individualistic biomedical 
perspective it sets out to critique.  
 
The social model - in spite of its critique of the medical model - actually concedes the 
body  to  medicine  and  understands  impairment  in  terms  of  medical  discourse.  To 
recapture  this  lost  corporeal  space  without  returning  to  the  reactionary  view  that 
physicality determines social status, the social model requires to mount a critique of its 
own dualistic heritage and establish, as an epistemological necessity, that the impaired 
body is part of the domain of history, culture and meaning, and not - as medicine would 
have it - an ahistorical or, pre-social, purely natural object (326). 
 
In a nutshell, any claim to identity which rests on a division between the biological and the social 
will be weak in two ways. Firstly it will suffer the price of theoretical inconsistency by relying on 
an  arbitrary  distinction  between  a  socially  constructed  element  and  one  which  defies  this 
construction. For how can we argue for the social construction of the former, if we subscribe to 
the belief that the latter is mimetic, that is, that it reflects an inherent reality which has escaped 
the forces human interpretation? And, secondly, it leaves the area of experience surrendered as 
biological at the mercy of annexation and this serves a doubly subjugating purpose. For, if 
disabled people's pain and personal anguish are claimed to be irrelevant by both the medical 
model, which sees pain and distress as deficiencies in coping, and the social model, which 
promises to emancipate disabled people if they suppress any aspects of their conditions which 
may be considered to be individualising, they remain in a no-man's-land where these facets of 
their reality are given no credence by either the discourses that are believed to oppress them 
and that which promises to liberate them. 
 
One Problem, One Name, One Very Effective Prison 
 
The  second  brand  of  essentialism  I  wish  to  discuss  may  be  even  more  troubling  than  its 
biological  counterpart  because  it  is  so  seldom  recognised  as  problematic.  Laws  (1995) describes  this  kind  of  essentialism  provisionally  as  'humanist'  or  'structural',  but  does  not 
attempt to define it and Woodward (1997) touches on the same kind of notion and argues that it 
'involve[s] tracing our routes through history of the assertion of binding kinship relationships' and 
adds that, like biological essentialism, it rests on 'a claim to a unified notion of identity' (italics 
original) (11). I argue that this form of essentialism is philosophical in contrast to biological and 
that it may be more clearly defined in relation to the development of the liberal belief in a stable, 
unitary identity discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
As I attempted to demonstrate, although we are now aware of how fragmented and contingent 
our identities actually are, we are still tightly bound to a notion of identity which supports our 
need for fixity and unity. These conflicting perceptions, and, thus, the paradox which emerges 
from them, result in a case of double vision when trying to articulate the state of the late modern 
subject. The simultaneous view of the subject as both stable and constantly shifting, unified and 
fragmented, fixed and fluid, singular and hybrid, creates a sense of what Caines (2002) refers to 
as 'vertigo' in the face of these incommensurable realities. This dizziness and lack of orientation 
is also transferred to the ways in which we perceive collective identity and, as is the common 
tendency when we feel threatened with a loss of balance, we reach blindly for anything solid 
and grip as tightly to it as possible. I believe that this desire to cling onto what seems safe and 
comprehensible is at the root of our current dilemma within the realm of identity politics, for, 
although there are a multitude of theorists who are arguing passionately for the recognition of 
difference  and  diversity  within  liberatory  movements,  they  remain  loathe  to  let  go  of  their 
philosophical understanding of identity as being synonymous with unity and continuity. 
 
The need for unity at both an individual and group level is understandable and cannot be easily 
resolved.  For,  how  can  we  feel  whole  or  build  emancipatory  movements  based  on  shared 
experience without claiming some sense of unity? As Haber (1994) points out: 'The recognition 
of similarity with others is crucial in denying and recognising the harmful political implications of 
the public/private split. It is the recognition of the similarity of my pain or oppression in someone 
else that allows me to deny the idiosyncratic nature of my experience, and to deny my guilt at 
being different from the "norm" ' (133). However, this need to recognise the many and varied 
connections that inevitably exist between individuals does not necessitate the existence of an 
immutable, transhistorical identity which is based on fixity and the exclusion of other qualities.  
 
In attempting to build a concept of identity within feminist theory which escapes the restraints of 
modernist thinking, Griffiths (1995) argues that 'there exists no unity of the self, no unchanging 
core of a being' (185). It is the desire to build meta-narratives which claim to represent universal 
truths  about  the  human subject which has been responsible for the creation of oppression. 
'Infinitely  preferable',  Griffiths  argues,  '  is  the  variety,  confusion,  colour,  hotchpotch, 
kaleidoscope, medley, motley, and harlequin of patchwork selves' (ibid). What we need then is a 
way  of  acknowledging  and  utilising  our  shared  experiences  by  deconstructing  rather  than celebrating them, challenging rather than clinging onto them, coalescing around them to gain 
insights into how to release ourselves from their grip rather than tightening it ever further by not 
believing that release is possible. 
 
The need to recognise the diversity of problems, values, experiences, stories and identities that 
exist within the group of people defined as "disabled" has been acknowledged across the board 
within disability theory. However, although a great deal of lip service is being paid to the notion 
that  identities  are  fluid,  fragmented  and  multiple,  this  often  only  thinly  veils  the  modernist 
assumptions which underpin even the most poststructural of accounts. Every time disability 
theorists use the terms "we", "us" and "them" without qualification (Gilson, Tusler and Gill 1997; 
Morris 1991; Peters and Chimedza 1995) or speak of 'a conception of the self' (Anspach 1979: 
766) or 'a whole self' (Weeber 1999a: 110) that does not acknowledge the many selves we are 
or have the potential to become, we are relying on unitary logics which risk excluding certain 
people. Thomas (1999a) refers to these collapses into modernist assumptions as 'categorical 
approaches'  which  'suffer  from  the  paradox  …that  by  identifying  with  and  celebrating  their 
"difference"  disabled  people  might  reinforce  and  sustain  (rather  than  challenge)  categories 
which have been socially produced within an oppressive disablist and patriarchal society' (115). 
 
In assuming that the “shared experience” of disabled people truly is "shared" by all its members, 
disability  theorists  have  often  overlooked  the  other  strands  of  identity  which  affect  the 
experiences of disabled people. Indeed, I would argue that the unacknowledged "subject" of 
disability studies has been overwhelmingly white, male and middle to upper class (Couser 1997: 
185). Couser argues that women have been ignored because they are already considered to be 
disabled by their gender and Deegan (1985) adds that they are, therefore, seen as having less 
to lose than men (56-57). It is also becoming clear that the female identity has been neglected 
within disability studies because men have dominated due to their privileged status in society 
(Barnes,  Mercer  and  Shakespeare  1999;  Lloyd  1995;  Meekosha 1998). This neglect of the 
issues concerning disabled women has not been limited to disability theory. Feminism has also 
demonstrated  a  lack  of  interest  in  including  disability  in  its  analysis  (Barnes,  Mercer  and 
Shakespeare 1999; De Pauw 1996; Drake 1999; Lloyd 1995; Meekosha 1998) and has even 
been  shown  to  incorporate  discriminatory  attitudes  towards  disabled  women  because  they 
epitomise the passivity and dependence that feminists are trying to dissociate themselves from 
(Drake 1999: 131; Fine and Asch 1988: 3-4; Lloyd 1995: 219). The issue of race as it interacts 
with disability has also been notably absent in disability studies, as has the consideration of 
disability within the racial identity literature (Alston et al. 1996).  
 
Deegan (1985) argues that, because the effects of multiple oppression are not calculable via 
the  simple  addition  of  the  minority  statuses  involved,  an  adequate  consideration  of  their 
interaction can only be developed within what she refers to as 'the multiple minority group' (39). 
While I understand the  argument here, I also believe that, ultimately, it is based on the very kinds  of  unitary  assumptions  from  which  oppressive  thinking  originates  as  it  assumes  that 
identity does, indeed, reside somewhere in the core of these ever smaller minority groups. And, 
in so doing, it denies the opportunity for emancipatory politics to challenge and disperse all 
identifications based on lack of social privilege. To take the notion of the multiple minority group 
to its logical conclusion, consider the outcome of dividing off all of the groups within disability 
studies which are representative of multiple minorities. All that would remain in the original 
group would be white disabled males (or perhaps rich, white, disabled, heterosexual males who 
are successful and independent and are not disfigured). I suggest that, rather than this, we 
understand  the  disability  rights  movement  and  all  other  groups  which  coalesce  around  the 
recognition  of  shared  oppression  as  inherently  multiple  and  that  we  all  always  need  to  be 
conscious  of  our mixed heritage in privilege and subjugation. Only then will we be able to 
choose to live outside of these groupings. Otherwise, if I am fighting to retain one form of 
privilege while I am struggling to overcome another, how do I reconcile my belief that all forms 
of oppression are wrong? 
 
This  recognition  that  we  must  move  beyond  the  concept  of  singular  groupings  which  are 
believed  to  represent  singular  identities  is,  I  believe,  the  first  and  most  vital  step  towards 
developing an understanding of how oppression is enacted so that it can be undone. And the 
only way to follow through in practice is to stop demanding uniformity and to start inviting and 
attempting to make sense of the many voices which are capable of articulating the experience 
of subjugation. If we can learn to see both that there are many other subjugated identities 
experienced by those who also see themselves as members of disability culture and that other 
marginalised  groups  outside  of  disability  culture  have  shared  similar  experiences  in  their 
trajectory  of  oppression,  then  we  have  the  beginnings  of  an  emancipatory  theory  which  is 
capable  of  dissolving  exclusionary  boundaries  and  working  towards  the  celebration  of  the 
differences which exist beyond oppressive binaries.  
 
Slack (1999) argues that, to prioritise diversity, we must open our ears and our minds to the 
different stories, 'the personal and unique histories' that make up the identities of people who 
are also disabled (36). Haber (1994) also speaks in terms of stories or narratives and the fact 
that their multiplicitous nature ensures that 'the recognition of similarity does not foreclose on 
the recognition of genuine difference. So long as I recognise the many narratives I am I can also 
recognise that any story about another, or about myself, is necessarily incomplete'  (127). By 
accepting that the unique nature of our stories is based on their complexity and multiplicity, we 
have  the  potential  to  build  identities  which  are  not  bounded  by  exclusionary  divisions.  As 
Thomas (1999b) argues, it is necessary to acknowledge that claiming affiliation with disability 
culture should not rely on a unitary claim to a disabled identity, but should be based on the 
understanding  that  'one  set  of  strands  in  one's  web  of  identity  -  or  one  chapter  in  one's 
ontological narrative - has been subjectively acted upon, re-woven, and retold in the light of 
counter-narratives'  (120).  
Beyond the Disabled Identity 
 
I believe that, although biological and humanist essentialism are based on different kinds of 
originary logic, they are both implicated in the same modernist stalemate which comes from 
seeking liberation by simply reversing the dichotomies which define who is privileged and who is 
excluded in our society. By claiming an identity which has been created through the processes 
of hierarchical differentiation and exclusion, subjugated peoples reinforce their own oppression 
and restrict their hopes to the belief that they can demonstrate how positive it is to be identified 
as such. This kind of thinking misses the point entirely. What we must do is to challenge the 
very frameworks within which this way of perceiving the world as "good" or "bad", "right" or 
"wrong", "worthy" or "unworthy" have been constructed. The question should not be focused on 
whether we have positive characteristics based on our disability, womanhood or racial origins, 
but on how these distinctions function in the first place and what, if anything, lies outside of 
them.  
 
Foucault’s argument that those who believe that sexuality is a natural quality which can be 
liberated from repressive influences is relevant here (Foucault 1977d: 155; 1980h: 219-220). I 
suggest that the same form of entrapment in essentialist logics is in evidence within disability 
theory and the disability rights movement, because, by claiming that there exists a more positive 
disabled identity which has been repressed, and that its authenticity is now being unearthed via 
the theories and practices which frame disability culture, the disabled identity becomes iconised 
as a true and unitary way of being. This is the problem with a concept such as "disability pride." 
It is admittedly symbolic of the positive identity sought after by disabled people, but it only really 
serves to reinforce the oppression that it is attempting to challenge. For, when "disability" is 
understood within its social model context, it refers to a marginalised status which should foster 
a  desire  to  escape  from,  rather  than  hold  onto  and  celebrate,  it.  What  we  can  celebrate, 
however, is the strength we have developed through learning to survive in a world which relies 
on such negative identifications, our ability to create beautiful things from the rubble of our 
marginalisation, and, ultimately, our capacity to devise new ways of seeing ourselves which are 
inclusive of our impairments, but which exist outside of "disability". 
 
In keeping with this recognition of the importance of the repressive hypothesis, Simon (1995) 
states  that  'Foucault  was  not  interested  in  reversals  that  simply  affirmed  what  had  been 
repressed, be it sex, madness or delinquency, but in those that begin with such affirmations in 
order to dissolve the categorisations or subjections that construct sexual or other natures' (98). 
In other words, it was not Foucault's aim to affirm our social construction via identity, but to work 
towards the creation of liberatory forms of subjectivity. I would argue that this ability to use the 
concept of collective identity in the service of overcoming it revolves around the recognition of 
the difference that exists between "being" and "becoming" as articulated by Hall (as cited by Woodward 1997: 21). Woodward discusses Hall's concept of an 'imagined community' built on 
both a shared history of "being" and the freedom to "become" other than this (ibid).  
 
Although he may use different words to describe it, Foucault's work is liberally infused with 
references  to  this  need  to  move  beyond  an  imposed  sense  of  "being"  into  the  realm  of 
"becoming". Thus, when he suggests that 'maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what 
we are, but to refuse what we are' (Foucault 1982: 216) he is clearly articulating the difference 
between  a  sense  of  identity as "being" and one which involves "becoming", because he is 
suggesting that, by refusing what we are, we are capable of becoming something else. The 
evolution of effective liberatory theories and practices relies not, Foucault (1991a) argues, on 
the clinging to formerly inscribed identifications, but rather on the 'destruction of what we are... 
[and] the creation of something entirely different' (122). Many theorists have been concerned 
that the notion that even our most "private" domains are socially constructed serves to preclude 
any  hope  for  agency.  Yet,  as  Foucault  (1988g)  argues,  these  social  constructions  'can  be 
unmade, as long as we know how it was they were made' (37). This, as I have argued, is the 
purpose of the genealogical project. By seeking to uncover the buried knowledges of erudition, 
the  histories  of  the  present  which  disturb  the  self-evident  nature  of  our  most  deeply  held 
assumptions, we open the way for other choices, other "truths", other ways of seeing ourselves. 
I refer once again to Simon's (1995) observation that 'genealogy exposes the contingency of 
what appears natural, enabling one to loosen the ties to one's identity' (109). This does not 
entail  a  necessary  rejection  of  behaviours  that  have  traditionally  been  associated  with 
oppression,  such  as,  being  "feminine"  or  "maternal",  rather  it  reframes  these  positions  as 
choices instead of immutable facts of nature.  
 
The liberatory potential of post-structuralism is, however, queried  by authors such as Thomas 
(1999a) who declares that 'for anti-essentialists there cannot be an identity politics' because 
'identity politics is seen as re-inscribing the very boundaries it seeks to challenge' (116). With 
this I can only agree wholeheartedly. But, while Thomas uses this premise to destabilise the 
anti-essentialist assumptions of poststructural theory, I argue, conversely, that the call for the 
dissolution  of  identity  politics  as  we  know it is a sign of poststructuralism's success not its 
failure.  For,  although  I  concur  that  we  need  to  coalesce  around  our  points  of  common 
oppression to be able to overcome them, I do not believe that this necessitates that we lionise 
this identity and declare it a permanent feature of either society or our subjective realities.  
 
Instead, I argue that we should move beyond the reification of oppressive identifications, and 
see our collective struggles as temporary and partial responses to instances of injustice based 
on  negative  identifications.  These  groupings  should  not  be  allowed  to  calcify  into  fixed 
categories from which we cannot escape. They should be viewed rather as "communities of 
resistance"  which  must  be  capable  of  changing  their  shape  to  adapt  to  the  differing circumstances within which subjugated identities are framed.
5 Foucault (1977c) touches on this 
need for fluid rather than fixed forms of resistance when he argues that 'if power is dispersed in 
a  multiplicity  of  networks,  resistance  can  only  be  realised  through  a  series  of  localised 
strategies'  (italics  mine)  (126).  Strategies  which  are  localised  and particular are capable of 
taking into account the specificity of each claim to a more positive identity or enhanced social 
status and can be based on coalitions which are 'provisional', and, as such, are constantly 
'subject to recreation and renegotiation' (McNay 1992: 111). Wallace Balogh (1991) puts this 
beautifully  when  she  describes    this  kind  of  coalition  as  'creating  a  space,  …a  holding 
environment' which paves the way for change: 
 
The ongoing process of creating a holding environment for ourselves and each other, a 
social, intellectual space for political, intellectual sociability, for reflecting on our given 
"realities", strengthens and empowers us to address and challenge the oppressive and 
repressive nature of those realities and the representations of those realities (41). 
 
This  will  only  work,  however,  if  as  Caines  (2000)  argues,  these  partial  and  momentary 
collectivities  are  recognised  as  a  function  of  'a  hybridised  identity' (126). In arguing for an 
understanding of community which celebrates rather than fears its lack of fixity, she argues that, 
if our connections are recognised as fluid, partial and momentary, 'then the community networks 
built from groups of these connections can never be traced to a hierarchical or oppressing 
singular purpose, vision or voice' (ibid). 
 
This idea of a community of resistance which forms in response to shared oppression is based 
on an understanding of identity which attempts to move beyond the constraints of essentialism. 
This  has  been  a  difficult  vision  to  clarify  because  many  theorists,  like  Connolly,  who  use 
poststructural  theory  and  the  genealogical  method  to  explore  alternative  ways  of  viewing 
identity, remain tangled in the paradox which demands as its solution the retention of a stable 
notion of identity. Connolly (1991) expresses it thus: 
 
Now, the paradoxical element in the relation of identity to difference is that we cannot 
dispense with personal and collective identities, but the multiple drives to stamp truth 
upon those identities function to convert differences into otherness and otherness into 
scapegoats created and maintained to secure the appearance of a true identity. To 
possess a true identity is to be false to difference, while to be true to difference is to 
sacrifice the promise of a true identity (Connolly 1991: 67). 
 
                                                   
5 The term and the concept of “communities of resistance” was first used by hooks (1990b: 43). I originally believed that 
these  "communities  of  resistance",  like  the  identities  they  coalesced  around,  would  dissolve  when  they  had  been 
successful  in  their  goals,  but  my  supervisor,  Trish  Harris,  pointed  out  in  an  email  to  me  that  'oppression  doesn't  get 
beaten  once  and  for  all. It adapts, accommodates, takes on new forms etc. So I wonder if this doesn't need a rethink 
suggesting  that  your  'communities  of  resistance'  are  not  fixed  but  fluid;  that  they  take  new  shape  and  form  as  the 
patterns of oppression respond and change'.  
 Yes, it is true that we cannot hold on to our notion of true identities when we recognise that we 
are made up of multiple, fluid and changing points of subjectivity, and neither should we desire 
to.  "True"  identities  are  built  on  "truths"  which  are  created,  via  expert  knowledges,  for  the 
purposes of shaping our behaviour and they bind us to narrow, fixed choices of how to see 
ourselves and do not represent our complexity at all.  
 
Thus, the problem with envisaging the disabled identity as representing something inherent in 
the  natures of people with impairments that should be celebrated and maintained is that it 
negates the possibility for existing outside of it. One of the prime purposes of disability culture is 
to struggle against the fact that, as was discussed in the previous chapter, being "disabled" has 
been turned into a 'master status' (Becker 1963: 32-33) or a label of 'primary potency' (Singh 
1999: 88). Does this not necessitate both that the recognition that people who are incapacitated 
are  part  of  an  extremely  diverse  group  of  people  and  that  the  attempt  to  reinscribe  their 
identities in ways which are not framed by oppressive definitions, result in the dissipation of the 
disabled identity altogether? Davis (1998) discusses this possibility, but is obviously vexed by 
the outcome. 
 
The list of identities will only grow larger tied to an ever-expanding idea of inclusiveness. 
After all, when all identities are finally included, there will be no identity. When studies 
focus on alterity, and when alterity must be included, then, in the full plenum of inclusion, 
alterity ceases to be other. Identity becomes so broad a category that it cannot contain 
identity (22).  
 
I realise that Davis is referring to the methodological difficulty inherent in declaring the struggle 
for emancipation a universal objective, but I argue that the problems he outlines, that, if alterity 
is included it will no longer be other, and that, when identity is dissipated through a declaration 
of difference and a celebration of diversity then it will cease to exist, are in actuality the solutions 
to the paradox of identity politics.  
 
It should be apparent by now that I am not aiming for the creation a more positive disabled 
identity. I aim to challenge it at its roots and argue for its dissolution. This form of resistance 
does involve the creation of positive identities, but they will be positive because they exist 
outside of subjugated identity formations not because they celebrate them. They will be the 
identities that are possible when we are no longer defined by dichotomous polarities, but can 
freely choose to become individuals who are more self-determined and who are capable of 
challenging the social imposition of identity. This includes people who have been defined as 
"normal", as existing on the right side, the desirable side of the dichotomy. By understanding 
their enslavement to the principles of the norm, they can be more free to choose the ways in 
which they would like to be identified. This kind of identity formation would be based on a 
continuum of accepted and acceptable difference where difference is celebrated, and not on a 
hierarchical dualism of self and Other where difference from the norm is punished.   
This view of identity and the communities of resistance it implicates need not shatter our current 
applications of disability culture as a tool for social change. However, it will necessitate that 
these  sites  of  collective  struggle  are  utilised  in  different  ways.  My  method  of  research 
represents one possible means for building a partial and temporary community of resistance 
which is capable of devising new ways of "becoming" from its exploration of the processes of 
"being".  It  functions  by  combining  the  historical  project  of  genealogy  with  the  telling  and 
unpicking of narratives which represent, to various degrees, both phenomenological examples 
of the ways in which the dominant discourse is woven into people's identities and the counter-
narratives  which  have  been  built  in  their  scattered  locations  within  the  grid  of  power  as 
subversions of these identities. Both levels of perception are evident in participant narratives 
and I believe that, via the theoretical insights outlined so far, each can function to educate us on 
how  to  move  beyond  oppressive  identifications.  For,  by  learning  how  our  most  personal 
experiences have been fashioned as part of a historical project which governs our lives, we can 
begin to choose differently from the array of subjectivities that define each of us. 
 
To balance an understanding of the elements of shared oppression with the positive differences 
which are possible outside of binary classifications will require a constant rearticulation of the 
ways  in  which  we  describe  difference  and  diversity.  The  metaphors  which  we  create  to 
challenge our subjective locations will have to be malleable and capable of change as our 
connections to our common bond in oppression become weakened by our success. "Crip", for 
example, will only achieve its parodic purpose during the early phases of transition towards 
more  enabling forms of identity, and the term, "able-bodied" need only exist to trouble the 
boundaries between those are accepted and those who are not while those boundaries are still 
in evidence. Similarly, the descriptor, the "disabled identity", becomes redundant when people 
who have impairments and ongoing illnesses are not defined by them, but are characterized by 
the diversity of their qualities which include, but do not prioritise, the physical state of their 
bodies.  
 
In conclusion, I should make clear that the process of liberation that has been suggested within 
this chapter relies on the mapping out of what Foucault (1991f) refers to as 'a critical ontology of 
ourselves' (43). To challenge our identities and to loosen our ties to them requires that we 
attempt to work 'at the limits of ourselves', at the boundaries which define and divide us (ibid).  
 
I mean that this work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open up a 
realm  of  historical  inquiry  and,  on  the  other,  put  itself  to  the  test  of  reality,  of 
contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, 
and to determine the precise form this change should take (ibid). 
 
In  Chapter  One,  I  suggested  that  the  point  at  which  a  person  moves  from  a  state  of 
ablebodiedness to the social location defined by the disabled identity is marked by a hybrid and heightened  state  of  consciousness  of  the  margins  which  separate  the  privileged  from  the 
excluded. And I now reiterate that it is this liminality which makes it such a salient site from 
which to launch a critical ontology of ourselves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART THREE 
 
Speaking the Unspeakable: 
 
Tales of Loss and Healing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Since I became acquainted with you, this question of identity has lodged in my thoughts 
like a grove of trees, sometimes offering shelter, sometimes mysterious and even a wee 
bit scary, the home of strange and powerful spirits. 
Chris Baker, email correspondence 30/5/02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As I tuck myself beneath my computer table to begin the writing of this, the most important 
section of my dissertation, I am momentarily awestruck by the emotional complexity of the task 
ahead and I am faced with a quandary. For, how can I possibly share what a deeply moving and 
intensely transformative experience my communion with other disabled people and their stories 
has been, while maintaining the professional tone that such an academic analysis demands?  A 
typical  essay  designed  to  describe  a  piece  of  grounded  theory  research  will  begin  with an 
introduction which discusses background issues and the reasons why the research is believed 
to have academic value, and will then describe the nature of the sample and methods of data 
collection  and  analysis.  Following  this  will  be  a  breakdown  of  the  results  where  the  main 
categories  and themes are outlined and, finally, there will be a discussion of the theory or 
theories which have emerged from the data.  
 
All of these are vital ingredients in an informed and informative account and I intend to neglect 
none of them. However, I propose that, due to the differing nature of my particular methodology, 
the  way  I  structure  this  account  will  need  to  deviate  from  the  conventional  format.  My 
introduction has already been given and comprises the first four chapters of my thesis. Within 
Parts One and Two I have attempted to describe my methodological rationale and to set the 
scene for how it is that the disabled identity has come into being. Added to this, a significant 
portion of my data analysis and the conclusions drawn from it will be dealt with in the next section, Part Four of my thesis, when I apply a governmentality analysis to the main themes 
which emerge from this, the qualitative component. Therefore, what remains to be addressed 
here,  apart  from  a  description  of  the  sample,  the  sampling  technique  and  the data coding 
process, are the stories themselves and the insights they generate. What I most desire to create 
here  is  an  emancipatory  space  in  which  the  stories,  built  from  the  dialogues  and 
autobiographies and my own personal experience, can retain their integrity while being viewed 
from the different angles that a categorical analysis necessitates.  
 
Therefore, I will attempt in Chapters Five through Eight to provide the space for the telling of the 
stories which have emerged in the context of the core categories. It is within these four chapters 
that I most wish to deviate from a conventional approach. Firstly, there will be no attempt to 
formally embed these stories in referenced sociological texts. I believe that the sociological 
foundations, as I argued above, exist in the arguments and analyses presented in the chapters 
which come before and after this section. Additionally, as outlined in Chapter One, it is my 
intention to develop these chapters through a very subjective lens. It will be subjective in that 
the following interpretation of the data is completely my own and, although it rests on a strong 
theoretical background, as outlined in Parts One and Two, it is also heavily influenced by my 
own experiences of disability.  
 
It will also be subjective because I intend to interweave my own voice with the voices of my 
participants. This has already occurred within the dialogues I had with them because I tried to 
be very open about my own feelings in relation to disability and I see the dialogues as being 
representative of conversations between equals. However, in addition to this, my voice will also 
be present in the weaving together of the emergent themes. In other words, I will attempt to be 
open  about  my  own  feelings  and  experiences  where  I  feel  they  have  relevance.  A  further 
difference between this and a conventional grounded theory account is that I wish to ensure that 
the  excerpts  I  draw  from  the  dialogues  and  the  written  material  are  clearly  linked  to  their 
contexts, and for this reason these excerpts will be quite lengthy at times, so that they are not 
fractured unnecessarily to support my interpretations. Lastly, I often refrain from mentioning a 
person's  impairment  when  I  quote  something  that  they  have  said  because  frequently  this 
information is irrelevant and its addition would only serve to support the idea that disability 
should form the primary mode of identification for those who have impairments. Appendix One, 
however,  provides  a  basic  description  of  the  participants,  including  their  age,  geographical 
location,  nature  of  impairment(s)  and/or  illness(es)  and  time  since  the  onset  of  their 
impairment(s)/ illness(es). 
 
At  this  point  I would like to make an attempt to share the feelings of awe, inspiration and 
gratitude  that  have  grown  inside  of  me  over  the  preceding  months  in  response  to  my 
conversations with my participants, feelings which seem to me to epitomise the transformational 
potential inherent in this kind of approach. I am honoured to have met such a diverse group of truly exceptional people and to have been offered an intimate look into their lives, thoughts and 
emotions. This willingness to share on a very intense and, at times, painful level in the hope that 
it may help other people in similar situations, established the atmosphere for our discussions 
and, I believe, created a space in which an extremely valuable consciousness raising process 
was encouraged to occur. In support of this belief many of my participants have indicated that 
the opportunity to discuss or write about their identity issues has been helpful, in some cases 
simply to let off steam and in others because it has made them think about things in completely 
new ways. In my own case, the impact has been enormous. My view of my life, myself, my 
disability  and  my  future  has  been  completely  revolutionised  and  it  is  my  hope  that  the 
emancipatory  insights  which  link  my  qualitative  research  experience  with  my  new  self-
perceptions will infuse every layer of my thesis from this point onward. 
 
Methodological Considerations 
 
Before proceeding to the stories themselves, it is necessary to engage in a brief discussion of 
the  methodological  consequences  of  attempting  to  merge  genealogy  with  grounded theory. 
Fundamental  to  the  principles  of  grounded  theory  is  the  proviso  that  the  researcher  must 
approach the study at hand with no preconceived ideas about the outcome of the research. As 
McCann & Clark (2003a) reiterate in their encapsulation of grounded theory, it initially involves 
an inductive process which ‘requires the researcher to use a ground-up (from practice to theory) 
approach, to enter the field with no preconceived hypotheses from the literature or elsewhere, 
and to be open-minded and flexible, so that the theory emerges from the data’ (9). Its inductive 
nature makes it ideally suited to emancipatory research because, in the case of dialogical data 
generation,  it  does  not  impose  any particular hypothesis on the narratives which are to be 
gathered and, as such, allows for the participants to tell their own stories in their own ways and 
for emergent theories to develop directly from the rich bank of data which is built from these 
stories (Hill & Thomas 2000; Kushner & Morrow 2003). Indeed, Knox et al. (2000) argue for the 
adoption of grounded theory specifically in the case of disability research because it contributes 
to the development of an emancipatory research model: ‘a model that fosters maximum control 
over and input into research endeavours by people with disabilities’ (50). 
 
However, I diverge from a strict adherence to the “tabula rasa” approach by declaring such a strong 
theoretical  standpoint  from  the  outset.  As  I  make  clear  in  the  preceding  chapters,  I  bring  to  the 
grounded  theory  component  of  my  research  a  strong  social  constructionist  viewpoint,  a  practice 
which  is  becoming  increasingly  common  within  the  field  of  grounded  theory  (see,  for  example, 
Marsiglio et al. 2001; Hill & Thomas 2000). I believe that this concern for social structure and context 
addresses one of the major weaknesses of traditional grounded theory studies, that is, that they have 
the potential to ‘concentrate on the immediate contextual factors that impinge on a phenomenon 
and ignore the broader structural influences on the phenomenon’ (McCann & Clark 2003b: 23). 
Denzin  (1989)  builds  his  methodology,  “interpretive  interactionism”,  from  the  same  foundation  in symbolic  interactionism  as  grounded  theory,  but he adds a constructionist layer in the attempt to 
incorporate an awareness and analysis of social structures and power relations. 
 
This concern for power and for how power twists and shapes human experience gives 
interpretive  research  a  critical  thrust  that  is  often  absent  in conventional evaluation 
studies.  Interpretive  studies  should  provide  a  thorough  going  critique  of  the  social 
structures and social processes that have been investigated. This will involve a critique 
of the general cultural formations that stand behind the phenomenon in question.  It will 
also involve a critique of the intellectual-scientific thought that creates knowledge about 
the problem (Denzin 1989: 33-34) 
 
In  adopting  a  genealogical  approach  founded  on  disability  theory  and  poststructuralism,  I  follow 
Denzin’s  emphasis  on  merging  the  biographical  with  the  historical  in  the  development  of  middle-
range sociological theory, but choose to retain the coding procedures of grounded theory because I 
believe  they  serve  to  prevent  my  preconceptions  from  affecting  an  open-minded  and  fresh 
perspective  in relation to the data (see Charmaz 1990). As McCann & Clark (2003a) argue, this 
process  of  data  fragmentation  and  reassembly,  particularly  the  initial  intensive  line-by-line  coding 
process,  ‘forces  the  researcher  to  concentrate  on  the  data  and  avoid  undue  influence  by 
preconceived beliefs about the field of enquiry’ (14). 
 
Additionally,  although  disability  theory  and  poststructuralism inform the fundamental premise upon 
which the entire project is based, that is, that identity and disability are social constructs, this premise 
is not a hypothesis nor is it part of a hypothesis that I seek to test. It is, rather, a conclusion drawn 
from prior research, one which has become what is referred to within the field of grounded theory as 
a ‘theoretical sensitising concept’ (Marsiglio et al. 2001). These sensitising concepts, and what Hill & 
Thomas (2000) refer to as ‘theoretical orientations’, are vital components of our research  because 
they stem from or form biases which need to be explicitly stated ‘so that findings can be interpreted 
in light of this bias, thus increasing the credibility of the study’ (197). Glaser & Strauss (1967) 
were aware of the importance of these concepts and orientations when they first developed 
grounded theory and wrote: 
 
As we have frequently remarked, researchers often stifle potential insights by virtue of 
too  strict  adherence  to  existing  theory,  particularly  "grand"  theory.  Nevertheless, no 
sociologist can possibly erase from his mind all the theory he knows before he begins 
his research.  Indeed the trick is to line up what one takes as theoretically possible or 
probable with what one is finding in the field. Such existing sources of insight are to be 
cultivated,  but  not  at  the expense of insights generated by the qualitative research, 
which are still closer to the data.  A culmination of both is desirable  (253). 
 
It is important to note that, although Glaser (1992) remains sceptical of pre-existing theoretical 
orientations and maintains that the literature review should not be engaged in prior to data 
collection, Strauss & Corbin (1990, 1998) diverge from this view by developing an approach 
which draws on social constructionist ontology and poststructuralism and encourages a review of existing research and an acknowledgement of social context and theoretical positioning as 
long as these do not stifle the development of insight during data collection and analysis. 
 
My basic research question can be stated as follows: what affect does the onset and ongoing 
existence of an impairment have on people’s self-perceptions and how other people view and 
react to them? This question is intended to get to the heart of the identity shift which occurs in 
response to disability without imposing any preconceived ideas on what these effects might be. 
I had certainly experienced a dramatic change to my own identity when I became disabled, but, 
prior to the dialogues, I had not really been able to clearly articulate or categorise the nature of 
the  rather  diffuse  feelings  of  inadequacy,  shame  and  loss  which  had  resulted.  It  was  only 
through the dialogues that the categories began to emerge and through the process of analysis 
that they ultimately took shape. Thus, although I approached the qualitative component of my 
research with a strong belief that my feelings were a form of internalised oppression rather than 
a personal response to a tragic event, and an associated commitment to analyse the results in 
light  of  the  constructionist  perspectives  which  inform  the  social  model  and  genealogy,  I 
undertook the dialogues with an open mind and was to meet with startling new insights again 
and again. 
 
Sampling and Analysis 
 
Some  months  before  beginning  the  dialogues,  I  emailed  fifty  seven  disability  related 
associations  and  support  groups  around  Australia.  Within  these  introductory  emails  I 
summarised my research objectives, explained the nature of the stories I was seeking and 
asked whether my call for participants could be included in a newsletter or posted on a list-
server where relevant. In addition to this I sought participants by word of mouth in my local area. 
I was aware of the difficulties in attracting participants to this kind of research because, firstly, 
the kind of people who comprise my research population, by the very nature of their conditions, 
are often so challenged in their attempts to negotiate the processes of daily living that they lack 
the time, energy, health or freedom from pain to be able to engage in anything else. Secondly, I 
was asking people to discuss issues which can be of an extremely personal and painful nature. 
Therefore, I knew that I would need to spend a great deal of time and effort in the attempt to 
make these contacts and that my "hit rate" would be relatively low. For this reason, and because 
I believe that it is a technique which aids in the theoretical sampling component of grounded 
theory, I expected to gain many of my participants via the process of snowball sampling where 
participants would introduce me to new participants. 
 
What I did not envisage was that this process of snowballing would expand the geographical 
boundaries of my research population to the degree that it ultimately did. Some months after my 
first attempts to attract participants, a woman in New Zealand, Lesley Tyzack, heard about what 
I was doing and emailed me. She is a disability rights activist and psychology student who has been  focusing  on  the  issues  of  disability  and  identity  in  her  own  studies.  She felt that my 
research complemented her own aims to such a degree that she was keen to help in any way 
possible. Through a snowballing process initiated by her I was eventually approached by nine 
other New Zealanders, many of them activists, who were willing to share their stories with me. 
The geographical boundaries of my research continued to expand due to the unpredictable 
pathways formed by electronic forms of communication and I was approached by people in the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  
 
It quickly became apparent that telephone conversations would provide the best way to conduct 
all of the participant dialogues, most obviously because of the distance factor, but, eventually 
they proved to be preferable to face-to-face interviews even when the latter were feasible. As 
Kidder  &  Judd  (1986)  point out, telephone conversations provide the same benefits as the 
personal  interview,  but  are  cheaper  and easier to organise. Moreover, they are particularly 
advantageous in cases where participants experience pain, illness and/or mobility problems. As 
such, telephone contact allows participants to converse from the comfort of home, at times even 
from bed, and it is easier to alter appointed times or to cut things short if the effects of the 
disability or illness make it necessary to do so (Clarke & James 2003).  
 
The 34 participants consisted of 18 women (53%) and 16 men (47%). Three participants live in 
the USA, three in the UK, ten in New Zealand and eighteen in Australia. It is important to point 
out here that, although the proportion of participants in the USA and the UK were relatively 
small in comparison to the Australasian contingent, when the length and number of dialogues 
with these participants are taken into account, they contributed 35% of the overall data derived 
from the 34 participants.  
 
The group ranged in age from 21 to 68, with those over 50 years of age possessing long-term 
impairments which were not age-related. The mean age was 45. The time since onset of injury 
ranged from 2 years to 58 years with a mean time of onset since injury of 18 years. The range 
of impairments reported was extremely diverse (see Appendix One). Although it had been my 
intention, for the reasons stated in Parts One and Two, to focus only on people with acquired 
disabilities, two of my participants and some of the autobiographical authors were born with 
their  impairments.  This  provided  the  possibility  for  valuable  comparisons  to  be  made  and 
similarities and contrasts noted. At the time of the dialogues, 7 persons - 3 females and 4 males 
- were in paid employment, ten were students
6 and the remainder were unemployed. Ultimately, 
however, I decided that, like Low (1996), it was not of great importance to "stratify the sample 
by sex, age, class or race as my intent was not compare the experiences of different categories 
of [people] with disabilities, rather it was to explore the experience of [people] with disabilities in 
general" (236). Appendix Two lists a range of significant differences between sample sectors, 
                                                   
6 Note that three people were both students and in paid employment.  some of which will be discussed in the following chapters and others which point to possibilities 
for further data fragmentation. 
 
The dialogues were commenced after informed consent was given (see Appendix Three for 
consent form) and ranged in time between one and three hours. With the exception of Lesley 
Tyzack, Lee Trustrum, and Chris Baker, who specifically requested that their real names be 
used, pseudonyms were assigned to each of the participants to protect their privacy. The way 
the  conversations  began  varied.  Often  participants  had  already  provided  details  of  their 
impairments during prior email correspondence and the dialogue was initiated with the question: 
"How has [the illness or disabling condition] affected the ways in which you see yourself and 
how others treat you?" If I didn't already have a clear idea of the nature of the impairment/s in 
question I would begin by asking for more details. However, frequently the conversation had 
already begun in the email correspondence preceding the first telephone contact, so the starting 
point varied according to what had already been discussed. As part of the dialogue I shared 
details of my own disability related experiences and it appeared to me that this aided a great 
deal in the building of rapport.  
 
Of the 34 participants, 22 spoke to me directly, 12 provided written responses, and 2 provided 
both spoken and written responses. In the case of the dialogues, the number of exchanges 
engaged in with each person varied according to whether additional conversations were seen to 
be mutually desirable and, if so, at the completion of each conversation we would renegotiate 
whether and when to speak again. In all, 52 dialogues were entered into (see Table One for a 
breakdown of the numbers of dialogues engaged in with each participant). The 12 participants 
who  gave  written  responses  provided  them  in  the  form  of  already  existing  essays,  diary 
excerpts, email dialogues with me, or single pieces of writing which were written specifically in 
response  to  my  basic  research  question. They ranged between one page and 35 pages in 
length. 
 
 
 
          Number of Participants            Number of Dialogues 
                        11                            1 
                         8                            2 
                         2                            3 
                         1                            5 
                         1                            6 
                         1                            8 
Total                24  Total                 52 
 
Table One: Number of Dialogues Per Participant  
In addition to the contributions of these participants, I also analysed 27 autobiographies and 31 
anthology  contributions  (see  Appendix  Four).  Prior  to  starting  the  process  of  reading  the 
autobiographies  and  anthologies  I  was  uncertain  as  to  whether  they  would  function  as 
comparable pieces of data as they had been produced in isolation from my research process. 
However, I kept in mind Glaser and Strauss' (1967) advice. 
 
When someone stands in the library stacks, he is, metaphorically, surrounded by voices 
begging  to be heard. Every book, every magazine article, represents at least one person 
who is equivalent to the anthropologist informant or the sociologists interviewee. In those 
publications, people converse, announce positions, argue with a range of eloquence, and 
describe events or scenes in ways entirely comparable to what is seen and heard during 
field work. The researcher needs only to discover the voices in the library to release them 
for his analytic use (163). 
 
In the case of the autobiographical material, in almost every case, these books, essays and 
poems could easily have been written in response to my basic research question: "How has [the 
illness or disabling condition] affected the ways in which you see yourself and how others treat 
you?" Therefore, those which were identity-oriented were treated as equivalent data slices and 
were analysed accordingly. Ultimately, the combination of the above processes resulted in the 
collection and analysis of 122 separate pieces of data based on the testimonies of 92 different 
people. 
 
Fundamental to the development of grounded theory is the understanding that data collection 
and data analysis must not be viewed as discrete entities.  From the earliest stages of data 
collection it is important to begin the coding process so that the emerging themes guide the 
ensuing collection of data. This is referred to as theoretical sampling and is used to ensure that 
the data guides the direction of the research rather than being used, as is the case in traditional 
studies, to prove or disprove existing theories and hypotheses (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 115). 
In this particular case, the technique of theoretical sampling did not so much affect the ongoing 
choice  of  participants,  but  rather  indicated  possible  directions  for  the  dialogues  to  take. 
Interestingly, however, I found that more specific questioning on sensitive issues frequently led 
to evasive responses and decided that the richest data resulted from free-form conversations 
rather than more focused dialogues.  
 
Consistent with grounded theory methodology, data analysis occurred on three levels. First of 
all  the  transcripts,  solicited  documents,  autobiographies  and  anthology  contributions  were 
subjected to an intensive line-by-line coding and memo-making process. I cannot overstate my 
astonishment  at  the  effectiveness  of  this  intense  scrutiny.  When transcribing a dialogue or 
extracting relevant excerpts from a book I found myself forming an overall picture of what was 
said or written in accordance with my preconceived ideas of what constitutes identity loss in relation to disability. However, once I combed the data in a detailed way I became aware of how 
much "thicker" and richer this data was than I had initially assumed. The data seemed to take 
on  much  more  of  a  life  of  its  own  and,  although  I  would  certainly  still  have  affected  its 
interpretation by my own attitudes and understandings, it unravelled and reformed in ways that 
were previously unimaginable to me. The next level of analysis involved the process of axial 
coding where comparisons were drawn between emerging themes, and the final step involved 
the  abstraction  of  these  themes  into  the  conceptual  groupings  which  constitute  the  core 
categories (see Charmaz 1994a).  
 
Three  core  categories  emerged  from  my  analysis  of  participants’  accounts,  each  of  which 
interweaved  to  define  the  major  identity  issues  affecting  disabled  people.  These  were 
independence, work and appearance/sexuality. The following chapters will therefore be devoted 
to  them. Before beginning this journey, however, it is necessary to highlight and discuss a 
crucial theme which emerged from the data, one which performed as the greatest confounding 
factor affecting data collection at the same time as representing the most potent symbol of how 
internalised  oppression  is  played  out  in  daily  life.  This,  as  it  was  defined  by  one  of  my 
participants, who is conducting her own research into disability and identity, is the practice of 
'self-silencing'.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Reaching Beneath the Compact of Silence 
 
Of course we smile.  
What else is one to do?  
Despair will not penetrate   
Defiance will not disintegrate this glass wall that surrounds us  
And hostility will only puzzle you.  
This smile covers a multitude of things -  
The frustration of short-circuited  
human contact,  
The deep-seated pain on loss of  
a whispered word,  
The hidden but utter rebellion against the gods.  
Would crying help?  
Of course we smile.  
It is our defence against  
The rest of you.  
                                                 Norma James             
 
 
After twelve years of inhabiting the problematic space defined by the disabled identity I should 
have known better. Yet, although I was well aware of the painful nature of the issues I was 
asking people to share with me, I was still naïve enough to assume that disabled people could 
and would have drawn clear and conscious boundaries between what they commonly shared 
with others and what they had learned should remain unspoken, and that they could move 
between these territories at will. In my own case I have learned to conceal from others and, at 
times, even myself, many of my feelings about my disability and how it has impacted on my life. 
After acquiring a disabled status it becomes apparent that there are certain socially acceptable 
ways of behaving and presenting oneself and that life moves more smoothly if one adheres to 
these expectations. Yet, beneath the social façade there live emotions submerged and losses 
unspoken and it has been my belief, one which is fundamental to my research aims, that a large 
part of the emancipatory process requires the creation of a space in which the unspeakable can 
finally be spoken.  
 
This  is  more  easily  said  that  done,  however,  and  during  the  early  stages  of  the  dialogical 
process I found myself caught in a conundrum. I had anticipated that our conversations would 
be dealing with two relatively distinct although interconnected phases, those defined by the loss 
of  identity  and  the  process  of  reconstruction.  I  expected  that  people  would  feel  more comfortable about sharing their experience of reconstruction as it is a much more positive and 
emotionally  safe  topic,  but  it  was  equally  important  to  for  me  to  be  able  to  touch  on  the 
experiences of loss because of my belief that, if society did not hold such negative views about 
disability, the losses would not be as great. I wanted to give people the chance to be open 
about the kinds of things they had been encouraged to submerge, to validate their feelings and 
experiences in an empathetic environment, and to explore the ways in which these feelings and 
their silencing have been framed within the dominant discourse. However, the early dialogues 
and  autobiographies  seemed  to  focus  almost  exclusively  on  the  narratives  surrounding 
reconstruction, particularly when this was accompanied by a sense of triumph, and little time 
was devoted to expressions of loss.  
 
My conundrum, therefore, lay in the question of whether my assumptions had been wrong. It 
was possible that people did not experience the deep sense of loss that I had anticipated and, 
even if they did, that they preferred not to talk about it. Either way, two of my foundational 
premises were seriously shaken, as I had strongly believed that all disabled people suffered, at 
least initially, from identity loss and that talking about it would be a welcome and emancipatory 
process. In relation to the former assumption, it quickly became apparent that everyone in the 
sample acknowledged their sense of loss. They just did not want to dwell on it when directly 
questioned. Consider the following dialogue. I am talking to Stan about a mutual friend who 
introduced us. Stan is very sympathetic towards her and feels she's been through a dreadful 
time. 
 
Me: Has there been any similarity …. did [you also] go through a dark time? Early on? 
 
Stan: I did, but I wasn't anywhere near as disabled as [her]. 
 
Me: Nor was I, but it's still difficult, isn't it, to come to terms with the losses, you know? 
 
Stan: Well, the losses... I've been very, very lucky... I mean, all these overseas trips. My 
initial trip, my firm gave me six months leave on full pay.  
 
Stan's reaction exemplifies the response that most people gave when they were asked a direct 
question about their losses. They agreed that they had experienced losses, but they would then 
quickly bounce off to safer ground, usually into what I refer to as a "triumph narrative". My 
quandary became, if people were resistant to dwelling on the emotionally difficult times, then 
what right did I have to push them in this regard? In keeping with grounded theory principles 
informing my research and my natural inclination to respect people's boundaries, I believed it 
would be inappropriate to encourage them to talk about things that they obviously felt were 
better left alone. My understanding of the processes involved in this kind of avoidance was 
aided in a very significant yet unexpected way in another dialogue with Stan. It had been my 
practice to let my participants know that I am disabled as it was important to me that we viewed the dialogues as a sharing of views between people who have experienced similar problems. 
Hence I was surprised to learn that I had not made this clear to Stan. He reacted with great 
sympathy. 
 
Stan: Oh dear, I'm sorry to hear that. I sort of half-way guessed, but I asked you and you 
never told me [this must have been by email, but I don't recall]. So I'm sorry to hear that. 
 
Me: Well, I'm like you and it's been for a long time and I've really come to terms with it. I 
mean, I'm trying to... I'm still trying to recover because I can't see any good reason why I 
can't get my back to start working again. I swim a lot and do lots of exercises, but it has 
definitely held me back. … 
 
It  was  not  until  I  transcribed  the  dialogue  that  I  realised  what  I  had  done.  When  offered 
sympathy and an opportunity to discuss the difficulties I had faced, my immediate reaction was 
to shy away into a triumph narrative. I remember feeling quite taken aback by Stan's sympathy 
and that my reaction was based on a desire not to be viewed as an object of pity. Dai Thomson 
(1986), in her anthology contribution about anger, points to how a false dichotomy has come to 
define the possible representations of disabled people. 
 
Instead  of acknowledging the basic humanity  of  our  often-powerful  emotions,  able-bodied 
persons tend to view us either as helpless things to be pitied or as Super Crips, gallantly 
fighting  to  overcome  insurmountable  odds.  Such  attitudes  display  a  bizarre  two-tiered 
mindset:  it  is horrible beyond imagination to be disabled, but disabled people with guts 
can, if they only try hard enough, make themselves almost "normal". The absurdity of 
such all-or-nothing images is obvious. So, too, is the damage these images do to disabled 
people by robbing us of our sense of reality (78). 
 
This dichotomy leaves no room for the expression of the infinite array of feelings surrounding 
the experience of disability and I believe that this is why most people tend to quickly shy away 
from the suggestion that their lives are defined by loss. And, in keeping with the recognition that 
there exists a continuum of realities between the extremes of total devastation and complete 
triumph, it is important to note that stories of triumph form a very important part of the disabled 
identity.  They  are  just  not  the  whole  story.  As  was  discussed  in  depth  in  Chapter  Three, 
although  it  is  important  for  people  to  see  themselves  as  unified  beings  describable  by  a 
coherent narrative, our self perceptions are actually formed from a series of often contradictory 
fragments and we are constantly shifting our views according to our contexts. As Sarup (1996) 
argues about identities: 
 
They are never finished products. Identities are stitched together out of discontinuous 
forms and practices. The representation of identity is an ongoing process, undertaken on 
many  levels,  in  different  practices  and  sites  of  experience.  Identity  is  articulated  in 
multiple  modalities…(40)  … When we talk about our identity and our life story, we include  some  things  and  exclude  others,  we  stress  some  things  and  subordinates 
others. This process of exclusion, stress and subordination is carried out in the interests 
of constituting a story of a particular kind  (16) 
 
 
Accordingly, I am telling the truth when I say, as in my dialogue with Stan, "I've really come to 
terms with it", but there are other stories which are not being told and there are powerful social 
forces in place which affect my choice of plot. 
 
For, while I have in many ways "come to terms" with my disabilities, where coming to terms 
means  that  I  feel  good  about  my  life  despite  and  sometimes  even  because  of  what  has 
eventuated from my pain and physical limitations, "coming to terms" often refers to socially 
sanctioned coping mechanisms which involve an intricate process of concealment. Recently, for 
example, I have had a new impairment thrust upon me and I am faced with new losses and the 
disquieting vestiges of old ghosts. I had come so far and now I have lost most of my hard won 
independence again. I have many different feelings inside in relation to these fresh losses and I 
am developing a variety of ways of interacting with others in relation to my current state. At one 
extreme I am very cheerful and intent on focusing outwardly on the lives of others. At the other I 
am twisted in knots of deep distress as I struggle to negotiate the process of "coming to terms" 
with my new physical and emotional reality. Both states are valid parts of my experience and my 
identity, and often the cheerful one is representative of a healthy attitude. But sometimes that 
happy face is merely masking feelings of absolute devastation and I fear what will happen when 
the mask inevitably cracks. 
 
In relation to my quandary as to whether it was appropriate to initiate discussions which touched 
on the feelings of loss, which seemed vital to my research, but were evaded by my participants, 
I decided to stop referring to the losses and a surprising outcome became apparent. Ultimately, 
people  were  much  more  open  about  these  issues  when  we  came  upon  them  in  general 
conversation. Consequently, the dialogues proved to be rich resources for shedding new light 
on the experience of disability and, interestingly, one of the main themes that emerged was the 
process of concealment, the reasons behind it, and the decision that some people made, over 
time, to eventually break the silence. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to share these 
revelations.  
 
Hiding the Pain 
 
Many people talked about the need to hide the way they were really feeling and to show the 
world a positive face. They all spoke or wrote about a similar process of submersion, but they 
differed in the beliefs they attached to it. There were some who believed that it was necessary 
to accept their losses with stoicism and good humour and to get on with life. In these cases, 
there  was  a  strong  assertion  that  there  would  be  no  point  in  dwelling  on  the  bad  things. Consider the following dialogues which occurred when I was still asking direct questions about 
my participants' feelings of loss. 
 
[Robert makes light of everything, including the chemotherapy that he's just started 
having again.]
7 
 
Robert: Like I say, I'm a toxic waste dump going somewhere to happen [he laughs] 
 
Me: That's how you'd feel, wouldn't you? That's one way of putting it. You've got a very 
colourful way of looking at things. 
 
Robert: Yeah, well, you know, I don't…as I say to people, well, I could sit down and say 
[he makes his voice sound mournful and full of pathos], why is this happening to me? 
Why me? You know and ball my eyes out for hours a day and what good's it doing me? 
 
Robert has had to deal with a range of serious illnesses and disabilities throughout his life, the 
most recent one being life-threatening, and he faces them with a fatalistic and jovial attitude. 
Janet expresses similar sentiments when she talks about the chronic pain she experiences in 
relation to a range of disabilities. 
 
Janet: A lot of things just don't ever change and won't either. Some of it will improve, but, 
for example, I don't think the pain will ever go away... ever. 
 
Me: So, how do you deal with that? 
 
Janet: Well, sometimes I get fed up with it. But, on the whole, I don't let it bother me. 
 
Me: Mmm [in agreement]. 
 
Janet: What's the point? To leave your life full of resentment and anger. What's the point 
in doing that? 
 
The kinds of attitudes expressed here are often looked upon as being philosophical. What's the 
use in worrying about things you can't change? And it's very true. An important part of learning 
to deal with disability involves recognising that there is much in life that we cannot control and to 
find meaning outside of previous patterns of identification. Yet, as will be revealed in the section 
which covers the costs of concealing one's emotions, there is often a very fine line between 
making  a  good  adjustment  and  burying  vital  parts  of  one's  identity  and  reality.  In  earlier 
autobiographical writings it was common to see the expression of an exclusively stoic attitude, 
as in the following.  
 
                                                   
7 I use square brackets to enclose the remarks I have added during the transcription process, immediately after the 
dialogue occurred. There was no doubt that the loss I had sustained was serious and final. It was equally 
clear that the situation had therefore to be accepted, and that "crying over spilt milk" 
would not help (Walter Thornton 1968: 11-12). 
 
Blindness should not be regarded as an affliction: at worst, it is a nuisance which, with 
careful training, can to a great extent be overcome. For this attitude I am indebted to the 
intelligent and practical training given me by my parents, who by their own indomitable 
will taught us to “Keep your powder dry and your flag flying”. It was not always quite so 
easy  as  that;  the  powder  sometimes  became  damp,  the  flag  bedraggled;  but  their 
courage never wavered, and we tried to follow their example (Harold C. Dickinson 1983: 
3). 
 
Most of the participants, however, acknowledged that they were hiding their emotions and that 
their  negative  feelings  would  not  simply  go  away.  Hugh  Gallagher  (1998)  writes  about  the 
impossibility of keeping things buried forever. 
 
Flat denial of hard reality can serve a useful purpose - it buys time for coming to terms 
with trauma. Modern medical rehabilitation theory holds that, while temporary denial is 
normal, continued denial is unhealthy. Over time, according to theory, the psychic wound 
will heal: we will accept our condition and learn to like self and body as it is. We will 
learn, "It's OK," to be disabled.  
 
It has not worked that way for me. I wanted it to, but it has not. For many years, should 
someone ask me how I felt about being crippled, I would answer, "It's OK with me! Never 
think much about it anymore." And indeed this was what I thought I believed. But this 
was just another form of denial at work. It was not OK, it has never been OK. In fact, I 
keened over my disability all the time, every day, all day; I just pretended to myself that I 
did not (Hugh Gallagher 1998:  5).  
 
The following two quotes also acknowledge the wall that can separate people's interior worlds 
from what they believe they can share with others. 
 
I have learned to be bright, loud, bubbly, friendly, funny, self-deprecating and to avoid 
ever communicating how I feel (Jacky, written story: 2). 
 
During my travels I mourned, passing through stages of grief: denial, anger, depression, 
and acceptance. I felt as if a part of me were dying. It seemed as if I were watching 
helplessly as I disappeared and a sickly, dependent stranger for whom I had no respect 
was taking my place, stealing my hopes and dreams. But in the beginning I would not 
admit my anguish and sense of loss, not to myself or to others. I sank the worst of my 
grief deep in a lake within me, hiding the lake and the stone weight it hid (Melissa Anne 
Goldstein 2000: 96).  
 It would be wrong to suggest that it isn't possible that some people actually do deal effectively 
with their distress in the early stages of becoming disabled and go on to have meaningful lives 
without needing to reflect back on their losses. What does appear to be the case, however, is 
that many people find it hard to bury their pain and that they suffer in various ways from feeling 
pressured to do so. Yet, because I remained open to the idea that ridding oneself of negative 
emotions could aid in the process of healing, I tended to express this stance if appropriate to the 
particular  conversation.  On  occasion  this  led  to  unexpected  reversals  as  in  the  following 
dialogues. 
 
Me: I guess that... if you're like me, I mean, having to, over the years, come to terms with 
disability and learning to deal with setbacks and disappointing things, physically and in 
other ways, you get in practice, don't you? Like it really gets you well honed in the skills 
of dealing with disappointment and pain? 
 
Susan: I'd say that it skills you in hiding disappointment and pain. 
 
Me: Ahh. 
 
Susan: Not not feeling it. Certainly not.  
 
Me: It certainly does do that. 
 
Susan: It hurts just as much, but you learn not to show it. 
 
Me: That's a big part of it, isn't it? 
 
Susan: It's a sign of weakness. It's a sign of weakness when you already appear as a 
weak person, so you just can't go there, can you? 
 
Me: Yeah, so a lot of it is the development of this apparent strength.  
 
Susan: A lot of people say to me, gosh, you are strong. And I'm not at all. I'm very 
vulnerable. I'm upset very easily. But, I'm just good at hiding. 
 
Me: Mmmm. 
 
Susan: I must be a good actress or something. 
 
When  I  posed  the  original  question  about  how  we  learn  to  cope  with  difficulties  and 
disappointments, that was exactly how I was feeling. I, like many of my participants, swing 
between seeing the submersion of pain as an effective coping mechanism and experiencing it 
as a process which discounts one's reality and leads to a sense of alienation and isolation. The 
following dialogue with another participant, Karen, greatly surprised me when it occurred. I had already spoken extensively to Karen and this interchange occurred during our second very long 
and detailed conversation. She had come across as completely open about her feelings and her 
positive attitude seemed to accurately reflect her inner state. So, when I made the following 
statement, I did so in a genuine manner. 
 
Me: I mean, you've got a bubbly personality and you can quickly show people how you 
are … and I'm sure that's been really helpful for you in that way. 
 
Karen: It has, but also it can sometimes be... it can also be a pain, because... sometimes 
when I feel really yuck, I still have to be this bubbly person and I talk myself into being 
this person. 
 
Me: I know. Yes. 
 
Karen: And you can't break that pattern because it's been with you for so many years 
that this is you, but really it's not you. 
 
Me: No. 
 
Karen: It's just what you want people to see …  I think the thing that got me started when 
I was growing up was that people used to say, poor wee thing because they just saw the 
wheelchair and I thought, what are you talking about, I'm not poor and so, of course, I 
just …  started trying really hard to say to people, no, don't feel sorry for me, because I 
hated people feeling sorry for me. I really, really, really hated it, so I started being, I 
guess, being a different person. 
 
Me: And it does [superficially] make you feel better about yourself, but, like you say, it 
creates that wall between you and other people when it comes to how you are really 
feeling. 
 
Karen: Mmm, yeah and also, when you do finally end up with a relationship you do find it 
hard to show him how you are feeling. When you are feeling different you just always 
say sometimes that you are that person. 
 
Me: Because you're so practiced at doing it. You do it automatically. 
 
Karen: I'm professional at it [laughing]. 
 
This  was  the beginning of a lengthy conversation about the reasons behind, and the costs 
incurred by, hiding our real feelings. This conversation came to exemplify a process that was 
shared, entirely or in part, by many of those who had been dealing with disability for a long time: 
first one learns to bury one's feelings, even sometimes from oneself, then it becomes apparent 
that this is having a detrimental affect, often there is a crisis point, and then a resolution is reached where one attempts to strike a balance between concealment and disclosure. Karen 
and many of the others spoke and wrote at length about the reasons they felt obliged to conceal 
their feelings, the costs this imposed and the final decision to speak out. These are the topics 
that will frame the remainder of this chapter.  
 
Why We Pretend it's Okay When it Isn't 
 
The multitude of different reasons that were given by disabled people to explain why they felt 
the need to build protective facades can all be seen as symbolic of a rational reaction to certain 
social expectations. In Chapter Three it was argued that the disabled identity is the outcome of 
internalised oppression, a marginalised sense of self which is mediated by a society which 
privileges certain norms, norms which are shored up by being contrasted with disability. Thus, in 
the attempt to avoid the stigma associated with belonging to a socially devalued group, it is 
natural for people to develop patterns of behaviour which, if they cannot disguise the disability 
altogether,  will  at least attract the most positive forms of identification on offer to disabled 
people. This awareness of the role that is expected to be performed by disabled people is made 
apparent in the following recipes devised by disabled people. 
 
 So I’m now a crip. That’s my occupation, being a crip. And from the point of deciding on 
that definition, things become easy. I’m now formally and officially doing what I’ve been 
doing  anyway.  Being  the  best  crip  I  can  be.  Being  as  cheerful  as  I  can  about  my 
circumstances. Submerging my irritations and frustrations. Accepting as gracefully as I 
can that I need help a lot of the time. Being suitably grateful for that help. And above all, 
never being grumpy (Chris Baker 2001: 9). 
 
As with all other social roles, a person can succeed or fail at sickness. A key rule for 
being a successful sick person is: Don't complain! The person who smiles and jokes 
while in obvious physical misery is honored by all. Doctors and nurses are especially 
appreciative  of  this  kind  of  patient,  for  he  usually  follows  orders  and  seldom  files 
malpractice suits. Hospital visitors also value cheeriness, and the sick person soon finds 
that he is expected to amuse them, and thus relieve their guilt at being well. These are 
front-area, or on-stage, performances - to use sociologist Erving Goffman's celebrated 
theatrical  metaphor  for social  interaction.  The  backstage  behavior  may  be  totally 
different, however, and the public hero may become a whiner at home. The bad patient 
is either tyrannical or a crybaby, or both at once. But above all, the bad patient is one 
who does not follow orders. There are, then, social skills in sickness (Robert F. Murphy 
1990: 20). 
 
He  had  worked  very  hard  over  the  years  to  become  a  certain  sort  of  person  with 
a handicap. This person was the cheerful but not saccharine, confident but not cocky, 
direct,  but  not  bitter,  sort  of person.  He  had  become  the  person  who  accepts  his 
handicap  comfortably  and,  thus, makes  others  comfortable  in  its  presence.  He 
had accomplished this person by consciously projecting a secure self reliance. When with  him,  people  sensed  they  need  not  fear  that  he would  burden  them  with  his 
responsibilities. His mental state and physical condition were not contagious. He had 
learned  early  on  that, no  matter  how  kind,  well-meaning,  or  determined  another 
might be, he could or would not bear to assume a part of the real burden of being 
crippled. People flee from a sick room, leave their corpses on the battlefield, and prefer 
not to see their crippled neighbors. He often thought how much happier they would be if 
we were kept like lunatics in lunatic asylums or lepers in leprosariums. The price he paid 
to live in the world of the fit was to keep his burdens and his bitterness to himself. He 
tried - whether with friends, employees, or strangers - to be cheerful, healthy, interested, 
and never dependent or vulnerable. This makeup he assumed, like the movie star, but 
time was eating away at it. His life had become no easier (Hugh Gallagher 1998: 157).  
 
When Hugh Gallagher decided to include the above entry in his autobiography, he pointed out 
that he had written the essay before he had his breakdown, before he had accepted that it was 
okay,  
indeed necessary, to be more open about the ways he really felt. He wrote it in the third person 
(as  
did  Robert  Murphy  in  the  quote  above)  to  distance  himself  from  the  pain  it  described.  In 
introducing  
the piece, he wrote:  
 
Today, reading it more than 20 years after it was written, I find myself shuddering and 
sad. I shudder because my life really was like that; I am sad that I lived so many years in 
such a state. I do think that this is a remarkable piece of writing, but it is not pretty. It is 
brutal and cold and angry. It depicts, all too accurately, what my life was like.  
 
In attempting to fulfill these roles, disabled people hope to dissociate themselves from morally 
untenable  positions,  one  of  which  is  based  on  the  belief  that,  if  you  talk  about  your  pain, 
limitations or losses, then you are seen to be a whinger, or as Robert Murphy expresses it 
above,  a  "crybaby".  In  relation  to  this  belief,  Max  Dashu  (1986)  writes  in  her  anthology 
contribution which discusses the difficulties she had in being open about her epilepsy, "Some 
seemed  to  believe  that  to  talk  about  your  reality  is  to  complain."  This  recognition  is 
acknowledged in the title of another anthology, Mustn't Grumble, and a participant, Susan, also 
refers to this attitude in the following. 
 
Susan: And the other thing people say is, you don't complain, do you? And I say, well, 
there wouldn't be a lot of point, would there? I mean, people get bored if you complain 
and they don't want to talk to you if you are going to whinge. And people say, you're 
really good, you don't complain. 
 
What becomes apparent in the above observation is that, not only are we expected not to 
whinge, we are rewarded when we remain silent. Being recognised as a strong person who is dealing well with a difficult situation is a powerful form of compensation for other identity losses. 
There  is  also  another  dimension  to  the  isolation  that  results  from  becoming  estranged. 
Sometimes our perception is not that we are choosing to remain silent. Rather, we are being 
silenced. Our realities are being actively avoided and our experiences and feelings are, thus, 
invalidated. Melissa Anne Goldstein (2000) discusses this in the following excerpt. 
 
In some instances, I found that people avoided asking me "How are you?" by saying 
"You look so wonderful. You must be feeling better." Generally, they meant well. Implied 
in  these  words  was  the wish  for  me  to  feel better.  But  this  greeting  invalidated  my 
suffering on the days when I was not feeling better. Sometimes this greeting was a way 
to forestall me from saying anything about my illness. Mostly, I just said thank you, but 
this left me feeling empty (98).  
 
Many of the others already quoted for their references to self-silencing acknowledge that they 
do this in reaction to other people's expectations. When Susan noted that 'people get bored if 
you complain and they don't want to talk to you if you are going to whinge. And people say, 
you're  really  good,  you  don't  complain'  she  is  acknowledging  that  the  silencing  process  is 
reinforced not only through people's disapproval if you are open, but also by their approval, their 
positive reinforcement, if you do submerge the less pleasant features of your reality. 
 
 Closely associated with the preference for stoicism is the desire to be seen as strong. Disabled 
people  do  not  want  to  be  defined  in  relation  to  their  physical "weaknesses" and often feel 
compelled to demonstrate strength. As Susan was quoted as saying earlier in relation to hiding 
her real feelings, ‘It's a sign of weakness. It's a sign of weakness when you already appear as a 
weak person, so you can't just go there, can you?’ Melissa Anne Goldstein (2000) also stresses 
the importance of remaining silent in the attempt to appear strong. 
 
The way I coped with disclosure altered over the years. In the beginning, when I was still 
coming to terms with the lupus, I mostly kept silent, at times going to great lengths to 
keep my illness hidden. I did not like to acknowledge its existence. I feared the reactions 
of the person I told. I did not wish to drive people away, but neither did I want their pity. I 
wanted people to see me as I wished to see myself - strong, independent, and whole 
(101). 
 
Melissa also makes it clear that being seen as strong is a tactic for avoiding the lurking threat of 
pity. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, an aversion to pity is a prime motivator for 
keeping people either silent or focused on their triumph narratives. From my own perspective, 
the problem with feeling pitied is that it seems to negate all the other aspects of one's identity. 
Recently I visited a dental practice where the people understand my special needs such that the 
process of negotiating the dental chair is as safe as it can possibly be for my neck and my back. 
In my daily life when I am walking around it is not apparent that I am disabled, but seeing me try to get on and off a dentist's chair brings my pain and limitations into high relief. At the end of my 
last visit, the dentist spoke with great sympathy about how awful my life must be and I can 
remember feeling that, although I appreciated the sentiments behind his comments, they also 
made me feel minimised, for I am so much more than my pain and awkwardness and I have 
built a life for myself that is far from ‘awful’.  
 
The desire to avoid pity can lead to a very tenuous balancing act when a disabled person is 
trying to be open about his or her feelings and the person responding to this is attempting to 
understand and acknowledge them. I am not sure as yet how this minefield can be successfully 
negotiated, but I believe that it is connected with raising the status of disabled people in general. 
In this way pity can be replaced with a response which more closely approximates empathy, for 
we all experience hardship and exemplify different ways of being. Currently, however, pity often 
represents the unpalatable side of a dichotomy devised to define disability as a tragedy that 
needs  to  be  overcome  by,  as  one  participant,  Adrienne,  put  it,  'meeting  or  exceeding  the 
expectation of the norm… Instead of just getting rid of it.' 
 
Adrienne's observation that we should challenge the norm and ultimately 'get rid of it' points to a 
recognition which I believe should form the central rationale for any attempt to resist oppression 
and will thus be discussed at length throughout the following chapters. But, for most of us in our 
daily lives, the only immediate solution appears to lie in the attempt to approximate the norm as 
closely as possible. Hugh Gallagher (1998) calls this the 'battle for normalcy' and argues that it 
is  the  basic  premise  underlying  rehabilitation  philosophy  (89).  This  'battle  for  normalcy',  in 
combination with the desire not to be pitied or in any way singled out, is expressed in the 
following example. 
 
Me: But, you don't necessarily want special treatment. 
 
Glen: No, no, people don't like that. They think you're trying to gather sympathy. You 
know, you just want to be…….I don't like using this……normal …and treated like they'd 
treat anyone. 
 
Melissa Anne Goldstein (2000) also expresses this desire succinctly when she argues: 
 
Do we not see ourselves, at least partially, through others' eyes? When others perceived 
me as normal, it was easier for me to do the same and carry on in the everyday world 
defined by health. It helped me to fight against becoming trapped in the world of illness.  
 
Ultimately, however, a fundamental reason for remaining silent, the fear which can be seen to 
underlie many of the other reasons, is that which is connected to the threat of rejection and 
abandonment. Many of the quotes already cited in this section acknowledge and incorporate 
this fear, as when Susan says ‘people get bored if you complain and they don't want to talk to 
you if you are going to whinge’ and when Hugh Gallagher (1998) notes that: 'People flee from a sick room, leave their corpses on the battlefield, and prefer not to see their crippled neighbors' 
(157). When Melissa Anne Goldstein (2000) writes that the 'dilemma' of 'disclosure' involves 
'great  risks',  the  first  of  the  risks  she  refers  to  is  related  to  the  fear  of  being  'shunned  or 
abandoned' (99). Similarly, when Joni Earickson (1976) found herself in hospital after she had 
sustained a spinal cord injury, she wrote that ‘I was afraid people would stop coming to see me 
if I got bitter and complained, so I worked at cheerfulness’ (28).  
 
Possibly the most compelling description of these feelings of rejection came from Karen who 
was earlier quoted extensively in relation to her admissions about hiding her emotions after 
having appeared to be completely open with them. Karen is now 38 years old and, unlike most 
of my research population, was born with her disability. She needs to use a wheelchair, but, 
other than that, was not treated, and did not see herself, as different from her brothers and 
sisters. It wasn't until her late adolescence that she was forced to face the harsh reality that she 
was going to be viewed as Other and that certain choices may be denied her. This was when 
she began being conscious of the need to project a special kind of image.  
 
Karen: Yeah, and it's our way of coping because, you know, when you realise that you're 
different, being rejected is the biggest part. I don't like that feeling. I mean, no one would 
like the feeling of being rejected, but having a disability, that rejection seems to be ... it's 
all  of  you.  They  are  not  just  rejecting something you might have said or done. It's 
because they're rejecting you... it always comes back to you being different because you 
have a disability. 
 
What Karen touches on here is the terrible experience of being seen only as disabled and then 
being rejected on that basis. It is, as Karen laments, the ultimate form of rejection because you 
are not being spurned because of some personal failing, it is simply because your differences 
are seen as unacceptable. It feels like the whole of you is being rejected. As Karen says, ‘it's all 
of you.’ This is why Karen strived to become the kind of person that others could not help but 
love despite her physical difference. However, as she points out, this has meant that she has 
had to conceal huge parts of who she really is and how she really feels and, as I will be arguing 
in the following section, for some people this can create a sense of loneliness and isolation all of 
its own.  
 
The Price of Silence 
 
I have suggested that the reasons why it is common for disabled people to submerge a large 
proportion of their emotional lives is that their silence is linked to certain rewards which are 
sought in the attempt to gain social acceptance and to avoid stigma, disapproval and pity. Yet, it 
has also become evident that these perceived or sought after "rewards"  do not come without a 
price.  Some people point to the feelings of isolation that stem from keeping large parts of 
themselves hidden. Others talk about the depression and, in some cases, complete emotional breakdown that can result. And, connected with both of these problems are the feelings of 
invalidation and the inhibition of true intimacy with a loved one that can result from the attempt 
to project only part of one's feelings and experiences.  
 
When I focus on the experience of isolation, I question whether this isn't perhaps the most 
devastating disability-related experience of all. It certainly was in my own case. Recall that in 
the introduction to my thesis I wrote: 
 
My life was shattered and by far the worst part of the experience for me was that no-one 
understood. I was completely, utterly alone and from behind the sheet of glass that 
separated me from the rest of the world I could not make myself heard. I had become, to 
all intents and purposes, invisible, without a voice and it is this kind of isolation that I 
want to break down by inviting disabled people to raise their voices through my research 
(3).  
 
This loss of voice is simply terrifying. Initially, I had no concept of trying to stay silent. I was 
desperate to be heard. Part of what I wished to get across was that I was still the same person, 
with the same memories and similar aspirations. But the reaction I received from others was so 
discordant to the way I experienced reality that I ended up feeling like an alien who no longer 
shared a common language with those I loved. Silence came upon me slowly and with a stealth 
that masked its subtle implications. These days I am lucky that I have one or two people with 
whom I can usually share how I really feel. But, when things are particularly tough, like now, the 
chasm of alienation and estrangement shifts dangerously close to the feet I try desperately to 
keep wedded to solid ground, and still, far too often, I find myself swallowing what I would really 
like to say and choking on the fear that accompanies the possibility of ending up completely, 
utterly alone. For the true irony lies in the fact that, if I am too honest, I may end up scaring 
everyone away. Yet, if I conceal my inner being too well, the loneliness which results from being 
a stranger to one's most intimate friends can, in some ways, feel more distressing than actual, 
physical solitude. 
 
Like me, Hugh Gallagher (1998) traces his deepest feelings of isolation back to the early days 
of being disabled, but, unlike me, he understood the need for silence right from the outset. He 
expresses similar feelings of horror at the thought of ever having to live through such isolation 
again. He was twenty years old when polio struck. 
 
I lived for at least two weeks at the outer limits of pain. I was, however, well trained to 
hide my emotions. As a child, I had not been encouraged to express my feelings or, 
indeed,  allowed  to  admit  to having  them.  And  so  in  the  hospital  I  knew  what  was 
expected of me. With but few exceptions, I lived up to these expectations. I was of good 
cheer;  I  was  a  good  sport;  I  complained  as  little  as  possible.  I was  helpful  and 
cooperative,  encouraging  and  inquisitive,  aware  and  thoughtful  at  all  times  of  the 
feelings of others. I was, in fact, the person I had been trained since infancy to be. For so many years I had worn a mask, I was not, even at this moment, aware that it was a 
mask. As my life was collapsing, as my body was turning from muscle to water, and the 
cells upon which health and movement depended were dying by the millions, I remained 
a well-brought-up, courteous and considerate, upper middle-class child.  
 
And, as the mask was impenetrable, as the wall was unscalable, there was no way for 
me to reach out for comfort and support, no way to share or have acknowledged the 
deep terror of the unknown, the agony of pain. I could not reach out, and I knew no way 
of  letting  in  those  who  would  help,  those  who  would  share,  those  who would 
acknowledge and give comfort and support. Whatever I must bear, I must bear alone. 
Whatever  was  happening  to  me,  whatever  my feelings  were,  however desperately I 
yearned for help and understanding in the face of these terrible things, none of this 
was reflected upon my expression or my demeanor. I was, I believe, a perfect patient.  
 
This memory of emotional isolation fills me today with a terror far exceeding the fears 
aroused by a recounting of the physiological events of my disease. It is conceivable I 
could live through similar events again; it is inconceivable that I would be able to do so 
alone, masking my emotions, denying my needs (37). 
 
In  her  book  The  Horizontal  Woman  Suzanne  Berger  (1996)  also  speaks  eloquently  of  the 
cleavage of one's reality into life shared and life unsharable and how this results in a loss of self.  
 
Chronic pain seems to starve the fleshy part of your soul and its generous perceptions. 
While self-pity persists in feeding it the wrong stuff. You can just sit there eating it, of 
course, but the room grows darker and lonelier around you with each meal, each season 
passing outside your life with banners, bells, and whistles. Because the preponderance 
of  dark  self-regard pushes  others  away,  and  makes  a boring  diet.  Also  a relentless 
dominatrix, pain makes you cringe from the constant self-referring. But because you do 
feel ruined, especially at first, it's almost impossible to do otherwise, though you promise 
yourself not to complain in front of others. However, the incessant effort not to bemoan 
fate,  not  to  be  openly anguished,  makes  for  a  drastic  inhibition  of  the  self, so that 
the voice attempting to be cheerful will come out sounding tinny, with a kind of empty 
brightness, like rhinestones. An effort that, I believe, pushes confined people back into 
themselves, alone at the table, the inner light and energy having been spent on the work 
of not appearing depressed, not letting self-pity show. Self-referring then is traded for 
self-effacement, not a fair transaction at all (49). 
 
This  self-effacement  or  backgrounding  of  the  self  can  become  so  habitual that it makes it 
difficult to adapt to situations where more openness is desirable or even necessary. Part of the 
conversation between Karen and myself already quoted is relevant here. 
 
Me: And it does [superficially] make you feel better about yourself, but, like you say, it 
creates that wall between you and other people when it comes to how you are really 
feeling.  
Karen: Mmm, yeah and also, when you do finally end up with a relationship you do find it 
hard to show him how you are feeling. When you are feeling different you just always 
say sometimes that you are that person. 
 
Me: Because you're so practiced at doing it. You do it automatically. 
 
Karen: I'm professional at it [laughing]. 
 
 
This habitual distancing of the inner self can make it difficult to be as close as one wants to be 
in one's intimate relationships with partners and friends. It can even prevent one from having the 
courage to try to become intimate at all. In the following excerpt from Mustn't Grumble, Jeni 
Fulton  (1995)  writes  about  the  conflicts  she  experiences  in  developing  a  more  intimate 
relationship with a male friend. 
 
The car has stopped now. The rain has stopped too, but everything is sodden and 
heavy. The fog still clings everywhere. Time has stopped because I can't get past the 
point at which the motorway divides for me. I'm frustrated by the whole situation. I don't 
want things to go on as they are. I'm weary of emotional dishonesty, of being on my 
guard, of not being completely me, of suppressing such an important part of myself, of 
behaving  so inconsistently,  at  odds  with  the  strong  political  woman  I  am. But  is  it 
possible anymore to be honest in talking affairs of the heart - or body, more's the point - 
when there's a fundamental insuperable barrier between us? The twisted, scarred and 
sagging deformity that I perceive to be me (88-89).  
 
In their most serious form, the cumulative costs that a disabled person can incur by containing 
his or her emotions behind a wall of stoicism and good cheer can lead to an eventual crumbling 
of the wall and a collapse into emotional breakdown. Both Hugh Gallagher and Karen discuss 
this outcome in their own cases and believe it to be the result of years of suppression. Hugh 
speaks about it thus. 
 
It was at terrible cost to my person. I repressed or denied everything. I had no feelings; at 
night, I had no dreams. No sex. I simply ignored pain and fatigue. I did not allow myself to 
get sick. I took risks and did things no sane person would ever do. I lived in terror of collapse, 
of fear that the world would see how hollow I was. I had a million friends but I could confide 
in no one because, in truth, I had nothing to confide. When asked about my handicap (as it 
was called in those days) I would reply, "I never think about it, never think about it at all." I 
continued in this desperate fashion, wracked with constipation and insomnia, until July 
4,1974. On that day, I bombed out of Super Cripdom. My body collapsed physically, and I 
plunged headlong into a deep and chronic clinical depression, which took me years to 
climb out of (Hugh Gallagher 1998:  246). 
 Karen also reached a time in her life when the façade collapsed. 
 
Karen: [I experienced a] lack of confidence inwardly, but outwardly everybody thought I 
was this confident, well adjusted person. 
 
Me: Yes, so that was part of that sense of, when you were around about 18 … you 
wanted to get out in the world and have a normal life and there seemed to be a lot of 
things getting in the way of that and your perceptions of that, but you buried that. You 
actually went on and pretended that everything was okay, but it couldn't continue. So, 
how did all that work out? For while you were able to make it seem like it was okay... 
 
Karen: That was when it all came to a head, when I basically had my break down. 
 
Me: Right. 
 
Karen: It had to all come out then, basically. You can only cope for so long, pretend for 
so long and it all catches up with you. I tried to take an overdose, because I couldn't 
cope with it and that's when counselling came into the process and that was the best 
thing that ever happened. It actually got me on track, by teaching me … that it was all 
right to have all these feelings and these emotions and bits and pieces, but beginning to 
respect myself and not being worried about what other people think all the time. 
 
I am four people when I read about such painful experiences. The first three are close to the 
surface and clearly and consciously affect how I react to these revelations. I am a researcher 
who is sorting data and reporting on a significant finding. I am a human being who feels sad and 
angry that some people have to suffer so much so needlessly. And I am a disabled person who 
can directly identify with the desolation and desperation and emotional toll that being invisible 
can exact. But, the fourth person only emerged when my disabled and empathetic self was 
shaking her head sadly while feeling relieved that she was one of the lucky ones who had not 
had to completely hit rock bottom. At this point I experienced a sense of dissonance and faded 
fragments of memories began to flicker in the background of my thoughts. For, although the 
narrative that I have stitched together to make myself feel whole acknowledges that I have 
experienced a great deal of pain. As Adrienne pointed out during our dialogue to explain why 
she did not wish to dwell on the losses she had suffered, "It's like picking at a scab. If you let it 
alone it will eventually grow new skin."  
 
It shocked me to realise that I could hear of Karen and Hugh's eventual breakdowns and not 
immediately remember my own. I almost avoided the memories altogether, but my dual position 
as researcher and researched has often forced me to face the incongruities inherent in my self-
storying process. Like Karen and Hugh, my emotional collapse culminated in a specific event 
which ultimately represented a turning point. But the process of breaking actually occurred in an 
agonisingly drawn out series of smaller fractures. It now seems like that time exists in another world, a cold and lonely world in which all hope was lost. Climbing out of that kind of hole 
requires the creation of a whole new way of seeing the world and oneself within it and, for Karen 
and Hugh and I, a large part of this involved learning how to break the silence. 
 
Breaking the Silence / Letting Go of Pain 
 
In concluding this chapter, I bring two sets of reflections together. The first deals with breaking 
the silence, the second with strategies for living with pain. In relation to “breaking the silence”, 
the first point is that relatively few people in this study believe this to be possible or, in some 
senses, even desirable, given the costs. Among the ninety two people whose voices have been 
included in this study, those who preferred to “pass” on an emotional level were in the majority. 
In the minority, there were those who stated that it was vital to rid oneself of these feelings and 
get on with life, and, on the other end of the scale, a similarly small number talked about 
challenging this process of sublimation.  
 
One of these was Hugh Gallagher and his experiences are worth considering at some length. 
When Hugh traced the pathway which ultimately led to his decision to be more open about his 
feelings and experiences, he points to the lessons he learned from Franklin Delanor Roosevelt 
(FDR). He initially began the project of writing FDR's autobiography because he considered him 
to be his greatest hero and role model. Yet, try as he might, Hugh could not successfully follow 
FDR's  example  and  he  began  to  'wonder  about  [his]  hero,  FDR.  Had  there  been  anything 
behind his facade? To answer this question, [he] began the research that resulted in [his] book, 
FDR's Splendid Deception.' Over this time he learned that FDR had 'dealt with the fact of his 
paralysis  by means  of  total  denial'  and  that  '[t]he  wreckage  proceeding  from  FDR's  closed 
mouth "courage" was everywhere' (208).  
 
Hugh writes about 'a rainy, cold November Sunday afternoon'  when he sat in a car park and 
saw the parallel between himself and FDR in relation to how they dealt with the failing muscle 
control  that  accompanies  post  polio  syndrome  and  how,  as  a  result,  FDR  'died  before  his 
time, lonely, depressed, and exhausted' (209).  
 
It was there in that cold and rainy parking lot that I at last broke with the President of the 
United States. I would be goddamned if I would follow him, stiff upper lip, good soldier to 
the  last.  I  would shout  out  my  hurt  to  the  skies,  curse  the  fates,  both  mourn  and 
celebrate my loss. FDR was a great man, a magnificent leader of world scale, but he 
was no longer my role model. He was Super Crip; I opted for human.  
 
My feelings are mine; they go with the territory. People who love me will share these 
feelings,  and,  together,  we  will  cope;  more  than that,  we  will  prevail.  This  way  lies 
survival. (ibid). 
 Karen  also  spoke  of  similar  revelations  when  she  told  of her breakdown and renewal. Her 
reflections on her decision to break the silence were not as neatly expressed as in Hugh’s case, 
but were interspersed throughout our conversations. Her breakdown was a vital turning point 
that she returned to in the dialogues several times. At one stage, she commented, ‘You can 
only cope for so long, pretend for so long and it all catches up with you.’ Eventually she lost faith 
in herself and attempted suicide as, she said, ‘I couldn’t see myself going on like that … but I 
didn’t know what else to do.’ Counselling helped her to realise that ‘it was alright to have these 
feelings’ and that she could acknowledge them and share them with others in comfortable and 
liberatory ways. She summed up by saying, ‘It’s still hard sometimes and I don’t always get it 
right, but, you know, I’m okay about who I am and I’m not ashamed to talk about what it means 
to be disabled.’  
 
In touching on the need to speak out, Max Dashu (1986) writes about her 'refusal to let 
her epilepsy be unspeakable. Or invisible; because even when its affects can be seen 
they are not identified or understood by most people' (204). And Dai Thompson (1986) 
discusses  the  need  to  express  our  emotions  because  'even  if  the  larger  community 
would  adopt  totally  fair  and  appropriate  attitudes  toward  people with disabilities, this 
would still not eliminate the sense of loss, the frustration, and indeed the anger we feel 
just because we are disabled' (79).  
 
In considering different strategies for dealing with pain, I wish to touch on two connected, 
yet seemingly contradictory ways in which people can find solace in the face of disability. 
The first is encapsulated in the following dialogue between Adrienne and myself.  
 
Adrienne: It's important to know ones pain, but, you know, we take pain killers for a 
reason. 
 
Me: We do. 
 
Adrienne: I think that one of the things that I've learned that is one of the four noble 
truths of the eight fold path. I had this Buddhist friend for a while who kept telling me 
things and I picked up just enough to be appallingly ignorant [she laughs]. [This one is 
that] pain is inevitable, suffering is optional … 
 
Me: I know what that means now. I don't think I would have gotten that ten years ago, 
but I understand that really well, because I've learned the difference. 
 
Adrienne: Yeah, and we can control our suffering. 
 
What is being discussed here is our belief that there is, at least to some degree, a choice in 
relation  to  how  we  deal  with  our  pain and losses. And, I believe that part of an effective strategy  would  combine  the  capacity  to  be  more  open  with the ability to let go of certain 
expectations and negative feelings.  
 
The  second  is,  in  fact, the possibility of “letting go” and “getting on with life”, a response 
touched on at various points in this chapter. In admitting this, I, thus, remain open to the idea 
that some people who report that they have let go of their negative feelings have actually done 
so. One such person is Chris Baker who responded to my call for participants by telling me his 
story  in  a  series  of  emails  and  short  stories.  When  I  asked  him  the  question:  "How  did 
becoming ill/disabled affect the way you felt about yourself?" he replied as follows. 
 
Initially, it nearly finished me. I was suicidal for a few weeks, before I found out what  
was happening. My identity was based on the image of a tough ex-bushman, resourceful 
and able to handle any of life’s vicissitudes. It was also based on a sort of Sir Galahad 
rectitude and of course the first thing the MS did was rob me of both. My physical 
prowess? Gone. My manly grace? A fast-diminishing joke. And to make matters worse, 
my  partner,  in  whom  I’d  invested  most  of  my  emotional  energy,  left  me,  finally 
succumbing to a burgeoning schizophrenia. Her departure had nothing to do with my 
condition, which serendipitously waited until the day after I helped her onto a bus to her 
home town before visiting on me a collapse where all my energy simply drained away at 
the speed of a washbasin full of shaving water with the plug pulled, and left me sitting 
out the back of my flat wondering what the hell had just happened. 
            
These two events coincided most happily with the end of a year’s spiritual instruction, 
based around the premise ‘be happy’. This, of course, was as simple as it sounds, but it 
took me ten years to work it out. In the process, I devised the strategy by which I’ve 
coped with the disability wrought by the MS. It took me that long to get my ego under 
control,  and  to  grasp  the  idea  of  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  and  the  concept  of 
emptiness.  
 
I also had to deal with the grief of losing the parts of my life that the MS trashed. It was 
this process that finally brought me to the point where I was able to see my disability as 
a blessing, as a positive rather than a negative condition, and I can see now that this 
positive attitude was central to my handling of the disease and the wreckage it made of 
my old life (Chris Baker 2002: 2-3). 
 
For many of the participants in this study, however, the pathway to freedom from feelings of loss 
has  not  been  so  clear  and  often,  as  has  been  demonstrated  throughout  this  chapter,  the 
appearance of "coping well" rests on an elaborate process of self-denial. When Karen and I first 
engaged in the conversation about hiding one's pain, I attempted to express the difference that I 
perceived between coping well and self-denial. I would like to include it here, verbatim, as I still 
lack any better way of saying it as expresses what I perceive as different states, one healthy 
and the other very damaging. 
 There are very positive things that we've learned, very deep things that are going to help 
us through life and they make us understand life even better than people who haven't 
been through them. But, there are other coping mechanisms that are probably unhealthy 
because they are about burying things and concealing your deepest feelings. So, I think, 
on the one hand, there are going to be things that I discover through talking to people 
and it's like, yes, yes, and I'm really inspired and I think, yeah, these are the things I 
want to develop, and there are other things where I think we find ourselves behaving in 
ways that we're uncomfortable with, but we don't know how else to behave because 
that's what society expects from us. That's how we have to behave to fit in. 
 
Telling the difference, however, is often extremely difficult. What is clear, however, is that, 
because socially sanctioned forms of “coping well” largely require the submersion of emotions, 
disabled people are offered a false choice which obscures that dealing effectively with loss 
involves  an  acknowledgement  of  the  pain.  Both  Chris  and  Adrienne,  however,  through 
developing  a  spiritual  understanding  of  the  role  that  pain  and  loss  play  in  their  lives, 
demonstrate that it is possible to bring pain to the surface and, over time, to let it go.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER SIX 
 
The Loss of Independence 
 
Such dependency is much more than simple physical reliance upon others, for it begets 
a kind of lopsided social relationship that is all-encompassing, existential, and in some 
ways more crippling than the physical defect itself. It is not so much a state of body as a 
state of mind, a condition that warps all one's other social ties and further contaminates 
the identity of the dependent. (Robert Murphy 1990: 199). 
 
The loss of the ability to do things for oneself appeared to be the most pervasive theme of all 
when it came to the losses talked about by disabled people. The nature and extent of the loss 
depended on a number of variables including the severity of the impairment, the kind of support 
system  already  in  place,  the  time  elapsed  since  the  onset  of  disability  and  whether  the 
impairment  developed  slowly  and  involved  an  unclear  prognosis  or  occurred  suddenly  and 
remained relatively stable.  However, there were certain feelings attached to the experience of 
becoming dependent on others that appear to have occurred across the board and this chapter 
will begin by sharing these sentiments. Most fundamentally, as with any identity-based loss, 
there was the experience of transformation, from being a certain kind of person to becoming 
someone in possession of a less desirable sense of self and a disturbingly different life. The 
most concise description of these losses come from the published autobiographical  and written 
statements as these people had the time to present their experiences in narrative form. I quote 
from a number of them below. 
 
It seemed  as  if  I  were  watching  helplessly  as  I  disappeared  and  a  sickly, 
dependent stranger for whom I had no respect was taking my place, stealing my hopes 
and dreams (Melissa Anne Goldstein 2000: 96). 
 
I was resentful at having to depend on someone else to do what I wanted to do for 
myself … I was losing my old self - the way I controlled my body, the way I conducted 
my physical being. My daily routine - not only closing windows, but getting out of bed, 
getting dressed and washed, doing dishes, cooking and going to the john - seemed 
nearly  impossible. I  had  taken  for  granted  the  old  ways  of  doing  things  and 
only appreciated  the  simplicity  now  that  drastic  changes  were  necessary  (Marjorie 
Wagner 1986: 59).  
 
But my body, which I had called myself, had changed dramatically from autonomous to 
dependent, from strong to weak, from rapidly moving to completely immobile. I had to 
rely on others for even my most elemental functions and activities - even those that 
belonged in the bathroom. My spatial existence seemed more like that of a sack of flour 
than a human being … 
 I had been thrust backward in the developmental scale, and my dependence was now 
as profound as that of a newborn. Once again I had to deal with all of the overwhelming, 
degrading conditions of dependency that belong with infancy and childhood - at the 
same time that I considered myself a mature adult (Arnold Beisser 1989: 22).  
 
From being athletic, I was now disabled; from being a wife and mother, I was now 
solitary; from being able to relate to others on equal terms, I was now patronised; from 
being a public servant responsible for assessing the disadvantaged in order to establish 
their eligibility for state benefits, I was now one of those disadvantaged people; from 
being an independent adult used to making her own decisions, I was now treated as a 
child (Lesley Tyzack 2000: 1).   
 
Even though I am suggesting that the written word makes it more possible to succinctly outline 
the details of one's distressing transformation into the realm of disability, it is still far from easy 
because it touches on an extremely painful experience. When I first hurt my back I was aware of 
having  an  impairment  but  not  a  disability  because,  as  far  as  I  was  concerned,  it  was  a 
temporary condition. Certainly, it was extremely frustrating to find my life as I had been living it 
so abruptly halted and I hated having to rely on others for almost everything. But, initially, this 
did not affect my identity as such and did not constitute an overall loss because I did not and 
could know that I would still be largely immobilised and in high levels of pain over a decade 
later. My horror at the loss of my independence came upon me gradually as my former life 
shrivelled  and  eventually  died,  as  the  people  who  had  originally  come  to  my  aid  became 
resentful,  and  as  this  necessitated the unthinkable but only solution of moving back to my 
parents’ home at the age of thirty two.  
 
I had been so proud of what I had achieved. I had made a life for myself which was heavily 
based on physical strength and independence. Now I was "back there" again, where back there 
referred to more than just the physical location of my childhood home, it was also indicative of a 
loss of autonomy, the loss of a certain status that comes with adulthood and the achievement of 
certain objectives, and the loss of the ability to engage in life freely without having to plan every 
move like a battle campaign and without having to feel heavily indebted, guilty and ashamed in 
response to needing so much help to attain what seemed, in comparison, a very poor quality of 
life.  
 
The Self Immersed in Unacceptable Need 
 
The  terms  most  commonly  used  to  express  the  feelings  which  accompany  becoming  and 
remaining  dependent  on  others  are  "anger",  "resentment",  "frustration",  "shame"  and 
"humiliation". Although these emotions have many causes they are all linked in various ways to 
the infantalisation process. When treated like a child, it is natural to react with anger, frustration and  resentment.  When  feeling  like  a  child,  shame  and  embarrassment  are understandable 
responses. Many people wrote about their feelings of becoming childlike in their dependency. 
 
His  mind,  proud and  ambitious, was still there; but the body, the means of serving 
his pride and ambition, was gone. In its place was the curious soft, pudgy body of a baby  
- fully as helpless and as pink but lifeless (Hugh Gallagher 1998:  150).  
 
Now you are a body on one of eight high metal beds. Lying under stiff sheets, eyes fixed 
on the door, feeling the rubbery chill, you are four years old again (Inga Clendinnen 
2001: 23).  
 
I felt like a helpless baby having to rely on everyone for the simplest things (Jane, written 
story: 2). 
 
Infantalisation is also something that is imposed by others and, in this vein, Albert Beisser 
(1989) writes about his redefinition as an infant. 
 
Once, the six-year-old son of a friend put the whole matter in a nutshell. He had great 
difficulty  categorizing me,  for  I  seemed  to  have  many  of  the  privileges  and 
responsibilities of an adult, but on the other hand, everything had to be done for me, as 
with  a  child.  He  did  not  know what  to  make  of  me.  Finally,  with a special joy that 
comes from insight and illumination, he said, "Oh, you're a big baby!" I did not share his 
joy over the category he placed me in, even though it did seem to fit.  
 
I had been thrust backward in the developmental scale, and my dependence was now 
as profound as that of a newborn. Once again I had to deal with all of the overwhelming, 
degrading conditions of dependency that belong with infancy and childhood - at the 
same time that I considered myself a mature adult.  
 
I  did  not  adjust  easily  to  my  new  dependence,  and  despised  giving  up what I had 
won years  ago  in  long-forgotten  battles.  The  baby  and  the  man  were  in  conflict, 
and the conflict was heightened by the many ways that other people treated me. Some 
people were interested in the dependent baby; others found the adult part, my head, 
more deserving  of  attention.  Some  seemed  concerned  with  controlling  what  they 
considered the unruly child, while others wanted to nurture a helpless infant.  
 
Nurses and attendants often talked to me as if I were a baby. If I became soiled through 
no fault of my own, they were likely to say, "Naughty, naughty," or "You've been a bad 
boy." Some people were so perplexed that they simply fled in despair. None of these 
attitudes helped clarify my confusion about how I thought of myself (22).  
 
This process of infantalisation can lead to the disabled person being seen as child-like in other 
ways, for example, incapable of making appropriate decisions. Albert Robillard (1999) writes about  the  response  he  was  given  when  he  would  not  follow  the  instructions  given  by  his 
therapists. 
 
After I had explained that the voice panel board would not work for me, I got the distinct 
impression, mainly from facial expressions of the therapists, the salesman, and my wife, 
that I was being willfully obstructive in rejecting the machine. "Don't you want to help 
yourself?" the salesman asked with a sigh. Divina added, "He is very stubborn." Still, I 
insisted that the machine was inappropriate (128). 
 
The whole tone of the interchange locates Albert as a child who is being chided for his lack of 
cooperation. He is being a 'willful' rather than an obedient child and his own perceptions of what 
is best for him are not being trusted. Chris Baker (2002) touches on similar ground when he 
writes about adapting to life in an institution. He quickly realises that, in certain situations, the 
willful child is not acceptable. 
 
I’m not silly. I know when to shut up, and I manage to act contrite. And helpless. They 
like  helpless,  and  despite  appreciating  independence,  are  nonetheless  alarmed  and 
discomfited by it (4-5). 
 
However, although disabled people are often thought to be childlike this does not mean that 
their process of seeking help is as straightforward as it is for children. Jacky puts it thus. 
 
Other people did, and still do, treat me in a childlike fashion - all happiness and good 
intentions - until you may perhaps want or need something (written story: 2). 
 
The social forces which affect what happens when disabled people need to seek help will be 
explored in the following section. 
 
Seeking Help 
 
Being able to negotiate the process of seeking and managing the assistance of others is fraught 
with difficulties. Often people who become disabled need to rely on friends, family members and 
even strangers for help and this puts pressure on relationships and often strains them. Others 
are given necessary care by paid workers and they in their turn face different problems which 
will be discussed later in this chapter. In either case, learning to accept help can be seen to be 
part of the process of coming to terms with a more limited physical capacity, a very painful part, 
and is often avoided if at all possible. Therefore this section will begin with the statements of 
those who have preferred to live more limited and/or painful lives than to ask for help. 
 
Throughout my dialogues with Anne, it became apparent that asking for help was not an option. 
 Anne: I reject help at the rate of knots and I find it very difficult... 
 
 
Me: So, you still do? 
 
 
Anne: Yes, oh definitely. I've never, ever been able to do that. Because, I can function. 
Look, honestly, there's never been a time... even when I was on crutches and bedridden, 
I suppose I was still trying to function on my own. And crawling... I don't know if I told you 
last time, on my knees [we talk about how we both ruined our knees by trying to be 
independent]. 
 
Kevin Hitchcock (1998) also expresses an extreme aversion to asking for help. 
 
I hate relying on other people. I feel inadequate. I can't get away from that feeling or 
overcome it. My stubborn insistence on being independent won't allow me the humility to 
readily accept the help of others (157). 
 
Recall  that  Melissa  Anne  Goldstein (2000) wrote that 'asking for help was an overwhelming 
obstacle for me then, and even now, though to a lesser extent. It seemed a sign of weakness and 
made me ashamed and embarrassed' (111).Similarly, Hugh Gallagher (1998), as it became clear 
in Chapter Five, avoided asking for help until his body and emotions completely broke down 
from the effort of trying to remain independent and stoic. He expresses it thus. 
 
In  the  bad  old  days,  I  tried  to  be  the  "heroic"  crip.  I  asked  no  one for  help. I was 
determined to get into cars without help. I would transfer, all by myself, onto strange 
toilets even if the transfer was dangerous. I would lift myself into hotel beds even if the 
effort left me breathless and my muscles cramping. I insisted upon traveling alone; I 
even flew alone around the world. The tension and anxiety caused by this made travel a 
terror (203).  
 
These feelings are very close to my own experience. In the following dialogue with Peta about 
the need to reciprocate, I talk about my own experiences where too large an imbalance in the 
"give and take" of my relationships made it impossible for me to ask for much needed help. 
 
And now finally, in the last 18 months, I have moved into town. I'm right in the middle of 
town and I can do just about everything I need to be able to do for myself and it's just 
wonderful. But, when I lived out in the bush I needed to rely on others to go anywhere or 
get anything. I had to travel lying down in the back of a car and I needed to ask people 
to pick stuff up for me at the shops.  And sometimes I'd rather starve, basically. It came 
down to that, because it was all one way and I was trying to balance it out by giving to 
other people and not taking anything unless my need was urgent. 
 
It is still very painful for me to remember the time when my situation was so difficult that I would 
rather starve than ask for help. Even more disturbing is the recognition that, if I were thrown back into that strange mixture of isolation and dependency again, I would still rather starve than 
risk tipping the scales too far out of balance. For me, consequently, the solution lay in creating 
an environment which has allowed me to be as independent as possible. But, it is conceivable 
that an increase in my level of disability could force me to suffer from similar losses in the ability 
to reciprocate. This possibility lurks as an impending source of terror. 
 
Many others, however, talked or wrote about having come to accept the need for help. Leslie 
Tyzack (2001), in her essay analysing her own experience of identity loss and reconstruction, 
writes about having to learn 'new norms of behaviour, which differed in many ways from the 
behaviour expected of an able-bodied person' (2). As part of this adaptive process, she writes: 
 
For example, I often needed help in day-to-day tasks, and I had to learn to ask for this 
help in a way that did not frighten or alienate people with little or no experience of 
disability.  Once  I  had  learnt  these  skills,  I  was  ready to face the next stage in my 
development (ibid). 
 
In  an  extensive  dialogue  with  Nancy,  which  focused  entirely  on  the  issue  of 
independence/dependence,  she  talked  about  her  recognition  that,  due  to  the  extent  of  her 
spinal cord injury, she needed to quickly accept her need for help. 
 
Nancy: Almost from the beginning, when you realise that everything has got to be done 
for you, I think there's a point where you say to yourself, I have to accept this. This is the 
way it is, so I've got to accept it. I would say after that, once you've done that major brain 
washing thing to yourself of, this is the way it is, this is the way it's going to be, you stop 
thinking about it. That's the way it is. But, even accepting that's the way it is, what I used 
to say was …okay, I accept that you have to do everything for me physically. That's 
obvious. That's fine. And I accept that. But, when it comes to my mind or my spirit, keep 
off the grass. They are very much mine. 
 
Nancy's acceptance was conditional. She would let go of her body as a colony over which she 
could no longer maintain direct control. But her way of thinking and her autonomy was not to be 
interfered with in the process. This distinction will be discussed in more detail in the concluding 
section of this chapter.  
 
Both Hugh Gallagher (1998) and Melissa Anne Goldstein (2000), although initially very resistant 
to seeking support as demonstrated above, wrote about how they eventually learned to accept 
help,  Hugh  by  employing  people  to  provide  assistance  while  he  travelled  and  Melissa  by 
developing a whole new view of interdependence and her value as a friend. Hugh writes: 
 
Now I no longer have the strength to pretend that I can live independently on the road. I 
need help with everything. If I am to travel, I now must travel with a helper. To my great 
surprise, this has made travel not only easier, but also fun. Over the years I have been fortunate  to  have had  as  helpers  some  excellent  guys.  They  have  been  not only 
employees, they have become lifelong friends (Hugh Gallagher 1998: 203).  
 
Melissa puts it thus: 
 
Most important, Evelyn helped me to understand that I could accept assistance from 
others without diminishment of self, because I could still help others, even if not as I had 
before … I could still enjoy rich, full relationships that included giving and receiving on 
both sides. Possessing the knowledge that I could contribute to others was of paramount 
importance to me. I could still be the kind of person I respected. I could let go of the 
shame I had been carrying with me these past nine months. I also felt more secure; I no 
longer  feared that people would abandon me.  
 
Though  this  was  a  harder  lesson  for  me  to  grasp,  I  learned  how  essential  it  was 
for others in my life to be able to help me. Their need to give was as deep as mine. 
They, too, felt powerless when confronted by my illness (Melissa Anne Goldstein 2000: 
124).  
 
I would argue that the differences between these two methods of coming to terms with being 
dependent on others are indicative of the overall differences that exist between those who rely 
on paid carers and those who depend on the goodwill of others. Ultimately this distinction had 
such a powerful effect on how disabled people conceptualised and negotiated their need for 
support that it demands a lengthy consideration in a section of its own. 
 
Remuneration Versus Goodwill 
 
Prior to engaging in the dialogues and reading the autobiographies, I was not familiar with the 
experiences  of  anyone  who  managed  their  need  for  care  with  the  help  of  professional 
assistants. My only experience with paid carers had been during the times I spent in hospital, 
which included three stays of around two weeks in general hospitals and one month spent in a 
rehabilitation  facility.  I  certainly  did  not  enjoy  the  institutionalised  life,  but  each  time I was 
admitted to hospital I can remember feeling a great sense of relief that I would no longer be a 
burden on my friends and/or family. I felt more comfortable about receiving help from those who 
were paid to give it to me than I have ever been able to feel when reliant on the kind of informal 
support which is based, as one participant put it, on the "goodwill" of others. Having now spoken 
in depth with three people who rely almost solely on paid personal carers, one who lives in an 
institution and two who receive assistance in their homes, I can see that there are enormous 
differences between these people's experiences of dependence/independence and those who, 
like me, have had to rely almost exclusively on informal arrangements.  
 
In this particular sample of the disabled population, those who procured professional carers 
were primarily those who were or had become wheelchair users due to the paralysis which accompanies conditions such as spinal cord injuries, advanced Multiple Sclerosis (MS) and 
some congenital disabilities. These disabilities are extremely severe and offer no opportunity for 
the person to "pass" as able-bodied in an attempt to avoid asking for help. It would appear from 
this particular study that, due to this degree of severity, the identity crisis is also extreme as the 
adjustments required are enormous. However, it would also appear that, once this adjustment 
has been made, the new identity and the level of autonomy achieved can eventually be much 
more favourable than those whose conditions seemed in many ways less dramatic. I will be 
suggesting here that part of the reason for this superior level of adaptation is linked to the 
battles these people won to secure effective assistance from paid carers. 
 
Lesley Tyzack (2000), for example,  became so severely affected by MS twenty years ago that it 
was agreed that her life was not worth living and she was granted permission and the means 
with which to end it. It was at this point that she realised that her 'will to live was too strong' and 
from  that  time  forward  she  set  about  creating  a  meaningful  life  for  herself  (1).  Her  initial 
experiences with seeking support were horrendous. Originally she became bedridden in her 
marital home and she describes her experience of relying on the informal care of her family in 
the following dialogue. 
 
Lesley: …my husband didn't want to be responsible for my care. 
 
Me: So, your husband didn't want to come to the party at all. 
 
Lesley: He resisted it quite a bit. And it was just a really difficult time. There was a lot of 
friction. There was one point when I was in bed the whole time, barely able to get out of 
bed... you know, just able crawl to the toilet and that's all. I couldn't feed myself and my 
mother-in-law  came  along  at that stage and helped give me meals, but she wasn't 
actually the motherly type... 
 
Lesley lived in Australia during the early years of her illness, but when she eventually developed 
quadriplegia and ended up in a series of hospitals and nursing homes, she felt that she would 
receive better treatment in New Zealand where she had spent most of her life prior to marrying 
an Australian. She was aware that the conditions under which disabled people live were more 
favourable  in  New  Zealand  due  to  both  the  superior  formal  care  arrangements  and  social 
attitudes in general. She believes that in New Zealand people ‘on the whole, have a much 
greater respect for autonomy than Australians’ (private email correspondence 2/12/01). She 
now expresses her state of autonomy as follows:  
 
Lesley…  for  the  last  three  years  now  I  have  had  just  as  much  freedom  and 
independence as any other adult New Zealander, mainly because, along with a lot of 
very high technology equipment, I have individualised funding, which is a lump sum 
fortnightly  payment from the health department which I use to employ and pay my 
personal carers (ibid).  
Reaching  this  state  of  independence,  however,  did  not  come  easily  and,  initially,  the  paid 
assistants in charge of her care were the nurses who worked in the institutions that Lesley was 
forced to live in at times in South Australia. When talking about the oppressive atmosphere, the 
lack of freedom and her eventual demand for autonomy, Lesley expresses it thus: 
 
Lesley: [It] was really what I would imagine a prison was like. If a prison is worse than 
that, I feel really sorry for the prisoners. 
 
Me: Oh really? 
 
Lesley: You were told what to do and when to do it. And they'd base it very much on 
what they did and you had to fit in with their routines. 
 
Me: How horrible. 
 
Lesley: And, I was able to stand up and say, no, that's not what I'm going to do. This is 
the way I'm going to do it and this is what I want to be done. 
 
Nancy told similar stories of institutional life prior to the changes brought about by the disability 
rights movement. Nancy, however, has lived in an institution since an accident thirty years ago 
which resulted in an extremely debilitating spinal cord injury. She also compares the old style 
institution with a prison and says that: 
 
Nancy: I felt as though I was being punished all the time. Well, probably what I've 
described to you sounds like punishment. It certainly felt like it. 
 
Me: Well, it was. 
 
Nancy: And the other thing I used to say was, hang on, what's this all about? I didn't 
commit a crime. I only had an accident. 
 
Like Leslie, however, Nancy fought for her right to choose how she should be treated and how 
she would spend her time and she describes her demand to be treated with respect and her 
transition to autonomy as follows. 
 
Nancy: Yeah, well, look at it like this, Rose. This is the way I see it. They are paid to do a 
job. What's their job? It's being my hands and feet but not my head. 
 
Me: Exactly. And that's where you have to draw the line, isn't it? That they shouldn't, just 
because they're doing those physical tasks, think they own your... will? They need to 
know that you are still in charge in that way. 
 Nancy: Well, I've probably got it to an extreme … I probably don't get a very good name 
for it. I don't really care. I don't mind. Because of the treatment I got in the early years 
here, where you didn't have a voice at all. As soon as, gradually,... and I think I said to 
you before, 1981, the year of disabled persons, that was the year that it became trendy 
to be kind to poor crips. 
 
Me: Yes, right. 
 
Nancy: I said that before I believe. But, anyway, after that, gradually, you gradually 
found  your  way  into  working  for  the  militant  disability  crowd  or  doing  other  things, 
whatever,  and  then  going  to  university.  Gradually,  gradually  I  got  more  and  more 
autonomy until the national government, about ten years ago, they brought in the new 
health reforms. Suddenly, it was not only trendy, it was desired. Where are all meant to 
be responsible for ourselves. 
 
Karen spoke to me of a different battle to gain autonomy. She was born disabled and, when she 
became an adult, she wished to leave her family home to begin a life of her own. She was 
ineligible for the supports which were given freely to those who were covered by the accident 
compensation  legislation  brought  into  existence  in  New  Zealand  back  in  the  1970s  and, 
therefore,  she  needed  to  fight  for  special  consideration  so  that  she  could  be  granted  the 
assistance she required to live independently. She is now funded by the same government body 
which Lesley refers to which enables her to manage her own carers. This has enabled her to be 
independent enough to gain employment, to have a happy marriage of twelve years in which 
the  responsibility  for  her  personal  care  has  not  fallen  to  her  husband  and  to  employ  and 
organise her carers in the way that is most suitable for the needs of she and her husband. 
 
In  the  following  excerpt,  Arnold  Beisser  talks  about  how  much  better  he  feels  about  the 
assistance  he  now  pays  for, in comparison to that which was given grudgingly by informal 
carers. 
 
 I used to feel crushed and humiliated when I needed help from someone and they did 
not want to do it. I would blame either myself or them. But the sting I felt has now 
diminished. Getting help for my needs is more of a business transaction, and I no longer 
feel like I have to act like "the brave little soldier." The change also became evident to 
me when I could interview prospective personal-care attendants and discuss their duties 
without embarrassment (132). 
 
Most of the people I read about and talked to did not have paid support and, therefore, had to 
rely on gaining the help of friends, family and even strangers. Many of them discussed the issue 
raised  by  Arnold  Beisser  above  when  he  wrote  that  he  felt  bad  about  needing  help  with 
something if 'they did not want to do it.' Craig, who refers to his impairment as blindness, writes 
about this as follows.  
You go to a Church group. They will be safe. The youth invite you to an outing at the 
beach. No problem. You arrive at the  beach, singing choruses "Oh Happy Day, Oh 
Happy Day, when Jesus etc." A nice young thing offers to assist you down to the beach.  
"Thanks, are you sure?" "Of course, I don't mind." The happy young  people run on 
ahead. Turning back they shout, "Come on Sharon, hurry up." "I can't hurry, I've got to 
help him," she says in a  brassed off tone of voice. Shrink shrink, I wish I'd never come.  
Why did she say she'd help if that's the way she really feels? [written story: 6]. 
 
Aaron also talks about the discomfort that arises if the help he needs is not given freely. 
 
Aaron: Well, no, I don't have a problem with asking for the help, but I have a problem 
with my partner that she's obligated to do everything. And that makes it very difficult. It 
puts a bit of a strain on the relationship at times… 
 
Me: Yeah, it just pushes it out of balance a bit, doesn't it?. 
 
Aaron: I think though that... I think it's the expectation that they build up in their mind that 
they're going to have to do it. So, me going out and doing something is just an extra 
burden for them and, you know, that's always the concern for me. You know, you don't 
want to put that kind of pressure on. 
 
Me: No, you don't. But it's really hard not to. 
 
Aaron: You know, I don't have a problem with things that are done voluntarily, but I feel 
that there are times when my partner feels it's really not a choice for her, she has to do 
it. And that's difficult for me. 
 
Even help that is given voluntarily can feel uncomfortable. When Alana Arnot (1998) left an 
Australian hospital after many months of rehabilitation for her spinal cord injury, she had to rely 
completely on her husband. She writes: 
 
Nigel worked with me methodically, but I could see the strain in his face at times and 
knew  he  hated  seeing  me  so  incapacitated. I  cried  a  lot  that  weekend.  It  was  so 
humiliating and frustrating having to rely on someone else for everything (175).  
 
Melissa Anne Goldstein (2000) also writes about the unease she felt at the thought of asking 
her friends for help. 
 
But asking for help was an overwhelming obstacle for me then, and even now, though to a 
lesser extent. It seemed a sign of weakness and made me ashamed and embarrassed. I 
was also protecting my friends, keeping them from worry. And though I did not openly acknowledge it, even to myself, a tiny part of me, buried deep, felt that I must maintain a 
healthy facade, or I would lose my friends (111). 
 
And, as Chris Baker (2002) wrote to me about how he was settling into his new life in a nursing 
home: 
 
Ellie is most welcome here. She's able to eat meals here & stop over if she wants, & 
Sam the dog is also able to visit, leaping & slithering around the room. It's good to be 
able to stay friends with Ellie, a situation that was seriously endangered by her having to 
care for me (cf yr words about friends & family) [personal email correspondence, 7/8/02]. 
 
The above reference, once again, points to the difference between paid care and the reliance 
on loved ones and others. Needing to rely heavily on one's intimates obviously puts a great 
strain  on  most  relationships.  Adrienne  talks  about  this  in  the  following  dialogue.  She 
contemplates what it would involve to live alone, without the help of her partner who has taken 
over the shopping, cooking, house cleaning and laundry. 
 
Adrienne:... and it's come to the point where there are so many things that I just can't... I 
don't know... can I ever live alone again? What does it mean? I mean, yeah, I can 
imagine managing an attendant, but I'm not very patient in myself and the willingness to 
just put up with shit that is required to communicate what one needs done to another 
person … 
 
Me: Oh yeah. 
 
Adrienne: And so, that's been really yuck. Yucko! 
 
Me: Oh, I know. It is. 
 
Adrienne:  Yeah,  there  is  an  interdependent  ideal,  but  always,  always,  there's  that 
question in the back of my head, will my partner leave me? Am I asking too much? 
 
Kenny Fries (1997) pays someone to do the housework, but still feels that his lover is burdened 
because of his needs. 
 
Since  living  with  Kevin,  I've  made  sure  I  have  housekeeping  help  other  than  my 
lover. But  still  the  physical  imbalance  between  us  sometimes  takes  its  toll.  Most 
people who  help  the  disabled  do  so  in  the  hope  of  cure,  or  at  least to  alleviate  a 
temporary physical situation. I'm afraid that when a disability is chronic not many will 
stick around for the long term (216).  
 
As Karen, who battled successfully to attain the assistance of personal carers, puts it: 
 Karen: I mean, I've got a perfectly able-bodied husband, but he is not going to do my 
personal care. 
 
Me: Yeah, and the expectation here [in Australia] is that you don't need support if there 
are people there, whether it be your parents or your siblings or your partner … or your 
friends. And you can't run your relationships and your friendships like that. 
 
Karen: And as much as they love you and want to be with you, they wouldn't do that for 
the average wife. 
 
Karen's husband was able to marry the independent woman he met and fell in love with. Karen 
implies that, if their marriage had necessitated that he take over her personal care, it would not 
have been acceptable to either of them. 
 
Whether the assistance one receives is paid for or not, the manner in which this help is received 
is an issue for all disabled people. Gratitude was talked about by many of those in the sample 
as an extremely problematic issue. The next section will seek to outline the dilemma which 
disabled people report in response to constantly being in need of assistance. 
 
Graceful Appreciation or Irrevocable, Soul Destroying Obligation? 
 
"Just stop saying sorry and thank you." [She] is angry with me, but I don't know how to 
stop the tears that are pouring down my cheeks. I especially don't know how to explain 
to her how these words define my current experience almost perfectly. I am so sorry for 
being such a burden and for not always being able to hide my distress and I am so 
grateful that she keeps helping me and does not reject me altogether. But, I know that 
any attempt to explain things better will damage our dying friendship even more than my 
tiresome sorries and thankyous. I eventually manage to stop crying and say "Okay…" 
biting down hard on my inclination to add, "I'm sorry" (excerpt from my diary, 22/04/91). 
 
Recently,  I  have  been  trying  to  explain  to  my  partner  and  my  friends  the  revelation  I 
experienced about gratitude when Susan, one of my participants, brought up the following issue 
in one of our dialogues. 
 
Susan: I just emailed someone at work - "I had a book recalled from the library. If you 
are going over today, can you take it?" And I read my e-mail back after I sent it and it 
says  "[Terry]  dear,  sweety,  honey,  light  of  my  life,  please,  if  you  are  going  to  the 
library..." and it's just a joke kind of thing. But, it's not really. 
 
Me: Yeah. 
 Susan: You have to keep saying it to people and it's not fair. …It's a dent on ... not just 
your identity, but on your whole sense of independence. Why should I have to be nice to 
people that I don't really want to be nice to? 
 
Me: Exactly. 
 
Susan: Just to do normal, day-to-day things that anybody else takes for granted … It's 
the dependency... just the dependency on the goodwill of other people. 
 
Susan works in an environment where certain parts of her workplace are inaccessible or very 
difficult to access and she has been provided with no supports to help her with the tasks that 
her disability makes difficult or impossible. This forces her to be reliant on the goodwill of others 
where she is thrust into a state of constant gratitude and apology as a result. What I realised 
from this conversation was that those of us who are reliant on goodwill are forced to inhabit a 
space defined by irrevocable obligation and the unremitting need to show and feel gratitude. 
When I tried to explain this to my partner and friends, it came out sounding like I was ungrateful 
and that my deep and sincere appreciation had been a pretence. But, what I am trying to say is 
not that I am ungrateful. It is that I wish I were in a position where gratitude was no longer so 
necessary. And, apart from having my impairments magically disappear, the only way I can see 
this being possible is in the creation of a new social situation where formal support structures 
are more accessible and the attitudes towards interdependency are not so heavily reliant on 
identical forms of reciprocation. This is, however, a topic for the next section. 
 
Following  the  above  mentioned  dialogue  with  Susan,  I  began  to  code  for  “gratitude”  as  a 
dimension of the larger category of “dependence” and it became apparent that a great many 
people had experienced similar feelings. Those who had relied on paid support and were at the 
mercy of institutions resolved the issue by refusing to be grateful at all. As Nancy was already 
quoted as saying in relation to demanding her rights very firmly: 
 
Nancy: I probably don't get a very good name for it. I don't really care. I don't mind. 
Because of the treatment I got in the early years here, where you didn't have a voice at 
all … because of the way I started and the way I was treated then, there is a voice inside 
me that says, no one is ever going to do that to you again. 
 
Lesley also speaks about the injustices she suffered and how she went through a stage of 
refusing to be grateful at all.  
 
Lesley: It's hard to get used to. I don't know how you find it, but nowadays I have my 
own funding and my own carers and they've mostly been with me for a long, long time. 
And it's just a very good relationship. They do things for me and they'll even go the extra 
mile and I pay them and I don't have to be grateful for it. But, at that stage, it was how 
grateful you were supposed to be for people doing things for you. And, even when people were paid, they were paid by another agency which gave you the impression that 
they thought you were taking advantage of it and they didn't want to do any more than 
they absolutely had to. 
 
Me: Oh right. So you had to be grateful even for that. 
 
Lesley: Yes. 
 
Me: Just the fact... and that's a real transition phase, isn't it? That whole phase from 
feeling like... I don't know... the position where you really feel that you need so much and 
you have to be grateful for getting anything, to thinking of it as a right and a form of your 
own... 
 
Lesley: And, I really object to that, and I refused to be grateful. I refused to be grateful 
for anything. I think I put it in that essay that I thought I had to learn to deal out my thank 
yous. 
 
Karen, who is also in receipt of formal assistance expresses a different, although related form of 
restructuring in her relationship with gratitude.  
 
Karen: … that's what the counselling taught me, that everything you do in your life 
doesn't have to be for everyone else. She said I was one of these really bad people. She 
tried to get me angry one day and I couldn't get angry because I'd always been taught 
that I should be grateful for what you get  … and when I say grateful for what you get I 
mean people helping you or... don't get me wrong, I'm very grateful when people help 
me and things like that, but it was kind of like you forgot to stop and think that it was nice 
of them to do that for you, but you needed this done because you needed it... she taught 
me that it's okay to go out and do things and do them for yourself, not just to make 
everyone else happy, you know. That was really hard... 
 
Karen's insights about her own situation deal with the general reaction one feels towards always 
being in need, such that it is possible to feel that you have no right to do things for your own 
pleasure.  Hugh  Gallagher  (1998) also writes about his relationship with gratitude before he 
changed his feelings towards being incapacitated. It is part of his third person account which 
was quoted from extensively in the preceding chapter on self-silencing. 
 
He was pleasant and cheerful, thanking them for taking the time and going through the 
additional bother that his handicap had caused them. He did not feel very much like 
thanking them - he was tired and it was late, and there was really no excuse for taking 
15 minutes to unload him and his chair from the plane - but he did so because he knew 
there would be other times, other nights, when he or some other handicapped person 
would cause healthy people some unexpected and unlooked-for burden. It is one of the 
obligations of the handicapped to be meticulous in thanking people for little favors … 
 After  25  years,  he  had  found  that  these  favors  were  given  only  when they  cost  no 
sacrifices. This was why he had worked so hard to gain such physical independence as 
he had. This was why he had worked to obtain his money and position. Money could not 
buy  his  physical independence,  but  it  could  buy  physical  assistance  on  which  he 
could count. There was a difference - a substantial difference, he knew - between the 
reliability and relationship between a chauffeur hired to drive you to work each morning 
and a neighbor who volunteers to assist you in time of need. He first learned something 
of this when he returned to work. There were five steps into the building in which his 
office was located. The first several mornings, people were kind, assisting him up the 
steps.  After  the  first  week  or  two,  he  noticed  the same  people  tended to use other 
entrances into the building in order to avoid the effort (160-161). 
 
Suzanne Berger (1996) also writes a compelling testament to what she refers to as 'the patina 
of bastardised gratitude' that one feels toward 'the huge beastlike kindness'. 
 
Someone brought food to someone who couldn't get food: human to human, an act of 
kindness, appeasement, and generosity, all of which the world is known to badly need, 
to put it mildly. Gratitude is expected, but no, this one on the floor … feels like a dog that 
has been fed and must then lift moist eyes upward in thanks to its owner … But it's as 
though food has been thrown to me: I can't complain, must try to feel always always 
always, gratitude for the big beast of steady kindnesses which has come to the door.  
 
And so a certain patina of bastardized gratitude becomes the currency of dependency. 
Upon receiving both "favors" and necessities, it is expected. To keep peace, one must 
act grateful: the etiquette is as carefully laid out as in the old Emily Post. Gratitude is the 
good  behavior  extracted  from  the  recipient  of   multiple  kindnesses:  a form of bitter 
payment between adults, who - while honorable and fair-minded - are trapped. As time 
goes on, giving gratitude becomes a labor in itself, when one person is always doing and 
the  other  receiving.  It  stinks like  old  broccoli.  As  years  of  "unableness"  continue, 
gratitude makes the relationship between donor and recipient a briar patch. Soon the 
whole house is filled with one person's extreme gratitude, gratitude in every corner, until 
all that is given stands, with tusks center stage and shining, demanding notice, notice, 
see how grateful you should be.  
 
The cosmic issue is that the previously autonomous person would like to reciprocate, 
would like to perform all those "kindnesses" for her/himself. I wanted to select my own 
clothes, drive myself, buy my own clothes, buy my own canes, my own presents for 
others; I couldn't. So sometimes the real wish was to say in moments of excruciating 
bathos: Take me out and shoot me or leave me by the side of the road, instead of, 
Thank  you, thankyou,  thankyou  again.  Unless  a  couple  is  sophisticated  in the 
convoluted art of tactful tending, beyond any usual earthling capacities, the negotiation 
of acts of daily care takes over, gobbles affections, equilibrium, and harmony. Though no 
one is ever at fault, I know it is harder for the recipient - who should feel unpinched gratitude and doesn't, and becomes knotted with subsequent guilt. There is no choice, in 
extremis: one needs the huge beastlike kindness (92). 
 
Challenging the Norms Defining Need and Dependency 
 
What  happens  when  a  person's  life  is  governed  by  the  'huge  beastlike  kindness"  which 
demands endless gratitude, when the transition from able-bodied to disabled necessitates a 
regression,  either  self-defined  or  inflicted  by  others,  into  infancy,  and  when  one's  anger, 
frustration and shame become key features of one's identity? In many cases the response may 
eventually be one of epiphany questioning the authenticity and appropriateness of the ideology 
of individualism which underlies the ideology of independence in the first place. As Marjorie 
Wagner (1986) writes, the feelings of 'pain' and 'worthlessness' which can result from being in 
constant need actually stem from the kinds of social values which classify certain dependencies 
as unacceptable. 
 
It is unpardonable in an individualist society to fail to be seen as  self sufficient. Our 
society  values  a  false  sense  of  independence  which results  in pain and a sense of 
worthlessness for women and men whose capabilities have been ignored and whose 
potential has been uniformly underdeveloped. Yet, independence does not truly reflect  
anyone's reality. As a species, we are emphatically interdependent. Disabled people 
cannot be independent, not because we are pitiable or helpless, but because we are 
human.  
 
Americans are particularly unmindful of the many persons on whom we daily depend for 
survival. A market economy - as a nexus - obscures this fact. Moreover, class relations 
are hidden by the ideology of individualism. We firmly believe that if we are able to 
purchase the goods and services we are not able to produce for ourselves, we are free 
of  dependence.  Conversely,  if  we  are  not  able to  buy  them,  we suspect we do not 
deserve "charity". Those who are able to purchase a false sense of independence are 
revered and are a measure by which the working class evaluates its members. The fact 
that some grow rich at the expense of their employees is conveniently ignored, while 
people who are systematically disadvantaged are criticized for their dependence (97-98). 
 
Robert Murphy (1990) is similarly critical of what he refers to as 'the myth of independence', 
suggesting  that  ‘[l]ack  of  autonomy  and  unreciprocated  dependence  on  others bring 
debasement of status in American culture and in many other cultures’ (199, 202). In attempting 
to challenge the myth of independence, it is vital to recognise that able-bodied people are also 
dependent  on  many  taken-for-granted  "supports". Susan raised this subject in the following 
dialogue. 
 
Susan: And people go on about how dependent you are and I read a fascinating thing … 
the example used is, you turn your tap on and water comes out of it. Why does it? Because you depend on other people to make sure that water comes out of that tap. 
Now, the whole social dependency thing is important, but because you have a little bit 
more dependency compared to other people, you're labelled. 
 
Arnold Beisser (1989), writes that the 'independence that I once prized I now realize was in part 
a luxury that I could indulge myself in because of self-deception' (41). 
 
Our view of dependency is generally that it is a weakness and a flaw. There is a special 
pride one derives from feeling independent. It is a position that we have valued and 
taught. But I have come to a different understanding of the meaning of dependence and 
independence.  
 
Every living being depends on others of its kind and the environment for nourishment 
and support. So a feeling of independence is not based on a belief that one is self-
sufficient, but on a confidence that what one needs is available from the outside. The 
wider the circle that we can rely upon, the more we can feel and behave independently.  
 
We confuse this feeling of independence with self-sufficiency, and interpret it to mean 
that we have done everything on our own. The belief that we are "self-made" men and 
women is a belief in a biological impossibility. That is the optical delusion of which 
Einstein spoke (43). 
 
Many of the people who participated in this study, having recognised the myth of independence, 
have reconstructed the ways in which they view their need to interrelate in special ways with 
other people. One such reconceptualisation, as is suggested in the above quotations, is based 
on  the  recognition  that  we  all  rely  on  each  other  and  on  many  taken-for-granted  social 
structures for the fulfilment of our daily needs and that disabled people simply have different 
needs and are able to give in different ways. Adrienne talks about her own experiences as 
follows. 
 
Adrienne: In America there is this fascination with pushing on and being independent 
and overcoming and all that kind of crap…[so] some of the things I'm really good at 
doing now really don't count for shit in a male world. Like, I'm a really good friend now. 
 
Me: Yeah. 
 
Adrienne: And that's still... that isn't high up on the list all the things that people put in 
your obituary. 
 
Me: But, when you look at it, in reality... 
 Adrienne: It's really a gift … And I know that the people whose lives I am in, part of that 
is that I am really important to them. I help them get through the day and they help me 
get through the day and we've got this kind of interdependence kind of thing going. 
 
In a similar vein, Melissa Anne Goldstein (2000) writes that she came to understand that she 
could 
 
accept assistance from others without diminishment of self, because I could still help 
others,  even  if  not  as  I  had  before … I could still enjoy rich, full relationships that 
included giving  and  receiving  on  both  sides.  Possessing  the  knowledge  that  I 
could contribute to others was of paramount importance to me. I could still be the kind of 
person I respected. I could let go of the shame I had been carrying with me these past 
nine months. I also felt more secure; I no longer  feared that people would abandon me.  
 
Though  this  was  a  harder  lesson  for  me  to  grasp,  I  learned  how  essential  it  was 
for others in my life to be able to help me. Their need to give was as deep as mine. 
They, too, felt powerless when confronted by my illness (124).  
 
Another  vital  element  in  challenging  normative  values  has  been  the  redefinition  of 
independence as the ability to make choices - or autonomy -  rather than the ability to achieve 
things as a solitary individual (the 'polar explorer' as Adrienne calls it). Eli Clare (1999) puts it 
succinctly: 
 
Independent living advocates measure independence not by how many tasks one can 
do without  assistance, but  by  how much control a disabled person has over his/her 
life and by the quality of that life (89). 
 
This  recognition  that  independence  necessitates  autonomy  is  a  vital  ingredient  in  the 
redefinition of the disabled identity. For, if the challenge to the myth of independence rested 
solely  on  the  argument  that  disabled  people  can  still  engage  successfully  in  relations  of 
reciprocity, then it is still possible that they may feel as though they are lacking. My proposition 
is that it is also essential to acknowledge that disabled people have the right to choose. As we 
heard Arnold Beisser (1989) comment, 'a feeling of independence is not based on a belief that 
one is self-sufficient, but on a confidence that what one needs is available from the outside’ 
(43). Touching on the same issue, Lesley Tyzack (2001) writes that in her personal recovery: 
 
As predicted in Erikson’s theory, my next need was for autonomy. If I was to succeed in 
becoming  a  person  in  my  own  right,  I  must  make  my  own  decisions,  and  accept 
responsibility for them. The medical profession and nursing home staff had taken over 
as “parents” and believed they knew what was best for me; some were encouraging, 
many were obstructive. An infant, if over-restrained or punished, may develop shame 
and doubt  … and in these circumstances, so did I. Could I be so sure my way was 
right? Did I “deserve” what I was demanding? Was I being fair to my caregiver?  … I was fortunate that I had an adult brain that could reason and analyse because I was able to 
decide what was “my problem” and what was “their problem” and adjust my thinking 
accordingly. I considered myself successfully through this stage when I developed my 
will to the point where I could make my own decisions and insist on them in the face of 
opposition (2). 
 
Making one's own decisions and remaining firm about them in the face of opposition is implicit in 
the need, or more appropriately, the right to decide what is best for oneself. Nancy, Chris Baker 
(2002) and Ruth Seinkiewitz Mercer (1989), all of who are reliant on full personal care, are very 
aware of how important their autonomy is to their independence. Each expresses this in relation 
to their need to maintain their independence of thought. 
 
… it began in the fairly early days, I think I accepted the physical dependence, but my 
message was that, okay, I accept that you have to do everything for me physically. 
That's obvious. That's fine. And I accept that. But, when it comes to my mind or my spirit, 
keep off the grass. They are very much mine (Nancy). 
 
There are paid to do a job. What's their job? It's being my hands and feet but not my 
head (Nancy). 
 
But independence sure is a huge part of identity and that's the one thing that nobody can 
rob me of. It's just that it becomes more and more a cerebral thing, an attribute of 
attitude, and mine feels unshakable, stronger than ever, made that way by disability. 
Sure, I need help with damn near everything, but I sure as hell don't need help to think 
(Chris Baker, personal email: 11/12/02). 
 
Despite my unavoidable dependency on others for physical I assistance, I am a very 
independent person in thought and spirit (Ruth Seinkiewitz Mercer 1989: 12).  
 
Managing to be autonomous when in need of so much assistance requires the ability to be 
explicit about things which people usually do for themselves without thinking about them. For 
example,  Lesley  Tyzack  talks  about  the  authority  she  had  to  develop  to  ensure  that  her 
assistants were doing things in the way she desired them to be done. 
 
Lesley: You have to be explicit and give directions and, when they've done it, you have 
to  check  that  they've  done  it.  And  people  can  get  quite  offended  because  you're 
checking up on them afterwards. But, you have to do it because they can forget or not 
understand what you've told them and do things wrong and that can have quite a bad... 
quite an effect on you …You've got to be in charge and with me having my own money 
to pay people, they accept that. People that were paid by another agency didn't accept 
that  I  had  any  responsibility  for  it,  not  unless  they  had  a  reasonable  amount  of 
intelligence and realised that it was my life, but a lot of people weren't like that and 
thought that they were paid by the agency and would do what the agency told them. 
 Me: Whereas, now, you are actually in charge of choosing people? 
 
Lesley.: That's right. Yes, I actually advertise for them and I employ them and interview 
them and I train them and they know that they are here to do what I want them to do. 
 
There are many elements that are mentioned by Lesley which impact on and/or facilitate one's 
autonomy. It has become essential for Lesley to become a highly effective human resource 
manager. She needs to be clear about what she needs and to feel that she deserves to be 
given the level of care that she requires. She has to be prepared to correct people when they 
get it wrong and to keep on trying to make her needs clear. She also touches on, not only the 
difference  between  paid  and  unpaid  assistance,  but  also  the  different  levels  of  autonomy 
accorded to recipients of these services. This would perhaps point to a difference between 
welfare related services and services which are purchased privately through the market place. 
Many of my participants talked about the negative attitudes which exists towards recipients of 
welfare services, an issue which will be dealt with in more detail in the following chapter on the 
effects that having employment, or not, has on one's identity.  
 
Karen, who is dealing with the same individualised care funding system in New Zealand as that 
which Lesley refers to, argues that, even though she has to a large degree been able to be 
more autonomous because of this system, those in authority still do not fully accept her right to 
judge whether her care is effective or not. 
 
Karen: They wanted to do assessments to see if the carers were doing their jobs right 
and they wanted to send somebody and come and watch me doing a shower and I said, 
excuse me, I'm not a piece of meat in the butcher's on display, I'm a person, and I said 
no. I said I'll tell you if my carers aren't doing their job right and they go, oh no, we've got 
our standards of what to do, and I said, sorry, but I'm not going to do it. One is, I'm not a 
piece of meat to be viewed. If my carers not doing their job right, I will tell you, and, two, 
we have enough strangers in our lives and my husband doesn't need to have another 
stranger come in to view me. And she says, I don't know what to do with you people. I 
said, what do you mean, you people. Are you going on about the fact that I'm not the 
only one who says no. She said, yes, I'm definitely going to have to get a dispensation 
for you people … A lot of people in my situation don't think they have the right to say no, 
because they are scared they're going to have their care taken away from them if they 
said no. I said, by law, you can say no. 
 
Me:. That's the threat, isn't it, because when you're depending on these people, whether 
they be doctors or carers or whatever, you feel like you have to please them or that you 
are indebted to them or... 
 
Karen: That's right. 
 
Me: But you've taken that power back again.  
Karen: I've got [my power] all back again. It took a long time to get it back.  
 
Me: I'll bet it did. 
 
These  statements  indicate  a  form  of  personal  power  which  goes  beyond  our  current 
conceptions of "empowerment". Empowerment, as Susan points out in the following statement 
still relies on the notion of being given certain allowable and specified areas of power, rather 
than taking this power as one's own. 
 
Susan: But, I don't like the word empowered actually. It's like someone else is letting you 
have the power, because they let you have it, and, you know, someone empowering you 
is giving you choices … That means they must have the power to give you choices  … 
We'll let you be independent. And that's not independence. 
 
I believe that the achievement of the kind of personal power which is being demonstrated by 
those who are succeeding in gaining independence built from autonomy is based on a different 
world view. To gain personal power when one cannot be self-reliant requires that certain myths 
be toppled and new rights established. From what can be seen in the stories told in this chapter, 
a properly independent life would not only allow disabled people to access a whole range of 
new  possibilities  for  making  comfortable  and  fulfilling  lives  for  themselves,  it  also  has  the 
potential to resolve many of the attitudes which contribute to internalised oppression. People 
who  do  not  feel  they  are  morally  inferior  because  they  rely  on  others  for  certain  forms  of 
assistance and who can, moreover, access this assistance in ways which suit their needs and 
preferences  are  far  better  placed  than  those  who  live  their  lives  in  a  state  of  guilt, 
embarrassment and deprivation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
The Imperative of Paid Employment 
 
Closely connected to the loss of independence were the losses related to people's identities as 
workers, particularly in relation to paid employment. No one used the term "paid employment". 
Most  people  simply  used  the  term  "work"  to  convey  the  concept  of  an  income  earning 
occupation. Some people were equally concerned about their inability to engage in productive 
enterprises  other  than  those  which  attracted  remuneration,  but  by  far  the  most  commonly 
lamented losses in relation to occupation were those connected with paid employment. Looking 
back to the genealogical investigation of disability outlined in Chapter Two, it is hardly surprising 
that not being able to work is looked upon as a severe loss. The industrial revolution not only 
created the necessity for a uniformly capable workforce which excluded those with impairments, 
it also removed people from their larger support groups and forced those who could not work for 
an income into a state of isolation and destitution. Indeed, it has been since this time, when the 
modern concept of the workforce came into being, the that term "disabled" has been used to 
describe those who, due to physical impairment, are unable to participate in paid employment. 
 
The following quote from Robert Murphy (1990) demonstrates how tightly tied together is the 
current definition of disability with the ability to engage in the workforce.  
 
When  the  1980 census  form  arrived,  I  looked  at  the  question  that  asked  whether 
anybody in the household was fully disabled and checked "no." The question seemed to 
be one related to income rather than health, and I remained fully employed. My physical 
deficiencies would keep me from further research in the boondocks, but I was getting a 
bit old for that anyhow. Otherwise, I was neither "handicapped" nor "disabled" in my 
profession. And I took inordinate satisfaction in this (81).  
 
In relation to those in my sample who were no longer able to work due to their impairments or 
disability, the extent of this loss varied according to the nature of the impairment(s), the type of 
work engaged in prior to the onset of disability, and how important it had been in defining the 
person's identity. Some people were able to gain or retain employment after becoming disabled 
and their statements of pride and satisfaction were as revealing as the statements of loss made 
by those who could no longer work. As was the case with the loss of independence - and of 
course they are intimately connected because of the "independence" that money can buy - 
people talked and wrote about the transition from being a worker to being unemployed. 
 
Monique: I don't want to sound like I'm full of myself but like I had potential. I used to do 
performances and I'd have people come up and say oh wow that was beautiful. And I'd 
tell people I was a dancer and they'd say oh wow, it's amazing. And now it's like this 
question, I hate this question "what do you do?", you know, when you meet people. And I used to get such an amazing response because I was a dancer, but now it's like I have 
CFS and I can't do anything and people go "ah" and it's really awful… 
 
Me: That's why we end up feeling like that's what defines us because "you are what you 
do." This is what matters most in this society. 
 
Monique: Each time it happens I feel smaller and smaller … 
 
 
And naturally I’m fascinated by the impact of MS on things like identity. Of course the 
disease has an impact, and a very severe one for most people, especially those – and 
that’s probably the majority – used to answering that rudest of questions, ‘And what do 
you do?’ with anything more comprehensive than ‘fuck all.’ (1) … Who am I, now that I’m 
no longer defined by occupation? (Chris Baker 2001: 8). 
 
This then opened up a new set of problems, depression, irritability and most of all a 
feeling of failure. At the time of this I was a very successful and valuable member of the 
[Council's]  survey  department, in fact I was the highest paid and most experienced 
Instrument Hand in all of the [state's] local government authorities. Not being able to do 
the work I loved was devastating (Jack, written story: 1). 
 
I felt useless and of little worth because I could not go back to the job I had had prior to 
my  accident  …  As  a fairly high functioning individual I felt like a total waste and I 
internalised the devalued attitude I continually encountered in others, in the media and 
even in myself. I often described myself as a 'parasite' because of inability to work and 
because I received ACC (accident compensation) …(Jacky, written story: 1). 
 
Anne: Initially it was a nightmare and it was a very, very downward spiral for a long time, 
because I just felt useless, totally useless. From being in such a difficult job … I had to 
sit at home on the lounge while all this was happening … 
 
 
Notice how these people are not referring to their loss of income, although this is surely a great 
loss in itself but more to abstract or emotional qualities such as pride and self worth. I, in fact, 
felt my greatest losses in areas which provided the least remuneration. My greatest pride had 
come from the creation and care of my organic vegetable garden. True, it was ostensibly a 
market garden and I sold produce each weekend at the local organic markets, but the returns 
per hour spent in the garden were so low that I often joked that I was performing a community 
service rather than making a living. Growing these vegetables fed my soul as well as my body 
and when I watched through the window as my garden withered and died, a large part of "me" 
seemed to follow suit.  
 Yet,  it  is  also  true  that  my  income  earning  occupations  contributed  to  similar areas of my 
identity. I worked in a variety of part time jobs at two orchards, a plant nursery and a tutoring 
firm. But, once again, the loss of income mattered less to me than my loss of meaning, fulfilment 
and  identity.  The  horticultural  jobs  exercised  my  ability  to  nurture  growing  things  and  the 
tutoring, in an extremely comparable fashion, allowed me to help nurture growing minds. When I 
lost these activities I felt crippled in a way that went far beyond my physical incapacity and loss 
of income-earning ability. I felt crippled in the sense that I could no longer help to nurture 
potential  and  to  encourage  fresh  growth.  In  the  following  excerpt  Adrienne  talks  of  similar 
feelings.  
 
Adrienne: ... I don't think it was so much that my identity was threatened as it was the 
idea  of  not  being  the  person  that  I  used  to  be.  I  guess  that  is  my  identity  being 
threatened after all. [She laughs]. The moment I admitted that, wait a minute, things 
were different, was when I stopped being an interpreter. I was in too much pain and I 
couldn't remember stuff and that was like this big, stone weight dropped around my 
neck. Oh why is this happening? 
 
Me: You loved it so much. 
 
Adrienne: I adored it. I absolutely adored it and it was like [Adrienne makes a mournful 
sound]. But at that point I went to a physician and said, this is really important to me, and 
she said, is that what you do for money? And I said, no, I have a job. [And she said], Oh 
well, guess it's not a problem then. 
 
Despite the economic necessity for women to work, as well as the personal and social reasons, 
some people pointed to the gender-based differences which can result in men feeling more 
threatened by the loss of work as a primary mode of identification. Adrienne touches on this 
when she discusses the ways in which being a woman has allowed her to develop a more 
diverse range of self-defining features. 
 
Adrienne: I think it's also the cultural expectation. Because the men I know with chronic 
fatigue are shattered by the idea that they're not being seen as capable wage earners. 
 
Me: Yes. 
 
Adrienne: So, I think that for once there is an up side to being a woman. 
 
Robert Murphy (1990) comments that: 
 
As  could  be  expected,  when  women  added  wage-earning  to  their  contributions  as 
housekeepers and rearers of children, their status in the family increased markedly; in 
cases where the husband lost his job and the wife provided the sole support, role reversals 
have  taken  place.  Despite  all  these  profound  changes  in  American  society,  an  old sentiment persists: A man who stays home is a loafer and a failure, but a woman who 
stays home is a homemaker. Women may work, but men must work. And since a large 
percentage of the motor-disabled are not employed, they are economic dependents, 
supported by Social Security disability insurance and the incomes of their families. As 
would be expected, this dependency affects the social standing of men more deeply than 
women (204). 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that most of the women in the sample talked or wrote about the large 
impact that their employment status had on their identities, it was also the case that it was the 
men who were more likely to claim that their occupational status provided their primary mode of 
identification. Albert Robillard (1999), still able to work, writes with satisfaction that: 
 
I have continued my career as a professor of sociology at the University of Hawaii. 
Except  for  my  hospitalization, I  have  never  missed  a  day  of  work  (until,  after 
October 1997,  my  wife  was  hospitalized  and  going to the university was out of the 
question for a short time). Work is my  primary means of fulfilment (32).  
 
Robert Murphy (1990) also describes how essential work has been to his identity. 
 
… my own struggles against decline were made more intense by my attempt to deny my 
disability. My overreach beyond the limits of my body was a way of telling the academic 
world that I was still alive and doing what I always did. And all my feverish activities in 
both academia and my community were shouts to the world: "Hey, it's the same old me 
inside this body!" These were ways for protecting the identity, for preserving that inner 
sense of who one is that is the individual's anchor in a transient universe (82).  
 
Kevin Hitchcock (1998) writes about the loss of his work identity and the consequent loss of 
self. 
 
Apart from the innate power which goes with the position of Director of News, many 
people are apparently intimidated by my physical presence. That's reinforced by my 
reputation  as  something  of a  brawler,  both  on  the  football  field  and  in  settling 
drunken arguments.  I'm  not  accustomed  to  having  my  decisions  and instructions 
questioned. I am used to having the ultimate power in a workplace - the authority to hire 
and fire. Here I have no physical presence, no strong commanding voice, no mantle of 
authority. My suggestions and opinions are generally ignored. I feel I am just one of 
many. I am a nobody (183).  
 
Once again it is evident that the primary qualities of concern to these men are less concrete 
than financial rewards. In describing what their jobs meant to them or what had been lost they 
used  words  such  as  "satisfaction",  "identity",  and  "authority".  These  kinds  of  identity-based 
rewards can seem even more compelling when one has been denied mainstream employment 
for many years. Craig, for example, talks about finally getting a job after becoming blind at the age  of  eighteen  and  spending  years  of  frustration  in  sheltered  workshops  where  'far  from 
learning a viable trade, one ended up either making baskets, mats or wire coat hangers, or at 
the bottom of the pile, one counted jam jar lids into boxes' (written story: 1). 
 
Getting  that  job  and  moving  back  into  the  able  bodied  workforce  and  community 
changed everything for me. I still had problems,  but self esteem and self respect went 
up and I began to get  back to being "Normal". I made able bodied friends, bought my 
own little house, looked after myself for ten years, travelled  to Australia, Fiji, Vanuatu, 
Bali, Hawaii, America and Mexico. Got involved with a Church group ------ All because I 
got  a job with normal able bodied people, and could relate to them  on the same level 
(ibid: 2). 
 
Obviously the ability to be financially self-sufficient gave Craig more freedom of choice in his 
life, but he also felt that working for a wage built 'self esteem', 'self respect' and the capacity to 
live a 'normal' life. Karen also talks about the difference that this made in her own life.  
 
Karen: Work has helped a lot. 
 
Me: Yes. 
 
Karen: Working in society, as we put it. And being part of the mainstream of life and just 
people seeing you differently. People do see you differently. People try to say, oh no, I 
don't  see  you  any differently, but they do, and I know they do because I'm treated 
completely differently than I used to be. People would say, what do you do with yourself 
and when I used to say, on a benefit, you could see that its a lot different to now when I 
say I work for the department and they say, oh really, and that kind of attitude. 
 
Me: It is a completely different attitude. Yeah, I'm experiencing that as well because I 
had to be on a benefit for a long time and now I'm getting paid a scholarship to do my 
PhD and I know that part of it, it's like you say, part of it is just me feeling better about 
myself, but it's true that other people are so much more impressed. 
 
Karen: And what annoys me is that, why do we... how to I put it? I get annoyed with 
myself too because I like to shock people that way. Can I put it that way? 
 
Me: Yes. 
 
Karen: I like to shock people in that way because for a lot of years I couldn't. Now I can. 
It's quite an experiment sometimes, how people treat me. People that I haven't seen in 
years or something like that and they might come up and, say [Karen] I haven't seen you 
for a long time, what are you doing with yourself? Oh, I've been married 12 years and 
I've been working for five years and I've got my own home and I can see them treating 
me in a totally different way to the way they used treat me. I quite enjoy it. It's probably 
silly, but you get a kick out of it.  
While  it  is  not  income  that  is  cited  as  the  main  attraction  to  working,  it  is the loss or the 
possession  of  the  income  earning  occupation  which  has  the  more  critical  effect  on  one's 
identity. In my own case the combination of earning an income with doing the work I love has 
certainly contributed greatly to an improved self-image. Even though I had been studying part-
time  for  seven  years  before  I  began  my  PhD,  once  I  was  being  paid  and  my  occupation 
sounded less like a hobby or a pastime, people began to react much more positively. And, 
although I am still trying desperately to care less about how others perceive me, I have been 
deeply warmed by the glow of acceptance that has been accorded me since I have been seen 
to be doing "real work" again. It's strange in a way, because before I became disabled I worked 
in relatively low paid, low status occupations and was not overly concerned with deriving my 
identity from my occupational status. But, now I gain an inordinate amount of pleasure from the 
respect my work attracts from others.   
 
Resisting the Loss of Employment 
 
Work proved to be such a necessary feature of people's lives that many of the people in the 
sample talked or wrote about retaining their employment even when it was seriously detracting 
from their health and making their impairments much worse. Adrienne talks about this in the 
following dialogue: 
 
And in '91 I had to quit working. Between 88 and 91 I worked myself into the ground, 
which is unfortunately a common pattern for people with CFS … I didn't stop when there 
were lots and lots and lots of things telling me to stop, stop, stop. And friends, my 
husband, and my good friend saying, you know, gee maybe this is time for you to begin 
to take it easier, quote, unquote. I mean it was really obvious, but I didn't listen. I didn't 
listen. 
 
Adrienne  was,  as  she  refers  to  herself  in  a  previous  quote,  'one  of these ridiculously high 
performing people' and it was very hard for her to stop working even when her body was close 
to the point of collapse. Even now, even after she has learned how vital it is to respect her 
body's needs and limitations in relation to her case of chronic fatigue syndrome, she still feels 
lazy at times for not pushing harder. 
 
I'm so conditioned by the past decade of experiences not to push myself to do things... 
you know, because I felt like I pushed myself over the edge and that I was partly to 
blame for getting sick, because I was working sixty hours a week for one job and twenty 
hours a month for another job and going to community meetings and swimming and 
doing this and that and the other and I worked myself to death … but, when I need to 
beat up on myself I say, that's the perfect excuse for a lazy, slob like you. That's my 
internal dialogue, but it's a very... yuck. 
 Chronic fatigue is a particularly problematic disabling condition as fatigue is poorly understood 
and those who develop it tend to feel guilty and confused about their diminishing ability to work. 
Rita talked about similar difficulties to Adrienne and a similar resistance to stopping until it 
became painfully obvious that the struggle to continue was extremely damaging.  
 
Rita: I got a real guilt complex from not doing things and I'd try to do it and then I'd be 
wiped out again. Yeah, it was a drastic change. It took me a long time to accept the fact 
that I couldn't do what I used to do. 
 
Me: It does take a long time to develop whole new ways of doing things. 
 
Rita: Even when you try to force yourself to go on, it just gets worse. Because I tried to 
keep myself awake. 
 
Me: That does make it worse. 
 
Rita: I would force myself to do things and I got so achey and tired that I'd just go into 
tears and that sort of counteracted everything I was doing. 
 
Anne also talked about her resistance to giving up work after she injured herself. She kept 
pushing herself until, ultimately, she was so disabled she was barely capable of getting out of 
bed. 
 
Anne: With teaching disabled kids, or the kids that I taught, it was much more painful for 
me to do... there's a lot of lifting with teaching anyway and with those kids, they quite 
often have emotional outbursts and you have to hold and rock them or whatever... 
 
Me: So, it's much more physical job... 
 
Anne :... much more physical than normal teaching. Yes. And sometimes I had to lift 
kids, for whatever reason. Anyway I found it really painful, but I kept going … I'll just tell 
you. I'm from a Yugoslav background and we have the stoic work ethic thing that you 
never stop and, you know, you just continue to work. That real Slavic thing of never ever 
stopping and, for me, I've had to approach ... culturally too, it's been quite a difficult thing 
for me. For me to accept that, you know, there is a limit [laughs]. You can't push the 
body too far. 
 
Robert, also kept working through a severe back injury, the loss of a finger and his current 
chemotherapy treatments, was proud to say that he was still noted for working harder than most 
people do under normal circumstances. 
 
Robert: As a comment was made to me, your light duties, what you consider as light 
duties, a lot of people are flat out doing it as normal work.  
Me: Right, and this is when you were going through, what, the recent kind of stuff, like 
when you were doing your chemotherapy? 
 
Robert: That was my back. 
 
Me: My goodness, and you had surgery … yeah? 
 
Robert: Yeah. 
 
Me: So, you were still working when your back was in so much pain…you described it 
very vividly the other day. 
 
Robert: Yeah, yeah, I was still working when it was like that.  
 
Like Robert, I have recognised for some time that I now work far harder than I ever worked 
before I became disabled. Robert Murphy (1990) also talks about his resistance to stop working 
despite the seriousness of his illness.  
 
During the winter of 1980-81, my general state of health began to decline markedly. I 
developed  colitis,  in  part  a  byproduct  of  overwork,  and  a  series  of  bladder 
infections. These combined with the infected ulcer to produce frequent low-grade fevers 
and left me vulnerable to a rather bad bout with flu in February. But I kept on working, 
driven now by an almost  manic need for self-assertion and continuity. I was no longer 
so much  denying  the  illness  as  defying  it.  Yolanda  finally  took  matters  into  her 
own hands and told my doctor about the problem. He took one look and said, "Good 
God!" (180). 
 
Hugh Gallagher (1998) also kept working until his ultimate collapse. 
 
I continued in this desperate fashion, wracked with constipation and insomnia, until July 
4,1974. On that day, I bombed out of Super Cripdom. My body collapsed physically, and I 
plunged headlong into a deep and chronic clinical depression, which took me years to 
climb out of (Hugh Gallagher 1998:  246). 
 
At the time of the following dialogue Angus was still working although his health was making this 
extremely difficult. His illness had almost forced him to give up working two years before and, 
when asked how this made him feel, he replied: 
 
Angus: It was just an abyss, like a black hole that I just couldn't imagine, and I was 
thinking things, without being suicidal. Right, I don't think I've ever truly contemplated... I 
mean, I've thought about suicide in an intellectual sort of way. I can even tell you how I 
would do it if I had to. It's simply with hypoxia. It's a very nice way to go but, not for a moment do I plan to top myself. How ever, I can remember thinking, well, a good option 
would be to sort of die, without planning to make this happen at all, but just thinking that 
dying would solve all of those problems. 
 
Me: Because life was unthinkable. 
 
Angus: That's right. 
 
The insights so far provide overwhelming evidence that those who could no longer work felt 
diminished and were unable to maintain their former senses of self, while those who could work 
highlighted its importance in relation to creating or maintaining a positive identity. These feelings 
of pride and diminishment are directly related to an overarching social view that to be a good 
person, a good citizen, one must be active and productive and financially independent. When 
this  is  no  longer  possible,  in  each  of  the  countries  from  which  participants  were  drawn  - 
Australia, New Zealand, America and the United Kingdom - there are welfare systems in place 
to  help  support  those  who  cannot  support  themselves  because  of  disability.  Yet,  the  view 
towards those who rely on this kind of support is uniformly negative. 
 
The Values Surrounding Work and Welfare Dependency 
 
Those people who needed to rely on social welfare talked about its moral implications and the 
feelings of worthlessness that being dependent on the state brought with it. Michael, a recipient 
of what he refers to as "disability" in the United States, expressed it very eloquently in the 
following dialogue. 
 
Michael: Here we call it a welfare mentality. And this is really organic to our culture, the 
free enterprise, hardy, individualist culture and, you know, I suppose this goes back to 
workhouses, you know, Charles Dickens, that the only honourable way to proceed in life 
is  self-support.  And, therefore, if you rely on the state for support, you are morally 
reprehensible. 
 
Me: Yes. It's still there, isn't it? 
 
Michael:  Yes  it  is,  and  that's  the  whole  thing  about  [the  attitude  of  social  security 
bureaucrats], "I can feel free to be demeaning to you and to know that there is no 
standard of service whatsoever regarding the way I treat you and the mentality behind 
that is that you are essentially a beggar and anything you get, you should feel lucky that 
we don't just put you out on an ice flow and let the polar bears get you." 
 
During our many dialogues, Michael, who practiced law before developing chronic fatigue and 
fibromyalgia, stressed the demoralisation and the bureaucratic nightmare that being in need of welfare support brought to his life. Craig, who is reliant on the non-means tested Blind Pension 
in New Zealand, also expresses how this makes him feel. 
 
Craig: We are disabled, we are in a disadvantaged position, on the benefit through no 
fault of our own, and thank God for it, but the moment they threaten to pull it on us, or do 
anything to it... they've cancelled it on me a couple of times And, unfortunately it's like 
that with so many things for the disabled. We go in, cap in hand, almost with the begging 
attitude because society has conditioned us to do so and, because in so many cases, 
there is no other way. I mean, let's face it, if it comes to a job, they're not going to come 
to me. 
 
During this conversation, Craig told me that the reason his benefit had been cancelled was that 
they had questioned how blind he actually was, whereupon he pointed out that he has had both 
eyes removed. We discussed how difficult it is to deal with these kinds of attitudes, the kind that 
are imposed on us when we have to deal with the welfare system, and Craig develops an 
interesting argument in which he suggests that we have what he calls a "headmaster complex" 
that affects us every time we are in a situation where we have less power like a doctor surgery, 
social security or the boss's office.  
 
Susan, who lives in the United Kingdom and talks extensively about how much more important 
work and a career are to her now than they were before she became disabled, expresses what 
she believes is the general view of the population. 
 
Why should the country keep helping you, keep giving you benefits. I pay my taxes to 
help you stay at home and do nothing. Okay. Fine. And that's the way that people see it, 
isn't it? 
 
During a dialogue with Terry, an Australian man now living in New Zealand, we talked about the 
losses that come from not being able to work anymore. He points to how work 'really builds your 
self esteem', 'gives you financial independence' and 'broadens you social network'. He talks in 
detail about these losses throughout the dialogue, but what seems to hurt the most is that 
disability 'makes you totally dependent on the state and that's a really terrible thing.' Jacky, 
already quoted for her feelings of loss, writes that: 
 
I felt like a total waste and I internalised the devalued attitude I continually encountered 
in others, in the media and even in myself. I often described myself as a 'parasite' 
because  of  inability  to  work  and  because  I  received  ACC  (accident  compensation) 
…(Jacky, written story: 1). 
 
Recall also that, when Karen was speaking proudly of her job and the difference it had made to 
how other's viewed her, she referred to her previous status as a recipient of welfare benefits. 
 People do see you differently. People try to say, oh no, I don't see you any differently, 
but they do, and I know they do because I'm treated completely differently than I used to 
be. People would say, what do you do with yourself and when I used to say, on a 
benefit, you could see that its a lot different to now when I say I work for the department 
and they say, oh really, and that kind of attitude. 
 
All these reflections and comments illustrate the attitudes that recipients of welfare benefits are 
exposed to, attitudes that cannot help but be internalised. My own experience with being forced 
into the welfare system was similarly damaging to my self-perceptions. Six months after I hurt 
my back, the system of benefits in Australia was restructured and it was decided that people 
who had been on sickness benefits for more than three months would have to move either to 
the  invalid  pension  (now  the  disability  support  pension)  or  unemployment  benefits.  I  was 
automatically placed on unemployment benefits and was required to fill in a fortnightly review 
form which contained a question concerning my ability to apply for work during that period. 
Despite the enormous pressure that was applied on me to do so, I would not tick the box which 
declared me fit for work because my pain and immobility were so severe that work of any kind 
was  out  of the question. Six months later, due to my recalcitrance and the reality that my 
impairment would not go away, I was finally allowed to apply for the invalid pension.  
 
At that time there was a shift in government policy which led them to target this benefit as an 
area where extreme cuts would be made, aiming to halve the 400 000 people in receipt of the 
benefit  during  the  following  twelve  month  period.  Therefore,  it  was  not  a  good  time  to  be 
applying and the Commonwealth Medical Officers (CMOs) who were responsible for assessing 
one's eligibility for the pension were told to be very rigorous in weeding out malingerers. During 
my interview and examination by a CMO I was treated with such emotional and physical cruelty 
that I felt crushed by it. No matter how upset I've been I have not allowed myself to cry in a 
doctor's surgery before or since. But that day I could not stem the flow of tears. And the feelings 
which  accompanied  those  tears  of  humiliation  and  distress  became  deeply  woven  into  the 
demoralised identity I came to take on due to my disability.  
 
Part of this kind of harshness appears to derive from the view that disabled people should be 
able to triumph over their adversity. Hence, if recovery or rehabilitation do not progress as 
planned, then the disabled person is claimed to be a malingerer. Melissa Anne Goldstein (2000) 
writes about the harsh judgments that she received from doctors before, and even after, the 
seriousness of her condition was understood.  
 
"You're not in school. You're not working. What do you do with yourself all day. Stay in 
bed?" With these words, Dr. Hornbach, a doctor I barely knew, addressed me, his tone 
accusing as he entered the room and planted himself in front of me. I lay on the hard 
gurney shocked into muteness. I stared up at Dr. Hornbach. He had a broad build with 
the solidity of granite, an immovable object cloaked in white. From his height of over six feet,  he  looked  down  at  me,  his  craggy  face  and  ice-chip  blue eyes  showing  no 
compassion. His eyes clearly did not see me the way I and others thought of me - as a 
twenty-seven-year-old writer, a poet, and a young woman who despite the ravages of 
disease had retained her identity, dignity, and femininity (5).  
 
On another occasion a female doctor expressed similar sentiments. 
 
I then tried to make her understand my frustrations about not being able to work over the 
summer and my worries about not having enough energy and strength to keep up a 
busy schedule in the fall. She was my physician. I thought that meant I could confide in 
her. There was an empty pause before she answered. Then she coldly informed me that 
my  inactivity resulted  from  excessive  anxiety,  not  disease,  and  that  there  was  no 
reason to be concerned about returning to school. She suggested counseling to help me 
deal with my anxieties. Either I could find someone on my own, or she could recommend 
the behavior modification unit at the university hospital. I was stunned. Before I could 
respond, I heard the click of the receiver, then the dial tone. She had hung up. And left 
me alone on the other end of the line (82).  
 
I have experienced similar disdain from the medical profession. One instance which is relevant 
here is drawn from recent correspondence. 
 
During the early years when I was still seeking a cure for my back, I had waited two 
months for an appointment with one of the Gods of orthopaedics at Royal North Shore 
Hospital. I remember the journey down to Sydney from Katoomba [lying in the back seat 
of the car]. It was two hours of hell as my back screamed out at the slightest bump or 
application of the brakes. Then there was the terror and agony of having to negotiate 
unknown territory when I could barely walk. When I finally got settled in the surgery I 
didn't even get to see the great god himself. He sent me an underling, a really young 
and arrogant doctor who said "I can see what your problem is. You need a job."  All my 
hopes were dashed in a couple of short sentences. He didn't have a clue (personal 
email correspondence, 13/3/03). 
 
This doctor simply assumed that one must normalise to the greatest degree possible, and that, 
after a certain time has passed and a physical cure cannot be exacted, one must achieve these 
ends regardless of the level of physical incapacity. Perhaps I would now be able to answer him 
by asking which profession he thought would be suitable for someone who was bedridden and 
in agony, but, at the time, my only response was the silence which overlay my feelings of 
disappointment,  alienation  and  minimization.  As  Arnold  Beisser  (1989)  and  Robert  Murphy 
(1990) agree, rehabilitation is seen to be a form of work itself, one which, if it does not achieve 
the desired results, is believed to be a case of personal failure. Arnold Beisser (1989) writes: 
 
As far as working "hard enough," I do not believe that anyone could have worked harder 
at his rehabilitation. In fact, that effort became a detriment in several ways. Patients were told that the degree of improvement would be equal to how hard we tried. We did not 
know then that beyond a certain point exhaustion produced even further damage. We 
were told that the enemy was the contracture that developed in the weakened muscles, 
and that we must endure pain in being stretched. I was so willing to endure my share, 
that I have several muscle groups that have been seriously overstretched.  
 
So  firm  was  belief  in  hard  work  among  the  people  I encountered  in  rehabilitation 
medicine  that  nothing  would dissuade  them.  If  you  were  not  improving  the  way 
you hoped, it was simply, in their view, that "you didn't want it enough." Perhaps they 
were not so rigid as I remember, but rather it was the stricture of my beliefs at the time 
that I was dealing with.  
 
If I were to give up my cherished conviction in being able to make things better, I would 
have a void in my belief system, and I did not have anything to replace it. I did not have 
some way of regarding my life which would allow me to live with it. Surrender seemed a 
matter of cowardice, and I did not want any of that.  
 
Only  as  the  years  wore  on  and  forced  me  to  realize  that my  limitations  remained 
unchanged did I begin to consider alternatives. I felt as though I were dragged, kicking 
and screaming, toward this new version of reality (118 -119). 
 
In  a  similar  vein,  Robert  Murphy  (1990)  draws  the  following  conclusions  from  his  own 
experiences. 
 
Rehabilitation differs from other branches of medicine in the degree to which the patient 
is involved in his own treatment. Ideally, he is active, not passive, and he must try 
continually to outdo himself. To a degree, the patient is responsible for his own recovery, 
and this has many positive aspects. The negative side of patient responsibility, however, 
is that if his efforts cannot yield improvement, then any failure to improve can be an 
indication that he isn't trying hard enough, that he is to blame for his own condition. This 
load of culpability is often added to a lingering suspicion among family and friends that 
the patient was responsible, somehow or other, for what happened to him. And the 
patient, too, is often beset with guilt over his plight - a seemingly illogical, but very 
common, by-product of disability. In this way the patient's inner circle can escape a 
sense of remorse over his travails, and the medical establishment can absolve itself of 
responsibility for the failure of its procedures (52). 
 
Craig refers to another form of pressure, closely connected with the rehabilitation mentality, 
which is based on the belief that, if one person with a particular type of disability can perform 
certain tasks, then they all should be able to. 
 
We have here in New Zealand a Blind gentleman, that has been seen on TV using a 
chain saw to top a tree. The question immediately is asked, "Can you do that?" The next 
question is "why can't  you do that?" The next statement is "You ought to be able to do that." Next "You must do that", and when you say "I can't do that," they hit back with 
"Can't means won't, you are a welfare bludger, who just doesn't want to work." Now, 
from a Blind perspective, that chain sawing gentleman may be able to use his saw to top 
a tree, and if he feels comfortable doing such things, that's fine, but don't let anyone 
think that he represents the rest of the Blind community. The vast majority couldn't do 
what he does. Most wouldn't be silly enough to attempt it (written story: 17). 
 
In this example of the pressure to act like "normal" able-bodied people, Craig points to the 
expectations  which  are  created  when  some  people  engage  in  feats  which  highlight  the 
possibility for triumphing over disability. And, indeed, some disabled people maintain flourishing 
careers (cf. Gallagher 1998, Robillard 1999, Murphy 1990), others learn to fly aeroplanes (cf. 
Shepherd 1994, Arnot 1998) and still others climb Mount Everest (cf. Whittaker 2001, Team 
Everest 2003).
8 While these are very worthy achievements, their utilisation as mechanisms to 
inspire other disabled people can leave those who are not capable of anything like these feats 
feeling very inadequate. When this kind of pressure is applied in concert with the rehabilitation 
ethos to suggest that all people are capable of doing some kind of work, and that those who do 
not work are somehow lesser individuals, the pressure to perform is enormous. 
 
Challenging the Imperative to Work 
 
Unlike the category of independence/dependence where many people talked or wrote about the 
development of new perspectives to combat the oppressive views which can exacerbate the 
feelings of loss associated with disability, the subject of work attracted little talk of resistance. It 
appears to me that this is the case because the expectation that we all should work to earn a 
living and to define who we are is so ingrained that any suggestion that it is possible to develop 
a meaningful and pleasurable life outside of it becomes unthinkable. Even the disability rights 
movement which has challenged the individualistic attitudes which currently frame our views of 
independence bases its aims on the right and the necessity for all disabled people to be able to 
gain employment and, thus, does not focus on challenging the imperative to employment. There 
is no doubt that this is part of the answer because discrimination in the workplace is a serious 
issue and there are many people who would be able to engage in productive activities if these 
barriers were removed. However, what may be overlooked here is that many people may not in 
fact be able to undertake regular work and the continual pressure that is put on them to do so 
reinforces their feelings of inadequacy. Hence, I believe that, for this and other reasons, a new 
way of viewing productivity and social worth needs to be developed outside of work. 
 
Four people from the sample spoke of developing new philosophies around the issue of work 
and social value. The first of these, Adrienne, has not been able to return to paid employment 
because of the severe and unpredictable nature of her condition. So, she now spends as much 
time and energy as she can working for change in relation to disability rights issues.   
I'm not working yet, but my business cards says civic activist. I'm involved in various 
[unclear] disability organising around transportation issues. 
 
In doing this, Adrienne looked for things she could do which would help her 'to build a life that is 
gratifying like the one I left behind.' To make up for the losses she experienced when she could 
no longer be an interpreter, she volunteered at the local English language speaking centre and 
became a 'conversation buddy to people who were learning English.'  In the following dialogue 
she discusses the new perspective about work and productivity that these activities and the 
accompanying insights have inspired. 
 
Adrienne: ... there's a certain kind of stereotype of an upper middle-class woman forty 
years ago... it was like they would never work for money, but they would be like... not 
quite like the charitable women... 
 
Me: More active in the community. Yeah. 
 
Adrienne: More active in the community. They helped to ensure that there was tutoring 
in the schools and the arts were supported. I mean, there was a whole range of roles 
that they fulfilled, and nobody would say... I mean people would say, what are your 
interests? Not, what do you do? What are your interests? 
 
Me: Mmm. 
 
Adrienne: It's so much more a kind of... you know, it's a thing that you defined and not 
something you are measuring up against. So, I tried to think, well, that's my heritage, this 
bizarre kind of middle-class "ladies for lunch" and sometimes when people say, what do 
you do, I say, I'm a lady of leisure. [She laughs and I join in]. And I just play with it. 
 
Me: Yeah, play with it. That's great. 
 
Adrienne:  But  I  recognise...  it  didn't  take  me  long  to  realise  that  I  can  do  the 
volunteering, the things I like to do, and, when I'm volunteering, I can decide how much 
to do. 
 
Me: You can define the boundaries. 
 
Adrienne: Exactly. 
 
Dianna also points to the tremendous significance of activities outside the workforce. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
8 See http://www.teameverest03.org/ I used to feel there was a distinction between those people who knew me before I had 
MS and those friends I have made since. I used to think that the ‘befores’ treated me 
differently than the ‘afters’; that they see more of the person and less of the disability. 
But I am rethinking that one. Because I am very active in the local world of politics, 
disability, Labour Party, book group, pub quiz among some of the things I do, I think 
people see me for what I can do rather than seeing the wheelchair. And there are so 
many things nowadays where the wheelchair is a positive advantage because they are 
wanting to hear an opinion from a consumers point of view. A transport group that I am 
on, I Chair because they want a user’s voice to be out front. So my identity is enhanced 
and a positive asset.  What a change from 30 years ago (1). 
 
Arnold Beisser (1989) wrote about a deeply philosophical change which challenged his previous 
belief in the necessity for working and pushing forward and replaced it with the ability to accept 
what life offered. I place it in this section because it speaks eloquently of a new way of seeing 
things which is outside of the dominant paradigm which governs the imperative to work. 
 
When I was growing up, I learned that I must "make something of myself" and make a 
place in the world. Making the necessary changes to become something and to find a 
place were acts of will and effort. I learned that those things were possible if I was willing 
to work, to plan, to expend effort, and to struggle.  
 
The implications were clear. I was "not enough" to begin with, and there was not a place 
for me in the world without my making it. Order had to be created. I had to change 
myself through discipline and effort. The world had to be changed to make it a better 
place to live in. Self improvement was required, and the world had to be civilized. Willful, 
enforced change was the only kind that I learned.  
 
My  disability  has  taught  me  that  there  is  also  another kind  of  change.  I  reluctantly 
learned  about  it  through  defeat.  I  faced  something that  no  amount  of  work, 
effort, planning, or struggle could give me. Defeated on all fronts, I had to learn how to 
surrender and accept what I had become, what I did not want to be.  
 
Learning to surrender and accept what I had not chosen gave me knowledge of a new 
kind  of  change  and  a  new kind  of  experience  which  I  had  not  anticipated.  It  was 
a paradoxical change.  
 
When I stopped struggling, working to change, and found means of accepting what I had 
already become, I discovered that that changed me. Rather than feeling disabled and 
inadequate as I anticipated I would, I felt whole again. I experienced a sense of well-
being and a fullness which I had not known before. I felt at one not only with myself but 
with the universe (Arnold Beisser 1989: 168-170). 
 
Paul  Hunt  (1966),  who  edited  and  contributed  to  the  anthology  Stigma:  The  Experience of 
Disability, wrote about a similar insight into the ability to accept things rather than overcome them, but he more clearly expressed this in terms of work. He, of all those whose writings are 
represented in the sample, was the most courageous in challenging the imperative to work. 
 
I am concerned that we should not telephone the idea of work in our minds to the point 
where it dominates values that ought to transcend it. It is important not to do this, if only 
because  it  causes  the  most  acute  suffering  in  those  of  us  who  cannot  help  being 
parasites on the economic body. 
 
Obviously  we  who  are  disabled  are  deeply  affected  by  the  assumptions  of  our 
uselessness that surround us. But it is vital that we should not accept this devaluation of 
ourselves, yearning only to be able to earn our livings and thus prove our worth. We do 
not have to prove anything. 
 
If we have a basic willingness to contribute to the community, yet cannot do an ordinary 
job, we may certainly contribute in less obvious ways; even, and perhaps especially, if 
these  seem  insignificant  beside  the  'real  world  of  work'.  Our  freedom  from  the 
competitive trappings that accompany work in our society may give us the opportunity to 
demonstrate its essential elements. Also we can act as a symbol for the pre-eminent 
claims of non-utilitarian values, a visible challenge to anyone who treats his job as a final 
end itself.  And we do of course afford people the chance to be generous in support of 
the needy, thus enabling them to give practical expression to their desire to go beyond 
the acquisitive instinct. 
 
At the ultimate point we may only be able to suffer, to be passive through complete 
physical inability.  Just here we have a special insight to offer, because our position 
gives us an extra experience of life in the passive aspect that is one half of the human 
reality.  Those who lead active lives are perhaps especially inclined to ignore man's 
need to accept passivity in relation to so many forces beyond his control. They may 
need reminding sometimes of our finiteness, our feminine side in the hands of fate or 
providence.  We are well placed to do this job at least (149-1 50). 
 
Hunt’s philosophy of acceptance is very similar in nature to the one described by Chris Baker 
(2002). Both emphasise that we cannot be in control of every facet of our lives and that there 
are circumstances over which we have very little control at all. Acceptance, then, lies behind the 
capacity to develop a positive identity despite, and because of, disabling circumstances. Yet, 
our cultural beliefs tell us otherwise. The belief that we can control things and that hard work will 
win through every time is fundamental to contemporary Western values and is deeply woven 
into the rehabilitation mentality. When we base our response to disability on these premises, we 
feel that recovery and a satisfying life are achievable if only we try hard enough and that, 
conversely, if we cannot succeed, we are at fault.  
 
Challenging this does not necessitate a loss of motivation. Motivation and acceptance are not 
mutually  exclusive,  yet  our  dominant  paradigm  constructs  them  as  dichotomous.  A  new perspective is required to challenge the imperative to paid employment. What needs to be 
accepted is that, if it is not possible for a person to engage in what we currently construe as 
work, either because of physical limitations or economic conditions, then it should be possible 
for them to achieve happiness and a positive identity outside of it. To make this achievable, the 
view of paid employment as an essential ingredient in a worthwhile life needs to be challenged 
and changed. It is certainly the case that disabled people usually enjoy far less flexibility and 
choice in their lives due to their impairments and their social exclusion. Yet, not being a part of 
the traditional workforce could actually be reconstructed as a positive quality, offering more 
flexibility to those who can begin, like Adrienne, Dianna, Arnold and Paul, to find new and 
diverse ways of developing productive lives.  
 
This way of thinking brings to mind a conversation I had with one of my participants. We were 
talking about the losses that disability can bring and how one comes to terms with them. Lesley 
then turned the conversation to the advantages that can stem from the new life one must build 
to accommodate one's impairments. 
 
Lesley: Yes, though there was one thing that worked to my advantage. You see, it was 
always my secret dream to live on my own in a flat with no other people to consider... 
 
Me: Ahhhhh. 
 
Lesley:... surrounded by books and I had lots of books, so I had what was probably my 
starting point. 
 
Me: Because you were given an opportunity that you would never have otherwise been 
given. 
 
Lesley: That's right. 
 
Me: And I think that happens a lot, don't you? … Because, even though originally it's 
like, oh no, everything's been taken away, and there's nothing left and it's horrible, you 
also find all sorts of freedoms that you never dreamed existed within that. 
 
Lesley: Well, this was one that had already been my secret dream [she really does say 
this with absolute relish] that one day I would live on my own surrounded by books and 
just live the sort of life... did you watch Inspector Morse? 
 
Me : Oh yes. 
 
Lesley: You know, his sort of lifestyle... to read good books and have a nice glass of 
wine...? 
 
Me : Lovely.  
Lesley : That was my dream. And, I unexpectedly got loaded with that. 
 
Me : That is amazing, isn't it? 
 
Lesley : Yes, because there are... well, there are different dreams, but that was a dream 
you already had [and becoming disabled] allowed that to be able to happen. So, that 
was one positive that came out of it and that, I think, was my starting point. 
 
The  life  that  Lesley  led  prior  to  developing  MS  was  one  which  was  framed  by  the  social 
expectations of the time. As well as being a wife and a mother, she held a demanding job and 
her time was very much mapped out and limited by these responsibilities. Her dream for some 
space of her own and the time to read and pursue her own interests unexpectedly became 
possible some years after her disability became extreme. I believe that this can be perceived 
not only as a compensating factor, but as an example of the kinds of subversions which living 
outside of the constraints of the norm can offer. Those who become disabled will usually suffer 
a great deal of distress because of not being able to fulfill the expectations of the norm, yet they 
can also, over time, come to see alternatives to the norm which can allow all kinds of freedoms 
never before imagined or, as in Lesley's case, imagined but not attainable.  
 
Lesley, as you may recall from Chapter Six, became so severely disabled that she was given 
permission and the means with which to end her life. Following her recognition that her will to 
live was too strong, she reached a turning point in her life which allowed her to move forward. It 
is  the  discovery  discussed  above  which  she  says  became  her  'starting  point.'  She  now 
describes her life as follows. 
 
Since I wrote [my essay on identity and disability] in 1998 I have continued studying part-
time and expect to graduate with a BA in two years time, majoring in psychology and 
political  science.  I  live  alone  in  a  small  flat  with  a  voice-activated  computer  and 
environmental control units that make me completely independent. I receive funding that 
allows me to employ helpers who come in four times a day to help me with showering, 
dressing, meals, and anything else I cannot manage alone. I am the vice president of 
the Christchurch branch of the Disabled People's Assembly, I belong to Toastmasters, 
which is a public speaking club, I play chess weekly, and I have five grandchildren 
between the ages of newborn and five years, four of whom live in Christchurch, and one 
in Tasmania. At present I live on a social welfare benefit, but I have recently started 
working at two direct marketing businesses that are disability friendly and promise to be 
very  profitable.  Nowadays  I  would  describe  myself  as,  happy,  cheerful,  contented, 
comfortable,  loved,  popular,  motivated,  busy,  stress-free,  optimistic,  interested, 
interesting, intelligent, and well-informed. Perhaps it is going too far to say MS was the 
best thing that could happen to me, but it was certainly the making of me (personal email 
correspondence, 16/11/01). 
 I believe that the reconceptualisations and meaning making activities that Lesley refers to above 
were  made  possible,  at  least  in  part,  by  the  development  of  a  new  way  of  seeing  what 
constitutes meaningful activity and how this affects identity. Certainly Lesley's story can be seen 
as one of incredible triumph and can be construed as inspirational. What I believe provides the 
most effective inspiration, however, the kind of inspiration which will not leave those who cannot 
scale similar mountains feeling inadequate, is that which stems from the way that Lesley has 
been able to define a whole new way of making meaning and building her identity which lies 
outside of and challenges the norms which once defined her life and her possibilities.  
 
In my own case, I find myself suspended between two mutually contradictory spaces. The first 
one is that which is defined by my new compulsion to engage in socially sanctioned work. As I 
have  already  discussed,  prior  to  becoming  disabled,  my  primary  form  of  identification  was 
connected to my occupation as a grower of organic vegetables. This was linked with my stained 
glass and pottery projects and my aim for self-sufficiency and environmental harmony. The 
combination of these activities helped to define me as someone who was creative and who was 
pursuing an alternative lifestyle. Part of this pursuit was related to challenging the importance of 
high paid, high status employment. Yet, when I lost the luxury of choice in this regard and 
suffered from the severe identity losses which follow the onset of disability, gaining employment 
and social approval became far more important to me. This is only evident to me in retrospect in 
light of the boost that earning an income for a well respected occupation has given to my 
feelings of self worth. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  I  have  also  come  to  delight  in  some  of  the  very subversive 
elements which structure the occupation-based space I now inhabit. Working from home allows 
me to choose how to organise my time in a way that best suits me. Some of what "suits" me is 
unfortunately  connected  to  a  very  unpredictable  state  of  health  which  means  that  I  am 
sometimes unable to work at all. But, in addition to my physical limitations, my needs and 
desires can also be facilitated within an environment that gives me a great deal of choice as to 
how and when I engage in my work. Disability has also led me to a type of work that is creative 
in a different yet similar way to my past work of growing things, making things and helping 
people to learn. I now grow ideas, build new ways of seeing things and hope to educate through 
my writing. And I have discovered a kind of work which allows me to explore and challenge the 
social  issues  which  have  always  interested  me  most,  those  which  are  focused  on  social 
exclusion. This work is enormously satisfying at the same time as being productive and flexible. 
Like Lesley, I surprised myself by carving out a dream existence from the core of a nightmare. 
 
Many other people within the sample reported that they had discovered various "gifts" in relation 
to becoming disabled when they began to challenge the forms of oppression which contribute to 
the disabled identity and to realise that this allows for the possibility of creating a new more 
liberated  space  in  which  to  live.  To  learn  to  speak  out  to  break  the  silence,  to  define independence in new ways which create more warmth and freedom and choice, and to learn to 
structure a fulfilling existence outside of the imperative to work are all tools which can be used 
to carve out this emancipatory space. To work, to be productive, to contribute to society are 
obviously very vital features of a worthwhile life. Yet, the narrow view which currently exists 
towards occupational identity and the need for self reliance has resulted, as it has been shown 
in  this  chapter,  in  the  creation  of  a  very  inferior  social  location  for  those  whose  physical 
limitations exclude them from participating in socially sanctioned ways.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Looks Can Be Deceiving: Appearance, Sexuality and Shame 
 
How do others decide whether a person is "disabled" or not and, as a consequence, set in 
motion the processes of value judgment and exclusion which truly disable people? Those who 
have what are commonly referred to as "invisible disabilities" may choose to pass as able-
bodied. Only when less conspicuous issues such as not being able to work or needing help 
from others come to the forefront does the impaired person face the imposition of disabling 
judgments. Yet, for those whose impairments are clearly visible, the allocation of a disabled 
identity  can  occur  before  they  are  given  the  opportunity  to  reveal  any  other  distinguishing 
characteristics. Accordingly, appearance is often the front-line indicator of a disabled person's 
physical  difference  and  is  all  too  often  the  focal  point  from  which  negative  attitudes  are 
generated. 
 
The visible physical differences which were perceived as problematic by those in the sample 
were extremely diverse. Some were related to changes in size and shape, such as when people 
gained or lost significant amounts of weight, when muscle tone was lost, or when the shape of a 
particular  body  part  was  altered  in  a  socially  unacceptable  manner  as  in  "deformity"  or 
"disfigurement". Other visible differences were involved with changes in observable movement 
and position in space: such as the involuntary movements associated with epilepsy, cerebral 
palsy, familial tremens, spasmodic torticollis, Parkinson's Disease and Turettes Syndrome; the 
lack of movement which stems from spinal chord injuries or other immobilising conditions; the 
changes in body language associated with movement disorders and sensory disabilities; and 
the solidification of spatial orientation which comes from being fixed in a sitting or lying position. 
Also  conspicuous  were  the  aids  that  help  to  compensate  for  certain  features  of  some 
impairments such as wheelchairs, leg braces, back braces and catheters.  
 
Obviously, some of these visible signs of disability tend to attract more negative attitudes and 
disempowering self-perceptions than others. For example, it is evident that Lucy Grealy's (1994) 
and Caroline Shuck's (2000) facial disfigurements  and Albert Robillard's (1999) drooling and 
the constant presence of the urinal have a more dramatic impact on identity than moderate 
weight  change  or  the  use  of  a  cane.  Yet,  what  all  these  physical  manifestations  have  in 
common is that they can function as what Albert Robillard (1999) refers to as 'stigmata', signs of 
physical difference which incite aversion, exclusion and sometimes even punishment. These 
signs, on their own, are meaningless. They only become stigmata when they are invested with 
social meaning according to the rules of normality that they violate. 
 
 
 The Stranger in the Mirror 
 
People's initial response to their changed appearance was very often a lack of recognition. As 
with  the  loss  of  identity  associated  with  work  and  independence,  changes  in  appearance 
created a sense of dissonance between past and present identities. Nancy was bedridden for 
many months before she was able to reach the point where she could sit in a wheelchair. She 
remembers this day very clearly and says 'the first day up in the wheelchair, quite honestly, 
Rose, when they put me in front of a mirror, I didn't know it was me'. Jane also touches on this 
lack of recognition in her written story and connects it with her overall feeling of involuntary 
transformation. 
 
Jane: I keep wondering every time I look in the mirror who the hell this fat woman staring 
back at me is. I must be lazy and unmotivated to have let my appearance slip so bad, 
right? … Did you ever see that movie "Big" with Tom Hanks? Kinda like that - going to 
sleep a kid and waking up 10 years later and wondering why the world's different. 
 
The first time that Joni Earickson (1976) saw herself in the mirror after her accident she was so 
deeply shocked that she began to feel suicidal. 
 
The figure in the mirror seemed scarcely human. As I stared at my own reflection, I saw 
two eyes, darkened and sunk into the sockets, bloodshot and glassy. My weight had 
dropped from 125 to 80, so that I appeared to be little more than a skeleton covered by 
yellow, jaundiced  skin.  My  shaved  head  only  accented  my  grotesque  skeletal 
appearance. As I talked, I saw my teeth, black from the effects of medication.  
 
I, too, felt like vomiting.  
 
Jackie took away the mirror and began to cry with me. 'Tm sorry, Joni," she sobbed, "I 
didn't want you to see."  
 
'Please take it away. I never want to look in a mirror again!' (38). 
 
Kevin Hitchcock (1998) also expresses horror at the sight of his image. 
 
It's the first time I've seen myself almost fully naked since the accident six weeks ago. 
The face is familiar, but it's supported by the body of a seventy-year-old man. Gone are 
the broad, square shoulders and solid, tight muscular frame. I'm looking at sagging 
shoulders,  sunken  chest, thin  bony  arms  ...  and  ribs!  The  short, army-style  haircut, 
courtesy  of  Marg,  doesn't  help.  I  look  like a  survivor  of  a  concentration  camp.  It's 
frightening  to  think  I have  lost  so  much  in  such  a  short  time.  I  don't  know  how 
much weight I've lost, but I'm shocked and desperate to find out. There's something 
else. My body hair has changed colour. Staring down, I discover my legs are covered in 
brown, almost black, strands, not blond. On further investigation, I realise my chest and arms are the same. What does all this mean? It's something else I have to find out from 
the experts (155).  
 
When Samantha wrote her story in response to my request for a sharing of the factors related to 
identity and disability, she began with appearance. 
 
Samantha: Let's start with body image. I used to be quite slim but now I look like a 
female version of the Michelin man! I can joke about it when it's just an abstract concept, 
but the truth of it frightens me. Aside from health concerns that obesity raises, I feel so 
alien in my own skin … Other times, I can still see the person I was staring back at me, 
and I know that it's not my fault. But thinking of the fat stereotypes - lazy, greedy, 
unmotivated, slobby, and all the rest - does nothing to inspire me to do what I can to 
change my body. 
 
Like Samantha, although in different ways, my body image changed dramatically and I found it 
hard to come to terms with the person in the mirror. The intense pain of my back injury drained 
me of colour, gave my eyes a sunken, haunted look and changed my movements from smooth 
and easy to slow, stilted and self-conscious. My long, thick hair dried out and broke and then, 
after I contracted glandular fever, much if it fell out and I felt like a scarecrow. The firm muscles 
built from strenuous work withered and atrophied, my skin paled and sagged, and I quickly 
began to look much older. On a "well-ish" day, accompanied by relatively low pain levels, I can 
look ten years younger than I've become accustomed to looking. But on the bad days, which are 
most days, I think I look old and frail and withered, drained of life and dried out like a prune. To 
add insult to injury, my genetic legacies of familial tremens and spasmodic torticollis kicked in 
five years ago and my body language became further compromised by the effects of these 
movement disorders. The woman who at thirty years old had never felt quite pleased with how 
she looked even though she satisfied most of society's prescriptions for the right appearance, 
became a shaky middle-aged invalid who looked liked something out of her worst nightmare. 
 
Suzanne Berger (1996), 'the horizontal woman', writes that 'pain bleaches the color of your self' 
(47). She writes eloquently of her perceived loss of attractiveness and touches on the issues of 
self-doubt and her concern as to how others were judging her. 
 
I barely recognized myself, the woman in the mirror, who had gained thirty, then forty 
pounds, from inactivity, stooped over, hair askew from lying down, slovenly, suspicious 
that  everyone  wonders,  Can't  she  just  take  one  more minute  to  make  herself  look 
better? (No, I couldn't. It was too hard to stand up) (172). 
 
Glen also spoke very powerfully of the fear he had of how others would react to his changed 
appearance. He had been a strapping young man who had engaged in very physical work and 
was proud of his strength and physique. His injury resulted in paralysis down one side of his 
body which affected both his physique and his gait.   
Glen: When I came out of hospital, for about four or five weeks I never went out of the 
house. I just stayed in the house and wanted to, you know, 'cause I was so [pause] 
demoralised over the accident and the way I looked and the way I walked and I mean it's 
okay saying, well, people don't look at you, but they do. 
 
Both Glen and Suzanne Berger point to the fact that other people do not react well to the 
changes of appearance that accompany and contribute to disability. The following section will 
elaborate on the experiences my participants have had in relation to the negative attitudes of 
others. 
 
Under the Gaze of the Other 
 
All those from the sample whose appearance had changed observed that other people reacted 
to them in completely different ways. In my own case I found this to be extremely disorienting. 
You feel like the same person inside and yet the people around you start behaving in ways that 
are very disconcerting. Most of the people who visited me when I first hurt my back behaved in 
the uncomfortable manner that I have observed when in hospital. They shuffle and fidget at the 
end of the bed and leave quickly, commenting that this is because I must need my rest. Need 
rest? You have got to be joking. I was metaphorically crawling the walls and was desperate for 
the distraction that company could bring. But I quickly learned that there were certain people 
who could not deal with the horizontal, pain ravaged, physically diminished version of me. 
 
Lesley talked at length about the ways in which people's reactions to her changed when her 
paralysis necessitated that she use a wheelchair and how this, in turn, confused her about how 
to react to them. She still felt like the same person, but people treated her so differently that she 
was thrown right off balance in social situations. 
 
Lesley: That's about it. Yes. You've just got this feeling that, not only can they not 
understand you, you can't understand them any more. 
 
Me: Yeah. 
 
Lesley: Because they are reacting to you so differently. 
 
Me: And so it works both ways, doesn't it? 
 
Lesley: Yes, yes, it does. 
 
Me: Because, they are reacting in such a different way, and then you've lost your 
anchor,  what you used to hang on to. Your expectations are all turned upside down. 
 Lesley: That's right. You no longer know how to read their body language, and you don't 
know what someone's seeing when they are seeing you. That's something I've found. If 
a person is standing in front of me, what do they see? The physical picture. You know, 
you've known exactly what you've looked like all your life. You know if you are tall or 
short or fat or thin... but, once I was disabled, I didn't know what people saw any more … 
 
Lesley: I mean, did I look perfectly normal when I was sitting down in a chair? You know, 
what  did  people  feel  when  I  stood  up  and  tried  to  walk  or  when  I'm  sitting  in  a 
wheelchair. I just didn't know what they saw any more and what their expectations were 
of me. 
 
Lesley's  insights  show  how  we  use  other  people,  as  well  as  pieces  of  reflective  glass,  as 
mirrors. When people begin to behave differently when they see us, this creates a similar kind 
of dissonance to that which is caused by catching a glimpse of the stranger in the mirror. Yet, 
unlike the mirror which produces sharp edges around an image that we can gauge subjectively, 
Lesley points out that you can be left wondering what on earth other people are seeing when 
they react the way they do.  
 
Aaron also talks about the very different and disturbing treatment he received from people once 
he became blind. 
 
Aaron: Well, I mean, when you have a physical disability that is very obvious to other 
people, it's very interesting to see the way that other people treat you. 
 
Me:  Yes,  and  how  is  that?  That's  a  big  part  of  what  I'm  looking  at  and  what  I've 
experienced myself. 
 
Aaron: There are people that can be... especially for blind people [Aaron talks about 
people who will grab his arm and forcibly try to help him across the street]. It's very 
difficult, because even though sometimes the treatment that you get is terrible, behind it 
there are very good intentions. It makes it difficult. One of the things I believe with 
disability, and if you look at the way it's all portrayed, especially in the media and in films 
and that, is it's one of the worst things that is ever supposed to happen to you. 
 
Me: Yes, exactly. It's portrayed so negatively. 
 
Aaron: It is, and most people, they come up and... oh I couldn't cope if I was you, you do 
so well, blah, blah... and, again, good intentions, but what lies beneath that is... I can't 
think of the right word at the moment... but a real disgust for your actual condition, and 
I'm saying disgust at the moment for want of a better word, that you have this disability, 
because that's how they treat you to begin with. They treat you as the disability first, 
rather than treating you as a person. 
 
Me: Yeah, so you've got this barrier between you and people that has to be bridged.  
Aaron: That's right, and you also know that people are extremely uncomfortable around 
you … What they forget, and, as I say, a lot of this comes out of good intentions, but, if 
you're doing something like, I get frustrated because all I'm doing is going down to pick 
up the groceries, but people say, isn't it great, you're doing that and blah, blah, blah and 
I think, well, they think that's a great achievement for me and it's like, isn't it great I can 
do  something  simple  for  myself?  You  know,  I  think  you're  fantastic  … I guess the 
patronising behaviour makes you feel small and little. 
 
What Aaron illuminates here is that when an impairment is visible, people see this first and 
assume all kinds of things as a result. The person's identity is subsumed beneath what it is that 
people think is representative of the condition of being "disabled", although ironically these 
attitudes themselves are disabling. Aaron, although he has distinct limitations and needs, has 
learned to be highly mobile and lives a satisfying life which includes working in a challenging 
career, studying at postgraduate level, socialising and enjoying a good relationship with his 
partner. Yet, he is continually jolted back into an uncomfortable space when his disability is 
focused  on  above  all  else  and  is  assumed  to  be  'the  one  of  the  worst  things  that  is ever 
supposed  to  happen  to  you.'    Karen  internalised  these  very  attitudes  and  said  that  'I  kept 
thinking that [the wheelchair] was all they saw first. They didn't see me'. Adrienne talked about 
similar attitudes. People's behaviour toward her changed dramatically as she became more 
visibly disabled. She expresses the opinion, like Karen, that people only seemed to see the 
wheelchair, not her. 
 
Adrienne: I went from being a walking person to a person in pain to a person using a 
rolling walker to being a power wheelchair user and the whole time I was riding the bus... 
and it was just terrible. People who would never give me the time of day when I wasn't 
visibly  disabled  would  talk  to  me.  Everybody  would  talk  to  me  when  I  was  visibly 
disabled. 
 
Me: Oh, is that right? 
 
Adrienne: But, they weren't talking to me. They were talking at me. 
 
Me: Oh yeah. 
 
Adrienne: They were taking their assumptions and just sort of rolling through... oh it's so 
wonderful they let you out of the house [laughing]. 
 
Me: Oh, that whole patronising thing. 
 
Adrienne: Oh, it's amazing! And people patting me on the head. 
 
Me: Oh really.  
Adrienne: Oh wow. It was stunning. People patting me on the shoulder, which was 
unfortunate because... 
 
Me:... its very painful. 
 
Adrienne: And, oh yeah, I saw you on the bus last week, didn't I? And then we'd kind of 
go through detail by detail and it turns out that the person was six inches taller than me 
and black and had a manual wheelchair... 
 
Me: Ah. 
 
Adrienne: So, that was you on the bus. 
 
Me: Oh yeah, right. That was, all of a sudden, how you were defined. 
 
Adrienne: Exactly. 
 
Me: The main defining... 
 
Adrienne: There wasn't a person in the chair. There was just the chair. 
 
Nancy gives similar examples of the kind of treatment one can expect to receive when using a 
wheelchair. She believes this happens because the wheelchair user is literally on a lower level. 
'Often, your nose is only just coming above the counter, isn't it?' Nancy believes that this leads 
to a feeling or discomfort and even fear. 'I think it's a slight apprehension. Ooo, we don't know 
anything about this.'   
 
Nancy: Another friend of mine in a wheelchair, and a couple of upright people... we've 
got a very good theatre in Christchurch. So, we went there one evening and we'd come 
in after the show into the foyer and the rain was just pelting down outside. So, the two 
people who were upright were going to bring the van right to the back door as we were 
going to, you know, get wet going to the car park and that. It seemed a pretty good idea. 
So, [Alice] and I were there in wheelchairs and a woman came up and put her hand on 
my  shoulder  and  said, and did you enjoy that dear? So, I said, well, I did enjoy it 
actually. Oh, she said, and where have you come up from? And I said, we have not 
come up from anywhere. I said, this is not our annual treat and she looked really taken 
aback. And I didn't pursue it, but if I had pursued it, I would have gone on to say, you 
see that good-looking guy just going out of the door over there. Would you go up to him 
and put your hand on his shoulder and say, did you enjoy that, dear? Because, if you 
wouldn't do it to him, why are you doing it to me? 
 
Me: Exactly, it's so patronising. 
 Nancy: Another time I had to go to the dentist and St. John's ambulance had arrived. I 
had to go to the dentist and I was in a push wheelchair. So he pushed me into the 
waiting room and the woman at the reception desk, it was right across the waiting room 
where everyone was sitting. She called out, what time is her appointment? So, I called 
out two o'clock. She totally ignored me and sang out, what time is her appointment? 
And, it was just spontaneous, I said, excuse me, I said, it's just our bodies that are 
paralysed, not our bloody minds, you know. 
 
Me: Oh, well said! 
 
Chris Baker (2000) writes very colourfully of similar treatment. 
 
Like the former MS Society welfare officer who says to Ellie and me one day when she 
was visiting, ‘The condition will impair his cognitive faculties.’ We’re both gobsmacked. 
Ellie recovers first and ripostes, ‘how am I supposed to tell?’ We’re getting used to shite 
like that, even from so-called experts. ‘And how’s he getting on?’ people have been 
known to ask Ellie, when I’m sitting in my chair right next to her. ‘Blowed if I know,’ she 
says. ‘Why don’t you ask him? He’s around somewhere. If you hang on, I’ll give him a 
yell.’ 
 
Disabled. Not-abled. Unabled. Reduced to a one word description. How many people do 
you  know  who  are  described  by  one  word?  Unless  it’s  a  joke  like  the  balanced 
accountant,  the  level-headed  carpenter,  the  sparkling  electrician,  most  people  are 
afforded at least a crude attempt to encompass the breadth and complexity of their 
being. But not if you’re in a wheelchair and need a hand with a few things. Then you’re 
disabled, and woe is you, if, like me, you sound like you just got off the special bus. 
You’re not only disabled, you’re intellectually handicapped as well. That’s when people 
bend down to you and talk really loud, often referring to you in the plural. 
‘And how are we today?’ they ask 
 What can you say? ‘Well, these guys are okay, but I’d watch those blokes in the striped 
jumpers. They seem intent on causing trouble.’ 
Even some of the staff in the Lesley Groves home say it. ‘And how are we today?’ I’m at 
their mercy so I bite down hard on the smart replies, and refrain from looking around with 
a puzzled expression. ‘We’re doing fine,’ I say. ‘Box of fluffies.’ 
‘That’s good. Do you need anything?’ (4-6). 
 
The stories are endless. Most of the participants with visible disabilities spoke or wrote about 
the patronising reactions they received from those around them. It is not possible to share them 
all in full, but I will attempt to paraphrase some of  them. A. Manette Ainsay (2001), who is a 
power  wheelchair  user,  gives  numerous  examples,  but  one  particularly  compelling  one 
concerns a visit to the post office. Her mind is filled with the complexities of the day ahead and 
she begins to plan a grant proposal she needs to write later that day. Out of nowhere a woman 
addresses her: 'You seem awfully young to he in one of those things, she says, mournfully. Is it permanent?'  What clashed the most discordantly with A. Manette Ainsay's reality was that the 
stranger saw only the disability and felt pity for her, while she was in fact engaging in a very 
positive and complex life and could not be feeling less like an object of pity (183).  
 
Albert  Robillard  (1999:  72),  Alana  Arnot  (1998:  172),  Marjorie  Wagner  (1986:  61),  Joni 
Earickson (1976: 110), and Kevin Hitchcock (1998: 211) in their autobiographies, and Greg, 
Craig and Jane in their written stories, all gave examples of their companions being addressed 
instead  of  them.  Many  of  them  connected  this  treatment  with  being  considered  a  'mental 
defective' and Alana Arnot (1998) wrote of the pain and shame that came from being stared at. 
She wrote: 'I despised myself this way and I felt like a carnival freak show' (172). Alana's words 
point to the fact that these patronising and alienating behaviours do not occur without effect. 
And it would appear that the most salient emotion that disabled people felt in response to the 
way that people reacted to their appearance, as with becoming dependent, was shame. 
 
Disabled by Shame 
 
Shame is the recognition of the fact that I am the object the Other is looking at and 
judging.  
Jean-Paul Sartre  
 
Shame: The painful emotion arising from the consciousness of something dishonouring, 
ridiculous, or indecorous in one's own conduct or circumstances or of being in a situation 
which offends one's sense of modesty or decency. Disgrace, ignominy, loss of esteem 
or reputation. 
Oxford English Dictionary 
 
Feelings of shame can arise from one's inner sense of inferiority or from the disabling treatment 
of others. Yet, in either case, they are embedded in social foundations because, if it were not for 
the stringent standards against which one was encouraged to measure oneself, then shame 
would not be incited. We feel shame when the realities of our appearance are so out of phase 
with what is socially acceptable that we feel grotesque or looked down upon. With the exception 
of Glen, who admitted that when he came out of hospital he felt 'demoralised' about the way he 
looked and walked, and Lee Trustrum, who elaborated on the discussion of shame that she 
launched in her written story, statements of shame only came from within the autobiographies. I 
believe that the reason for this is that shame is too painful an issue to bring up in conversation. 
Lee Trustrum talked about this in one of our dialogues. Although her genetic disability is largely 
invisible, she has experienced a great deal of shame at her physical difference. She speaks of 
disability-related shame in the following excerpt. 
 
Lee: [Shame is] terribly insidious. It just works it's nasty little ways in everything. It 
dabbles its fingers in the whole development of the kid. Especially for small people, I think … children naturally feel inferior to adults because they don't know much, they go 
to bed early, they have to be looked after, all that sort of stuff. And, we tend to grow out 
of that, but that feeling of inferiority, if it lasts, particularly beyond childhood is, in itself, 
an admission of inferiority and that's the shame. So we are ashamed of the shame and 
that's why we don't admit it... 
 
Me: Because you're not supposed to feel like that. 
 
Lee: No. Well, if you feel like that, then you must have something to be ashamed of and 
that's awful, so then you can be judged. So, that's another convoluted one I think. 
 
Me: Yes, where it feeds on itself. It's very complicated and therefore difficult to get to the 
source of it. 
 
Lee: Yes, and I think that's why people are often not aware that it's there. 
 
Me: Because they bury it for that reason because they can't acknowledge it. 
 
Lee: Yes. Yep. 
 
What became clear during this conversation was that we are often hesitant to admit to shame 
because we are too ashamed to do so. At least if we can act like we are coping well, no one will 
know how deeply scarred we are by our experience of disability. Those, however, who could 
distance themselves through their writing tended to point to shame as one of their strongest 
emotions in relation to their changes in appearance. Jill Sager (1986) writes that: 'I don 't like my 
body. I'm ashamed of my body. I treat my deformed leg like an "it," not a real part of me' (198). 
Jill has deeply painful memories of attending a mainstream school. 
 
Attending a regular school in a health class meant being the first class to enter the 
school auditorium for Friday assemblies. For two years every Friday morning I made that 
long and dreadful walk from the elevator into the school auditorium. It meant walking 
past all the other fifth and sixth graders as they were getting into lines preparing for 
their walk into the auditorium after the nine of us were already seated. Every week we 
walked in single file in front of the rest of the school while they stared and we tried not to 
feel different.  
 
But we were different and they wouldn't let me forget that 'different' meant I should feel 
ashamed. I couldn't feel OK about being different because I felt too abnormal. I was too 
aware of the clanking of my leg brace. I was too aware of the visibility of my back brace.  
 
Every Friday I felt embarrassed for who I was, and that feeling never disappeared until 
the assembly activities were under way (197).  
 Reading this excerpt again brings to mind a conversation I had with one of my participants. 
Susan talks about how the university she works for does not have adequate modifications to 
facilitate students and staff members who have disabilities. There are no special parking spaces 
and there are no accessible toilets on her floor of the building. Everyone else walks up the stairs 
to the next floor to use the toilet, but Susan, who does not have this choice, must use the toilet 
that is usually only accessed by those in the music room. She explains how embarrassing this 
is. 
 
Susan: Yeah. It's just crazy. And my choice is, disturb all the people playing music... 
we're talking about semi structured orchestras here... 
 
Me: Gosh! 
 
Susan:... and conductors and people singing opera and not the sort of people I would 
usually deal with and you're a sort of knocking on the door and opening the door and 
zooming through [on an electric scooter] and apologising like mad, keeping your head 
down because you are so embarrassed. 
 
Susan is not talking about experiencing deep feelings of shame here, but she is forced to feel 
extremely uncomfortable about having to draw so much attention to herself in front of all those 
people. Unlike her able-bodied peers, she has to go through this embarrassing routine every 
time she needs to go to the toilet, and, like Jill Sager, she feels like the centre of attention when 
she just wants to blend in and go about her business. Melissa Anne Goldstein (2000) writes 
about the shame she has had to deal with in relation to the myoclonic attacks (epilepsy) that 
have been brought about by lupus. 
 
Occasionally I broke out into myoclonic attacks in which my hands, arms, legs, and even 
my head would jerk or spasm uncontrollably, sometimes violently. My face, including my 
eyelids, also fluttered and tremored. Sometimes only my face might be involved, just one 
side of my body, or single limbs. As I shook, a little girl, maybe about four or five years 
old, pointed at me and said loudly, "Mommy, why is she doing that?"  
 
I knew that she was only a child. I should not be angry or hurt by her understandable 
curiosity. But at that moment she seemed cruel. I felt humiliated enough by my spasms 
(7)  
 
… even though the rational, intellectual part of me knew that seizures should not be 
viewed differently from any of my other symptoms, so powerful is the stigma of epilepsy, 
I  could  not  help but feel a lingering sense of shame and embarrassment about the 
seizures (222). 
 Max Dashu (1986) also writes about the shame she had to learn to deal with in relation to her 
epilepsy. Like some of the others (cf. Gallagher 1998) she writes in the third person to distance 
herself from her pain. 
 
She felt people on the bus staring at her. It made her feel more restless: claustrophobia. 
She looked out the window and thought how unnatural she must look - too jerky, and 
how she should try to look more normal - blend in somehow. Camouflage was her life 
strategy in these situations. Moira was disgusted with the watchers but dissatisfied with 
herself anyway. Most people are terrified of epilepsy, its dramatic interruption of social 
convention. Nervous disorders carry a special stigma because they affect behavior. Very 
close to  insanity.  People  are  threatened  by  physical  movements  with  no  apparent 
reason. Twitching, jerking, blankness - or full-scale convulsions …  
 
Moira began to attend to herself and work on the shame. She knew what kind of looks to 
expect, but she picked herself up with dignity. She worked on her own confidence. She 
had to chisel through the layers of grotesqueness that coated her self-image (203-204).  
 
Eli Clare (1999) whose disability also involves involuntary movements writes about her shame in 
the strongest terms possible. 
 
I think about my disabled body. For too long, I hated my trembling hands, my precarious 
balance, my spastic muscles so repeatedly overtaken by tension and tremor, tried to 
hide them at all costs. More than once I wished to amputate my right arm so it wouldn't 
shake. Self-mutilation is shame of the baldest kind (130) . 
 
My own experience with movement disorders is one which has caused such deep feelings of 
shame  that  it  is  generally  an  unspeakable  issue  in  my  life.  When  tremour  and  dystonic 
movements entered my physical repertoire, I was mortified and I learned quite early that to talk 
about it or in any way draw additional attention to it made things infinitely worse. I am currently 
in a state of remission where my hands only shake when I am under stress or when trying to 
engage in something which requires a degree of fine manual precision and the torticollis (neck 
twisting)  is,  I  believe,  only  mildly  observable.  However,  when  the  torticollis  first  became 
apparent five years ago I was not in possession of the management strategies that I have since 
developed and I was constantly finding myself in situations which left me feeling like a freak. I 
remember searching on the internet to find out more about my condition and I saw photos of the 
most extreme versions of torticollis where the person's head is pulled down onto one shoulder 
by the muscle spasm on that side. It was there that I read about how people with torticollis had 
once been locked up in mental asylums because their body language had made them appear 
insane. I cried for a long time over my initial discoveries and I still live in fear that my virtual 
remission will end and that I will be thrust into full blown torticollis and tremour again.  
 Suzanne Berger (1996) writes about the shame which accompanied the stares she received 
when she needed to lie down in public: the particular shame of "the horizontal woman". 
 
But then someone started to stare. Being stared at somehow creates a sense of shame, 
as though the soul suddenly assumes a face and must hide it, turning away wordless, 
cast  off.  And  how could  I  allow  another  stranger,  this  time  a  well-dressed, all gray 
businessman, to cause such commotion for me? Even with the wheelchair there, for 
context, the eyes of people still searched me out. What is that woman doing lying in our 
bar? This time I stared back, forcing boldness out of its hiding place. It was an animal 
confrontation: I was also asking for mercy. Please, I am asking you, do not violate me. I 
know I look odd, but get on with it, accept it. l wanted to punish him, for his face to go 
slack with embarrassment. He just walked away (132).  
 
Robert Murphy (1990) analyses the shame experienced by disabled people, particularly those 
who use wheelchairs. 
 
Shaming is an especially potent means of social control in small-scale societies, where 
everybody  is  known and  behavior  is  highly  visible,  but  it  is  less  effective  in 
complex societies like our own, where we can compartmentalize our lives and exist in 
relative anonymity. But a wheelchair cannot be hidden; it is brutally visible. And to the 
extent that the wheelchair's occupant is treated with aversion, even disdain, his sense 
of worth  suffers.  Damage  to  the  body,  then, causes diminution of the self, which is 
further magnified by debasement by others.  
 
Shame and guilt are one in that both lower self-esteem and undercut the facade of 
dignity we present to the world. Moreover, in our culture they tend to stimulate each 
other. The usual formula is that a wrongful act leads to a guilty conscience; if the guilt 
becomes  publicly  known,  then  shame  must  be  added  to  the sequence,  followed  by 
punishment. There is then a causal chain that goes from wrongful act to guilt to shame 
to punishment. A fascinating aspect of disability is that it diametrically and completely 
reverses this  progression,  white  preserving  every  step. The  sequence  of  the  person 
damaged in body goes from punishment (the impairment) to shame to guilt and, finally, 
to the crime. This is not a real crime but a self-delusion that lurks in our fears and 
fantasies, in the haunting, never-articulated question: What did I do to deserve this? (92-
93). 
 
Against all this, if one was not aware of being viewed as unacceptably different, then shame 
would not be an issue. For example, Lucy Grealy (1994), who had most of her jaw removed 
because of cancer early in her adolescence, did not think of her appearance as unacceptably 
different for some time. She had always been proud of her tomboy appearance and wore the 
scars of her operation with pride as badges of courage. Eventually, however, the reactions of 
others began to make her realise that her appearance was being met with aversion. 
 One morning I went into the bathroom and shut the door, though I was alone in the 
house. I turned on the lights and very carefully, very seriously, assessed my face in the 
mirror. I was bald, but I knew that already. I also knew I had buck teeth, something I was 
vaguely ashamed of but hadn't given too much thought to until this moment. My teeth 
were ugly. And, I noticed, they were made worse by the fact that my chin seemed so 
small. How had it gotten that way? I didn't remember it being so small before. I rooted 
around in the cabinets and came up with a hand mirror and, with a bit of angling, looked 
for the first time at my right profile. I knew to expect a scar, but how had my face sunk in 
like that? I didn't understand. Was it possible I'd looked this way for a while and was only 
just noticing it, or was this change very recent? More than the ugliness I felt, I was 
suddenly appalled at the notion that I'd been walking around unaware of something that 
was apparent to everyone else. A profound sense of shame consumed me (112).  
 
The  same  humiliating  sense  of  revelation  hit  Kenny  Fries  (1997)  when  he  reached  his 
adolescence.  As  his  disability  did  not  severely  affect  his  physical  abilities  he  attended  a 
mainstream school and did not consider himself different in any problematic way. 
 
When  I  was  young,  I  performed:  I  sang,  played  the  piano, acted  in  plays  and 
musicals. But  by  the  time  I  reached  high  school,  something  began  to change.  One 
afternoon, coming home from school, as I reached for my keys, I noticed the reflection of 
the full-length of my body in our apartment building's glass front doors. To my surprise, 
the reflection that confronted me in the glass was not the image of myself I saw in my 
mind. Did what I see reflected back to me correspond to how others perceived me?  
 
For months, I could not get rid of this image: my asymmetrical body lurching forward with 
each step. Although I never told anybody, I became self-conscious, felt my deformity 
was too obvious, drew too much attention. Disabled, I felt everybody's eyes - like the boy 
who asked me about my legs, the kids who would call me midget - were transfixed on 
my legs. What was I doing on stage? I felt like a fraud (22). 
 
It  is  significant  that  both  Lucy  and  Kenny  became  ashamed  of  their  difference  when  they 
reached adolescence. This is often a time where the building of a comfortable identity relies on 
being  able  to  fit  in.  Only  then  can  one  feel  safe  to  make  choices  that  lead  to  voluntary 
differences. People who are disabled in adulthood already know about the discrimination that 
accompanies certain changes in appearance and, as a consequence, they often experience 
shame from the outset. Yet, for children, who often perceive the reality that everyone is different 
anyway, what it is that constitutes unacceptable difference is learned by cold, hard experience 
over time. 
 
 
 
 
 Intimate Losses 
 
I feel teardrops trickle through  
nearly half a century  
For the loss of touch.  
Is it something gentle,  
warm, intimate, exciting,  
Being touched?  
Does it contribute towards  
that feeling of  
Being loved?  
I taste the saltiness of tears  
engulfing the years  
For the loss of sexuality.  
Is it something sensual,  
self-defined, empowering?  
Does it allow the sensitivity  
of being a woman  
To be acknowledged?  
I expose a stormy outburst of emotion  
taking almost half a century of anger  
For the loss of relationships.  
Are they something experienced only by 
non-disabled people?  
Belonging, being welcomed as  
part of family, community, society  
Let me give expression to  
Almost a lifespan  
of isolation, of painful separations.  
Let me not be ashamed in grieving  
for the loss of touch,  
love, sexuality, personal growth  
As I search and reach out  
for inclusion.  
                           Ann McFarlane 
 
Closely related to the experience of developing an unacceptable appearance and the resultant 
rejections  and  feelings  of  shame,  are  those  losses  which  can  adversely  affect  a  disabled 
person's sexual identity and his or her capacity to establish and maintain intimate relationships. 
Many people from the sample who were single at the time they became disabled, as well as 
those who lost their partners as a result, worried that they would not be able to attract another 
partner. Many of those in relationships expressed concerns about how their appearance made 
them uncomfortable or self-conscious about sex and some pointed to the belief that their choice 
of partner had narrowed considerably because of the effects of disability. Living in a society which glorifies the attainment of "love" in its ideological form as a union which is purported to 
provide  such  diverse  rewards  as  romance,  companionship,  affection,  financial  security, 
interdependence,  sexual  satisfaction  and  children,  means  that  those  who  are  perceived  as 
unworthy of this kind of love can feel that they are losing out on a great many levels. Sexual 
desirability, influenced as it is by cultural imagery which privileges a certain kind of physical 
"perfection" and athletic prowess, greatly affects the potential for a person to find and preserve 
these intimate relationships based on "love". The losses in this area, touched upon by many, 
are extremely painful in the sense that they affect very vulnerable and private areas of one's 
identity.  
 
Take, for example, Jeni Fulton (1995) who writes that in every other area of her life she has 
been able to become strong enough to challenge the norms that originally disabled her. Yet, her 
doubts in relation to her physical and sexual identity have become more intense. 
 
Disconcertingly,  my  unhappiness  about  my  body  has  grown  as  I  have  become 
increasingly political about being a disabled person. In other areas of my life I have 
become more assertive and confident about who I am, an important part of which is me 
as a disabled woman. I am, after all, a woman with a happily independent life, a beautiful 
home, a ridiculously senior job. Yes, I can say proudly, that this is me, despite the ways 
society tries to deny me the competence I have, tries to make me invisible, put me down, 
patronise me, exclude me, deny me my civil rights. Mostly I am strong enough to get 
politically angry, to challenge and continue to grow. Hard as it sometimes is, I really 
enjoy that part of the journey.  
 
Then I see myself naked in the bathroom mirror, and suddenly that sight redefines me. I 
wonder if the politics help me avoid what I have to do in challenging my relationship with 
my emotional and physical self. I want to make progress in that relationship as I have 
done with my political self, but if I can't like my body, love it, be kind to it, how can I 
expect anyone else to feel differently about it? I'm so out of practice that I can't imagine 
what I would do now if I wanted to seduce someone. Others see, fancy and proposition - 
a usual course of events. I couldn't even approach that. I would have to embark on a 
full discussion - what my body is like, how I'm restricted, and so on ... and so on... and 
so on. Some seduction! Or I could just grab the condoms from the bathroom cupboard 
(hoping they're not past their sell-by date - very likely by now, I'm afraid), and risk him 
recoiling in horror. Perhaps it would be easier with a relative stranger, rather than with a 
tried and trusted friend where there would be so much more to lose ... (87).  
 
These intimate revelations indicate how deeply disturbing and difficult to resolve are the issues 
which stem from the disabling of a person's sexuality and their opportunity to engage in sexual 
relations. The nature of this identity loss and its isolating effects will be the focus of this section. 
Firstly, however, the fact that many disabled people are assumed to be asexual, altogether 
lacking in sexual identity and needs, will be explored. The Loss of a Sexual Identity 
 
While many people talked about the concerns they had for finding new partners or of holding 
onto existing ones because of the fears they had developed in relation to their appearance and 
sexuality, some felt like their gender and their sexuality had been completely neutered. It was 
felt or discovered that when one has lost the attributes perceived to be necessary for sexual 
attractiveness, then others come to believe that a sexual identity is no longer relevant. Adrienne 
talks about the discordant response that her naturally flirtatious nature now receives. 
 
Adrienne: And I know for one thing... I'm an uncontrollable flirt and I will flirt with people, I 
don't even know I'm doing it, you know, and I've had bus drivers, when I get on the bus, 
they use things that are called "tie downs", kind of sexual there, to tie my chair to the 
floor of the bus... 
 
Me: Okay. 
 
Adrienne:... and some of them have kind of "come alongs"? Where you move something 
back and forwards to tighten it. 
 
Me: Right. 
 
Adrienne:... like to lift a heavy load like a motor... 
 
Me: Oh yeah. 
 
Adrienne:... and so, I remember when this guy was sort of going, oh yeah, okay, got it 
now, and I said, was it as good for you as it was for me? And it took him, I could just see 
it, like, oh wait a second, she is flirting. Gee, people like that flirt too? You know, I mean, 
it just hadn't occurred to him. 
 
Me: Yeah. 
 
Adrienne: And that's really annoying. 
 
Me: It would be. 
 
Adrienne: And it's like, oh my God, and that was one of the areas where I just knew I 
was  confident,  even  when  I  was  young and in the sway of my crazy family, I was 
confident that I was the bees knees when it came to sexuality and so, to have that 
undercut by vuvlodynia, undercut by the change in my appearance and the change in 
assumptions that people have...errrr. Errrr, I don't like it. 
 
Craig also talked about the threat of losing his sexual identity and how this made him react in 
what he considered to be a promiscuous way.   
Craig: The problem was that there was an exaggeration because of my disability and 
well, okay, there was the sex thing and all that kind of stuff... simply because I felt so 
inadequate with my disability. You were so afraid of [pause] everything and you also 
desperately craved - that was the other thing too - with the disability and all the rest of it, 
you desperately craved to be treated as normal. And so it was the party scene and the 
sex thing and that was all part of it, because everyone else was doing it in the Sixties. 
 
Chris Baker (2003), in a story he sent me recently, which is tellingly called  No Sex Please, 
We're Disabled, focuses on how life in a nursing home tends to render one, in the eyes of many, 
a non-sexual being. 
 
Sex is really a no-go area here in the Leslie Groves Hospital. I mean, here are us 
residents, wheelchair-bound and utterly dependant on the nurses for the most intimate 
functions like bowel motions and catheter changes, lying back and thinking of the queen 
while we get put to bed, got up, showered, dressed and undressed (1). 
 
It probably helps you to survive in this vale of tears generally and here in particular to 
have a good awareness of your own sexuality. In fact, if you’re disabled you’ll need that 
awareness, especially in the interests of surviving society’s prevalent attitude towards 
disability, for which you can probably substitute the word ‘disqualification’.  In other 
words,  how  dare  you  view  yourself  as  a  sexual  being?  You’re  less  than  physically 
perfect  and  the  thought  of  you in the throes of passion is utterly distasteful to any 
‘normal’ person (4). 
 
Eli Clare (1999) writes about being treated as asexual, genderless. 
 
It is no exaggeration to say that we are genderless, asexual undesirables … On the one 
hand, disabled people mostly escape the sexual objectification and harrassment many 
nondisabled women face every day at their jobs and on the streets. It is an escape that 
has given me a bit of space. Amidst all the staring I absorb and deflect, I am grateful not 
to have to deal with sexual leering. On the other hand in the absence of sexual gaze of 
any kind directed at us – wanted or unwanted – we lose ourselves as sexual beings. I 
almost don’t have words for what this absence, this loss means in my life. It has been a 
gaping hole, a desolate fog, and a “normal” everyday fact. It has translated into an 
inability to conceive  of myself as attractive and desirable, has added to my sense of 
being ugly and clumsy. I hate these meanings (113-114). 
 
Suzanne  Berger  (1996)  recalls  an  incident  where,  like  Adrienne,  she  is  jolted  into  the 
recognition that strangers no longer view her as an object of sexual interest. 
 
Part of femaleness, but only part, is feeling an animal possibility, the elation of possibly 
attracting new sexual interest, with the potential of acting upon it, even if there 's no real 
desire to carry through. With chronic pain, clumpy sneakers and a cane or wheelchair, erotic possibility felt canceled, or at least for me, and with that, my femaleness partly 
canceled too. No one seemed a possible lover because no one saw me that way. Not to 
be looked at longingly anymore; of course that is the hard truth of the past tense: We 
were all beautiful once. But in me the sense of lost attractiveness had been sped up. 
Stolen were those accidental glances from strangers that as contemporary women we 
are not supposed to want … 
 
I am getting into a car, quite a spectacle in itself: cane thrown in first and body "bent" as 
much as possible to get in the back door, lying on the mattress the goal. But before that, 
a dignified, unusually handsome older man looks over in my direction; will the glance 
smolder or deepen? I hope. Then I hear from his lovely plummy mouth, Can I be of 
assistance to you? End of the imagined sensual drama. I was not seen, except in terms 
of needing help. Agh, we are not beautiful anymore. I am seen as an extension of my 
stupid cane, my shoes, my awkwardness, doctor. I had been unsexed in my image of 
self, and no healer can (or should) "re-sex," exactly as no healer can truly revitalize 
the truly anemic spirit in a series of office appointments (172 -173). 
 
 
The Loss of Sexual Desirability and Relationship Potential 
 
Whether  one  is  seen  to  be  asexual  or  an  unappealing  example  of  one's  gender,  the 
reverberations  reach  out  to  affect  the  potential  to  engage  in  intimate  relationships  with 
significant  others.  Some,  like  Angus,  feel  that  disability  cancels  out  the  possibility  almost 
entirely. 
 
Angus: God, and how do you get to know somebody when you're incapacitated? I guess 
it's not impossible, but it's... [pause]... 
 
Me: Intimidating. 
 
Angus: Yeah, and I just can't see how it can happen without me making a lot of changes 
and it all just seems to be too hard. 
 
Glen  talked  about  how  he  had felt that marriage was out of the question for him after his 
accident. 
 
Glen: And you start thinking then who's going to marry, who wants to go out with a 
bloody old cripple? You know how things go through your mind.  
 
Me: I felt like that.  
 
Glen: And once you start feeling like that you get down in the dumps. 
 Me: You do.  
 
Glen: It doesn't make things better. It makes things worse, doesn't it? 
 
Me: It does.  
 
Karen names the time in her life when she began to desire boyfriends in her late adolescence 
as the most damaging to her identity. Prior to that she had not seen herself as unacceptably 
different  and  her  family  had  included  her  in  everything.  She  was  not  prepared  for  the 
insecurities that come to the forefront when she started meeting boys. 
 
Karen: I was very scared that when it came to personal life, you know, boyfriends... I 
mean, they may have been saying to you that this is not working for normal reasons, but 
I didn't believe it. 
 
Me: Look, I know exactly what you mean. 
 
Karen: I believed it was because I was in a wheelchair. So I kept thinking that that was 
all they saw first. They didn't see me. Like it came to you like a shock really. I'd sort of... 
right up until that point you cruise along with life and have your fun and all this and then 
you realise that you have all these emotions and feelings and, you know, that other 
people aren't going to see them the same because you are different. Especially guys, for 
me, being a female, wanting boyfriends, relationships, that sort of thing. It starts making 
you question yourself mostly. 
 
Me: Yeah, because there is a difference... there is like a gap there, isn't there, between 
how you see yourself and how you feel that other people are going to see you. There's 
this gap and you can't bridge this gap. That's the fear, isn't it? 
 
Karen: Yeah, and it's very powerful and, no matter how level headed I thought I was, it 
still controlled me. Probably, right up until about fifteen or sixteen years ago, really. It 
was really uncontrollable, really powerful, because it was how you wanted people to 
perceive you, but in your mind he knew that they didn't perceive you that way. 
 
Lisa Reid (2001) endured very similar circumstances. 
 
An even harder thing to cope with was growing up and becoming a woman. I felt like no 
boy would ever fancy me, or love me, because I was different. That age is hard enough 
as it is, coming to terms with all the changes to your body and mind without the added 
difficulties  of  disability.  From  being  a cheerful  joker,  I  became  very  withdrawn  and 
depressed, and I hated that (45).  
 Ruth Seinkiewitz Mercer (1989) tells how her hopes of ever having a relationship with an able-
bodied man were dashed.  
 
Shortly after our date, I asked Hans to the prom, and he readily accepted. During one of 
our conversations about it, he started telling me that he thought I was a beautiful woman 
with a good mind locked up inside an unfortunate body. He said that he liked me very 
much as a friend, but he didn't think we would make a very good match romantically.  
 
I understood what he was saying, and I was heartbroken. For the first time in my life, I 
realized that I would never be able to enjoy a romantic relationship with a "normal" man. 
It finally dawned on me that no nonhandicapped man would ever be sexually attracted to 
me - certainly no nonhandicapped man to whom I was attracted, anyway. Since I had 
never been physically attracted to men with disabilities like mine I concluded that I would 
never enjoy a sexual relationship with anyone (190-191). 
 
Lucy Grealy (1994) writes about her feelings of self-doubt and how they were reinforced by the 
responses of men. 
 
In the wake of my recurring disappointment I'd often chide myself for thinking I'd ever be 
beautiful enough, good enough, or worthy enough of someone else's love, let alone my 
own. Who cared if I loved my own face if no one else was going to? What was beauty 
for, after all, if not to attract the attention of men, of lovers? When I walked down a street 
or hallway, sometimes men would whistle at me from a distance, call me Baby, yell out 
and ask me my name. I was thin, I had a good figure, and my long blond hair, when I 
bothered to brush it, was pretty. I would walk as fast as possible, my head bent down, 
but  sometimes  they'd  catch  up  with  me,  or  I'd  be forced  to  pass  by  them.  Their 
comments would stop instantly when they saw my face, their sudden silence potent and 
damning (188).  
 
Jane wrote at length about her feelings of unattractiveness, her despair at ever finding anyone 
to love and her feelings about her sexual experiences since becoming chronically ill. 
 
Body image is so closely tied in with sexuality, probably because both are such intimate 
feelings. I don't get out much, so my chances of meeting anyone right now are minimal, 
and even if I did, I wouldn't have the energy to even talk about sex!! I remember when I 
first became ill, and my boyfriend at the time and I were in the infancy of our relationship. 
We hadn't yet had sex, and he asked to see me naked. I burst into tears, because I felt I 
had more of a chance of painting the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel than standing there 
naked under what I felt would be intense scrutiny. I went home alone that night. He later 
told  me  that  he  felt  hurt  that  I  couldn't  trust him enough. I felt hurt that he'd even 
requested it of me … 
 
I went through a period about six months ago when I became convinced that I'd never 
have sex again, and that I should grab it if it ever came along. After all, being ill and overweight doesn't mean that you stop feeling sexual. An old friend (actually the first 
love of my life) popped back into my life, and things turned sexual, which I was really 
pleased about. I put myself through some awful pain, but the payoff seemed worth it. 
Now I feel that unless there's real feeling and respect there, I'm not going to sell myself 
so short. Sure, the intimacy of being so close to another person can't be replaced by 
much, but the feelings of near-depression when he popped out of my life again weren't 
worth it. (written story: 2). 
 
In  many  cases,  existing  relationships  did  not  survive  disability  and  illness.  In  some 
circumstances this was because the disabled person made the decision to break up with an 
existing partner because they believed that the disability made being loved and found attractive 
impossible. Lois Anderson (1986) wrote about how her ‘hopes went down the drain’ and she 
decided that she could not continue her previously very successful and satisfying relationship. 
 
Looking at myself in that big water and sand bed I saw a body so horrible looking. I 
started thinking about the three wonderful years I spent with my boyfriend before this 
accident. What was going to happen to me now? I loved him and wanted very much to 
keep him, but I gave up my relationship. My hopes went down the drain. I had to give 
him up. I knew I was the same person in my mind, but my body kept telling me it would 
not work out. I felt I could not give him what he needed. I felt that my sex life was over 
(276). 
 
Jacky also broke up with her fiancé when she became disabled for reasons that she eventually 
began to question. 
 
I also felt thoroughly unlovable and unable to share any emotion with those close to me 
(except sometimes crying because of physical hurt). I broke off my engagement - my 
reason being that I 'was no longer in love' - but, now I see that I was just 'letting him off 
the hook' since I didn't feel of any worth (written story: 3). 
 
In Alana Arnot's (1998) case, her husband eventually left her. They had been aerobatic pilots 
before the plane crash that disabled her and he found it impossible to accept the change in her. 
Alana writes about the clash between her and Nigel when she finally accepted the permanence 
of her disability but he could not. Nigel comes in when she is packing up her high heeled shoes. 
 
'No, don't touch them,' he said. 'Leave them right where they were.' He took a shoe out 
of my hand and put it back in the cupboard along with the rest from the bag. I was 
dumbfounded. I felt like an impostor. It was as if they weren't my shoes to touch. Nigel 
was still holding on to the beautiful, fit and active woman I had been before the accident. 
He wasn't ready to come to terms with letting that person go (195). 
 
Nigel did not adjust, however, and Alana tells of how the strain between them grew.  
 Mum and Dad came over to our house for dinner to celebrate Nigel's win on the night he 
came home, but he seemed depressed and preoccupied.  
'What's wrong with you?' I finally asked.  
'I didn't want to come home to you and this nightmare. Our future is so uncertain,' he 
said.  
I put my head down. I couldn't bear to look at Mum or Dad.  
Well, at least you're honest,' I said. My injuries were a life sentence but if I could walk 
away from them, I certainly would. I never wanted to be a burden on Nigel and never 
wanted to see myself as his invalid wife, but that's how he made me feel. I have never 
felt more unattractive than at that moment. I felt like half a woman, like a freak. It would 
have been so easy for Nigel to stay away, and part of me wished he had. I really didn't 
know why he'd come home (192). 
 
Eventually Nigel left Alana, as my own partner of eight years left me. Unlike Nigel, however, my 
partner had no patience with my disability at all. He came from a workaholic family and his 
mother had recently broken her back in a car accident and, after major surgery, had donned a 
back brace and gotten back to work on the farm. Additionally, our sex life, which had been a 
very beautiful and constant part of our relationship, became almost non-existent. On the few 
occasions that we did have sex I felt he was thinking only of his own satisfaction and I lay there 
in pain, immobile, feeling used and useless. After our break up, there were three years where I 
did not have a lover. I remember back then thinking that I would never be in a relationship 
again. I had been an athletic, highly sexual person before my injury and I could not imagine my 
new body, defined by pain, atrophy and immobility, being either sexually attractive or sexually 
capable.  
 
The Disabling of Relationships 
 
Those who maintained their intimate relationships or formed new ones after becoming disabled 
talked about the difficulties that arose. Craig, for example, told me how he was denied the 
opportunity to marry his first love by a family who believed that his blindness made him an 
unsuitable  marriage  partner.  He  later  married  a  woman  to  whom  he  has remained happily 
married for many decades, but the initial response to their marriage was similar. 
 
When [Marie] and I got married, some said "We give them six  months". Not because I 
was particularly horrible, not because I was unpleasant, but because I was disabled. 
Family said to [Marie], "He is a nice man, but we hoped you would marry someone  that 
could help you." She pointed out numerous able bodied relations who don't even make 
their wives a cup of tea, or dry the dishes. I bring [Marie] a cup of tea every morning at 6  
o'clock. I set the table. Wash the dishes. Vacuum the house, hang out the laundry, make 
the bed, cook when [Marie] is unwell, clean bathroom and toilet, but the majority of 
people think I get waited on hand and foot. [Marie] would willingly do that, but it isn't necessary. Society however, has preconceived ideas as to what being Disabled and 
married is (written story: 3).  
 
Albert Robillard (1999) tells of similar attitudes, this time toward a marriage that was already in 
existence before the onset of the disabling impairment. 
 
After he had changed my tube and I had gotten down from the examination table and 
was  sitting in  my  wheelchair,  the  doctor  unleashed  the  following  remark,  without 
provocation: "You are lucky you have a wife who stuck by your side. Most people in your 
condition have had their wives split long ago." Divina immediately replied, facing me, 
"You see, you see!" … I heard the remark of the physician as a left-handed endorsement 
of the commonsense reasoning that women married to disabled paralytic men should 
divorce them. I heard his remark as denigrating life with a paralyzed person. I heard my 
wife's response as referencing that body of commonsense reasoning (36). 
 
These 'commonsense' assumptions flowed on to other assumptions about Albert's sex life with 
his wife.  
 
[M]y paralysis leads people to think that I have lost sexual function. It does not matter 
that  my  penis  is one  of  the  last  things  working  properly.  I  still  experience 
this assumption,  seemingly  part  of  the omniprevalent condition of paralytics … This 
assumption about loss of sexual function, no matter what the diagnosis, is an ideal that 
assembles what the perceiver sees … 
 
My wife tells me that as soon as they know that she has a paralyzed husband in a 
wheelchair  many  men  start  making advances.  She  thinks  they  are  motivated  by 
commonsense thinking that she is sex starved. Having a paralyzed husband leads many 
men to assume that "she is not getting enough" and is an easy mark. These advances 
come all the time (21).  
 
Ironically, some people also talked of their own mistrust in those who desired them. Lucy Grealy 
(1994), Arnold Beisser (1989) and A. Manette Ainsay (2001) all said they had doubts about the 
kind of person who would want to get involved with them. In fact, both Lucy and Arnold drew on 
the same adage to describe this doubt. Arnold writes: 
 
At the time I was both surprised by and mistrustful of any evidence of interest in me by 
young women. I thought it proved that there was something wrong with them, as implied 
in Groucho Marx's famous saying: "I wouldn't want to belong to any club that would have 
me as a member." I had so many self-doubts, and was so embarrassed about my body, 
that  I was  very  afraid  of  disclosing  myself.  So  I  kept  my  relationships  with women 
rather superficial and impersonal. (Arnold Beisser 1989: 54).  
 
Lucy reiterates:  
Bent on proving I was desirable, I started collecting lovers, having a series of short-
term relationships that always ended, I was certain, because I wasn't beautiful enough. 
I became convinced that anyone who wanted to have a real relationship with me was 
automatically  someone  I  didn't  want.  It  was  the  classic  Groucho  Marx  paradox:  I 
didn't want to belong to any club that would have me as a member (Lucy Grealy 1994:  
208). 
 
A. Manette Ainsay (2001) writes of the similar lack of trust she and her family felt toward her 
new boyfriend. 
 
Still, by the end of December, I had my degree in hand. In addition to this degree, I had 
also acquired a boyfriend, a nice and decent boyfriend, who no one in my family trusted, 
least of all me, because if he really was such a nice and decent boyfriend and not some 
weirdo with a Florence Nightingale complex, then why was he going out with me? (193). 
 
On  another  level  of  doubt,  Suzanne  Berger  (1996)  began  to  feel  very  unworthy  of  her 
relationship with her husband and expected that he would want to leave her. 
 
"You could marry someone else, you know." I do mean it.  
"Try to be more optimistic," you say, but you turn away as you say it, looking out at the 
confetti shower of snow.  
 
But I will never be the person I was, the woman who canoed, the traveler, the lake rider, 
the sexual acrobat. I will never be at ease in this body, never believe that it's a good and 
useful thing, an instrument of pleasure and speed. I am not the woman you married. I 
am the Other, the one you wheel everywhere. The one whose shoes you tie, the one 
you  will  soon  watch  ascend to the second story of our house, accompanied by the 
extraterrestrial sounds of the new Chair-0-Later.  
 
The undertow is with us in the room, though breathlessly I am trying to escape it, this 
drowning sense of sorrow and stupid self-pity. "What are we going to do?" I ask. "How 
can we go on like this?" I know the answer: the same way we've been doing it (l8). 
 
I have experienced all of the above. The man I love, who is now my partner, came to know me 
after I hurt my back. We were friends for many years and, on many levels he was my saviour as 
many of my opportunities in life, such as moving from my parental home and starting my own 
life again, were only possible because of his support, both practical and emotional. Yet, when 
we began to desire one another I was torn between my deep love and sexual yearning, and my 
feelings of worthlessness, my belief that he could do so much better than me. There were many 
able-bodied women who were keen on him, women whom everyone seemed to agree were far 
more suitable than me, and, as part of my love for him, I believed I should not get in the way of 
him finding a more appropriate lover and partner. Many years went by where we were drawn together  then  flung  apart  by  our  uncertainties.  It  took  me  a  long,  long  time  to  develop  a 
sufficiently strong sense of self-worth to allow me to have a healthy, balanced relationship with 
my lover.  
 
My sexual identity was torn asunder by the ravages of my disability. My intimate relationships 
had always contained a strong sexual component and I liked being my lover's sexual equal and, 
to an extent, feeling in charge of his pleasure. I loved being spontaneous and adventurous and 
acrobatic. Becoming immobilised and frightened of sudden movements left me with none of my 
old mechanisms for embodying my desires. In trying to cling onto the old me, and in fear of 
becoming  too  unappealing  as  a  lover,  I  risked  injury  again  and  again.  Many  of  my  early 
setbacks were caused by not admitting to my limitations. It has taken years for me to be able to 
share my fears and my constraints honestly and in their entirety. Still, I often long to be able to 
do what has become impossible and deep within me lurks the disturbing dilemma, never quite 
resolved, that I cannot offer enough to my partner in the realm of sensual pleasure. Once a 
confident and competent lover, able to satisfy and be satisfied, I now live on a roller coaster of 
uncertainty as to what my body will be capable of from one day to the next, how it will look, how 
it will feel and how it will perform. 
 
Kenny  Fries  (1997)  draws  from  conversations  and  experiences  with  lovers  to  share  his 
insecurities about his body and his sexuality. In the first excerpt he is talking to another disabled 
man, trying to reach an understanding of his own feelings and experiences. 
 
"Do you have a lover?" I ask.  
"I did but it didn't work out," he says as he pulls on the lever that will make his seat 
recline.  
"What happened?"  
"I'm not sure but when we tried to live together after a few months it blew up. We were 
too different. I'm not sure he ever could have understood my body. My legs have no 
muscle left. I never let men see my legs. I drape a towel over them when I get into bed. 
It's not easy for two men who want to love each other here. And I'm not pretty with the 
polio. I was too insecure. I don't know."  
 
"I never will fall in love again," Dani tells me after a long pause. "I don't want to. It is too 
difficult for me."  
 
I  tell  him  about  Charlie,  the  first  man  with  whom  I  had  sex when  I  moved  to  San 
Francisco. Years ago, when I returned from Israel I surprised myself by asking Charlie 
what he felt about having sex with a disabled man. "I concentrate on the good parts," is 
what Charlie told me, also answering my unstated question of why during sex he never 
touched my legs.  
"How did you feel when he said that?"  
"I thought he was great to be so honest."  "That wasn't my question."  
"I felt as if a whole part of me had been erased" (200).  
 
Neil talked about how becoming impotent had affected his marriage and I reacted with a flood of 
self-disclosure.  Once  it  became  a  recognisable  theme,  I  really  wanted  to  ask  about  my 
participants' sexual identities in relation to disability, but often it just seemed like too personal a 
matter to touch on. 
 
Me:  Yeah,  well,  I  think  that  can  be  a  big  loss.  I  mean, I've certainly been through 
problems in that way. You can imagine with a really bad back, I mean, that has taken 
away a lot of my sexual ability and that was a big part of my identity and I felt very sad to 
lose a lot of that and I imagine it's probably different for men than for women. I mean, for 
a man... 
 
Neil: I don't know. I just didn't feel like I was a complete man and you mightn't have felt 
that you were a complete woman. 
 
It's true. No matter how politically incorrect it is believed to be, if you can't feel like a 'real 
woman' or a 'real man', then the potential losses are horrendous. Another married participant, 
Jack, also wrote that his disability made him feel 'less of a man' (written story: 3). Other people 
pointed  to  the  physical  and  emotional  discomfort  that  sex  caused  after  the  onset  of  an 
impairment. Emily Levy (1986) wrote: 
 
It affects my sexuality because warmth and wetness on my skin makes it itch, and I 
scratch and scratch and scratch instead of lying peacefully with my lover (28-29).  
 
And Jill Sager (1986) confides: 
 
I  feel  like  I've  experienced  rape. I  don't  like  my  lover  lying  on  top  of  me  when we 
make love, it's too confining. I feel like I've experienced death many times. Every time I 
start to have an orgasm I have to remind myself that the lack of control I am feeling is 
not the 'black hole'' I experienced with ether. Sometimes I don't feel different, sometimes 
it 's all I feel. Everybody treats me different but nobody notices what my difference is 
(198).  
 
Finally, two participants commented that disability had limited their choice of partners. Aaron 
expressed this feeling in a conversation that dealt with relationships in general. 
 
Aaron: I guess it's just a completely different thing. When you try to develop intimate 
relationships with people, it's just very difficult. 
 Me: It is. Oh yes, it is. For the first three years after I hurt my back, I thought, I probably 
won't have another relationship again. If I stay like this, I just can't imagine somebody 
fitting in with that. 
 
Aaron: That's right. And, you know, again, it in some way cuts down on the potential 
people that you can go out with and that's a sad thing, but that's the way I felt. 
 
Terry, who joked his way through most of the conversation, expressed similar concerns. 
 
Me: So, it sounds like your experience has been a very positive one. 
 
Terry: There have been a lot of positive things. I mean, there's always good and bad, 
don't get me wrong. I just have this inherent choice of choosing partners. Now, I seem to 
choose the wrong ones [laughs]. 
 
Me: Is that right? I mean, I think that's very difficult anyway. It's very difficult to meet the 
right person. 
 
Terry: Yeah, for sure. But, my sister made a very poignant comment. Since I've lost my 
sight, my taste in female company has deteriorated. 
 
Me: Is that right? Why do you think that would be? 
 
Terry: I'm probably a lot easier to compromise on... on what I want. And, of course, you 
don't get as many opportunities to develop a relationship, so you take what's offered... 
[pause]. 
 
The  ways  in  which  disability  can  affect  sexuality  and  relationships  are  diverse  and  very 
complex. What they all seem to share, however, is that they are linked to the belief that disabled 
people are either asexual or less worthy as sexual partners and that, therefore, they are less 
likely to find or maintain loving or otherwise intimate relationships. The social model of disability 
is premised on the belief that it is not impairments that are tragic, it is the cultural beliefs and 
consequent exclusions which surround impairments which have tragic effects. I certainly believe 
this to be true of all the factors which disable the identities of people who have impairments, 
including those which are based on sexuality and appearance. Yet, even when armed with this 
political knowledge it is still difficult, as Jeni Fulton (1995) indicates, to translate this awareness 
into  an  emancipatory  framework  within  which  we  can  learn  to  feel  comfortable  about  our 
differences and to convince others to love us as we are. 
 
Subverting the Norm Through Challenging Stereotypical Appearance and Sexuality 
 
Any attempt to subvert the norm is always precarious. For example, any challenge to the belief 
that people should work for a living leaves one open to various criticisms about dependency and malingering.  Similarly,  any  suggestion  that  being  in  a  position  of  eternal  gratitude  may  be 
inappropriate can make it sound like disabled people are unappreciative. In the same way, 
could it not also be claimed that people who challenge society's stereotypes of attractiveness 
are merely suffering from a case of sour grapes? I, for example, felt more comfortable arguing 
against the stereotypical ideal of beauty when I was still slim and young and able-bodied. With 
the encroachment of age, disability and spreading hips I feel that it can all too easily appear that 
I am only seeking to justify my own inability to approximate the norm.  
 
While we nevertheless continue to speak out against oppression when we feel that we have 
little  or  nothing  to  lose  other  than  our  inferior  position,  when  it  comes  to  appearance  and 
sexuality, there is, indeed, a great deal to lose. In coming out and drawing attention to oneself 
and one's vulnerabilities, the losses can be daunting. One can risk forfeiting one's privacy, 
dignity and the safety that comes from masking one's pain and shame. It is not an easy position 
to take or to even envisage taking. In essence, feelings of shame can severely compromise 
one's ability to launch strong challenges against the current ideals of body image and sexuality. 
Some of those in the sample have nevertheless begun to question these norms and to develop 
new  ways  of  seeing  themselves  as  a  result.  In  its  most  elemental  form,  this  entails 
understanding the tyranny of the norm and how it functions to disable people with impairments. 
Susan Browne (1986) and Robert Murphy (1990) both touch on these issues. 
 
Feminine  beauty  is  manufactured  by  cosmetic  and  fashion  industries  and  changes 
seasonally. Our  self  worth  suffers  when  we  respond  to  this  sexual  objectification. 
Disabled  women have  been  excluded  from  patriarchal  conceptions  of  beauty  and 
sexuality. Again, we are encouraged to see our bodies and our selves as distinct. Our 
beauty is reserved for the inside. Inner beauty is used by our culture as a consolation 
prize for those it finds ugly. Symmetry, clear eyes, straight limbs and fingers, uniform 
pigmentation and smooth motions are prerequisites for outer beauty, no matter what 
else may be popular. People jeer at us. We may not be able to find appropriate clothing 
for the outside and are advised not to call too much attention to our "flaws" with bright 
or fashionable adornments. Prostheses, canes, hearing aids, wheelchairs and braces 
are  not  designed  with  aesthetics  in  mind.  Our  individuality is  not  encouraged  or 
appreciated (Susan Browne 1986: 246-7).  
 
It hardly needs saying that the disabled, individually and as a group, contravene all the 
values of youth, virility, activity, and physical beauty that Americans cherish, however 
little  most  individuals  may  realize them.  Most  handicapped  people,  myself included, 
sense that others resent them for this reason: We are subverters of an American Ideal, 
just as the poor are betrayers of American Dream. And to the extent that we depart from 
the ideal,  we  become  ugly  and  repulsive  to  the  able-bodied.  People recoil  from  us, 
especially  when  there  is  facial  damage  or  bodily distortion.  The  disabled  serve  as 
constant, visible reminders to the able-bodied that the society they live in is shot through with inequity and suffering, that they live in a counterfeit paradise, that they too are 
vulnerable. We represent a fearsome possibility (Robert Murphy 1990: 117).  
 
People from the sample came up with a variety of ways of challenging stereotypes and negative 
reactions. Firstly, there were three participants who confronted mainstream response to their 
weight change. In the following conversation, Adrienne talked about how she redefined her 
perceptions about her body as her size changed.  
 
Adrienne: Have you heard the word, Zaftig? 
 
Me: What is it? [I don't understand and she repeats it]. No, what is it? 
 
Adrienne: Its Yiddish. Z-A-F-T-I-G. 
 
Me: I've not heard it or read it I don't think. 
 
Adrienne: It's a great word. It means that you have enough flesh on your bones to be 
huggable. 
 
Me: Ah! [Adrienne is laughing]. I like that word. 
 
Adrienne: It's a lovely word. And so I was a zaftig figure. 
 
Me: Oh, that a great word! I've got heaps of friends and family that are going to love that 
word. They need that word in their lives. 
 
Adrienne: There are lots of people who need that word. [We laugh]. I weighed 130 
pounds, 140 pounds. I didn't look like a model, but I was strong. I had lots of muscle and 
then as I got sicker, I started to take all these drugs which have the side effect of weight 
gain and I was hanging around the house doing nothing and now I weigh 210 pounds 
and the weirdness of it is was there was this moment at around 180 pounds where I felt 
fabulous. I felt, ah, this is the size I should be, even though I had passed into what is 
referred as morbid obesity in the health universe and so at risk of death from 14 different 
causes. I felt, oh wow, I had spent most of my teens and a significant part of my twenties 
and early thirties thinking, I'm so fat and I'd look in the mirror and I wouldn't like what I 
saw and, looking back on it, I was stunning. What was I thinking? 
 
Me: It's that pressure.  
 
Adrienne: Oh very. Absolutely. I mean this kind of heroin chic... you know the pale ... erk. 
Anyway, there is this show on TV [etc.. She describes the woman who plays the main 
role, very tall and skinny and very muscly]. Give the girl a sandwich. 
 What resulted from Adrienne's rethinking was that she developed a whole new ideal for herself. 
She discovered a joy in being larger which she found much more liberating than the way she felt 
when  she  was  under  pressure  to  remain  slim  while  never  feeling  slim  enough.  Charlotte 
expressed a similar resistance to the slender ideal, although her experiences were different. 
Before engaging in the following conversation, I had just discovered that the medications that 
Charlotte had to take to help control her illness, Crohn's Disease, resulted in weight gain. I 
asked her whether this had been a problem. 
 
Charlotte: I've never had that much of a problem, but then again I was always a big kid 
anyway. It's strange for a Crohny to say that [because Crohn's interferes with what one 
can eat and causes constant diarrhoea]. I was always overweight anyway. Not by much 
but enough so that when the prednazone effects did happen I might put on another five 
or ten pounds, but since I was already big to begin with, it really didn't show that much 
… But, as a result of that, what ended up happening was, any time I looked good [when 
the effects of Crohn's Disease made her lose massive amounts of weight], I felt horrible, 
and any time I looked bad [had weight on], I felt good. Because, that either meant that I 
was on prednazone and so I was stable or it meant that I was off my meds and was 
keeping my weight on. 
 
Me: Oh! Right. 
 
Charlotte: So, as a result, as a teenager it was really difficult, because the only time I 
could fit into the good clothes, the fashionable clothes, the cool clothes, the clothes that I 
wanted to fit into, was when I was feeling crappy. 
 
Me: Yes. 
 
Charlotte: And... but, because, when I felt crappy I looked like society's idea of what a 
teenager should look like, I got all sorts of comments, because I was in the closet 
[passing as non-disabled], from well-meaning adults, saying, oh, you look so great, 
you've lost so much weight, have you been exercising? 
 
Me: Mmmm. 
 
Charlotte: And I just wanted to strangle some of these adults. 
 
Me: Yeah. Because, what a combination and what reinforcement. 
 
Charlotte:  So,  it  was  just  like,  okay,  so,  very  early  on  I  learned  to...  I  learned  to 
disentangle how I looked from how I felt about myself. 
 
What is so interesting about Charlotte's case is that, unlike the experiences shared by disabled 
people in general in this chapter, when she was suffering the most from her condition, she was closest to fulfilling the norm. As a consequence she was given a lot of praise about her shape 
when she was actually so ill that she was too thin. Jane writes about another kind of subversive 
reaction to weight gain.  
 
A part of me embraces being overweight, because I get to be "invisible". I've noticed that 
as a person puts on weight, there's a point when others seem to look at you as that "fat 
woman" and wonder how a person could let themselves go like that. It no longer matters 
that you may be very kind, eloquent, generous and a whiz at canasta (where do I get 
these things from??? :) ), because who you are inside can't communicate itself through 
appearances.  Then  you  reach  a  point  where  these  same people just don't see you 
anymore, which is something of a relief. Once again you become free to express your 
individuality because now you're doing it to please yourself, not some outside notion of 
what it is to be attractive or desirable. I have a thing for brightly painted toenails - they 
make me feel cheerful! - so I indulge myself constantly, and don't worry about whether 
my  bright  turquoise  nails  clash  hideously  with  a  pink  shirt!!  So  even  amidst  the 
discomfort and feeling like an imposter [sic] in my own body, there is some good to come 
out of it! (Written story: 2) 
 
Jane thus indicates that, by no longer feeling pressured by the imposition of impossible ideals, a 
whole range of new alternatives opens up. This supports my belief that those who have any 
hope  of  approximating  the  norm  and,  accordingly,  face  the  constant  struggle  involved  in 
attempting to be slim enough, fit enough, youthful and productive and attractive enough to feel 
acceptable, are in some ways in a worse position in some ways than those who, through being 
cast  out  of  "normal"  circles,  come  to  recognise  the  fallacy  inherent  in  the  project  of 
normalisation.  
 
On a different level, a number of wheelchair users spoke or wrote about how they came to deal 
with people who patronised them. In commenting on this, Albert Robillard (1999) recalls how he 
learned to deal with readjusting his mind and his visual perceptions to his new spatial reality. A 
similar reorientation helped him adjust to people's negative attitudes. 
 
The  same  thing  happens  with  the  underlying  texts  of  utterances.  With  time,  the 
statements of physicians, including specialists, and the "blame the patient" rhetoric of 
the nurses, asking me to "be a good boy," were transcended. I not only lived through 
these textual residues but the repetitive nature of the references made me realize that 
these statements and underlying texts were standard figures of speech. Pretty soon, 
Divina and I could recognize many of these figures, and we came to regard them with 
ironic glee … We have gotten past the "be a good boy" form of speech, because we 
continue to resist this kind of patient management (47). 
  
I have experienced a similar form of liberation through my academic work. By learning how 
entrenched  these  oppressive  values  are  and  how  they  tie  in  to  the  very  foundations  of contemporary Western society, I am capable of letting go of the personal affront I used to 
experience.  Karen  talks  about  a  similar  shift  of  perspective  which  has  left her feeling less 
disabled. 
 
Karen: I think it has a lot to do with other people. It can make you or break you. 
 
Me: Yeah, it's true, isn't it? 
 
Karen: I think, basically, the biggest disability in the world is other people's attitudes. 
 
Me: Oh yes, gosh. 
 
Karen: They make the barriers. 
 
Me: They do. 
 
Karen: And once you've gotten over the part that having a disability isn't a problem, it's 
getting past those other people's attitudes, it doesn't really bother you anymore. 
 
The same point is picked up in a conversation with Lesley.  
 
Lesley: I never worry about other people's opinions. I think my opinions are far more 
important than anyone else's … 
 
Me: And, so, did they have an effect on you before the disability? 
 
Lesley: Oh yes, they did. 
 
Me: Yes. So, this is another thing we can learn, another strength that we can develop 
because of this. 
 
Lesley: Yes. So, if someone looked at me and sort of had an unpleasant look on their 
face, I'd think, what's wrong with me? But now I don't. 
 
Me: [laughs] 
 
Lesley: I think, what's wrong with them? What's their problem? 
 
Me: [laughs]. It's a much more sensible way of looking at things, isn't it? And, it's a much 
safer way of looking at things too, isn't it? Much more comfortable. 
 
Lesley.:  And  I  noticed  that  other  people  still  have  this  reverence  for  other  people's 
opinions. 
 Me: Oh yes. 
 
Lesley: And I'm just free of that. 
 
 
This conversation was revolutionary for me. I had realised for a long time that other people's 
attitudes could only be disabling if I willingly took them on board. Still, letting go of the desire to 
please others seemed like a quantum leap that was impossible for me to take. Talking to Lesley 
made me realise just how foolish my preoccupations with other people's reactions, particularly 
strangers', actually were. Letting go of self-consciousness and shame allows one to move in the 
world with an identity that is more self-defined and constant. As president of the Christchurch 
branch of the Disabled People's Assembly, Lesley works for wide scale political change, while 
on another level she redefines herself and her perspectives so that the oppressive world view 
which exists towards disability does not encroach on her identity. 
 
Nancy expressed the same refusal to take other people’s reactions on board when asked about 
whether she had been hurt by other people’s opinions. To this she replied: 
 
Nancy: … really more indignant than hurt. 
 
Me: Ah. 
 
Nancy: Really, I think that my reaction... 
 
Me: It's a better reaction. I'd prefer to be indignant than hurt. 
 
Nancy: Yes, I don't think I've really been hurt because it's been so... it shouldn't have 
happened. That's all I can say, indignant rather than hurt. 
 
Me: Well, that says a lot because being hurt means that perhaps it is then having an 
effect on your identity, whereas being indignant you are going, no, this is nothing to do 
with how I am and how I should be seen. 
 
Nancy: That's right! 
 
Me: And you are being indignant, so you are retaining your identity in that reaction. 
 
Nancy: Yes, yes! 
 
Once again I was incredibly inspired by this attitude. Like Lesley, Nancy refuses to be defined 
by other people's prejudices and retains a strong sense of self in the face of negative attitudes 
and behaviour. Rather than seeing others as mirrors which reflect back an image one can only feel ashamed of, it is possible to see them as reflections of unfortunate social attitudes which 
need to be resisted. 
 
Personal Reflections and Change 
 
At this point I must admit that the first time I attempted to code for sexuality within the data and 
to write of sexual resistance, my own disabling self-prejudices curtailed my ability to see the 
liberatory potential which existed both within the data and within myself. At that point, I was 
drawing  on  Eli  Clare’s  (1999)  arguments  about  developing  subversive  and  empowering 
imagery. And even she recognised the difficulties inherent in healing the sense of rejection, 
failure and loss. Thus she writes: 
 
But how do I write about my body reclaimed, full of pride and pleasure? It is easy to say 
that abuse and ableism and homophobia stole my body away, broke my desire, removed 
me from my pleasure in the stones warm against my skin, the damp sponginess of moss 
growing on  a  rotten  log,  the  taste  of  spring  water  dripping  out  of  rock.  Harder  to 
express how  that  break  becomes healed,  a  bone  once  fractured,  now  whole,  but 
different from the bone never broken. And harder still to follow the path between the two. 
How do I mark this place where my body is no longer an empty house, desire whistling 
lonely through the cracks, but not yet a house fully lived in (Clare 1999: 32) ? 
 
In dealing with these issues, and in my attempt to come to terms with them, I wrote on 15 June 
2003:  
 
I can only reach out across the abyss and clutch at half formed images and broken 
dreams. For, in my own life, I have made no momentous or even baby steps forward in 
resisting the disabling attitudes which overlay the experience of impaired sexuality and 
appearance.  I  may  well  recognise  the  faulty  expectations  that  are  tied  to  the 
oppressively  narrow  territory  of  the  norm  and  I  can  claim  to  have  made  a  shaky 
beginning in my newly empowered attempt to resist seeing myself in terms of other 
people's negative attitudes. However, within the part of me that is most influenced by the 
kind of cultural imagery that leaves many of us feeling unsightly and undesirable and, 
thus, unlovable, my fragile core seems intent on eluding any of my attempts to politically 
reframe the position of my impaired body in social space. This vulnerable, very private 
centre of my "self" is most susceptible to the kind of crippling diffidence engendered by 
socially created expectations, while being, simultaneously, the least responsive to the 
promises of social change. For, no matter how strong I become as a political creature, 
my broken body exists as a concrete and indelible reminder of my deepest sources of 
fear and shame. 
 
I now look back on those words from a space which allows me to experience a great deal more 
freedom and self-acceptance. This was partly the result of having read Shakespeare, Gillespie 
and Sells (1996) The Sexual Politics of Disability: Untold Desires. This involved an extensive qualitative research project aimed at filling the void which had existed in both the conventional, 
heavily medicalised field of sexual rehabilitation and in disability studies itself, by setting out ‘to 
explore the emotional and sexual experiences of disabled people in a variety of key areas, 
relying predominantly on the verbatim accounts of disabled people themselves’ (1). What resulted 
was a collage of empowering stories which embody the personal experience of reclaiming a 
sexual identity as well as a critical theoretical framework in which to better understand them. 
Together, this combination of theory and practice serves to demonstrate that the social model can 
be extended to argue that ‘the barriers to sexual and emotional fulfilment do not reside in the 
impairments  of  the  body  but  in  the  restrictions  of  our  society’  (12).  Many  of  the  stories in 
Shakespeare et al’s. research resonated with subversive potential. They did this by challenging 
the gender stereotypes which constrain our choice of roles, sexual orientation and appearance; 
describing ways of thinking about and creating pleasure which exist outside of the expectations 
of conventional, heterosexual penetrative sex; and exemplifying much more effective ways of 
communicating needs, desires and preferences which fly in the face of the assumption that 
“good sex” is achieved through instinct and non-verbal cues.  
 
Shortly after I read Shakespeare et al’s work, I became engrossed in two special issues of 
Sexuality  and  Disability  (2000)  (Volume  18,  issues  3  &  4)  which  further  strengthened  my 
understanding of the nature of the “disabled identity” and the possibility of challenging the forces 
that produce it. Around the same time I began to read what I refer to in Chapter Ten as the 
“sexual rehabilitation texts”. While these texts were, in the main, heavily medicalised and based 
on individualistic prescriptions, scattered throughout them are certain emancipatory insights. For 
example,  Bullard  &  Knight  (1981)  draw  from  a  range  of  personal  perspectives,  both  from 
disabled  academics  and  research  participants,  which  touch  on  issues  of  subversion  and 
consciousness-raising. 
 
The more I read about disability and sexuality from people who were not trapped in traditional 
normative prescriptions, the more inspired I became by the possibilities for change in both my 
research and my personal life. Based on this these inspirations, I recalled three dialogues I had 
engaged in where the participants had spoken about changes to their sexual abilities and how 
they had responded to them. While these dialogues had only contained brief references, they 
suggested much in relation to the loosening of normative ties. Adrienne had said  ‘Sure, the old 
ways of having sex were no longer an option  … But, use your imagination [pause] anything is 
possible’. When I had asked her later about this, she spoke about developing more pleasurable 
ways of engaging in sex with her partner,  saying that ‘we both discovered ways of giving 
pleasure that we’d never have thought of if we’d stayed stuck in the patterns of, you know, 
quote,  unquote,  normal  sex  (personal  email  correspondence  11/2/04).  And  Neil,  who  was 
quoted earlier as saying that, initially, his impotence had resulted in him not being able to ‘feel 
like a real man anymore’, later mentioned that he had learned new ways of pleasuring his wife 
manually and orally with the consequence that  ‘I see sex in a completely different way.’   
In a conversation with Angus, the idea that sex is about performance rather than pleasure was 
beautifully articulated. Angus, who had earlier said that, ‘you see, I would run out of puff before I 
could reach orgasm and she, you know, began to feel inadequate because things weren’t in 
keeping with standard expectations’, explained later that:  
 
Then one day, it was morning and we were in bed, just mucking around, not keen to get 
up, and I said to [Alice], “let me pleasure you”, and I could see that she really, finally got 
it … I could pleasure her and she could pleasure me and all the rest was so much 
window dressing. 
 
Angus’ idea that sex is about pleasure rather than performance and that normative expectations 
can  be  dismissed  as  ‘so  much  window  dressing’  is  symbolic  of  the  attitudes  expressed by 
Adrienne  and  Neil  and  many  of  the  others  I  have  encountered  in  the  literature,  both 
conventional  and  openly  political.  All  of  them  challenges  oppressive  notions  of  sex  and 
sexuality. In the same way, Eli Clare (1999) calls for images ‘within disability communities and 
mainstream culture’ that are ‘honest, solid, shimmering, powerful, joyful images—of crip bodies 
and sexuality in the same way we need crip humor, crip pride, crip culture’ (117). Recalling 
poems like Marie Wade’s ‘A Night Alone’, Kenny Fries’ ‘Love Poem’, and P. H. Leay’s ‘The 
Hidden History of People with Disabilities’, Eli Clare says that: 
 
With these images, I can begin to tunnel through my sense of being ugly and clumsy, 
unattractive and undesirable. When I look in the mirror, I can remember Joey on stage as 
a lover and a man with CP, his hands grasping, speech halting, in ways that look and 
sound familiar. I can see myself as sexy (117-119). 
 
I feel the same way about the “images” and insights which have emerged through my research. 
They have enabled me to see that ways of thinking about sexuality and of being sexual exist 
outside  of  the  mainstream  and,  as  a  consequence,  I  am  shedding  much  of  the  self-
consciousness and shame which encapsulated my formerly insurmountable sense of loss. Over 
the past year my illness and impairments have worsened in ways which have further limited my 
physical movement and changed my appearance. Yet, ultimately, the merging of these changes 
with my growing awareness of the possibilities inherent in escaping the norm have resulted in a 
dramatic increase in the level of intimacy, communication and sensual pleasure that I share with 
my partner and a weakening of the connection between how I look and how I feel about myself. 
How this shift of consciousness can help to challenge current forms of governance becomes 
apparent in the concluding section of this thesis. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART FOUR 
 
Governing Disability Through Technologies of the Self 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Technologies of the self are meant to be performed by people who believe that doing so 
is an exercise in democratic freedom, but instead improves the ability of the people to be 
governed (Powers 2003: 233). 
 
The narratives provide powerful examples of the ways in which identity can become either 
disabled or enabled in response to normalising pressures. Yet, to fully appreciate the processes 
of identity formation which crystallise through the disinterment of subjugated knowledges, it is 
necessary  to  undertake  a  further  level  of  analysis  which  will  place  these  notions  of 
subjectification in their current political context. Whereas my genealogy of disability in Part Two 
provides the broad brushstrokes for understanding how impairment has come to result in the 
disabling of identity, and the narratives which frame Part Three fill in the finer detail of the lived 
experience of disability, my final layer of analysis offers the potential to link the macro- and the 
micro-sociological facets of this study by making sense of these stories and their historical 
context both in terms of the part they play in, and what they reveal about, our contemporary 
systems of rule. In this respect I draw on the insights offered by governmentality theorists. 
 
Governmentality can be usefully understood as a historically specific genealogical tool.
9 The 
sites of analysis favoured by governmentality theorists tend to involve the recent and ongoing 
transition from the so called “paternalism” of the welfare state to the economic rationalism and 
shrinking of the public sector inherent under neoliberalism. This juncture provides a particularly 
potent nexus through which to better understand contemporary processes of subjectification 
and their imbrication in the construction of disability as a governmental concept, that is, as a 
concept  which  functions  to  shape  the  way  people  think  and  act.  By  subjecting  “work”, 
“independence” and “sexuality” to an analysis which will locate them within the diffuse networks 
of  power  which  now  serve  to  govern  us  ‘at  a  distance’,  it  becomes  possible  not  only  to 
understand how what appear to be the most intimate areas of our identities are continuously in 
process with governmental forms, but, as I have argued in Part Two in keeping with Foucault’s 
genealogical  objectives,  it  can  aid  in our understanding of how we can and do manage to 
loosen our ties to negative self-perceptions. 
 
As it was pointed out in Chapter One, governmentality studies traditionally steer well away from 
narrative sources and focus instead on textual material. Given that I am now about to focus the 
insights emerging from the narratives through a governmental lens, it is important that I briefly 
revisit the methodological issues which framed my decision to incorporate qualitative data in this 
kind of analysis. In this I draw inspiration from Stenson (1999) who argues against what he 
refers to as the ‘textual determinism’ inherent in governmentality studies (56). Stenson believes 
that, by focusing exclusively on texts, the governmentality approach risks retaining a ‘top down, 
even implicitly state-centred view of government’ which neglects to engage with ‘the messiness, 
tensions and ambiguities of everyday practices’ (op cit. 60, 59). He concludes by saying: 
                                                   
9 Please refer to pages 25-28 for a  full description of governmentality as a concept and as an analytical tool.  
In other words, under the auspices of [a] second model of governmentality, we need to 
go beyond a formal recognition of the great complexity of governmental techniques and 
accelerate the development and appropriation of a range of research tools, which will 
enable us to realize the rich research agenda which has been laid out. It is essential to 
supplement  text-based  analysis  with  this  kind  of  empirical  research,  including 
ethnographic  explorations  of  [those  whose  lives  are]  rarely  filtered  through  the 
researcher-friendly medium of texts (Stenson 1999: 59). 
 
When viewed from this perspective, the narratives which have been encapsulated in the last 
four chapters can be seen to provide a rich resource to mine alongside more traditional archival 
and discursive forms. I believe that the voices which were raised in the qualitative component 
provide clear demonstrations of the ways in which subjectivity is formed through the rationalities 
and technologies which currently shape our understanding of disability. And I also believe that, 
by presenting us with concrete examples of how people deal with the disabling of their identities 
by  acting  in  ways  which  either  serve  to  reinforce  or  subvert  the  norm,  the  narratives 
demonstrate  innovative  and  illuminating  responses  to  the  reality  that  disability  has  been 
constructed as a pivotal counterpoint to the norm. 
 
What is most illuminating in relation to the narratives, however, is the fact that the categories 
which emerged from the data coding process can be shown to be key sites of subjectification for 
people in general as opposed to issues which specifically affect those who become disabled. 
Accordingly, the following analyses into the ways in which disability and disabled subjectivity are 
currently being played out are based on the premise that work, independence and sexuality are 
being utilised as fundamental organising concepts in drawing the division between the affiliated 
and the marginalised in contemporary Western society. Recall Robert Murphy (1990), Marjorie 
Wagner (1986) and Glen’s statements [Part Three] in relation to how disabled people tend to be 
seen as either subverting or failing to achieve the norm. 
 
It hardly needs saying that the disabled, individually and as a group, contravene all the 
values of youth, virility, activity, and physical beauty that Americans cherish, however 
little most individuals may realize them (Murphy 1990: 117). 
 
It is unpardonable in an individualist society to fail to be seen as  self sufficient. Our 
society  values  a  false  sense  of  independence  which results  in pain and a sense of 
worthlessness for women and men whose capabilities have been ignored and whose 
potential has been uniformly underdeveloped (Wagner 1986: 97).  
 
Glen: You know, you just want to be…….I don't like using this……normal …and treated 
like they'd treat anyone. 
 The governmentality approach insists that words such as ‘youth’, ‘virility’, ‘activity’, ‘beauty’ and 
‘independence’ need to be recontextualised in terms of what are now considered the essential 
qualities  of  the neoliberal citizen, those which define our current understandings of what is 
‘normal’ (see Rose 1999; Dean 1999). Here the subject of government is constructed as active, 
enterprising,  autonomous,  self-reliant  and  capable  of  achieving  and  maintaining  a  level  of 
fitness  and  physical  attractiveness  that  will  ensure  sexual  desirability.  The  winners  in  this 
process  of  normalisation  are  supposedly  those  who  can  most  closely  approximate  these 
qualities and among the losers are those who remain passive, dependent and/or unattractive by 
normative standards.  
 
What is pivotal to a governmentality reading of the mechanics of neoliberal subjectification is the 
understanding, firstly, that no one really ends up feeling like a winner because the impossibility 
of attaining the norm tends to keep even those who may appear successful feeling like they are 
falling short of these ideals (see Harris 1994), and, secondly, disabled people are no longer to 
be left untended to serve as continual reminders of what not to be. Rather, they are increasingly 
being encouraged to develop the qualities of the active and enterprising neoliberal citizen so 
that they will no longer be “disabled” and it is this governmental process, one which purports to 
offer emancipation from a marginalised status, which will be explored in the remainder of Part 
Four.   
 
To fully appreciate how this process of government operates, it is vital to understand that under 
the political rationalities associated with liberalism, whether in the form of welfare liberalism or 
neoliberalism, subjects are wherever possible to be governed through their “freedom”. Here 
Burchell (1996) points out that freedom needs to be understood, not as a ruse disguising the 
intentions  of  those  in  power,  but  as  ‘a  technical condition  of  rational  government’  (24). 
According  to  this  understanding,  and  in  the  current  historical  context,  the  enterprising  and 
autonomous individual exercises choices which are mediated by expert knowledges and the 
market place. As Rose (1999) explains: 
 
the problem of freedom now comes to be understood in terms of the capacity of an 
autonomous individual to establish an identity through shaping a meaningful everyday 
life. Freedom is seen as autonomy, the capacity to realize one's desires in one's secular 
life, to fulfil one's potential through one's own endeavours, to determine the course of 
one's own existence through acts of choice (Rose 1999: 84). 
 
Thus, it is freedom in this contemporary liberal sense which enjoins the individual, via a range of 
technologies, to the aspirations which are central to current political rationalities such as those 
which define the tenets of ideal neoliberal citizenship.  
 
 In the following two chapters I will seek to demonstrate that the two most salient technologies 
through  which  the  processes  of  subjectification  can  be  understood  in  relation  to  work, independence and sexuality operate through welfare reform policy and the literature focused on 
sexual rehabilitation. I argue that both forms of intervention in the lives of disabled people can 
be seen to be ‘technologies of the self’ in that they have been devised to  
 
permit individuals  to  effect  by  their  own  means  or  with  the  help  of  others  a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way 
of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (Foucault 1988m: 18). 
 
As such, welfare reform can be seen to be aimed at facilitating the restoration of passive, 
dependent individuals who are “at risk of long term unemployment” to their roles as active 
citizens so that they can once again define themselves as occupationally engaged and self-
reliant.  Similarly,  the  sexual  counselling  and  self-help  literature  intends  to  facilitate  the 
development of improved body-esteem, sexual-esteem and sexual technique in accordance 
with  the  norms  surrounding  sexuality  and  appearance.  Both  appear  to  offer  emancipatory 
potential  and  access  to  positive  forms  of  identification  which  could  ultimately  lead  to  the 
disappearance of disability in its social model sense. However, as will become evident, these 
technologies have limited power to achieve what they promise because they largely remain tied 
to normative prescriptions and, thus, are more inclined to perpetuate the disabling of identity 
than to challenge it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER NINE 
 
Welfare Reform as a Risk Management Strategy and Technology of the 
Self 
 
The narratives outlined in Part Three indicate that people who develop impairments tend to 
experience their losses of independence and occupational status as key factors in the disabling 
of their identities. I contend that, in the contemporary context, the fundamental role that work 
and independence have come to play in the process of identity formation in general and, more 
specifically, in relation to the disabling of identity, can be best understood by analysing their 
immersion in current welfare reform policy and disability rights arguments. It can be shown that 
welfare reform and disability rights share an agenda which is based on the belief that increased 
access to employment is the fundamental unit of social change required to ensure that people 
with impairments regain their independence and are no longer disabled by their lack of access 
to social resources. It is my intention to problematise the logics upon which these frameworks 
for social change are constructed so as to bring to the surface the effects they have on the 
constitution of the neoliberal subject and the experience of disability in contemporary times. 
 
To  achieve  these  ends,  I  begin  by  exploring  the  context  in  which  welfare  reform  is  being 
developed. I argue that the perceived need to reform welfare systems in the first instance is 
based on shifting notions of the shape the ideal subject of government should take and that 
these are best understood when viewed against the backdrop painted by the withdrawal of the 
welfare  state and the reconfiguration of citizenship in terms of risk. I then draw on current 
Australian welfare reform policy documentation to show how the redefinition of disabled people 
as “job seekers” who are “at risk of long-term employment”, although it ostensibly promises the 
means through which to regain a positive identity in terms of independence and employment, 
contributes to their further marginalisation. Finally, I show that, by remaining trapped in the 
same value system which prioritises work and independence, the disability rights movement 
weakens its ability to contest the individualistic premises of welfare reform and, in an attempt to 
address these limitations, I draw on the narratives and certain challenges which are developing 
in response to the normative features of disability theory. 
 
Disabled by Dependency and Protection from Risk 
 
Under  the  earlier  form  of  the  welfare state, people excluded from employment because of 
disability were offered assistance in the form of varying degrees and styles of income support 
and  social  services  (OECD  2003a,  b).  These  systems  of  welfare  support  have  tended  to 
operate  within  a  paternalistic  framework  of  state  sponsorship  which,  by  way  of  the  direct 
interventions  of  such  experts  as  doctors,  social  workers  and  rehabilitation  professionals, 
provided “guidance” and ongoing assessment. Since the early 1980s, however, these systems have increasingly come under attack because, it is claimed, they produce a form of dependency 
and passivity which is self-perpetuating and highly damaging to the life chances of welfare 
recipients. Rose (1996b) touches on this transition in the following description of the subject of 
welfare reform as construed by neoliberalism. 
 
[T]hey are people whose self-responsibility and self-fulfilling aspirations have been 
deformed by the dependency culture, whose efforts at self-advancement have been 
frustrated for so long that they suffer from "learned helplessness", whose self 
esteem has been destroyed. And, it thus follows, that they are to be assisted not 
through  the  ministrations  of  solicitous  experts  proffering  support  and  benefit  cheques, 
but  through  their  engagement  in  a  whole  array  of  programmes  for  their  ethical 
reconstruction  as  active  citizens  —  training  to  equip  them  with  the  skills  of  self-
promotion, counselling to restore their sense of self-worth and self-esteem, programmes 
of empowerment to enable them to assume their rightful place as the self-actualizing 
and demanding subjects of an "advanced" liberal democracy (59-60) 
 
Thus, welfare programmes are no longer to be aimed at maintaining a static system of income 
support and assistive services, the hallmark of the welfare state. They are instead to be focused 
upon facilitating what Rose refers to as the ‘ethical transformation’ of its subjects into ‘active 
citizens’, a transformation which has at its primary objective the redefinition of disabled people 
in terms of their ‘work capacity’, ‘job readiness’ and ‘self-reliance’.
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This shift in perspective has been shaped in accordance with an increasingly potent rationality 
of government, that which is tied to notions of “risk”. In his seminal treatise, Risk Society, Beck 
(1992) argues that: 
 
In advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically accompanied by 
the  social  production  of  risks.  Accordingly,  the  problems  and  conflicts  relating  to 
distribution in a society of scarcity overlap with the problems and conflicts that arise from 
the production, definition, and distribution of techno-scientifically produced risks (19). 
 
As such, Beck (1992), and others like Giddens (1994), view “risk society” as a reality which has 
been brought about by contemporary social and economic forces. Giddens characterises (and 
criticises) the traditional welfare state on the basis that ‘[t]he more it tried to guarantee security and 
minimize risk, the more it fostered dependency and established new risks - risks that were perceived as  
both  the  product  of  its  own  inefficiencies  and  its  entrapment  of  its  subjects’  (Pratt  1999:  14). 
Conversely, an analytics of governmentality proposes that risk is simply a way of seeing things 
which, as Dean (1999) argues, ‘render[s] reality in such a form as to make it amenable to types 
of action and intervention’ (178). And, when applied to income support programmes, the notion 
of risk can be seen to provide the rationale which underpins the perceived imperative to reform 
systems of welfare provision.   
Higgs  (1998)  points  out  that  sociological  understandings  of  risk,  such as those mapped out by 
Giddens  and  Beck,  support  the  belief  that,  by  ‘accepting  the  challenges  offered  by  risk  and 
reflexive modernization’ and ‘abandoning some of the securities of the past’ such as those 
offered through welfarism, the neoliberal subject becomes empowered to pursue market driven 
pathways  to  success  (179).  Giddens  (1994)  describes  this  subject  of  government  as  ‘the 
autotelic self’: 
 
Schemes  of  positive  welfare  …  would  be  directed  to  fostering  the  autotelic  self. 
The autotelic  self  is  one  with  an  inner  confidence  which  comes  from  self  respect, 
and one where a sense of ontological security originating in basic trust, allows for the 
positive appreciation of social difference. It refers to a person able to translate potential 
threats  into  rewarding challenges,  someone  who  is  able  to  turn  entropy  into  a 
consistent flow of experience. The autotelic self does not seek to neutralise risk or to 
suppose that 'someone else will take care of the problem'; risk is confronted as the 
active challenge which generates self-actualisation (192).  
 
The autotelic self is the ideal neoliberal citizen who embraces risk. When defined against the 
autotelic self, the subject of welfare, by having been ‘shielded from risk’, is viewed, as Rose 
describes above, as ‘deformed by dependency culture’ and, thus, ripe for rehabilitation or, in 
neoliberal terms, self-actualisation, in the drive to achieve full neoliberal status. 
 
However, according to a governmentality perspective, welfare reform is not to be understood as 
a  response  to  an  increase  in  the  actual  number  and  intensity  of  risks.  Rather,  it  is  a 
reconfiguration of dependency and employment status in terms of an ever shifting alchemy of 
risk management strategies. While the welfare state operated through the technology of social 
insurance which served to collectivise risk, the retraction of welfare support associated with 
neoliberalism can be understood to have resulted from what O’Malley (1996) has coined as the 
development of the concept of ‘prudentialism’. He explains that prudentialism is 
 
a technology of governance that removes the key conception of regulating individuals 
by collectivist risk management, and throws back upon the individual the responsibility 
for managing risk. This is advocated by its supporters as "efficient", for individuals will 
be  driven  to  greater  exertion and enterprise by the need to insure against adverse 
circumstances - and the more enterprising they are, the better the safety net they can 
construct (197). 
 
Accordingly, people who have been assessed as “disabled” and, therefore, eligible for income 
support are currently being redefined as “at risk of long-term unemployment”. This is a shift 
which, while it acknowledges the historical relationship which exists between the concepts of 
                                                                                                                                                     
10 These terms are used in the Australian welfare reform documentation which will be explored in the following section. “work” and “disability”, essentially aims to reduce disabled people’s access to a level of income 
support which is higher than that received by unemployed people while increasing the points at 
which surveillance and guidance are applied to their lives.  
 
Thus,  as  Lupton  (1999)  argues,  ‘[t]he  designation  of  the  label  “at  risk”  often  serves  to 
reinforce the  marginalized  or  powerless  status of individuals’ (113). In the case of disabled 
people, this potential for further marginalisation is associated not only with a reduction in access 
to special benefits by way of reclassifying disabled people as simply “unemployed”, but it rests, 
more fundamentally, on the development of a new benchmark in relation to “active citizenship”. 
Under the increasingly persistent demands of the notion of enterprising subjectivity, those who 
fail  to  achieve  independence  through  employment  will  be  accused  of  lacking  the  qualities 
necessary  for  self-actualisation.  As  O’Malley  (1996)  argues,  the  unemployed  have  a 
responsibility to upgrade their skills, self-esteem and marketability and, if they do not succeed 
and continue ‘to rely on the state to deal with the harmful effects of known, calculable and 
individually manageable risks’, they can only be perceived as ‘feckless and culpable’ (202).  
 
As a consequence of neoliberalism’s basic premise that emancipation stems from change at the 
level of the individual, welfare reform as a risk management strategy exists in tension between 
two  opposing  modes  of  subjectification.  One  appears  to  offer  the  potential  to  aid  in  the 
reconfiguration of the disabled identity in more positive, empowering terms, while the other 
threatens to impose an even less desirable identity due to the effects of poverty and victim 
blaming which logically follow from prudentialism’s focus on individual responsibility rather than 
social  change.  This  tension  can  be  effectively  foregrounded  and  clarified  by  exploring  the 
linguistic  foundations  of  current  Australian  welfare  reform  policy  and  its  relationship  to  the 
liberatory language of the disability rights movement. By analysing the terminology which is 
currently being devised to redefine disability, disabled people and their proposed modes of 
emancipatory action, it becomes possible to untangle what remains normalising and, as such, 
oppressive, and what may properly enable subversion. 
 
The Appropriation of Liberatory Language within Australian Welfare Reform Policy 
 
Australian  welfare  reform  policy,  as  it  is  currently  being  promoted  by  the  Commonwealth 
Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS) and outlined in the McClure Reports 
(FaCS  2000a,  b)  and  Australians  Working  Together  (FaCS  2002a),  would  appear,  on  the 
surface, to offer disabled people the potential to achieve the state of full social participation and 
independence that is at the heart of the disability rights agenda. Indeed, if, as both welfare 
reformers and disability activists argue, "disability" is understood, not as a medical or physical 
problem, but as a state of social exclusion caused by lack of access to employment and social 
resources, then the removal of these barriers to inclusion should theoretically be capable of 
making  "disability"  disappear.  I  argue  that  this  apparent  confluence  of  positions  between government  and  proponents  of  the  social  model  has  eventuated,  firstly,  because  the 
Government has been able to reappropriate facets of the liberatory language that has framed 
the disability rights movement for the past three decades, and, secondly, because the disability 
rights movement has embedded some of its major objectives in the same framework of meaning 
and value which underpin the kind of libertarian policies which will ultimately undermine them.  
 
From the landmark speech delivered by the then Minister for Family and Community Services, 
Jocelyn Newman (1999a), to the present time where welfare reform is being articulated through 
Australians Working Together (FaCS 2002a) and the 2002-2003 Federal Budget’s ‘Recognising 
and improving the work capacity of people with a disability’ (FaCS 2002b), language which has 
been pivotal to the articulation of the aims of the disability rights movement has been utilised in 
such  a  way  as  to  suggest  that  the  proposed  changes  to  the  welfare  system  are  entirely 
consistent with emancipatory objectives. Consider, for example, the following statement which 
outlines the fundamental principles of the Commonwealth Disability Strategy. 
 
The Government's vision for Australia is a society where all Australian's can live, work 
and participate fully in community life. Nearly one in five Australian have a disability and 
the Government is committed to widening their opportunities for independence, access 
and participation (italics mine) (FaCS 2000c: 2). 
 
The terms “independence”, “access”, and “participation” represent concepts which are pivotal to 
the disability rights agenda. When, for example, the Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation (UPIAS) launched the social model in Britain in 1976, it based its arguments on the 
premise that people with impairments had been disabled by 'help which essentially entrenches 
our dependence on the state instead of encouraging our independence and active participation 
in the mainstream of life' (italics added) (as cited in Oliver 1996: p. 25). The language and 
concepts it employed thus appear to be reproduced in the fundamental principles of welfare 
reform in Australia. I will show, however, that a closer appraisal of the concepts in which these 
terms are embedded reveals vastly different agendas. In this respect, I return to the insights 
developed in Chapter Three where it was argued that surface meanings which often appear to 
mirror “reality” are always immersed in particular conceptual landscapes which determine the 
“truths” they purport to represent. In relation to an analytics of governmentality, Rose (1999) 
argues:  
 
It is possible to govern only within a certain regime of intelligibility - to govern is to act 
under a certain description.  Language is not secondary to government; it is constitutive 
of it.  Language not only makes acts of government describable; it also makes them 
possible  (28) 
 
To point to differing conceptual frameworks in relation to welfare reform and disability rights is 
not to claim that they are not largely constructed from within the same ‘regime of intelligibility’. Neoliberal ideals are extremely pervasive and are as integral to the desires and aspirations of 
the governed as they are to the frameworks of government. However, what is at variance here 
is a rudimentary conflict between the individualistic view which currently drives welfare reform 
and rests on the belief that it is the individual who is responsible for change and the social 
model view which prioritises change at the level of society, a view which, although it has some 
points  of  overlap  with  neoliberal  ideals,  is  fundamentally  at  odds  with  the  rhetoric  of 
prudentialism. In the following section I suggest that an analysis of each party’s use of the term 
“access” and its relationship to the concepts of “independence” and “participation” provides a 
particularly effective means for pinpointing the nature of this discursive dissonance and the way 
it ultimately affects the kinds of subjective locations which are available to disabled people. 
 
“Access” as Inclusive Versus “Access” as Exclusionary 
 
If “independence” is the primary goal of the disability rights movement, a goal that both relies 
upon and facilitates participation, then “access” emerges as one of the principal means for 
achieving it. In keeping with welfare reform policy, the disability rights movement agrees that 
access and employment are intimately linked, as access to employment and access through 
employment are vital components in the quest for independence. As Russell (1998) points out: 
‘Activists  contend  that disability  oppression  is  about  discrimination  and  lack  of  access. 
Since society  grants  status  based  on  work,  being  able  to  work  is  a  way  to move  beyond 
dehumanization’ (81). Under this view, the removal of the barriers which prevent people with 
impairments from accessing social resources including employment is seen to necessitate a 
range of structural changes, such as, adaptations to the built environment to increase physical 
access to public spaces, the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation to increase access to 
employment, better access to goods and services which can contribute to independence, and 
the contestation of attitudes and cultural imagery which devalue disabled people so that they 
can access more positive identities. 
 
The  concept  of  “access”  as  it  has  been  woven  throughout  current  welfare  reform 
documentation, however, means something entirely different. In very much the same way that 
words such as ‘joycamps’ functioned as euphemisms for forced labour camps in Orwell’s (1948) 
Newspeak, so the use of the word “access” by policy makers functions in a deceptive manner to 
conceal intentions which are in direct contradiction to “access” as it is promoted by the disability 
rights movement. The Australian Government claims that disabled people’s lack of access to 
employment is the result of an income support system which is too ‘generous’ and which serves 
to ‘reduce labour market attachment’ (FaCS 2000a: 34, 39). This argument has culminated in 
the decision to redefine disabled people as those ‘at risk of long-term unemployment’ and, as a 
consequence, to shift large numbers of them from the Disability Support Pension (DSP) to 
Newstart  (an  equally  Orwellian  euphemism  for  unemployment  benefits),  where  they  will 
supposedly have greater access to the labour market (FaCS 2002b).   
Before exploring these changes to the DSP in more detail, it is pertinent to discuss the pivotal 
role played by access within the current neoliberal rationale. As in the case of disability rights, 
“access” is being viewed as the answer to social problems deriving from its inverse, “exclusion”. 
Yet, as Rose (1999) points out, this entails the logics of individual responsibility rather than 
those which would contribute to social change. 
 
Social problems are recast as 'the problem of the excluded'. The unemployed are under-
stood as those excluded from regular work. Poverty is understood as exclusion from the 
resources  and  benefits  necessary  to  participate  as  a  full  citizen  in  the  life  of  the 
community. And these various forms of exclusion are to be counteracted by strategies of 
inclusion, for example an 'intelligent welfare state' which gives 'a hand up not a hand 
out', active labour market policies involving training and job search, even, in the words of 
the current leader of the Labour Party, enfolding and embracing all in a 'stakeholder 
economy' (258). 
 
In this context, “access” or “inclusion” is believed to be achievable via the provision of expert 
guidance and training aimed at assisting disabled people to become self-actualising subjects 
who are capable of competing in the employment market as it stands. When understood in this 
way, access requires the removal of the safety net of special forms of income support, but 
disconnects itself from the perceived need to change the social structures which have excluded 
disabled people from full economic and social participation in the first place. Hence, the prime 
mode of increasing “access” for disabled people comes to rely on the removal of the more 
generous  system  of  benefits  and  income  support  currently  offered  to  compensate  for  the 
additional costs of disability. It is now believed that, by being sheltered from the risks inherent in 
an employment environment which is increasingly being structured around short term and/or 
part-time jobs, disabled people have been given too many incentives to remain unemployed. 
Consider Senator Newman’s (1999b) original arguments in relation to incentives. 
 
Disability Support Pension is paid at a higher rate than Newstart Allowance, it has more 
generous income and assets tests than some other payments, it is not activity-tested, it 
is not taxable and it gives people access to the Pensioner Concession Card (17). 
 
Following this, first in the McClure Reports (FaCS 2000a: 35; FaCS 2000b: 19) and then in the 
policy developments which followed, it has been claimed that ‘better conditions for pensions 
create incentives for people to go on pensions rather than allowances, and reduces their focus 
on seeking paid work’ and that this results in some people ‘downplaying their abilities’ (FaCS 
2002c: 13). Evident here is the form of economic rationalism whereby benefit reductions are 
justified on the grounds that overgenerous benefits encourage rort, deception and passivity. 
This logic, however, is overlaid by a different discourse which justifies reform in the name of 
increased access and improved opportunities. Hence, while one part of government discourse is steeped in individualism and economic rationalism, another speaks in terms of empowerment 
and social justice.
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This  vacillation  between  empowerment  and  coercion  encourages  the  Australian  public  to 
engage in Orwellian “doublethink”, the ability to hold two completely contradictory beliefs in 
one's mind simultaneously and accept both of them. And one of the reasons why this kind of 
contradiction remains below the level of consciousness is because, as Rose (1999) argues, 
freedom and coercion enjoy an intimate connection within neoliberalism. 
 
[T]he programmatic and strategic deployment of coercion, whether it be in the name of 
crime control or the administration of welfare benefits, has been reshaped upon the 
ground of freedom, so that particular kinds of justification have to be provided for such 
practices. These might include, for example, the argument that the constraint of the few 
is a condition for the freedom of the many, that limited coercion is necessary to shape or 
reform  pathological individuals so that they are willing and able to accept the rights 
and responsibilities of freedom, or that coercion is required to eliminate dependency and 
enforce the autonomy of the will that is the necessary counterpart of freedom (10 ). 
 
Accordingly, the need for coercion is being defended through the argument that ‘some people 
lack confidence in their own capacities or the motivation to test their prospects for themselves, 
while a small group may even view income support as an unconditional right’ (FaCS 2000a: 57). 
Hence,  some  people  will  require  ‘persuasion’  and  ‘encouragement’  and  ‘the  most  resistant 
group may need to be compelled to consider and ultimately to undertake a course of activity that 
might lead towards greater self-reliance’ (FaCS 2000a: 57). Occasionally, it is envisaged that 
‘complete withdrawal of income support [will be required] as the last resort where people have 
the capacity to participate and where there is no reasonable basis for non-compliance’ (ibid). 
Those people being shifted from the DSP to Newstart because it ‘will link these customers to 
suitable interventions or services … to improve their capacity to work’ (FaCS 2002b) may face 
serious  disadvantages given that any expression of doubt in relation to their level of ‘work 
capacity’ may result in them being viewed as ‘non-compliant’, ‘unmotivated’, ‘resistant’ or, even 
worse, as holding the view that ‘income support is an unconditional right’ (FaCS 2000a: 57).  
 
In  making  the  argument  that  coercive  measures  such  as  these  will  result  in  the  kind  of 
increased access that disabled people actually seek, government discourse draws liberally on 
the spatial metaphors which are employed in disability discourse. It is argued, for example, that 
welfare reform seeks to ‘break down’ the ‘rigid boundaries’ which have ‘constrained [disabled 
people’s]  access’  to  employment  (FaCS  2000a:  24,  25).  In  practice  this  will  be  achieved, 
                                                   
11 Australian welfare reform policy is focused upon here as it provides a strong example of the trends which are common 
across liberal democratic nations. In a similar vein, Bill Clinton (1992), for example, announced his aim to ‘end welfare 
as  we  know  it’  (O’Connor  2001:  5)  prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  Personal  Responsibility  and  Work  Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 and current British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, signalled the end of what he refers to as the 
‘something-for-nothing  welfare  state’  when  he  proposed  cuts  of  £1.2  billion  a  year  from  the  disability  benefits 
programme (Lyall, 1999: 3). beginning in March 2004, with the introduction of a new assessment procedure which is being 
described  as  a  ‘gateway’  through  which  access  will  be  gained  to  ‘better  outcomes  for  the 
individual in terms of participation in the community and employment’ (FaCS 2000b: 13). In 
reality, this gateway will lead to reduced access to the more generous income support category 
represented  by  the  DSP  without  any  associated  job  creation  schemes  or  labour  market 
adjustment. Under the new scheme, growing numbers of professionals and agencies will be 
called upon to intervene in the lives of disabled citizens. The role of doctors, who have long 
been  drawn  upon  to  act  as  ‘gatekeepers  for  disability  benefits’  (Hickel  2001:  237),  will  be 
supplemented  by  the  calculations  of  ‘work  capacity  assessors’  and  ‘psychologists’  who  will 
decide  who  should  be  moved  from  the  DSP  to  Newstart.  This  increase  in  the  range  and 
intensity of professional scrutiny follows from the upgrading of disabled people to a “high risk” 
category,  whereby  attempts  to  enhance  the  “freedom”  of  problematic  subjects  actually 
increases the points at which surveillance and coercion are likely to occur (Ericson & Haggerty 
1999). As Rose (1999) argues: 
 
a whole array of control agencies … become, at least in part, connected up with one 
another in circuits of surveillance and communication designed to minimize the riskiness 
of  the  most  risky.  They  form  a  multiplicity  of  points  for  the  collection,  inscription, 
accumulation and distribution of information relevant to the management of risk … The 
logics of risk inescapably locate the careers and identities of such tainted citizens within 
a regime of surveillance which actually constitutes them all as actually or potentially 'risky' 
individuals (260). 
 
The conviction that an array of behavioural specialists - psychologists, counsellors, educators 
and work capacity assessors - are needed to energise subjects and effect welfare reform harks 
back to the assumption that lack of motivation lies behind the “failure” of disabled people to find 
employment. This assumption remains deeply pervasive even though its premises have been 
seriously  undermined  by  a  recent  study  commissioned  by  the  Department  of  Family  and 
Community  Services  itself.  This  study,  which  evaluated  an  extensive  trial  of  the  proposed 
assessment process, the Assessment and Contestability Trial (FaCS 2003d), revealed that the 
interventions employed, such as vocational guidance, training, rehabilitation and job search 
support, had ‘no significant effect on job search, volunteer work or the proportion of individuals 
in  employment’  (Bruenig  et  al.  2003:  97).  Moreover,  an  associated  finding  by  the  ABS 
demonstrated that 97.1% of disabled people who had been actively seeking work were still 
unemployed a year later (cited by Argyrous 2003: 4). It is interesting, then, that the notion that 
unemployment  can  be  solved  by  way  of  behavioural  interventions  remains  integral  to  the 
development of current welfare reform strategies. 
 
What, then, does government offer disabled people in terms of job opportunities? The question 
is particularly pertinent in a period characterised by ‘a hostile labour market’ (McClelland 2002: 
                                                                                                                                                     
 218) where ‘there are still seven applicants out there for every job vacancy’ (Silkstone 2003: 8). 
True to its neoliberal foundations, welfare reform does not subscribe to job creation schemes 
and, in Australia, relies on an alternative mode of participation in the form of unpaid work. In a 
recently drafted handout aimed at DSP recipients it is suggested that ‘by doing Community 
Work you can benefit by gaining valuable skills and experience while giving something back to 
your community’ (FaCS 2003c: 1). A parallel argument is that engaging in volunteer work can 
be  thought  of  as  a  ‘strategy  to  develop  [one’s]  capacity  for  economic  participation’  (FaCS 
2000b: 4). Indeed, each of the case studies developed in the Interim McClure Report (FaCS 
2000a) to demonstrate how the new system would operate involved hypothetical instances of 
people who would ultimately regain a position in the workforce by initially volunteering their 
services for free (such as Hans who donned a back brace at age fifty and, after offering his 
services  for  free  to  an  internet  service  provider  for  six  months,  obtained  paid  work).  A 
particularly interesting facet of this enterprise is that the majority of voluntary work exists in the 
welfare sector so that, what Saunders (2002: 244) refers to as ‘ ”welfare work” being  performed 
by “welfare recipients” ' may end up serving both as a form of ‘workfare’ similar to Work for the 
Dole (O’Connor 2001) and a solution to the shrinking state welfare sector. This novel solution 
not  only  privileges  privatisation,  economic  rationalism  and  self-reliance,  but,  as  far  as  the 
authorities are concerned, will contribute to the ‘self-esteem’ and ‘psychological health’ of those 
who participate in this way (FaCS 2000b: 3).  
 
Apart from the poverty which will directly result from the proposed changes to the pension 
system, there are more subtle processes at play. In the absence of the structural reforms which 
would help to ensure that employment was indeed accessible to people whose impairments do 
not necessarily prevent them from working, the loss of the title of “disabled” will mean that 
disabled people will be consigned an identity which is even more oppressive than that held 
previously. Once seen as lacking the qualities of citizenship due to misfortune, disabled people 
will  now  be  in  the  most  precarious  position  of  an  ever  increasing  number  of  long-term 
unemployed, a group which is believed to comprise only those who fail to adequately respond to 
the challenges and opportunities inherent in contemporary “risk society”. In sum, welfare reform 
reconfigures disability as personal responsibility rather than a social imposition, a sleight of 
hand that leaves ‘disadvantaged job seekers’ with impairments with less means than ever for 
accessing or challenging normative identifications.   
 
Problematising the Imperative to Work and Be Independent 
 
So  far  I  have  argued  that  welfare  reform  policy  has  appropriated  certain  disability  rights 
language and concepts in its quest to justify both immediate cost-cutting and the longer term 
neoliberal agendas of privatisation and labour market flexibility. I now suggest that this has not 
occurred without some level of complicity, albeit largely unintentional, by those who seek to 
defend the interests of disabled people. One of the main reasons why the two camps appear to share a similar agenda is that both embed their arguments in the same paradigm or ‘frame’ and, 
therefore, tend to share ‘a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman 1993: 75).  Consequently, in Marks’ (1999) view, 
‘the social model’ weakens its position by ‘adopting many of the values of capitalist society by 
prioritising work and independence’ (88).   
 
Bagenstos (2003) points out that activists have often found it expedient to adopt the dominant 
rationale and cloak their arguments for increased access in terms of the savings it will bring and 
the self-reliance it will promote. Hence, disability theorists and disability rights leaders often 
speak in a distinctly neoliberal manner. Thus, for example, we have suggestions that ‘a national 
disability income might itself be exclusionary’ (Oliver & Barnes 1998); that the move ‘from a 
welfare  mentality  to  one  that  has  seen  [disabled  people]  become  contributing,  productive 
members  of  society’  is  to  be  applauded  (Roberts  1989:  239);  and  that  income  support 
encourages ‘childlike dependency’ and is ‘tantamount to denying the disabled both their right to 
participate in the life of the community and their right to full personhood’ (De Jong 1983: 18). All 
of these authors, while intending to speak on behalf of disabled people, appropriate neoliberal 
concepts and, as such, contribute to the myth that current welfare reform is emancipatory in 
nature. 
 
At an underlying level there are certain, seemingly immutable concepts that both government 
and disability proponents actually do share, concepts which are distinctly problematic in relation 
to issues of equality and access. These include the belief that, if the barriers to employment 
were removed, all people with functional limitations would be able to engage in paid work. 
Associated with this belief is the notion that employment is fundamental to a positive identity, 
the ability to be independent and the right to claim citizenship. The problems symbolised by this 
view are twofold. Firstly, due to the rapid rise in unemployment in response to the globalisation 
of labour, the effects of technological innovation and the shrinking of the public sector as an 
employer, there are not enough jobs to go around, and, secondly, some people simply cannot 
work because of the nature of their illnesses or impairments (Gallagher 1993).  
 
Abberley (1999) argues, alternatively, that ‘just because the main mechanism of our oppression 
is  our  exclusion  from  social  production,  we  should  be  wary  of  drawing  the  conclusion  that 
overcoming this oppression should involve our wholesale inclusion in it’ (12). He, along with  a 
growing  number  of  disability  theorists  (such  as  Gallagher 1993; Hillyer 1993; Marks 1999), 
believes that, even if anti-discrimination policies were successful in creating more employment 
opportunities for a proportion of the disabled population - something which is certainly not being 
facilitated by welfare reform policy - this could ‘have the effect of maintaining and perhaps 
intensifying its exclusion of the remainder’ (ibid). He goes on to argue that a truly liberatory 
theory  of  disability  would  require  the  rejection  of  ‘work  as  crucially  definitional  of  social 
membership’  and, instead, ‘the posing of values counter to the classical conservatives and radical consensus, the assertion of the rights of the human “being” against the universalisation 
of human “doing”’ (13). And, in conclusion, he reiterates ‘that full integration of impaired people 
in social production can never constitute the future to which all disabled people can aspire’ 
(ibid).   
 
This recalls the views of those participants who, as discussed in Chapter Seven, learned to let 
go of the imperative to work. Hunt’s (1966: 218-9) discussion is particularly important here. He 
writes of disabled people being able to ‘contribute in less obvious ways; even, and perhaps 
especially, if these seem insignificant beside the “real world of work” ‘ and suggests that ‘[o]ur 
freedom from the competitive trappings that accompany work in our society may give us the 
opportunity to demonstrate its essential elements’ and, as such, that ‘we can act as a symbol for 
the pre-eminent claims of non-utilitarian values, a visible challenge to anyone who treats his job 
as a final end itself’ (Hunt 1966: 218).  He also argues that if and when our physical conditions 
become so severely compromised that we can “do” nothing, we can demonstrate that being 
‘passive’, far from being seen in terms of failure, is ‘one half of the human reality.’ After all, he 
argues,  ‘[t]hose who lead active lives are perhaps especially inclined to ignore man's need to 
accept  passivity  in  relation  to  so  many  forces  beyond  his  control’  (Hunt  1966:  218-219). 
Although  Paul  Hunt  wrote  these  words  almost  forty years ago when neoliberalism was still 
relatively dormant, they present a strong argument against the tenets of individual responsibility 
and the belief that we have the power to control our circumstances and become active citizens 
no matter what.  
 
Hunt thus suggests that the condition of “disability” has the potential to teach valuable lessons 
to all people in relation to the constraints and misconceptions perpetuated by the normative 
view. The insights which the participants in this study raised in relation to “independence” have 
the same kind of effect. Whereas welfare reform policy equates independence with the capacity 
to stand alone financially and uses the word interchangeably with “self-reliance” or the capacity 
to do things without help (see FaCS 2000a, b; FaCS 2002a, b, c, d), many of the participants in 
this study, alongside a number of disability theorists, redefine independence in terms of inter-
dependence and an understanding of autonomy as the right to make choices and to have equal 
access to social resources (Reindal 1999; Bricher 2000).  In this way, independence as a state 
of complete self-reliance is exposed as a myth, the reality being that we are all dependent on 
one another and on a variety of existing structures for access to resources and meaningful lives 
(Davis 1998; Barnes 1999).  
 
When framed within a rationality which glorifies the ability to be self-reliant, the need for help 
can only be seen as unpalatable (Penning 2002) and it is commonly felt that people who do 
have to rely on others lack initiative and are somehow morally inferior (Bryan 2001: 324). This is 
why people who have such support needs so often feel ashamed, particularly, as was apparent 
in the narratives, if the fulfilment of these needs is seen in terms of "burden" and "self-sacrifice". In this study, this was brought into high relief at the point where it became apparent that there 
was a distinct division between those who had access to paid personal assistants and those 
who relied on the goodwill of friends and family. It is significant that the three New Zealand 
women who served to most clearly exemplify the benefits of access to formal care could be said 
to  be  among  the  most  functionally  impaired  people  in  the  sample.  Yet,  their  attitudes and 
lifestyles demonstrate a high degree of emancipation, such that they appear to be, in effect, less 
disabled, in a social model sense, than many of those whose impairments are greater. I have 
argued that this is because those who are forced to rely on informal support structures are in 
effect disabled by the shame and irrevocable gratitude that is linked to this form of dependence.  
 
It can thus be argued that feelings of shame serve to immobilise disabled people to a far greater 
degree than any of their physical restrictions because it often makes them afraid to ask for help 
and  to  feel  demoralised  when  they  do.  In  Wade’s  (1994:  89)  words  it  is often the hidden, 
unstated reason why 'millions of us don't get out of bed or get by with inadequate personal care. 
Because we don't want to say this need that shames us out loud …'. To remedy this shame and 
the  limitations,  both  structural  and  self-initiated,  that  it  invokes,  it  is  vital  to  politicise it by 
challenging the rationales which conflate independence with self-reliance. As Eli Clare (1999) 
was quoted as saying in Chapter Six: ‘Independent living advocates measure independence not 
by how many tasks one can do without assistance, but by how much control a disabled person 
has  over  his/her  life and  by  the quality of that life’ (89).This recognition that independence 
necessitates autonomy, not self-reliance, and that autonomy represents the capacity to make 
choices, is a vital ingredient in any effective movement for reform (Barnes 1992). 
 
In drawing out the connections between the concepts of “work” and “independence” and the 
identities of those who are disabled by them, I am not claiming that neoliberalism bears a 
singular responsibility for imposing marginalised identities on people with impairments because 
of  their  dissociation  from  the  employment  market  and  their  need  for  assistance.  As  the 
genealogy  outlined  in  Part  Two  demonstrates,  these  concepts  have  been  pivotal  to  the 
construction of “disability” over the past three centuries. However, what I do argue is that the 
rationality of neoliberalism overarches a whole new way of problematising disability and, as 
such,  of  affecting  the  processes  which  govern  subjectification  by  way  of  the  contemporary 
conceptualisation of work and independence. As a risk management strategy and a technology 
of  the  self,  welfare  reform  policy  is  a  particularly  powerful  mechanism  for  reinforcing  the 
prescriptions of the norm. And what results is that those who fall short of its precepts either feel 
stigmatised  and  inadequate  because  they  remain  defined  by  normative  principles  or  they 
ultimately  develop  the  resources to subvert the norm and, in this way, become capable of 
achieving a more liberated view of themselves than those who are able-bodied and not as 
inclined to recognise the operations and costs of the hegemonic norm.  
 
 
 CHAPTER TEN 
 
Constructing the Self in Relation to Sexuality 
 
The impact on identity at the site of sexual subjectification can also result in self-perceptions 
which are either limited by normative prescriptions or liberated by the recognition that these 
normalising boundaries are not immutable. Indeed, sexuality can be shown to be an even more 
pivotal site of identity construction and reality configuration than either work or independence. 
As  Hayden  (2001)  argues  when  drawing  from  Foucault’s  History  of  Sexuality,  ‘sexuality 
discourse is a primary site through which power operates; it is one of the means through which 
both individuals and populations are controlled, "normalized," and "disciplined" ‘ (30). Therefore, 
an analysis of the discourses which are currently being developed to govern the sexuality of 
disabled people can be expected to shed new light on why the narratives surrounding sexuality 
suggest that it may be the most difficult realm of identity loss to challenge and, indeed, to further 
illuminate the nature of contemporary subjectification in general. 
 
I begin by furnishing the historical and analytical background necessary for the exploration of 
the government of disabled people through their sexuality in contemporary times. I will then 
argue  that  the  sexual  rehabilitation  literature  operates,  like  welfare  reform,  as  a  powerful 
technology of the self by facilitating the development of pathways of identity formation which link 
individual  subjectivity  to  systems  of  power  by  way  of  expert  knowledges.  As  with  all 
technologies which are developed within the rationality of neoliberalism, sexual rehabilitation is 
based on the belief that individuals are capable of, and are indeed responsible for, making the 
necessary changes to enhance their personal freedom and choice.  As such, although on many 
levels the technology of sexual rehabilitation can be seen to contain the seeds of emancipation, 
it falls short of its goals because it is essentially paternalistic, tends to reproduce normative 
values and places the onus on the individual without being critical of the social environment in 
which disability is created. 
 
The History of Sexuality in Relation to Disability 
 
As I sought to demonstrate in Part Two, a genealogical analysis, instead of assuming the self-
evident nature of the concept under investigation, traces its emergence and development as a 
product  of  particular  vested  interests  over  time.  When  sexuality  is  viewed  through  this 
Foucaultian lens, it becomes apparent that it is not, as conventional histories would suggest, an 
innate  human  quality  which  was  repressed  by  Victorian values and liberated by those who 
challenged this repression. Instead it appears as: 
 
an especially dense transfer point for relations of power: between men and women, 
young people and old people, parents and offspring, teachers and students, priests and 
laity, an administration and a population (Foucault 1978: 103).  
Part of sexuality’s ability to be ‘an especially dense transfer point for relations of power’ lies in 
its  deceptive  capacity  to appear natural. Hence one of my research participants, Adrienne, 
exclaimed: ‘Being a feminist I believe in the adage - the personal is political. But sexuality? It 
just doesn’t fit … I can’t think of anything more personal and less political.’ 
 
This  belief  in  the  “natural”  character  of  sexual  relations  underpins  the  nature/repression 
hypothesis criticised by Foucault. The main danger Foucault sees in accepting ‘the repressive 
hypothesis’ - and this is particularly pertinent in relation to the conventional views which many 
disabled people hold about their sexuality - is that, while challenging sexual repression and 
claiming a sexual identity may well appear to be an emancipatory act, it can actually constitute 
an even deeper immersion in the effects of power and, thus, reduce rather than increase one’s 
sexual agency. This does not mean that there are no avenues of resistance available to those 
whose  sexual  identities  and  access  to  loving  relationships  have  in  fact  been  disabled  by 
oppressive practices. On the contrary, an understanding of how power produces subjectivity 
provides the very means for opening up new ways of thinking and being. As Simon (1995) has 
already been quoted as saying, ‘genealogy exposes the contingency of what appears natural, 
enabling one to loosen the ties to one's identity’ (109). 
 
In challenging the notion that sexuality has been continuously prohibited and silenced, Foucault 
(1978) argues that the last three centuries have represented ‘a veritable discursive explosion’ in 
relation to sex (17) and describes his overall project as follows. 
 
What is at issue, briefly, is the overall "discursive fact" the way in which sex is "put into 
discourse." Hence, too, my main concern will be to locate the forms of power, the channels 
it takes, and the discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual 
modes of behavior, the paths that give it access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms 
of desire, how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure - all this entailing effects that 
may  be those  of  refusal,  blockage,  and  invalidation,  but  also  incitement  and 
intensification: in short, the "polymorphous techniques of power” ( 11). 
 
In essence, Foucault suggest that the individual discourse of confession that emerged in the 
middle ages - which, he argues, linked the ‘moral theory of concupiscence’ to the sovereign 
power  of  church  and  state  -  was  gradually  but  inexorably  ‘broken  apart,  scattered, 
and multiplied in an explosion of distinct discursivities which took form in demography, biology, 
medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political criticism’ (34). As argued in 
Chapter Two, this transition is symbolic of the shift from autocratic rule, which enacted power 
over  death,  to  the  more  diffuse  forms  of  administrative  government  which  still  prevail  in 
contemporary liberal democracies and which exert power over life. As we have seen, this form 
of biopower became inextricably linked with knowledge, whereby the development of science 
and statistics provide the means for disciplining individual bodies by way of the surveillance of the entire population. And, of all the sites of subjectivity in which power became immersed, 
Foucault  believes  that  sexuality  has  become  the  most  effective  as  a  mechanism  of 
subjectification and governance. 
 
Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. It was 
employed as a standard for the disciplines and as a basis for regulations. This is why in 
the  nineteenth  century  sexuality  was  sought  out  in  the  smallest  details  of   individual 
existences;  it  was tracked down in behavior, pursued in dreams; it was suspected of 
underlying  the  least  follies,  it  was  traced  back  into  the  earliest  years  of  childhood; it 
became the stamp of individuality - at the same time what  enabled one to analyze the 
latter and what made it possible to master it (Foucault 1978: 154). 
 
It was, thus, through the medicalisation and psychologisation of sexuality that the inner life of 
the individual, the “natural” state of the body, was brought together in an ‘artificial unity’ with 
systems of knowledge and power (op cit. 146). 
 
This is the point at which “disability”, “sexuality” and “identity” most clearly converge. Medical 
discourse has long been recognised as a principal arbiter of the norm (Foucault 1977c; Stiker 
1999) and, in providing a ‘bio-physiological definition of “normality”’ (Barnes et al. 1999: 25), it 
functions to delineate the social strata that particular people are allowed to occupy in relation to 
their capacities and desires, and, thus, influences how they feel about themselves and how 
others view them. Those who are able-bodied, heterosexual and attractive are accorded access 
to positive identities located within what is normal and desirable. Those who lack these qualities 
are marginalised by way of the ‘bio-mechanical measurements’ in which ‘normality is enshrined’ 
(Hughes  2000:  559)  and,  consequently,  are  forced  to  inhabit  inferior  social  locations  and 
disabled identities. 
 
When disability and sexuality intersect, the specific marginalisation that results takes one of two 
distinct,  yet  connected,  forms:  the  disabled  person  is  categorised  as  either  “asexual”  or 
“perverted”. The connection between these categories relies on their relationship to the norm. 
As disability is often seen to remove people’s ability to engage in “normal” sexual practices 
and/or their capacity to incite “normal” sexual desire in others, then, they either cease to be 
considered sexual beings or, if they persist in behaving in a sexual manner, their desires and 
behaviour can only be construed in terms of deviance. Other ways of maintaining a sexual 
identity are rendered inconceivable, unacceptable. As Wilkerson (2002) argues: 
 
The repercussion for those with physical disabilities, like many others, may be silence and 
unintelligibility, their sexualities rendered incoherent, unrecognizable to others or perhaps 
even to themselves, a clear instance of cultural attitudes profoundly diminishing sexual 
agency and the sense of self and personal efficacy which are part of it (46). 
 As argued in Chapter Three, these silences are just as important to the production of discourse 
as  the  things  it  authorises.  Silences,  Foucault  (1978) argues are ‘less the absolute limit of 
discourse … [than] an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses’ 
(27). In this case, what is prohibited for some people acts as a clarification for what is right and 
good for others. In keeping with its function as the privileged side of a hierarchical dualism, the 
norm is always defined and reinforced by what it is not. 
 
Foucault  (1978)  contends  that  “asexualisation”  and  “perversion”  have  been  integral,  if 
contrasting, features of the modernist project to connect power, through medicine, to the self. 
The  former  he  discusses  in  terms  of  the  sexuality  of  children.  Here  he  argues  that 
asexualisation has been ‘an important area of contention around which innumerable institutional 
devices and discursive strategies have been deployed’ and, like all silences, has operated as 
‘the counterpart of other discourses, and perhaps the condition necessary in order for them to 
function’  (30).  The  same  can  be  said  for  the  asexualisation  of  disabled  people,  who  have 
notably been infantilised, not only in relation to their sexuality, but in their reliance on others for 
their care. Thus, the silences surrounding disability and sexuality are as vital to the production 
and reproduction of normative discourses as are the cultural images which flood us daily with 
what  constitutes  acceptable  forms  of  sexuality,  preferred  ways  of  looking  and  being.  The 
concept of perversion serves a similar purpose. It sets the boundaries around what can be 
considered to be desirable identities, acceptable ways of being. For the disabled person, the 
notion of perversion constitutes a double bind. If disabled people dare to think or act as sexual 
beings, they are at risk of being considered perverted. Yet, even more damningly in some ways, 
if someone finds them attractive, this person is often construed as a “fetishist”.
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In sum, then, Foucault’s work reveals that the construction of boundaries between the sexy and 
the unsexed, the beautiful and the repulsive, the desirable and the perverted are integral to the 
dividing practices which fuel the overall process of normalisation. What results is a stratified 
society where certain characteristics, such as physical capacity, beauty, race, gender and age, 
are inscribed and continually reinscribed to define the level of respect and self-esteem, even 
love, that a person can appropriately be accorded. In relation to sexuality, Foucault (1978) talks 
about ‘specific class effects’ and how sexuality operates differently in different social strata 
(127). In the case of disabled sexuality, an underclass has developed which, while it has been 
denied ‘a sexual body’, it has simultaneously been heavily sexualised in relation to perversion, 
infantalisation,  medicalisation  and  rehabilitation,  through - as Foucault argues in relation to 
children and adolescents - 'the interplay of presence and a sense, the visible and the hidden' 
(153). 
 
 
 The Technology of Sexual Rehabilitation 
 
In researching the sexual subjectification of disabled people in the rehabilitation literature, I 
selected thirteen texts intended to serve as a reasonably representative sample of the literature 
in  question.  As  a  whole,  this  literature  has  been  produced  by  a  wide  range  of  health 
professionals  and  social  scientists  since  the  early  1970s and aims to  educate other 
professionals and/or disabled people themselves with regard to the adverse effects of disability 
on sexuality and how they might be overcome. It was my aim to choose books reflecting this 
diversity of timeframe and disciplinary heritage by ensuring that each decade of publication was 
well  covered  and  each  field  from  which  this  literature  is  being  produced  was  represented. 
Accordingly,  the  authors  range  from  doctors  and  psychologists  through  rehabilitation 
professionals including  physiotherapists  and  occupational  therapists  to  social  workers, 
community nurses and counsellors. 
  
In  selecting  the  texts,  I  also  wished  to  include  self-help  books  alongside  those  written 
specifically for professionals. Over the past decade it has become increasingly common for 
professionals  to  attempt  to  directly  engage  lay  people  in  processes  of  self-actualisation. 
Appendix Five provides an annotated bibliography of the texts and discusses them in terms of 
their objectives, disciplinary backgrounds and target audiences. The tone of these texts ranges 
from expressions of pity to those which suggest empathy and traces of subversion and, as 
such,  some  of  the  texts,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Eleven,  border  on  the  emancipatory.  In 
analysing the texts, I have merged the categories of appearance and sexuality under the rubric 
of the latter because what are now being defined as “body esteem” and “sexual esteem” are 
inextricably linked within the field of sexual rehabilitation (see Taleporos and McCabe 2002). 
  
I argue that a new interplay of presence and absence has evolved over the past thirty years 
which, although it is ostensibly aimed at liberating disabled people's sexuality by challenging 
their asexualisation, has the potential to tighten the knot of normalisation. As with welfare reform 
this is based on the neoliberal thrust towards self-actualisation which encourages the disabled 
person to take an active role in the building of a positive identity, in this case through the 
process  of  'resexualisation'  (Comfort  1974b:  9).  Unlike  welfare  reform,  however,  sexual 
rehabilitation is not embedded in economic rationalism and its objectives are not tied to cost 
cutting  strategies  or  to  any  overt  attempt  to  increase  individual  productivity  or  financial 
independence. Its points of immersion in the lives of subjects are more diffuse yet infinitely more 
powerful as they inhabit and symbolise what is believed to be the "core" of human subjectivity 
and, as such, are seen to be fundamental to every thought, feeling and action. Consider the 
following descriptions of sexuality drawn from the sexual rehabilitation texts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
12 Recall the participant narratives which referred to the lack of trust disabled people often had for people who desired 
them. Sexuality in its broadest sense is expressed in most of the circumstances in which an 
individual finds herself or himself on a daily basis: socialising, working, discussions of 
religion or politics, and raising children (Boyle 1993 :47). 
 
One's sexuality is interwoven throughout all areas of one's life, sometimes in very subtle 
ways (Sandowski 1989: 23). 
 
Sexuality is important because it is integral to self-image ... for some people, sexuality is 
how they feel about themselves and how they think others perceive them in terms of 
attractiveness and desirability. Sexuality can be a basic component of self-identity that 
can define sexual orientation and lifestyle. It can reflect political positions and human 
rights policies. It can encompass issues of power and control, affiliation, or hate (Lefebre 
1997: 19). 
 
According  to  these  texts,  sexuality  is  omnipresent,  all  encompassing and a primary site of 
identification.  Working  from  and  through  this  assumption,  sexuality  becomes  a  particularly 
powerful  site  through  which  subjects  can  be  governed.  It  arises  as  a  key  area  of  expert 
deliberation and intervention; a key mechanism for recognising, regulating and rehabilitating the 
behaviours and expectations of disabled people so that they coincide with what is considered 
"appropriate" to their sexual status. 
 
In annexing the sexuality of disabled people, the field of sexual rehabilitation has based its 
objectives on two interlocking premises, both of which are stated us guiding principles in all of 
the  texts.  The  first  involves  an  acceptance  and  reconfiguration  of  the  notion  that  disabled 
people, alongside that of the general population, have been subjected to sexual repression, 
thus buying into the “repressive hypothesis” criticised by Foucault. The second declares the 
need  for  new  definitions  of  and  interventions  into  disabled  sexuality  based  on  scientific 
investigation and knowledge production. The reconfiguration of the repressive hypothesis is a 
particularly  effective  governmental  tool  because,  as  with  welfare  reform’s  claim  to  offer 
increased access to social and economic resources, it is built around the idea that the barriers 
which have created oppression can and will now be removed. Hence the following arguments 
which, interestingly, remain substantially unchanged despite the passage of time. 
 
Denial and societal attitudes create the major barriers. The waning of Victorianism is 
levelling  these.  Sexuality  is  now  recognized  as  a  legitimate  area  for  inquiry  and 
rehabilitation (Erlich 1974: 62). 
 
Interest in sex and the myriad ways to express sexuality are as old as the history of 
humanity. However, acknowledgment of the existence and importance of sexuality in 
the lives of physically disabled people, such as those with spinal cord injuries, has been 
slow in coming (Bruyere 1981: 1) 
 Though  sexuality  and  sexual  behaviour  are  important  to  life  satisfaction,  health 
professionals  still  give  relatively  little,  if  any,  information  to  clients  about  sexual 
functioning and adaptation. Rehabilitation clients clearly need and want this information 
(Neistadt & Freda 1987: ix). 
 
Sexual messages bombard us daily, yet in professional settings the topic of sexuality is 
often ignored or is a cause for discomfort (Sandowski 1993: 29). 
 
 
In Chapter Nine, I argued that welfare reform is a neoliberal technology of the self configured in 
terms  of  risk  and  individual  responsibility.  I  will  argue  here  that  the  same  applies  to  the 
technology of sexual rehabilitation. It is increasingly being argued that disabled people who do 
not receive sexual counselling are at risk of suffering from needless sexual dysfunction (Comfort 
1974b) and loneliness (Mooney et al. 1975). Accordingly, the literature specifies that the experts 
who  are  being  trained  to  facilitate  sexual  rehabilitation  should  encourage  their  clients  to 
embrace risk rather than, as in the past, allowing themselves to be constrained by it. Flynn 
(1981), for example, writes about 'the dignity of risk' that disabled people are accorded when 
'not being overprotected in either a social or a physical sense' (57), while Mooney et al. (1975) 
argue that single disabled people will only be able to find partners if they risk rejection and take 
responsibility for making potential sexual partners feel comfortable. In relation to embracing risk, 
Greengross (1976) contends that: 
 
Of course there are dangers. No one would pretend that the dangers do not exist. But 
allowing  individuals  sometimes  to  make  decisions  for  themselves,  taking  risks  and 
understanding the implications of their actions, can help them to grow as people. Being 
over-protective is never kind, and is often cruel (8). 
 
Here, just as with welfare reform, risk and responsibility are tightly enmeshed and the ideal 
neoliberal citizen is encouraged to develop risk management strategies which are based on 
individual rather than social change (Lupton 1999: O'Malley 1996). This view is clearly evident 
in the texts. Thus Cole & Cole (1974) suggest that the goal of 'medical rehabilitation', in general 
and specifically in relation to sexuality, is to facilitate the 'regaining of those abilities which allow 
resumption of maximum responsibility for one's own life' (41). In the same vein Greengross 
(1976) argues that: ‘The aim of-sex education for the handicapped, as for every member of the 
community, must primarily be to help each individual take responsibility for his own sexual life, 
and to provide an atmosphere in which the individual can live the kind of sex life he chooses’ 
(93). Thus, although disabled people are being offered access to a sense of sexuality that (may 
have) formerly been denied them, it is believed to be up to them to achieve it through attitudinal 
and behavioural change. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from an article which 
aims  to  encourage  women  with  disabilities  to  take  responsibility  for  the  problems  they 
experience in forming new relationships.  
It is up to a woman to present herself as a full package, to make herself interesting 
enough so that potential romantic partners will see beyond the stereotypes. Sometimes 
a woman with a disability has to function in society as an educator and "consciousness-
raiser," especially if the people around her are unfamiliar or uncomfortable with disability. 
This responsibility can seem burdensome, but the results may be well worth the effort 
(Hwang 1997: 124). 
 
While the notion of individual responsibility may seem to indicate a somewhat solitary pursuit, 
this  is  never  the  case  within  a  neoliberal  framework.  On  the  contrary, the process of self-
actualisation is forever assisted and promoted by expert guidance. The following section will 
explore these networks of knowledge and expertise and the discourses which inform them in an 
attempt to better understand the contemporary connections between knowledge and power.  
 
Sexual Rehabilitation and Expert Knowledges 
 
The texts I examined emanated from a wide range of scientific fields and were aimed at a 
variety of health professionals ranging from doctors and psychologists through rehabilitation 
specialists,  including  physical  therapists  and  occupational  therapists,  to  social  workers  and 
community  nurses.  Essentially,  however,  the  discourses  which  most  affect  the  current 
reconstruction of disabled sexuality are those which frame what Donzelot (1980) refers to as the 
“psy” disciplines, and, as such, fundamentally support the notions of individual responsibility and 
personal change. Hence, each of the texts expresses the belief that, while the impact on sexual 
ability and sexuality is originally a physical one, the extent of the “problem” and the ability to 
solve it rests on the psychological state of the individual. Halstead (1974a), for example, claims 
that ‘[f]or most persons, whether able-bodied or disabled, attitudes regarding sex present the 
largest barrier toward achieving a satisfactory sexual adjustment. Helping patients reassess 
their sexual attitudes can be a very effective therapeutic measure’ (88). And, twenty three years 
later, Sipski & Alexander (1997) concur that ‘[t]he majority of sexual dysfunctions originate in 
reaction  to  psychologic  processes  or  are  compounded  by  psychologic  reaction  to  organic 
pathology’ (7). 
 
This  “psychologisation  of  sexuality”  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  Rose’s  (1989) 
‘psychologisation of the mundane’ in which no facet of the minutiae of daily living is thought too 
insignificant for scrutiny and self-reflection, and is integral to the neoliberal notions of freedom, 
choice and individual responsibility (244). If it is posited that elements of disability have their 
origins in a person’s attitudes and behaviour, then these can only be resolved by changing 
these ways of thinking and acting. Hence, it is believed that disabled clients ‘need their general 
attitude to sexuality to be restructured by permission’ (Comfort 1974a: 4), a statement and a 
goal which reveal the tightly woven governmental phenomena of intervention and choice. It is 
also suggested that sexual counselling in a rehabilitation setting can facilitate the development of the full complement of personal capacities, those to which all citizens should aspire. Thus, for 
example, Cole & Cole (1974) argue that '[h]elping clients to understand their own responsibility 
in finding sexual satisfaction may foster self-responsibility, maturity and positive actions toward 
other rehabilitation goals' (42). 
 
In  this  way,  sexual  rehabilitation  becomes  an  expertise-driven  mechanism  for  helping 
individuals to realise their "full potential" with sexuality positioned as a phenomenon intrinsic and 
integral to the personal aspirations of both the affiliated and the marginalised. This process of 
rehabilitation involves an intensification of both subjectivity and subjectification, a process which 
Rose (1989) refers to as the 'government of the soul'.  He argues that: 
 
The government of the soul depends upon our recognition of ourselves as ideally and 
potentially certain sorts of person, the unease generated by a normative judgement of 
what we are and could become, and the incitement offered to overcome this discrepancy 
by following the advice of experts in the management of the self (11). 
 
These experts, described by Rose (ibid.) as ‘engineers of the soul’, are expected to perform a 
kind of ‘moral orthopaedics’ whereby, in the case of sexual rehabilitation, disabled people are to 
be rendered capable of regaining their sexual identities and achieving fulfilment and a positive 
self-image (3, 217). Rose argues that these aspirations are created by way of simulacra, where 
images of desire and desirability are infinitely reproduced via various media and cultural forms 
to ‘provide the template against which the mundane dissatisfactions of our lives, the hesitancies 
and uncertainties of our speech, the embarrassed awkwardness of our intercourse with others, 
the clumsy fumblings of our loves and passions are to be judged and found wanting’ (239). The 
technology  of  sexual  rehabilitation,  therefore,  promises  to  provide  the  solutions  for  sexual 
inadequacy  while,  at  the  same  time,  constructing  a  framework  for  self-reflection  and  self-
creation  in  which  one’s  self  and  one’s  sexuality  can  never  truly  be  considered  a  finished 
product. 
 
Interestingly,  in  generating  the  framework  of  expertise  believed  necessary  to  guide  sexual 
rehabilitation, the texts I examined invoke the experts themselves in the process of sexual 
subjectification. Each of the texts aimed at educating “experts” links the repression of disabled 
people’s sexuality in clinical settings to the sexual repression of the practitioners themselves 
and demands that health professionals and community workers learn ‘to better understand their 
own sexuality in order to utilize their resources and awarenesses in the treatment of others’ 
(Cole & Cole 1974: 42). Accordingly, Neistadt & Freda (1987) develop a comprehensive list of 
requirements which outlines the skills, attitudes and knowledge believed to be essential for all 
rehabilitation professionals to acquire in addressing these limitations. 
 
In order to counsel effectively, you must first be comfortable with your own sexuality and 
from there progress to achieving comfort with counselling others about sexuality. To feel comfortable with your own sexuality, you must develop knowledge competencies about 
the anatomy, physiology, neurology, and development of the human sexual system. You 
need to be aware of your attitudes toward sexuality, your understanding of sex roles, 
and  your  tolerance  for  different  sexual  preferences.  You  must  also  be  able  to 
communicate well with other people and be emotionally open to establishing intimacy in 
those relationships where you choose to have it (5). 
 
Whether  in  relation  to  the  engineers  of  the  soul  or  the  engineered  themselves,  a  prime 
mechanism  for  resexualisation  through  education  and  attitudinal  change  is  the  process  of 
calibration and quantification, a process which is common to all contemporary governmental 
forms. Just as the technology of welfare reform operates through such devices as the work 
capacity  assessment  and  its  associated  medical  examinations,  so  sexual  rehabilitation  is 
developing its own tools of examination and enumeration. Foucault (1977c) argues that the 
examination,  ‘in  the  form  of  tests,  interviews,  interrogations  and  consultations’,  has  been 
developed  as  a  disciplinary  technology  which,  although  less  harsh  than  the  more  directly 
inquisitional forms which preceded it, is equally effective in a disciplinary sense (226). Rose 
(1989)  expands  upon  this  and  proposes  that  by  adopting  and  intensifying  the technique of 
examination, ‘[t]he psychological sciences … enable the human powers to be transformed into 
material that can provide the basis for calculation’ (48).  
 
What, then, of the 'tests, interviews, interrogations and consultations' that have been devised to 
make  calculable  the  sites  of  subjectification  which  are  the  focus  of  sexual  rehabilitation? 
Schover & Jensen (1988), for example, advise that the consultation should begin with a 'sexual 
assessment' based on 'the multi axial diagnostic technique', a schedule which utilises a set of 
questionnaires and scales ranging from the MMPI where psychosis is thought to exist to general 
questionnaires which 'pinpoint the areas of sexual dysfunction' (22, 24, 26). Similarly, Lefebre 
(1997) recommends the use of 'self-report questionnaires', such as 'The Open Ended Sexuality 
Limited  Organising  Worksheet',  for  'assessing  sexual  behaviour'  (35).  Each  of  these 
measurement  devices  functions  to  calculate  deviations  from  the  norm.  According  to  the 
'Multiaxial Problem-Oriented Descriptive System for Sexual Dysfunction', these deviations range 
from problems during 'the desire phase', such as 'low sexual desire' and 'aversion to sex' to 
problems during 'the arousal phase' such as 'decreased subjective arousal', 'decreased intensity 
of orgasm, and the state of being 'coitally inorgasmic' (Schover & Jensen 1980 8:57). Once the 
"problem"  has  been  adequately  quantified  and  clarified,  'precise  testing  measures  may  be 
employed to give patients specific rather than vague counselling' and 'a precise prescription for 
sexual activity' devised (Mackey 1974: 107, 106). 
 
In the spirit of perpetual re-examination and reassessment, the process of sexual rehabilitation 
must be continually monitored to measure its efficacy. Flynn (1981) describes, for example, a 
method  for  'evaluating  agency  success  in  promoting  normative  sex  behaviour'  through  the 
application of the 'Program Analysis of Service Systems' which is referred to as 'an evaluation instrument [which] can assess the degree to which [medical professionals] are successful in 
fostering  normative  behaviour,  including  normative  sex  behaviour'  (49).  Experts  are  also 
expected to subject themselves to examination using similar processes of measurement and 
assessment.  The  Sexual  Attitude  Reassessment  (SAR)  Program,  for  example,  is  aimed  at 
doctors  and  health  professionals  to  help  them  're-evaluate  their  personal  and  professional 
feelings regarding sexuality' (Halstead 1974b: 256), and, more recently, it has been suggested 
that successful sexual rehabilitation requires 'an ongoing institutional commitment to train all 
staff who have contact with patients on basic sexuality issues' (Sipski & Alexander 1990 7:9). 
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  all  of  these  processes  of  examination  require  both  clients  and 
practitioners  to  speak  with  increasing  openness  about  sex  and  sexuality,  a  process  which 
rests on a further transformation of the 'interplay of presence and absence, the visible and the 
hidden' (Foucault 1978:153). In drawing the parallel between this kind of personal examination 
and  the  Catholic  practice  of  confession,  Foucault  (1978)  quotes  from  Segneri's  book  on 
religious instruction (1695). 
 
Examine diligently, therefore, all the faculties of your soul: memory, understanding, and 
will.  Examine  with  precision  all  your  senses  as  well...  examine,  moreover,  all  your 
thoughts, every word you speak, and all your actions. Examine even unto your dreams, 
to know if, once awakened, you did not give them your consent. And finally, do not think 
that in so sensitive and perilous a matter as this, there is any thing trivial or insignificant 
(Segneri as quoted in Foucault 1978: 20). 
 
In  expanding on this, Rabinow & Dreyfus (1982) argue that ‘confession, and especially the 
confession about one's sexuality, [became] a central component in the expanding technologies 
for the discipline and control of bodies, populations, and society itself’ and that ‘[t]hrough it, the 
most particular individual pleasures, the very stirrings of the soul could be solicited, known, 
measured, and regulated’ (176). 
 
The new intermediaries in the contemporary form of Foucault’s (1982) ‘pastoral power’ are the 
doctors, counsellors, social workers and rehabilitation specialists (212-214). And, as with its 
priestly origins, ‘this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s 
minds,  without  exploring  their  souls,  without  making  them  reveal  their  innermost  secrets’ 
(Foucault 1982: 214). True to their mission, all of the texts I analysed began with a discussion of 
how to initiate this process of disclosure. For example, Schover & Jensen (1988) answer the 
question: ‘How can we reach the 90% of patients with problems who currently receive no help?’ 
by suggesting that ‘[t]he key is the primary care team's ability to bring up the topic of sex and to 
make patients feel comfortable in discussing a problem’ (106). And, similarly, Comfort (1974b) 
argues: 
 If  physicians  recognize  that  early  resexualization  is  as  important  as  early 
ambulation, and inquire diligently and tactfully into the sexual adaptation of patients, 
they can perform important therapy in limiting unnecessary dysfunction, and equally 
important  research  in  detecting  other  common  and  remediable  psychosexual 
problems of illness which their patients have been suffering in silence (8-9). 
 
This initial stage of encouraging clients to talk about their sexuality is implicit in the primary 
counselling technique advocated within all of the texts which are directed at educating sexual 
rehabilitation  experts  and  known  as  the  PLISSIT  model  where  the  “P”  stands  for    the 
“permission”  to  talk  about  sexuality.  Renshaw  (1974)  argues  that  this  ‘permission  from  a 
respected authority to look at, know, touch, understand the sexual self (and at home to en-
joy it)’ can ‘obliterate the ignorance of a lifetime’ (128). 
 
Self-help, Self-esteem and the Leaky Borders of Emancipation 
 
Increasingly,  sexuality  has  become  a  matter for discussion and self-examination outside of 
clinical settings. Facilitating this extension and diffusion of expertise into the mechanics of daily 
living is the field of self-help literature. While the texts directed at experts are intended to aid 
resexualisation from within the framework of the clinical setting, those which can be classified 
under the rubric of self-help literature attempt to intersect with the governance of the soul at a 
more  self-initiated  level.  Subjects  of  self-help  are  no  less  exposing  themselves  to  expert 
knowledges:  they  are  simply  engaging  with  them  in a process which operates at a greater 
distance from the source of expertise and which, as such, appears to privilege a higher degree 
of freedom, autonomy and choice. It is possible, however, that in some way this distance is 
closing given that doctors and psychiatrists are beginning to prescribe self-help books as part of 
the treatment process (Cambell & Smith 2003; Dobson 2003). 
 
Of the fifteen texts analysed here, three follow what I would define as a self-help format, those 
authored by Kahane (1990), Kaufman et al. (2003), and Kroll & Klein (1992). As a corpus, self-
help  books,  share  certain  basic  elements  in  their  structuring  and  tone.  Although  generally 
written by people who have academic qualifications, their discussions and prescriptions are 
developed around common sense applications of scientific knowledge and draw on anecdotal 
evidence which usually stems from informal opinion gathering. Thus, for example, Kaufman et 
al. (2003) use what they call a ‘highly unscientific survey’ to provide the lengthy quotes around 
which they structure their text, The Ultimate Guide to Sex and Disability (x). And, in self-help 
texts, the arguments for personal change are presented in what might be described as a “recipe 
format” where the possibilities for liberation and/or self-actualisation are structured in terms of a 
series of steps. Additionally, the reader is often invited to participate in exercises intended to aid 
in their learning process. This usually takes place at the end of each chapter. 
 In  the  academic  literature,  self-help  books  have  been  criticised  for  perpetuating  normative 
prescriptions  (Ebben  1995;  O’Connor  1995;  Schrager  1993;  Zimmerman  et  al.  2001),  for 
individualising social problems (Singleton 2003), and, in the governmentality literature, they 
have  been  analysed  in  relation  to  the  ethical  framework  in  which  subjectification  occurs 
(Cruikshank: 1996; Hazledon: 2003; Rimke: 2000). All of these observations are pertinent to the 
self-help books focused upon here. Kroll & Klein (1992), for example, continue to maintain an 
individualistic focus while arguing for emancipation. Hence they propose that ‘you can choose to 
have a proud, positive self-concept or a weak, distorted opinion of yourself’, affirming a process of 
self-actualisation which places heavy and ultimate responsibility on the individual concerned. 
Thus, they argue: 
 
Maintaining  this  inner  dialogue  with  yourself,  a  conversation  filled  with  calm 
reassurance and positive self-affirmation, is only part of the battle. This foundation must 
be strengthened by constant reminders from within that a disabled person has every 
right to a complete and fulfilling life, including a sexual life, no matter how he or she 
outwardly  varies  from  society's  ideals  of  physical  attractiveness.  A  person  with  a 
disability has to both act and feel confident, letting others know that he or she will not 
be treated as a second-class citizen (238-239). 
 
In a similar vein, Kaufman argues that: 
 
It is very difficult not to internalise negative messages, not to consider ourselves lacking 
in comparison to the dominant norm. We can do several things with these messages. 
We can give ourselves more positive messages, and take compliments when they are 
given. We can listen to what people who feel good about themselves have to say and 
use that as a cue to actively speak about ourselves in a positive way. We can try to think 
about ourselves as attractive, desirable, worthy and good (16). 
 
Once again, there is an acknowledgement of the social causes of a negative self-image, but the 
solutions are still seen to exist purely in the process of individual change in keeping with Gloria 
Steinem’s (1992) ‘revolution from within’. These arguments for inner change all come from 
chapters in the texts dealing specifically with self esteem and, as such, pivot precariously on the 
boundary between the development of emancipatory strategies and those which only serve to 
reinforce the norm.  
 
Adelson (1996) has observed that all self-help texts, regardless of their specific point of focus, 
are essentially about self-esteem. He recalls visiting a local bookshop, expecting to find at most 
a shelf of self-help books on self-esteem, but, instead, discovers 49 shelves and a total of 1,000 
books. He describes them as follows: 
 
Almost all were less than five years old, and almost all offered practical help: how to 
protect  your  self-esteem,  improve  your  self-esteem,  repair  your  self-esteem;  seven steps, ten steps, twelve steps to a better view of yourself; self-esteem through physical 
fitness or a more balanced diet; how women should deal with men who damage their 
self-esteem; how to guarantee the self-esteem of your children; how to recover self-
esteem after losing your job, or your fiancée, or your spouse (34). 
 
The  self-help  books  I  reviewed  here  were  no exception. While they each have a distinctly 
political edge which is largely consistent with disability rights principles and the social model, all, 
ultimately, came to rest on the premise that change must come from within and that, indeed, it is 
each person’s responsibility to improve their self-esteem. In this way, and as Cruikshank argues 
(1996),  ‘[p]ersonal  fulfilment  becomes  a  social  obligation  in  the  discourse  of  self-esteem 
according to an innovation that transforms the relationship of self-to-self into a relationship that 
is governable’ (239). 
 
How then, if individual change can only be construed as a mechanism of government, is 
emancipatory action aimed at enabling disabled identities to be understood and initiated? If 
self-esteem is a particularly powerful normalising concept and empowerment is, in reality, a 
top-down process which uses expert knowledges to distance the subject from power while 
intensifying and multiplying its points of access, how can we ever become agents in our own 
self-creation?  Within  a  social  structure  which  enmeshes  citizens  ever  more  deeply  in 
networks of power through their apparent freedoms and choices, any claim to liberation can 
appear  to  be  a  chimera,  an  illusion.  With  these  questions  in  mind,  I  will  conclude  this 
discussion  and,  to  a  great  extent,  my  thesis  by  further  exploring  the  concepts  of  “self-
esteem”  and  “empowerment”  in  relation  to  the  technologies  of  sexual  rehabilitation  and 
welfare reform. In this respect, I aim to tease out the differences between what may be 
construed as emancipatory and what can be argued to constitute an ever more pervasive, 
yet more subtle compact with the norm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
 
Self-esteem, Empowerment and the Struggle for Agency 
 
 
In Chapter Three I argued that  identity is the key mechanism for inserting social meaning into 
personal  experience  and,  as  such,  can  be  defined  as  the  main  conduit  linking  power  to 
subjectivity. I have now arrived at a point in my analysis where I believe it will be possible to 
fully grasp the intricacies of how this process of subjectification is engineered. My suggestions 
are twofold. First, “self-esteem” is the concept, the point of insertion as it were, through which 
governmental access to subjectivity is gained and, second, “empowerment” is the process by 
which  this linking of governance to the inner worlds of individuals is achieved. Thus, I am 
arguing  that  under  a  neoliberal  framework  the  identity  of  citizens  is  created  through 
technologies of the self like welfare reform and sexual rehabilitation which seek to act upon the 
self-esteem  of  individuals  by  way  of  their  empowerment.  I  also  propose  that,  by  fully 
appreciating how these processes of subjectification operate, we can choose otherwise. In other 
words, as Foucault (1988g) argues in relation to identities, ‘they can be unmade, as long as we 
know how it was that they were made’ (37). 
 
Self-esteem holds a place in our lives which is at the heart of our identities. It can appear to be, 
paradoxically, both an essential human quality and a form of self-belief over which we can 
ultimately exercise a great deal of control. Kroll and Klein (1992) define self-esteem as ‘the 
feelings we all have about our physical and emotional selves’ (35) and Nosek & Hughes (2001), 
in their study of how disability affects the self-esteem of women with disabilities, record that self-
esteem has be described variously as ‘personal self-regard (Bednar & Peterson, 1995), attitude 
toward one's self (Rosenberg, 1965), and the evaluation of one's self-concept as positive or 
negative, neutral, or ambiguous (Frey & Carlock, 1989)’ (20). They end by following Leary & 
Downs’  (1995)  notion  in  proposing  that  self-esteem  is  ‘how  we  assess  our  worth  and 
competence,  in  terms  of  how  we  think, feel, and act’ (20). From a different perspective, 
Cruikshank (1996) points out that ‘[s]elf-esteem is a technology of citizenship and self-
government for evaluating and acting upon our selves so that the police, the guards and 
the doctors do not have to’ (234). It is a particularly powerful concept or technology because, 
as Rose (1989) points out in relation to the government of the soul in general, it ‘binds subjects 
to  a  subjection  that  is  the  more  profound  because  it  appears  to  emanate  from  our 
autonomous quest for ourselves, it appears as a matter of our freedom’ (256). 
 
The ubiquity of self-esteem as a guiding concept is not confined to the self-help texts alone.  It 
is fundamental to the broader field of literature which informs the technologies of welfare reform 
and  sexual  rehabilitation.  Accordingly,  a  basic  plank  in  the  platform  which  supports  the 
technology  of  welfare  reform  is  the  belief  that one must work or at the very least actively participate  in  one’s  community  in  a voluntary capacity to build one’s self-esteem. Both the 
interim and final drafts of the McClure Report begin with the following argument: 
 
Participation in paid employment is a major source of self-esteem. Without it, people can 
fail  to  develop,  or  become  disengaged  from,  employment,  family  and  community 
networks.  This  can  lead  to  physical  and  psychological  ill  health  and  reduced  life 
opportunities for parents and their children (FaCS 2000a: 4; FaCS 2000b: 3).  
 
Reminiscent of Rose’s (1996b) observation that welfare recipients have been reconstructed 
through the rationality of neoliberalism as ‘people whose self-responsibility and self-fulfilling 
aspirations have been deformed by the dependency culture [and] whose self esteem has 
been destroyed’ (59), the Australian Government makes the argument that welfare reform 
aims ‘to rebuild the self-esteem of people whose self-image may have been damaged by their 
lack of paid employment’  (FaCS 2000a: 55).  
 
The sexual rehabilitation texts also claim that self-esteem is a pivotal quality which is both 
damaged by lack of access to full neoliberal citizenship, in this case in terms of an adequate 
sense  of  sexuality,  and  in  need  of  restoration  if  one  is  to  achieve  or  regain  it.  Sipski  & 
Alexander’s (1997) claim is characteristic here: ‘[p]erhaps the most important factor in people's 
psychological well-being is that of self-esteem. Disability affects the way in which people feel 
about themselves. If their self-esteem is damaged, their sense of sexuality will certainly be 
similarly affected’ (7). In the case of both welfare reform and the rehabilitation literature, we also 
have  the  argument  that  the  gaining  or  regaining  of  self-esteem  is  seen  to  be  a  matter  of 
individual responsibility and, ultimately, a necessity, which, as Kahane (1990) argues, ‘depends 
largely on your individual strengths and weaknesses’ (182). 
 
Hence,  poor  self-esteem  is  believed  to  be  both  an  off-shoot  of,  and  a  reason  for  being, 
unemployed, dependent or sexually inadequate. Accordingly, it is not only claimed that a good 
self-esteem  can  be  regained  by  getting  a  job,  becoming  self-reliant  and  recovering  one’s 
sexuality, but even more significantly, in keeping with the notion of individual responsibility, that 
developing a good self-esteem is a necessary, and even at times a sufficient, ingredient for 
securing employment, independence, sexual attractiveness and sexual satisfaction. A healthy 
self-esteem  is  increasingly  being  seen  as  a  panacea  for  all  ills  and  the  “prescription”  for 
obtaining one constructed in terms of empowerment. Consider the following claim made in one 
of the sexual rehabilitation texts: 
 
Sexual independence is an extremely potent form of empowerment. It is our belief (and 
our personal experience) that, by exploring our sexuality, by deciding that we are worthy 
of feeling pleasure and of realising our possibilities as sexual beings, we can change 
other parts of our lives as well (Kahane 2003: xii) 
 The  entry  of  “empowerment”  in  this  context  is  particularly  noteworthy  as,  in  practice, 
empowerment  is  rarely  perceived  as  a  solitary  pursuit.  It  is  invariably  attached  to  expert 
guidance and, therefore, any kind of independence that can be said to have resulted from it can 
only be understood as a facilitated form of freedom. As Rose (1996c) argues, it ‘has come to 
encompass a range of interventions to transmit, under tutelage, certain professionally ratified 
mental, ethical and practical techniques for active self-management’ (349). Cruikshank (1996) 
makes the same point: to become “empowered”, individuals must ‘accept the responsibility to 
subject their selves, to voluntarily consent to establishing a relationship between one's self and 
a tutelary power such as a therapist, a social worker, a social programme, a parenting class or 
what have you’ (Cruikshank 1996: 234). This attachment of empowerment to those who are 
qualified and sanctioned to empower, that is, the engineers of the soul, is nicely illustrated in 
this extract from another of the sexual rehabilitation texts.  
 
The emphasis social work places on holistic intervention on behalf of clients along with 
an empowerment oriented intervention strategy, uniquely prepares social workers to 
help clients with disabilities and their partners cope with the many psychosocial changes 
that accompany disabilities. Social workers who are prepared with counseling skills and 
disability  specific  sexual  knowledge  can  have  a  major  influence  on  positive 
psychosexual development and adjustment of clients with disabilities and their partners. 
It is up to the profession and up to individual social workers to meet this important need 
(Mackelprang  1993: 86-87). 
 
This connection between the government of the soul and its engineers is also evident in the 
literature which guides current welfare reform policy. The Final McClure Report (FaCS 2000b), 
for example, states that its main objective is empowerment and makes clear that this process 
will require the expertise and intervention of a great many professionals. 
 
Our vision is for a service delivery model that is enabling, rather than a system that 
encourages  reliance.  An  important  part  of  building  individual  capacity  and  working 
towards self-reliance is empowering and enabling people to identify their hopes and 
aspirations, and negotiate the steps they need to make in order to participate. This 
involves the individual working with the assessment agency and, as appropriate, brokers 
and  other  service  providers,  to  develop  participation  plans  and  making  informed 
decisions about the most suitable type of service intervention (14). 
 
Shaver (2001), who is critical of these claims to empowerment, argues that the McClure Report 
‘saw  the  role  of  welfare  as  to  enable,  empower,  and  finally  enforce,  social  or  preferably 
economic participation on the part of those at risk of social exclusion’ and that ‘the darker side 
of this communitarian vision’ is its ‘paternalistic supervision and compulsory community at the 
expense of individual rights and freedoms’ (277). He thus directly challenges the assumption 
that welfare reform will enhance personal freedom and individual rights. It is to the relationship between individual freedoms and paternalistic interventions that the remainder of this chapter is 
devoted. 
 
“Empowerment” as Fostering Powerlessness 
 
“Empowerment” is a term used both by those who seek to increase the points of intervention in 
disabled people’s lives and by those who aim to disengage themselves from such intervention. 
As a mechanism of government it can be said to lack the qualities of a truly emancipatory 
strategy  because  it operates to reinforce the dominant discourse rather than challenging it, 
channels power from above rather than allowing it to emerge from below, individualises social 
problems  and,  thereby,  neglects  to  address  the  structural  causes  of  marginalisation  in  its 
development of strategies for change. It is a potent mechanism because it appears to offer a 
great deal to those who have been denied access to social resources and positive identities. 
However, when the veneer of freedom and choice is stripped away to reveal its core values, it 
can be shown to reinforce many of the qualities and states of existence that it ostensibly seeks 
to combat. 
 
Powers  (2003)  argues  that  while  supporters  of  empowerment  argue  that  it  counteracts 
paternalism,  ‘in  practice  …  empowerment  equals  paternalism’  (230).  In  most  cases,  the 
empowerment strategies inherent in the technologies of welfare reform and sexual rehabilitation 
construct  experts  as  educators,  guides  or,  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  scale,  agents  of 
enforcement who need to overcome various forms of resistance and ignorance from their clients 
in the effort to offer their superior knowledge. Recall, for example, the argument, by no means 
uncommon throughout the sexual rehabilitation texts, that ‘some [disabled clients] will need their 
sexual  attitudes  to  be  restructured’  and  that  this  can  only  be  understood  in  terms  of  their 
‘compliance’ or ‘non-compliance’ with normative goals (Comfort 1974a: 4, 5). Recall also the 
welfare  reform  argument  cited  earlier  that  some  people  will  require  ‘persuasion’  and 
‘encouragement’  and  ‘the  most  resistant  group  may  need  to  be  compelled  to  consider  and 
ultimately to undertake a course of activity that might lead towards greater self-reliance’ (FaCS 
2000a: 57). Hence, Powers (2003) is able to claim that empowerment strategies provide ‘the 
illusion of choice’ while, in reality, functioning to justify coercion (235). Similarly, Beresford & 
Holden (2000) refer to empowerment by experts as ‘the new form of paternalism’ and accuse it 
of being ‘prescriptive, directive and top-down’ and, at times even ‘authoritarian’ (981-982). 
 
To fully appreciate how such an apparently liberatory strategy can conceal such oppressive 
underpinnings it is necessary to return to the earlier arguments about “risk management’ in 
neoliberal terms. In this context, Powers (2003) talks about the capacity of empowerment to 
create ‘pathologized identities’ based on the construction of a ‘pathologized at-risk situation’ 
(235).  In  other  words,  by  being  construed  as at-risk of long-term unemployment, long-term 
dependency, asexuality and/or perversion, disabled people are seen to be both in danger and a 
danger to others, claims which justify intervention in their lives and legitimise the formation of a conduit between their hopes and aspirations and the goals of normalisation. Over and above 
this,  though,  disabled  people  are  reconstructed  as  (potential)  neoliberal  subjects  who  must 
embrace  risk  rather  than  seeking  to  shield  themselves  from  it.  This  means  that  they  are 
expected to actively engage with whatever forms of expertise are believed capable of helping 
them restore their self-esteem so that they will be equipped to pursue their self-actualisation.  
 
To make matters worse, the imperative of “self-actualisation” is itself fraught. In Chapter Five I 
discussed  the  double  bind  involved  with  encouraging  people  to  talk  about their losses. My 
participants were so programmed to avoid pity that they were loathe to talk about their feelings 
of disenfranchisement and many of the participants initially tended to refer to themselves only  
in terms of triumph or intended triumph. It was only in the deeper discussions which ensued that 
the costs of stoicism, negation and super-cripdom were volunteered as topics of conversation. 
The  pressure  to  triumph over one’s disability in the name of self-actualisation is immense. 
Experts  contribute  to  this  when  they  incite  the  sick  and  the  disabled  to  overcome  their 
obstacles, a practice exemplified in the following quote from Kleinman, a doctor who writes 
extensively, both to other professionals and disabled people themselves about the need for 
empowerment in the face of chronic illness and disability. 
 
To maintain one's aspirations in the face of grave adversity, to work hard to contend 
successfully with the daily assault of an impaired body on a robust spirit, to be victorious  
over the long course of losses and threats that constitutes disability - these are lessons 
for us all, examples of what is best in our shared humanity (Kleinman as quoted by Rose 
1996c: 349). 
 
By its very nature, this kind of reasoning tends to silence other narratives. For, as it was pointed 
out in Chapters Six through Eight, how can one argue against the prevailing values in relation to 
work, independence and appearance/sexuality without appearing to be lazy, passive or, in the 
case of sexuality, suffering from a case of sour grapes or perversion? Or, as  Foucault (1988g) 
argues, 'How can the truth of the sick subject ever be told?' (29). This process of silencing is 
acknowledged by Couser (1997) who writes that the autobiographies of disabled people ‘may 
not in fact be very representative - in other words, typical - of those with disabilities’ because 
‘[t]here is a strong temptation - fed both by the needs of the ego and the literary marketplace, 
which prefers such narratives - to adopt the hegemonic narrative paradigm of transcendence 
over bodily injury rather than to challenge its cultural construction’ (183, 198). In relation to the 
dozens of autobiographies he analysed, he notes that: 
 
All  display  a  male  pattern  of  concern  with  individual  autonomy  and freedom; all in 
various ways base their comic plots on some sort of intellectual, emotional or spiritual 
compensation for the loss of physical mobility. None of the narratives examined thus far, 
then, goes out of its way to affirm solidarity with a marginalised group or to question the cultural ideals of individualism and independence; each autobiographer comes to terms 
with disability - denying, transcending or side-stepping stigmatisation - on his own (198). 
 
This pressure to conform, to normalise and to triumph results in, or, perhaps, more accurately, 
results  from,  what  has  been  referred  by  Jacobs  (2002)  as  ‘the  manufacturing  of  “disabled 
heroes”‘ (71). Wendell (1997) defines ‘disabled heroes’ as ‘people with visible disabilities who 
receive public attention because they accomplish things which are unusual even for the able-
bodied’ (271). She goes on to argue that those people who can be seen to “triumph” in this way 
are usually in possession of large material wealth and exceptional circumstances and that the 
presentation of these people as symbols of what all disabled people can attain is ultimately 
extremely  disempowering  for  disabled  people  in  general.  This  brings  to  mind  one  of  the 
participant’s observations, quoted in Chapter Seven. 
 
We have here in New Zealand a Blind gentleman, that has been seen on TV using a 
chain saw to top a tree. The question immediately is asked, "Can you do that?" The next 
question is "why can't  you do that?" The next statement is "You ought to be able to do 
that." Next "You must do that", and when you say "I can't do that," they hit back with 
"Can't means won't, you are a welfare bludger, who just doesn't want to work." Now, 
from a Blind perspective, that chain sawing gentleman may be able to use his saw to top 
a tree, and if he feels comfortable doing such things, that's fine, but don't let anyone 
think that he represents the rest of the Blind community. The vast majority couldn't do 
what he does. Most wouldn't be silly enough to attempt it (Craig written story: 17). 
 
As well as increasing ‘the "otherness" of the majority’ (Abberley 1999: 271), the imperative to 
triumph is often very damaging to the “heroes” themselves. Hillyer (1993) argues that becoming 
a Super Crip usually relies on the person “passing” as normal as is possible. This involves a 
certain degree of deception, both in relation to others and oneself - a practice which can only be 
maintained at great personal cost. 
 
Deception is demoralising, anxiety provoking, and harmful to the passer's health and 
relationships.  It also deprives society as a whole of knowledge about diversity. Passing 
involves adopting the values of the privileged group; it causes "emotive dissonance"; it is 
harmful  to  mental and physical health; it makes the secret the central focus of the 
passer's life; it harms relationships with those who know the secret and with those who 
do not; it makes it difficult to know who your friends or enemies are; and it maintains the 
very repressive system that causes it  (150). 
 
The costs of such practices are reflected in the stories told by Hugh Gallagher (1998), Robert 
Murphy (1990) and Karen, recounted in Chapter Five, all  of whom eventually suffered from 
both emotional and physical breakdowns as a direct result of pursuing the heroic path for a 
great  many  years.  In  their  case,  all  learned  to  recognise  the  trap  inherent  in  the  triumph 
narrative and found other identities to develop, other stories to tell. Hugh Gallagher (1998) expressed this very vividly when he wrote of his decision to let go of FDR as his hero: ‘FDR was 
a great man, a magnificent leader of world scale, but he was no longer my role model. He was 
Super Crip; I opted for human’ (209). 
 
Powers (2003) argues that it is its entrenchment in individualism which separates empowerment 
from strategies that possess genuine emancipatory potential. She traces the misuse of the word 
“empowerment” in relation to its origins in the work of Paulo Freire. She argues that, although 
most people who defend empowerment as a liberatory strategy do so because they attach it to 
Freire’s concept of liberatory education in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire himself argued 
against ever considering empowerment to be anything other than a process of social change. 
When  asked  by  Ira  Shor:  ‘There  is  no  personal  self-empowerment?’  He  replied  with 
vehemence: 
No, no, no. Even when you individually feel yourself most free, if this feeling is not a 
social feeling, if you are not able to use your recent freedom to help others to be free by 
transforming the totality of society, then you are exercising only an individualist attitude 
toward empowerment or freedom (Shor & Freire 1987: 109). 
 
Neath & Schriner (1998) take a similar view when they argue that ‘an exclusive or primary focus 
on individual empowerment by disability professionals violates the spirit of the disability rights 
movement which is a political movement organizing for social change’ (217). They then go on to 
make the case that: 
 
The vast majority of individuals in our society are quite limited in the amount of power 
(empowerment)  available  to  them,  regardless  of  how  'empowering'  their  attitudes, 
personality and behaviors may be, because of the hierarchical structure of the society 
(where political and economic power is concentrated in the hands of a relatively small 
and  elite  group  of  people).  The  disability  rights  movement,  as  a  social  movement, 
recognizes  the  need  for  individuals  to  work  together  in  order  to  change  the  power 
dynamics  at  work  in  the  society.  Looking  at  empowerment  as  a  characteristic  of 
individuals incorrectly suggests that the most important kinds of power will be gained by 
individuals, rather than through widescale social change (218). 
 
This means that if we are to develop strategies which can potentially lead to the development of 
an identity which is no longer disabled by internalised oppression, we have to shun all promises 
of  empowerment  which  are  paternalistic,  individualising  and  normative.  This  can  hardly  be 
claimed  to  be  a  straightforward  process  because  emancipatory  processes  are  very  tightly 
woven  within  neoliberal  structures  and,  as  such,  it  is  not  easy  to  separate  false  from  real 
potential. Yet, I do believe that if counter-narratives are shaped and continually reshaped within 
a critical genealogical framework, then it is possible to develop subject formations which do not perpetuate marginalisation. I even believe that, ultimately, it is possible to devise individual 
responses to oppression which are socially contextualised and, therefore, emancipatory. 
 
Enabling the Disabled Identity 
 
Our relationship with ourselves will change when powers that have worked secretly are 
revealed. They can never have the same kind of force, even if they continue to influence 
us  (Ransom 1997: 58). 
 
The question I set out to answer when I began my project was, how can we better understand 
the identity losses which are experienced by people who become disabled and how can this 
understanding lead to better lives for disabled people? What has emerged from the attempt to 
answer these questions is the recognition that disability forms a pivotal part of the construction 
of both preferred and marginalised identities and that to challenge the imposition of the disabled 
identity  requires  the  disruption  and  displacement  of  the  central  values  which  govern  the 
objectives of contemporary neoliberal citizenship. It is this recognition which is at the heart of 
how one separates what is emancipatory from what remains oppressive. Accordingly, and as I 
have argued throughout, I believe that the fundamental tool for enabling the disabled identity 
can be said to be the genealogical practice of ‘deconstructing necessity’ (Couzens Hoy 1998: 
31) because it makes it possible for us to understand the nature of our subjectification so that 
we can ‘promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of [the] kind of individuality which 
has been imposed on us’ (Foucault 1982: 216). 
 
I am in no way suggesting that this should entail a denial of the importance of self-esteem or the 
stultification of any attempt to improve upon it. But we need to undergird this process of re-
identification  with  the  recognition  that  our  identity  is  a  social creation which is in continual 
process with governmental forms and that to exercise any kind of agency we will need to be 
ever vigilant in our awareness of how the dominant discourse affects our inner worlds. By being 
cognisant of the nature of the “empowerment” being offered by the experts who guide welfare 
reform, sexual rehabilitation, medical treatment and self-governance in general, disabled people 
can choose to exercise power in the operation of these relationships and to discern what is and 
what is not in their best interests. Key to this ability to engage with power in liberatory ways is 
the knowledge that resistance can be applied at any point at which power operates (Foucault 
1978). I believe that there is nothing, no matter how oppressive, that we cannot at some level 
subvert or reconstitute in ways which loosen the ties that bind subjectivity to subjection as long 
as  the  process  remains  a  collective  endeavour  constantly  informed  and  reinforced  by 
genealogical insights.  
 
What makes this project always challenging and often confusing are the difficulties which arise 
from attempting to develop liberatory strategies within the main framework of meaning available, 
that which structures the dominant discourse. In Chapter Three I argued that it is possible and, indeed necessary, to develop new discourses and languages from the subjugated knowledges, 
both discursive and narrative, which evolve from the genealogical project. However, it is also 
the case, as Foucault (1980d) points out, that ‘the particular elements of the knowledge that one 
seeks to disinter are no sooner accredited and put into circulation, than they run the risk of re-
codification, re-colonisation’ (86). He goes on to argue: 
 
In fact, those unitary discourses, which first disqualified and then ignored them when 
they made their appearance, are, it seems, quite ready now to annex them, take them 
back within the fold of their own discourse and to invest them with everything this implies 
in terms of the effects of knowledge and power (ibid).   
 
This recodification and recolonisation is particularly evident in the incorporation of the language 
of  disability  rights  in  the  framing  of  welfare  reform  policy,  and,  in  reverse,  in  the  clearly 
neoliberal  underpinnings  of  certain  planks  in  the  disability  rights  platform  in  relation  to 
employment and independence. Rose (1996b) refers to the latter in terms of a ‘“reversibility” of 
relations of authority’ by which he declares, ‘what starts off as a norm to be implanted into 
citizens can be repossessed as a demand which citizens can make of authorities’ (58). This is 
clearly evident in the claims of some disability theorists and rights activists that disabled people 
will  only  be  liberated  through  employment,  that  welfare  support  encourages  unhealthy 
dependence  and  that  sexual  esteem  and  body  esteem  can  only  be  developed  through 
strategies which rely on individual change.  
 
This is why it is essential to retain a reflexive and entirely critical attitude towards the values 
which underpin any promise of liberation. Once there is an awareness that identity is socially 
constructed within a particular cultural and historical framework that is dynamic and extremely 
adaptive to attempts to resist it, it is possible to build new identities within the fractures and fault 
lines out of which power erupts and along the borders of the norm where metaphors can be 
devised to create new meaning, new identities. It is through having become marginalised that 
the disenfranchised ultimately wield more power to disturb the status quo than the “normate”, 
because, by having been forced to live at the edges of society, the oppressed occupy a location 
which lends itself  to the disturbing of these boundaries and the building of tensions which can 
cause new fault lines to erupt. I believe that this is what Foucault (1988g) touches on when he 
writes about the ‘virtual fractures’ which ‘open up the space of freedom’ (37), and, later, when 
he discusses what is involved in the development of ‘a critical ontology of ourselves’ (Foucault 
1991f: 47). He writes: 
 
I mean that this work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open up a 
realm  of  historical  inquiry  and,  on  the  other,  put  itself  to  the  test  of  reality,  of 
contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, 
and to determine the precise form this change should take (italics mine) (ibid). 
 I believe that what Foucault refers to as ‘the limits of ourselves’ are the margins, the borders 
and the fractures that define and potentially disrupt normative subjectivity. And, by continually 
shifting our attention between the historical elements of subjectification and the localised points 
at which its disruption can be struggled for in the present, Foucault believes that we can begin 
to  answer  the  question:  ‘How  can  the  growth  of  capabilities  be  disconnected  from  the 
intensification of power relations?’ (op. cit. 48). 
 
One of the primary means for combining social, historical and individual levels of awareness, 
one which provides a very powerful position from which to redefine disabled identities, is the 
formation of coalitions of resistance. The disability rights movement and the field of disability 
theory which draws from and informs it, for example, although representative of a great many, 
often conflicting viewpoints, share the belief that disability is a social construction that can be 
challenged through social change and it is in this awareness of the social nature of oppression 
that the possibility for emancipation resides. Oliver (1996) argues that a truly liberatory form of 
“empowerment” can be developed if the quest for individual change is combined with the social 
awareness  which  results  from  both  the  consciousness  raising  and  the  potential for political 
action which are integral to the process of  what he refers to as ‘collective empowerment’ (147). 
 
Indeed,  the  process  of  genealogy  itself  is  not  a  lone  enterprise  performed  by  isolated 
individuals. The collective nature of this enterprise may often be disguised by the disciplinary 
differences which exist between conflicting schools of thought and the all too often competitive, 
individualistic character of intellectual pursuit. Yet, it is essentially a cooperative process which 
relies on the research and inspiration of a great many theorists who build on each other’s work. 
The genealogical project surrounding disability has involved a variety of theoretical strands, not 
least of which are those informing the inclusion of personal experience in the production of 
sociological  knowledge,  the  recognition  that  disability  is  a  social  construct  deriving  from 
modernity’s imperative of labour and creation of the norm, and the provision of the tools which 
allow  for  the  deconstruction  of  modern  subjectivity.  The  theoretical  bases  and  practical 
objectives of these schools of thought may often be at odds with one another. Yet, they are 
nevertheless  part  of  a  collective  process  which  opens  the  way  for  the  development  of 
emancipatory  thought  and  action.  Only  by  our  reciprocal  engagement  can  we  make  the 
connections vital to our eventual leaps in critical insight. 
 
Many components of the disability rights movement and disability theory have emancipatory 
potential because they grasp the importance of the social context and are directed towards 
developing  new  understandings  of  power.  Neath  & Shriner (1998), for example, argue that 
disabled people need to extract themselves as much as possible from paternalistic structures 
where some people exercise ‘power over’ others and, instead, to devise more egalitarian forms 
where ‘personal power’ is developed through structures, based on the notion of ‘power with’, 
where power is shared equally among stakeholders (219). While Neath & Shriner’s work is directed towards the creation of egalitarian workplace structures, Prilleltensky (1996) takes up 
the same themes at a personal level when she argues for the application of the principles of 
‘feminist therapy’ to the lives of disabled women. Here she proposes that the usually oppressive 
underpinnings of psychotherapeutic practices can be rendered emancipatory by incorporating a 
‘political analysis of psychological distress, [the] equalisation of power, and [the inclusion of] 
social action’ (88).  
 
While  coalition  building  and  collective  action  are  vital,  it  is  also  important  not  to  develop 
overarching claims which negate individual differences and not to return to the view, perhaps all 
too common within identity politics, that identities are natural and that solutions to any form of 
oppression  should  be  universal.  This  means  that  a  particular relationship needs to emerge 
between what Foucault (1988j: 50) calls individual ‘practice of liberation’ and the wider coalitions 
of which they form a part, yet, in a sense, always remain distinct from. On this, Foucault argues 
that  individual  practices  need  not,  and,  in  reality,  cannot  operate  in  isolation  from  group 
strategies and, in relation to the task of critical theorists and their development of intellectual 
tools,  suggests  that  ‘by  forming groups specifically to make these analyses, to wage these 
struggles, by using these instruments or others: this is how, in the end, possibilities open up’ 
(Foucault 1988c: 192). Accordingly, as is articulated by McNay (1992) in relation to Foucault, 
‘[c]oalitions are not ruled out, but a relational understanding of identity reminds us that any 
common struggle is a democratic and provisional one. Subject to recreation and renegotiation’ 
(111). 
 
This brings me back to the central difficulty which framed Chapter Four, namely that it becomes 
very problematic to claim unity because it tends to reproduce the exclusionary practices which 
have served to create our divisive identifications in the first place. In that chapter I argued that, 
to avoid the pitfalls of identity politics, it is preferable to avoid seeing the solution to oppression 
in the creation of a new more positive disabled identity, worthy of celebration and based on 
pride. Rather, in keeping with the recognition that the disabled identity is socially imposed, we 
must aim to rid ourselves of it altogether. Thus, the enablement of the disabled identity actually 
entails its dissolution. To achieve this may well require a joint consciousness and group action, 
but this would be better served by forming partial and temporary communities of resistance 
rather than groups which are believed to be based on a natural and ongoing connection. And 
these communities of resistance must be capable of changing their shape in response to the 
differing circumstances within which subjugated identities are framed.  
 
Foucault (1991a) has argued that effective liberation movements do not discover the core of the 
human personality, they make possible the ‘destruction of what we are... [and] the creation of 
something  entirely  different’  (122).  However  much  the  technologies  of  welfare  reform  and 
sexual  rehabilitation  promise  in  the  way  of  personal  liberation,  this  cannot  be  achieved by 
renaming  disabled  people  “at  risk  of  long-term  unemployment”  and/or  “subjects  of resexualisation”,  for  these  categorisations  only  serve  to  deflect  our  attention  from  the  real 
sources  of  their  oppression,  thereby  deepening  it.  On  the  contrary,  it  involves  removing 
disability  as  the  primary  source  of  identification,  opening  up  all  the  other  sites  of  identity 
formation which can define people outside of their impairments and building a social structure 
which is based on interdependence and autonomy. 
 
It is vital, however, to avoid the inevitable collapse into a Utopian vision that a universal hope for 
a better world entails and, instead, recognise that individual and political struggle for change 
can only ever operate through fleeting, localised strategies which seek to disrupt power at its 
diffuse and multiple points of interface with daily life. I argue that this involves the creation of 
alternative spaces and discursive challenges which can break through the surface of hegemonic 
structures, disrupt them, dissolve and re-emerge repeatedly in ever shifting forms in varying 
locations  in  response  to  the  chameleon  nature  of  power.  Caines  (2003)  describes  these 
momentary and partial sites of contestation as ‘guerrilla’ in nature. Foucault (1997) calls them 
‘heterotopias’  and  suggests  that  by  creating  them  or  becoming  aware  of  those  already  in 
existence, all of the overlapping meanings of a concept or a particular space can be ‘at one and 
the same time represented, challenged and overturned’ (351).  
 
Yet,  the  question  remains:  in  practical  terms,  how  we  can  equip  ourselves  to  respond  to 
technologies of the self in ways which do not deepen our oppression? Based on my reading, I 
suggest that we need to engage with them with a critical eye for what can be useful and what 
must be challenged or discarded. I was struck, for example, by how closely woven together are 
liberatory possibilities and the normative prescriptions in many of the sexual rehabilitation texts. 
This made me realise that, while these texts should never be simply accepted, it would be 
equally wrong to discard them in their entirety. Kaufman et al. (2003), for example, although 
they  largely  follow  a  highly  prescriptive  “recipe  format”,  clearly  base  their  arguments  on 
emancipatory foundations. Consider the following: 
 
Some people feel that not fitting in with the dominant norm and experiencing life with 
some sort of "difference" is in fact a great benefit, because it both releases them from 
the expectations of others and allows them to look at themselves in new ways. 
 
In our culture we are bombarded with messages about who we are supposed to be, how 
we are supposed to act, and what our lives are supposed to mean. Therefore it's hard to 
separate the expectations that have been placed on us from our own feelings and needs 
(11). 
 
These comments acknowledge both the social construction of internalised oppression and the 
freedoms that can arise from overcoming it. Even more liberatory is the book by Kroll & Klein 
(1992) which is less prescriptive and more inclined to lay out the options so that the reader can 
do what they will with them. It is based on in-depth interviews with seventy five disabled people and offers detailed stories of their insights, experiences and problems. Instead of then listing a 
guide for what to do, it lets the stories speak for themselves, unlike Kaufman et al. (2003) who 
used uncited “quotes” to prove each point they were making. In essence, each of these books 
and many of the others are capable of being utilised as tools of liberation because they map out 
alternative “truths” and counter-narratives. At the same time, they must always be approached 
with an awareness of their immersion in, and ongoing connection with, the dominant discourse. 
 
The development of counter-narratives cannot be said to reveal the “real truth”, but they do offer 
alternative truths, ‘[o]ppositional truths  [which] destabilise the concept of an absolute truth by 
indicating that there are other truths yet to be developed, multiple games of truths yet to be 
played’ (McNay 1992: 137). It is in this way that the subjugated knowledges, both narrative and 
discursive,  which  evolve from consciousness raising, activism and theory development can 
come into play and make a difference. As Foucault (1978) argues: 
 
… we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and 
excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as 
a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies … 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any 
more than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process 
whereby  discourse  can  be  both  an  instrument  and  an  effect  of  power,  but  also  a 
hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines 
and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it (100-101). 
 
Our discursive challenges, whether they exist in the form of personal narratives, critical theories 
or acts of subversion, have the power to change things because they further complicate the 
already  multiple  layers  of  our  heterotopias  and  disturb  what  is  presented  by  the  dominant 
discourse as self-evident and indisputable because it is claimed to be scientific truth or just plain 
common sense. 
 
I have argued throughout that the ability to create alternative modes of thinking and being is 
always simultaneously a social and a individual process. To enable the disabled identity by 
continually refusing its imputations requires that inner change is accompanied, indeed, fuelled 
by an awareness of the social origins of oppression. Yet, given the necessity for structural 
change and the ease by which personal endeavours can be quashed or appropriated, it often 
seems  that  the  only  feasible  and  desirable  change  is overtly and collectively political. The 
individual and the collective, though, are intimately connected since, as Ransom (1997) argues, 
‘the disposition of forces internal to the individual [are] unavoidably central to effective action in 
a broader social context’ (169).  Hence: 
 Women  did  not  first  prepare  themselves  in  consciousness-raising  groups  to  effect 
change  once  outside. The consciousness-raising groups and other self-transforming 
practices that groups and individuals applied to themselves were the sites of change. It 
was in recognition of this already-achieved transformation in the subjective disposition of 
women  that  other  social  forms  adjusted  themselves.  Men  found  themselves  in 
relationships with suddenly different partners who were unwilling - really unable - to play 
the old games.  Psychiatrists found their terms and criteria for defining mental health 
changed "from below" by patients, while official political bodies confronted a magically 
altered political map (Ransom 1997: 168-169). 
 
To be able to engage in practices of liberation, it is necessary to be wary of two common forms 
of emancipatory promise, both of which can only serve to reinforce oppression. The first is the 
form of “self-esteem” steeped in neoliberal promises of independence and freedom; the second, 
the notion of an essentialist self which is believed to have been masked by oppressive forces 
and whose truth can be revealed to set one free. For reasons explained throughout this thesis, 
both  of  these  will  only  serve  to reinforce oppressive norms. In contrast, when built from a 
genealogical  understanding  or  otherwise  critical,  socially  aware  perspective  which 
acknowledges the social context in which identities are manufactured, liberatory practices are 
possible and hold the potential to challenge marginalisation. Hence, I believe it to be liberatory 
for one to cease to care about the negative attitudes of others because one understands that 
identity is socially constructed and that the disabled identity has grown out of negative attitudes 
which have a deep history. This kind of inner change stems from depersonalising the issue by 
contextualising it. Haber (1994) refers to this inner change as the refusal of humiliation and 
explains that, ‘if I don't care about "fitting in," then having it pointed out that I don't will not be a 
cause of pain’ (86). 
 
One can then build an identity which does not draw its meaning from a history of denigration. By 
recognising the points at which both the norm and the Other are constructed, one can choose 
alternative  modes  of  identification  which  are  constructed  outside  of  both  or  which  subvert 
existing categories of identification from within. Unlike the self-esteem of the psycho-sciences, 
the  self-help  movement  and  welfare  reform  with  its  foundations  in  personal  reform  and 
adjustment,  the  creation  of  a  truly  liberatory  self-image  rests  upon  a  whole  new  social 
understanding  of  oppression  which  can  be  used  to  challenge  the  hegemony  of  the  norm 
through activist resistance or by simply not being responsive to its prescriptions.  
 
Many  of  my  participants  developed  narratives  around  both  forms  of resistance, but Lesley 
Tyzack  shines  out  as  a  particularly  clear  example  of  the  dual  possibilities  inherent  in  the 
restorying process. When she found herself trapped in a nursing home in Australia with no 
power and no hope of escaping oppression within the existing system, she fought to return to 
New Zealand where she argues ‘on the whole, [they] have a much greater respect for autonomy 
than Australians’ (private email correspondence 2/12/01). Then, over the next twenty years she struggled  as  a  disability  rights  activist  to  achieve,  amongst  other  things,  the  instigation  of 
individualised care funding and the development of the necessary facilities and architectural 
modifications to make Canterbury University accessible to disabled people. At the same time, 
on a personal level, Lesley has developed an extremely positive self-definition which is resistant 
to the negative attitudes which once disabled her. As she was quoted as saying in Chapter 
Eight, ‘if someone looked at me and sort of had an unpleasant look on their face, I'd think, 
what's  wrong  with  me?  But  now  I  don't    …  I  think,  what's  wrong  with  them?  What's  their 
problem?…  I  never  worry  about  other  people's  opinions.  I  think  my  opinions  are  far  more 
important than anyone else's’. Now she describes herself and her life as follows: 
 
Nowadays I would describe myself as, happy, cheerful, contented, comfortable, loved, 
popular, motivated, busy, stress-free, optimistic, interested, interesting, intelligent, and 
well-informed. Perhaps it is going too far to say MS was the best thing that could happen 
to me, but it was certainly the making of me (email correspondence 16/11/01). 
 
And, during one of our dialogues about the effect of negative attitudes, Lesley concluded: 
 
… if there's one thing I can say it it's that I've got good self-esteem. 
 
 
 
 
Leslie graduating from Canterbury University, Christchurch, May 2004. 
Photographed here with her three daughters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
I came to theory because I was hurting - the pain within me was so intense that I could 
not go on living. I came to theory desperate, wanting to comprehend - to grasp what was 
happening around and within me. Most importantly, I wanted to make the hurt go away. I 
saw in theory then a location for healing (hooks 1994: 59). 
 
Above all else, my thesis attempts to map out a space in which healing can occur. Like bell 
hooks, I came to theory with a need to better understand my sense of erasure and to explore the 
possibility  that  my  personal  experience  was  part  of  something  larger.  My  difficulty  was  in 
determining  how  to  maintain  the  necessary  degree  of  theoretical  rigour  while  continuing  to 
foreground  the  personal  issues  inherent  in  my  participant’s  narratives  and  my  own. 
Poststructural theory is based on a wariness of the personal, having declared the subject dead; 
grounded theorists argue that holding a strong position at the outset of a research project is 
antithetical  to  the  objective  of  deriving  theory  from  the  data;  and,  until  very  recently, even 
disability studies’ fundamental tenet was based on the need to extricate the individual aspects of 
having an impairment, declaring itself solely concerned with the structural causes of oppression.  
 
I  propose  that  my  methodological  merger  has  demonstrated  one  way  of  foregrounding  the 
experiences  of  oppressed  people  within  a  critical  framework  which  does  not  sacrifice  its  
commitment  either  to  theoretical  rigour  or  to  the  well-being  of  the  people  it  focuses  upon. 
Fundamental  to  this  objective  has  been  the  fact  that  my  research  contains  two  closely 
interwoven methodological intentions, firstly, that it effectively combine theory and practice in 
keeping with my belief that any attempt to separate them results in an artificial distillation, and, 
secondly, that it be “emancipatory”, that is, that its primary function be to improve the conditions 
of the people it sets out to explore and that, accordingly, it prioritise their needs and interests.  
 
The  links  between  these  objectives  are  very  strong.  This  is  partly  because  the  practical 
processes  involved  in  focusing  on  lived  experience  and  attempting to transform theory into 
functional outcomes can sharpen theory’s liberatory edge. But, it is also because, as I have 
argued throughout, the application of critical social theory is a vital adjunct to the development of 
emancipatory strategies since it provides the means through which to contextualise individual 
experience by ‘deconstructing necessity’ and opening the way for alternative modes of thinking 
and being. Accordingly, I would like to furnish an embodiment of my reciprocal engagement with 
theory and practice by attempting to map out my own journey as both researcher/critical theorist 
and disabled person seeking emancipation. 
 
Once I had become firm about taking a subjective position, it was obvious that this would place 
me in the dual role of researcher and researched. Yet, while the methodological ramifications of 
choosing this path seemed clear once I had worked them through, the effect of engaging in what Miller (1991: 1) refers to as ‘an explicitly autobiographical performance within the act of criticism’ 
impacted upon my processes of subjectification and the theoretical insights which surround them 
more profoundly than I could have imagined. The insurrection of subjugated knowledges which 
gradually  took  shape  through  the  narratives,  dialogues  and  processes  of  critical  analysis 
transformed my life by offering an infinite range of alternatives for how to think, feel and act in 
the world. Essentially, I am healed, and it is in this healing process, fed by both theory and 
practice, that I believe some very important points of reference reside. 
 
Let me illustrate this by drawing on Boswell (2001) who claims similarly that her application of 
critical analysis to existing social structures enabled the construction of a new, more positive 
identity. She discusses the effects of her theoretical interchange with the personal aspects of 
disability in the following. 
 
My  awareness  of  my  "difference"  has  sometimes  reflected  a  limited  self-
conceptualization, where I have appropriated notions of "normalcy," "ability," and "power" 
from voices that seek to impose their world-view on me. At other times I have seen my 
"difference"  as  an  entry  into  a  range  of  perspectives  that  have situated themselves, 
through struggle, so as to shift discursive meaning in [such] a direction that justice, 
understanding, and responsibility become defining points of decision-making. Surveying 
a range of situations surrounding my hearing loss, I will suggest, here, that by re-weaving 
memories, and re-inscribing articulations which have sought to position me in limited 
ways,  I  have  been  able  to  embrace  the  paradox  of  "loss,"  and  to  (re)construct  my 
"disability" not only as a mark of awareness, insight, and vision, but also as a catalyst for 
positive change. I have come to understand that, from the very beginning, my negotiation 
of my (dis)ability has been closely linked to my interaction with hegemonic structures of 
meaning, identity, and agency (Boswell 2001: 47) 
 
This mirrors many of my own thoughts and experiences and articulates them concisely and 
courageously.  Boswell  describes  her  oscillation  between  feeling  defined  by  the  norm  and 
struggling to move beyond it, and claims that, ultimately, her socially located understanding of 
her  experiences  has  allowed  her  to  ‘embrace  the  paradox  of  “loss”’  and to re-contextualise 
disability in terms of its ability to elucidate and liberate. 
 
I feel the same. Ultimately, my marginalised viewpoint has provided a fertile location from which 
to better understand the processes of subjectification affecting the lives of all people and has 
enabled me to exercise more agency than I was capable of accessing as an able-bodied person. 
Like hooks (1990a), I have discovered the power of marginality as a site of resistance. At the 
outset of my research, which began in 1999 when I was embarking on an honours thesis based 
around the notion that chronic illness is often construed in terms of moral failure, I felt isolated 
and confused. I was grieving because my back injury and then my viral illnesses had stolen 
away the life I had known. Far worse though was that my losses and limitations were often 
viewed in terms of individual responsibility and I felt inadequate and somehow worthless in a variety of intangible ways. At the same time, however, I was angry at the unfairness of it all and 
wanted to fight it. What exactly I was going to fight and which weapons I would wield in this 
nameless battle were not immediately clear to me. 
 
My undergraduate studies into the construction of knowledge had revealed the provisional and 
opportunistic nature of what was claimed to be “natural”, “real” and “true”, and poststructural 
theory  offered  a  way  of  unpacking  formerly  unquestioned  assumptions  to  both  reveal  their 
hidden  agendas  and  to  allow  for  their  reconfiguration  in  limitless  ways.  Formerly,  my 
understanding  of  oppression  had  relied  on  ideologies  which  were  based  on  the  idea  of  “us 
versus them”. In Marxism, “we” were the working class and the enemy was capitalism and in 
feminism  “we”  were  women  and  the  enemy  was  patriarchy.  In  poststructuralism  I  found  an 
alternative view which problematised any claim to being a “we” and challenged the dichotomies 
and alternative claims to “truth” which frame traditional theories of liberation. Through my new 
understanding  of  power  as  diffuse  I  began  to  see  that  I  had  often  participated  in  my  own 
marginalisation by remaining trapped within the normative or by seeking to overcome it by simply 
reversing the dualisms on which it is built. 
 
Initially, this personal relevance was partially obscured by my careful excision of myself from my 
research. My training in the natural sciences prevailed and I believed that it was vital to prioritise 
objectivity.  At  this  stage,  although  I  was  aware  that  my  aim  to  challenge  structures  of 
governance had liberatory implications, the intention of my work was not to facilitate any direct 
form  of personal healing. However, the theoretical insights which evolved from my honours 
thesis and ensuing publications had a momentous impact on my world view. Fundamental to this 
change  was  the  “de-personalising”  of  previously  hurtful  experiences.  For  example,  by 
recognising  that  medical  knowledge  has  functioned  as  a  key  mechanism  which  facilitates 
biopower’s policing of the norm, I no longer felt hurt when faced with a doctor who expressed 
disbelief or blame. Suddenly, I understood that this was not a personal matter in which I had 
been  specifically  judged  as  culpable.  Rather,  when  taking  into  consideration  the  history  of 
thought governing the practice of medicine, any other reaction seemed rather unlikely. 
 
A  more  general,  cross-cultural  understanding  of  the  history of illness as “sin” helped me to 
recognise that human beings have tended to comfort themselves in the face of uncertainty by 
believing that they can control their lives and that the world is essentially just. Once again, my 
understanding of why people often seek to assign blame for blameless events made this kind of 
response  seem  inevitable  rather  than  a  specifically  targeted  indictment.  Thus,  as I became 
increasingly aware of the liberatory power of critically contextualising personal experience, the 
idea began to take form that I should bring the personal and the theoretical together in one piece 
of research.  
 The emancipatory potential of this fusion has been evident at every level. Most fundamentally, 
the stories have been illustrative and illuminating and have provided a great deal of insight into 
how the norm is either adhered to or challenged. The authors of the published works and those 
participants who wrote their stories commonly referred to their writing in terms of healing and 
catharsis. The dialogues involved a similar process and included an extra layer of narrative 
building and the potential for healing based on the intimate and reciprocal nature of shared 
experience. Many of my participants claimed that the dialogues were helpful either because they 
allowed them vent or because new insights arose from them. It was I who benefited most of all, 
however, because I participated in all of the dialogues and read all of the autobiographies and 
participant contributions. Some of the revelations I had while talking to or reading about these 
innovative and courageous people have had a monumental impact on my life, such that my 
narrative has continued to change and has required perpetual reinscription as a result.  
 
When I began my project I was defined by feelings of loss and shame. Now, like Boswell and 
hooks,  I  see  my  marginalisation  as  a  position  of strength and insight. This has involved a 
process of subversion, as opposed to the creation of a “triumph narrative”, and, as such, can be 
understood as a kind of “becoming” which has been fed by the development of the sociological 
insights which frame and evolve from my research. When I say that I have been healed I mean 
many things, but the healing which seems to infuse every layer of my existence is that which 
has arisen from my burgeoning ability to dissociate myself from the negative attitudes of others. 
I understood right from the beginning that my identity relied far too heavily on external sources 
and my investigation into the construction of disability and identity helped me to understand why 
this was so. However, although this genealogical interpretation cultivated the soil in which I 
could conceivably plant the seeds of a new set of self-perceptions and I found some degree of 
comfort in contextualising unkindness and the manifestations of my ailing self-esteem, I still 
found it hard to shrug off my shame in the face of other people’s pity, aversion, ostracism or 
condemnation. 
 
This tended to play itself out in ways that one of my participants, Lee Trustrum, empathised with 
and referred to in terms of ‘the shame of being ashamed’. For, if I understood the social roots of 
the attitudes which gave disability its negative slant, why was I still largely trapped within them? 
It made me feel silly that I still cared so much about how others viewed me, particularly when 
they were strangers. My eventual revelation in this regard was built from a variety of sources 
over time, but there was a pivotal moment during which I experienced a leap in understanding 
and, from that time onwards, I have moved in the world in a far more comfortable and less 
externally-defined way. During one of our dialogues, Lesley Tyzack and I were discussing this 
issue and I was taking the opportunity to explore why I had still been unable to completely 
dissociate myself from negative reactions. I shared my concern that, to stop caring, I risked 
becoming insensitive to the feelings and needs of others and Lesley replied, ‘Yes, well, I try to 
consider other people's feelings, but it's just their opinions that I don't allow to influence me’.  
What happened during and after that conversation was based on a coming together of the 
subjugated  knowledges  which  stemmed  from  my  prior  genealogical  understandings,  the 
generation  of  insights  that  evolved  from  narrative,  dialogue  and  role  modelling,  and  their 
consequent  re-contextualisation  through  theory.  Understanding  where  negative  attitudes 
emanate from historically was the first big step toward letting them go, but my readings from and 
conversations with disabled people often provided the final layer of insight necessary to fully 
apply the deconstruction of necessity to daily life. In this case, the disentanglement of people’s 
opinions  from  their  feelings  was  the  key  I  had  needed  to  enable  the  release  of  my  self-
perceptions from what were formerly hurtful attitudes and behaviours. Indeed, what was once 
painful became interesting or, if subtle, remained beneath my level of awareness. Like Lesley, I 
no longer think “what’s wrong with me?”, but, instead, I am able to contextualise the attitudes 
and behaviour of others and, as a result, can be compassionate, unconcerned or even, at times, 
amused. 
 
During another dialogue with Lesley I said that I admired her and felt she was a lot stronger and 
more insightful than I was. She replied ‘You must remember it's been going on a long time for 
me. It was 1980 that I had the first bad attack of MS and, I mean, that's twenty two years now. 
It's a long time to come to terms with it’. This reinforced my growing awareness that disability 
involves a trajectory and that, when one person is further along in their trajectory than another, 
they can act as role model and mentor. Many of my participants, particularly Lesley and Chris, 
have performed this function for me in a way that theory alone could never have achieved. 
 
However, this does not negate the vital role performed by theoretical insight in the emancipatory 
process. The weaving together of critical analysis and lived experience occurs, not only on the 
ground when negotiating and challenging the disabling of identity in a practical sense, but in the 
development of new theoretical conceptions within the academy. My thesis has grown from the 
constant attempt to keep theory and practice closely intertwined. This confluence reached its 
culmination during the final layer of analysis in Chapter Ten when the insights which emerged 
from the application of governmentality to the narratives were fed through a new organising 
structure based on the concepts of self-esteem and empowerment. At this point, I experienced 
the way in which the act of writing – writing as theoretical praxis – makes possible a leap into 
previously unimagined territory. Writing provides yet another means for drawing theory from 
data, whether that “data” be textual or narrative or, as in my case, a combination of both. 
 
Indeed, as Cixous (1980) suggests, ‘writing is precisely the very possibility of change, the space 
that  can  serve  as  a  springboard  for  subversive  thought,  the  precursory  movement  of  a 
transformation of social and cultural structures’ (149). As Merleau Ponty (1962a: 46) points out, 
by attempting to express the inexpressible, we uncover the gaps or 'the threads of silence that 
speech is mixed together with' and, thus, enable the development of 'truly expressive speech'. This  kind  of  writing  is  not  simply  a  mechanism  for  reporting  insights  already  derived  from 
analysis. It involves new levels of connection and creation in the melding of theory and practice. 
In my case, this produced a further leap in how I understand my own subjectification and its 
potential for subversion, and I also believe, as Cixous (1980) argues in relation to the writings of 
the marginalised in general, that this kind of combination of theory and practice through the act 
of  writing  opens the way for ‘a mutation in human relations, in thought, in all praxis ... [a] 
staggering alteration in power relations and in the production of individualities’ (253). 
 
As a result, I am now much clearer about how to exercise agency in the ongoing process of 
building and maintaining a desirable identity. I can read a self-help book or engage in welfare 
reform practices with an awareness of what is embedded in neoliberal, individualistic processes 
of self-actualisation and what may be utilised in emancipatory ways. Accordingly, my sexuality is 
no longer a site of grief and abjection, both because I no longer see it as a primary mode of 
identification and because my readings have opened up new possibilities in relation to sharing 
pleasure and exploring desire in keeping with a body which continues to shut down, piece by 
piece. And I am now at the point where I have recontextualised my understanding of “work” and 
I  no  longer  need  an  occupational  identity  to  shore  up  a  troubled  self-esteem.  It  seems 
paradoxical on one level, but inevitable on another, that my very fulfilling and pride-inducing 
work in the world of academia has culminated in the knowledge that my identity is no longer 
reliant on my participation in paid employment at all.  
 
Herein  lies  the  essential  difference  between  a  “triumph  narrative”  and  one  based  on 
emancipatory insight. I struggled with this distinction when I was about half way through my 
dissertation. Being on scholarship, winning a bursary, and achieving publication helped me to 
feel better about myself than I had felt since becoming disabled. Yet, it was possible that I was 
merely  participating  in  the  formation  of  a  triumph  narrative  which  may  be  construed  as 
supporting the view that all people can overcome their limitations if only they try hard enough 
and may tie me inexorably to the ongoing need for such achievements. Once again, however, 
the ability to contextualise these kinds of experience served to uproot them from their normative 
foundations  and  I  am  now  confident  that  my  identity  will  remain  comfortable regardless of 
whether I can work or not. This is an enormous relief to me for, although I once relied heavily on 
being able to continue my academic work, it appears that the recent acceleration of my failing 
health may preclude this possibility. In the end, disability has granted me an escape from the 
tyranny of the norm.  
 
To describe one’s own autobiographical experiences in relation to their theoretical development 
requires a genealogy of its own. Ribbens (1996) writes of the ‘taken for granted … psychic 
embedded  ness’  of  autobiographical  accounts,  conceptualisations  which  I  believe  must  be 
challenged if we are to ‘encourage academic sociology to reflect upon itself and provide more 
space’ for the development of such accounts (91). In other words, because it is often assumed that autobiography is personal and unique to the individual, we can have trouble accessing its 
social meaning. This, I suggest, can only serve to stifle sociological insight and emancipatory 
thought, with the exclusion of the personal from the theoretical functioning as just one more 
form  of  silencing.  Yet,  as  Merton  (1988)  argues,  sociological  autobiography  is  of  prime 
theoretical relevance because it involves ‘the interplay between one's sequences of status-sets 
and  role-sets  on  the  one  hand  and  one's  intellectual  development  on  the  other,  with  its 
succession of theoretical commitments, foci of scientific attention, planned or serendipitous 
choices of problems and choices of strategic research sites for their investigation’ (19).  
 
It  is  in  this  interplay  between  personal  experiences  and  intellectual  development  that  the 
reciprocal  engagement  between  theory  and  practice  occurs.  They  only  appear  as  two 
dissociable processes or sites of change when mapped out in two dimensions in the attempt to 
better understand them. In practice, these processes occur simultaneously and constantly feed 
into one another, and, once again, it is in writing about them that new insights about their 
interaction  can  develop.  This  is  particularly  the  case  when  the  theory  springs  from  the 
genealogical analysis of subjective experience.  As Couzens Hoy (1998) argues, that because 
genealogy  shows  that  self-understandings  are  not  only  interpretations,  but  contingent 
interpretations with the possibility of subversion, ‘politics and philosophy are no longer entirely 
irrelevant to each other, but instead, they become mutually reinforcing activities’ (30-31). The 
aim here is not to pretend that one person’s experiences mirror those of all people or that one 
solution fits all situations, but to demonstrate how the historical and the biographical interrelate 
and to provide examples of how an individual’s involvement with genealogical insights can 
instigate a process of positive change through opening up new possibilities. My story is not 
definitive, nor are any of the other narratives represented here. But, it is hoped they can provide 
stepping stones, signposts or springboards in the journey prompted either by the experience of 
marginalisation or the tyranny of almost, but never quite, approximating the norm, and, as such, 
become ‘instruments and tools that people might find useful’ (Foucault 1988c:197).  
 
As such, my thesis may be seen to map out part of a journey based on beginnings initiated long 
before its birth. It leads towards, not concrete outcomes, but multifarious possibilities which 
continue to change shape as quickly as they appear solid enough to fully grasp. It is not so 
much the nature of change which is the issue here, but the simple, yet complex recognition that 
change is possible at all, at every level and in every situation. By understanding the historical 
immersion  of  our  identities  in  value-laden  dichotomies  which  stem  from  the  very  basis  of 
language itself, we can begin to chart new ways of thinking, acting and speaking which can 
serve to restructure power relations and generate multiple points of resistance. And by utilising 
disability as a critical modality for understanding the distinction between the affiliated and the 
marginalised and revealing how both suffer from its specifications, it is possible to begin to see 
difference as exciting and inevitable rather than in terms of mutually exclusive extremes. When 
seen in this way, identity can celebrate its chameleon possibilities while retaining its power to represent a coherent and desirable way to shape the process of “being”, leaving the disabled 
identity as a social location which can be unmade, shrugged off, left behind. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX ONE 
 
Participant Descriptions
* 
 
Aaron 
Aaron is a 32-year-old man who lives in the ACT, Australia. He gradually became profoundly 
blind  after  developing  a  vision  impairment  at  age  7.  He  speaks  in  strong  terms  about  the 
discrimination he has faced in the education system and employment and is currently engaged 
in building a case for the attention of the Human Rights Commission in relation to workplace 
discrimination.  
 
Adrienne 
Adrienne is a 52-year-old Jewish woman who lives in the USA. She developed chronic fatigue 
syndrome  (CFS)  12  years  ago,  gradually  had  to  give  up  work  in  her  positions  of  paid 
employment and, over time, has become active in the disability rights movement, particularly in 
relation to transport accessibility issues as she uses a wheelchair. 
 
Amanda 
Amanda is a 21-year-old woman who lives in Northern Territory, Australia. She developed  CFS 
two years ago and is still coming to terms with having to drop out of university in her first year. 
She still hopes to return to her studies and is very distressed at having to be dependent on her 
parents after having left home at 16. 
 
Angus 
Angus is a 52-year-old man who lives in NSW, Australia. He has a range of chronic illnesses, 
many of which are yet to be satisfactorily diagnosed. Angus became ill ten years ago and this 
has greatly affected his life and his ability to work. He is still employed but lives with a constant 
fear that his failing health will eventually prevent him from continuing to work. 
 
Anne 
Anne is a 43-year-old woman, originally from Croatia, who lives in NSW, Australia. She injured 
her foot ten years ago and tried to keep working but eventually had to give up. Other than the 
loss of her career, Anne’s greatest sense of loss revolves around the ability to effectively parent 
her child who was an infant at the time of the onset of her impairment. 
 
Celia 
Celia lives in South Australia and describes herself as ‘a 43 year old mother of three’. After 
recovering from cervical cancer and tuberculosis in her early twenties, Celia developed Chronic 
                                                   
* Current at time of dialogue in 2002. Fatigue Immune Deficiency Syndrome (CFIDS) at age 28. Added to her fatigue, she suffers 
from an extreme sensitivity to chemicals, a condition which isolates her in the attempt to avoid 
debilitating  exposure  to  chemicals  that  most  people  take  for  granted  such  as  perfume, 
hairspray,  household  cleaning  products,  petrol  and  fresh  paint.  She  is  devastated  by  her 
ongoing illness, but felt that being able to share her story with me helped to lighten the load. 
 
Chris Baker 
Chris is a 54 year old New Zealand man whose mixed Samoan and Irish heritage locates him in 
a bicultural position which has provided a great deal of insight into the identity issues which are 
common to disability. He began to develop the symptoms of Multiple Sclerosis 12 years ago is 
now living in a nursing home. He remains a prolific writer whose work continues to be published. 
Some of his more recent stories are being produced as radio plays for Radio NZ and in 2004 he 
began  attending  university  to  obtain  a  Communications  degree.  His  resolution  of  his  initial 
identity problems can only be described as profound. 
 
Craig 
Craig is a 50-year-old man who lives in New Zealand. He became completely blind due to an 
accident  when  he  was  18.  Craig  was  originally  institutionalised  and  was  given  work  in  a 
sheltered workshop, but gradually managed to move back into the mainstream. He has a happy 
marriage and family life, a challenging career in the ministry, and, now that his children have 
grown up, he and his wife travel extensively.  
 
Dianne 
Dianne is a 60-year-old woman who lives in London. She first developed symptoms of Multiple 
Sclerosis 30 years ago. This eventually stopped her from working and resulted in her need to 
use  a  wheelchair.  She  is  married  to  a  supportive  partner,  has  children,  and  has  become 
extremely active in the community in ways that she feels has given her an extremely positive 
identify.  
 
Frank 
Frank is a 58-year-old man who lives in NSW, Australia. He developed chronic fatigue 30 years 
ago from a series of liver debilitating viruses. He continued to attempt to work, finding each time 
that it made him ill for months afterwards. He eventually accepted a disability support pension, 
but is still finding it hard to establish how much he can do in a physical sense without damaging 
his health. He appears to have no identity issues at all because he has always felt that the norm 
should be challenged and so he sees himself and his life in subversive terms. 
 
Glen 
Glen is a 62-year-old man who emigrated from England to Australia ten years after becoming 
disabled  at  the  age  of  19.  He  was  involved  in  a  motorbike  accident,  which  resulted  in  a traumatic brain injury and extensive paralysis. His main concerns relating to disability have been 
his limited options for employment and the lack of assistance he has received in relation to 
dealing with his daily needs and his emotional problems.
* 
 
Greg 
Greg is a 65-year-old Australian man who began to develop a vision impairment at the age of 
seven. His failing eyesight caused him a great deal of distress during his school years and 
made  him  feel  “inferior”  and  that  he  was  continually  treated  as  “naughty”.  He  later  did 
exceptionally well at adult education, built a happy marriage and feels very positively about 
himself and his life.  
 
Jack 
Jack is a 42-year-old man who lives in Queensland, Australia. Five years ago he developed a 
chronic pain disorder, which stopped him from being able to work and is threatening to destroy 
his marriage. His greatest identity issues are related to his loss of occupational identity and the 
negative attitudes of those around him who think he is lazy. 
 
Jacky 
Jacky is a 34-year-old woman who is studying for her PhD in psychology in New Zealand. She 
was involved in an accident 8 years ago which resulted in a traumatic brain injury and led to the 
loss  of  her  career  at  the  time. She hated being on welfare and felt that people were very 
discriminatory in general and now feels that a social model perspective gives her a way of 
combating the negative stereotypes. 
 
Jane 
Jane is a 25-year-old Australian woman who developed Chronic Fatigue Syndrome at the age 
of 19 while she was studying drama at university and working part time to support herself. She, 
like Adrienne and many of the others with CFS, felt that her extreme workload contributed to the 
development of her illness. Her greatest sense of loss has been in relation to her independence 
as she has had to move back to her family home to be cared for by her mother.  
 
Janet         
Janet is a 28-year-old English woman who is now living in New Zealand. She was born blind but 
is adamant that this had no bearing on her identity at all. Her problems with disability arose five 
years ago when a car accident caused her to sustain a head injury, liver damage and ongoing, 
severe abdominal pain. What appears to be most upsetting to Jane is that head injuries are so 
poorly understood. They are not looked at as physical injuries or physical disabilities but as 
                                                   
* In this case and in others where I felt that I may be able to link up my participants to relevant community supports I 
attempted to do so (with varying levels of success due to the constant erosion of government funding in Australia). connected to the realm of mental health problems and she believes that this is an area that 
people are very uncomfortable with and very ill informed about. 
 
Jeanette 
Jeanette is a 29-year-old PhD student who lives in the USA. She developed Crohn’s Disease at 
age 12. Throughout her life she has largely kept her condition hidden and has only just started 
to “come out” to her students in the disability studies class she is teaching. She takes a social 
model perspective to disability and is dedicated to helping young Crohn’s sufferers to develop 
positive identities. 
 
Karen 
Karen is a 38-year-old New Zealand woman who was born with paraplegia due to a genetic 
condition. She did not experience any identity problems until she began to take an interest in 
boys in her late teens and realised that her options would be limited by her disability. She was 
not offered the government assistance to live independently given to accident victims because 
she was born with her impairment, so she had to fight for many years to obtain the assistance 
provided by the Accident Compensation Corporation. Karen now works in a challenging job, is 
active in the Disabled People’s Assembly and is happily married. 
 
Lee Trustrum 
Lee is a 52-year-old New Zealand woman who has a genetic neurological disorder which has 
given her mobility problems from birth. She says that her impairment is largely invisible to the 
rest of the world, yet her physical difference and its genetic links to other family members with 
the same impairment has continued to make her feel inferior and somewhat ashamed. 
 
 
 
 
Lesley Tyzack 
Lesley is a 54-year-old New Zealand woman who was born in England and spent many years 
living  in  Australia.  She  developed  Multiple  Sclerosis  22  years  ago  and  quickly  developed 
quadriplegia which resulted in repeated institutionalisation in nursing homes in Australia. Once 
she was able to get to New Zealand, where she had first been married and where her children 
resided, she was able to obtain access to the kinds of supports which have allowed her to 
develop  an  autonomous,  fulfilling  life.  She  is  president  of  the  Christchurch  branch  of  the 
Disabled People’s Assembly, a member of Toastmasters, has just graduated from a psychology 
degree and is currently writing both fiction and an autobiographical treatise designed to help 
people who are experiencing the early stages of MS. 
 Luke 
Luke is a 63-year-old man who lives in Western Australia. He developed paraplegia when he 
was involved in an accident at work 30 years ago. He is a very positive person and reports no 
identity problems at all. He felt that his accident led him to get involved in a new career and that 
he had completely triumphed over adversity. His story was reported on a television show which 
portrayed him as a disabled hero. He is extremely cheerful and philosophical, but does not 
reflect on this being part of a transition. 
 
Michael 
Michael is a 56-year-old man who lives in the USA. He was supporting himself by writing novels 
until he developed CFS and fibromyalgia 8 years ago. He is very angry that his ability to think 
clearly  has  been  so  severely  compromised  and  discusses  identity in terms of his impaired 
cognitive ability (know as “brain fog”) and extreme fatigue. He is now in receipt of welfare 
assistance and finds the whole process extremely demoralising. 
 
Monique 
Monique is a 22-year-old woman who lives in Perth, Western Australia. She was pursuing a 
very successful career as a dancer when she developed CFS three years ago in response to a 
run of viral infections. She says now that she had defined herself almost solely in relation to her 
dancing  and  has  had  to  restructure  how  she  sees  herself.  And,  like  Jane,  Monique  feels 
uncomfortable about being dependent on her parents. 
 
Nancy 
Nancy is a 68-year-old woman who became institutionalised in New Zealand after experiencing 
a Spinal Cord Injury due to a fall when she was thirty years old. She tells a very powerful story 
of fighting against the discriminatory treatment she received in the early days and how she 
developed  an  autonomous  life  through  writing  and  studying  and  becoming  involved  in  the 
Disabled People’s Assembly. 
 
Neil 
Neil is a 52-year-old Australian man who sustained a traumatic brain injury due to a car accident 
8 years ago. He has worked extremely hard to regain some of the physical independence he 
had lost due to his substantial paralysis and is very keen to contribute to the community in any 
way  he  can.  Consequently,  he  works  in  a  voluntary  capacity  for  a  number  of  different 
organisations and is a very clear example of the “active neoliberal citizen” discussed in Chapter 
Nine. 
 
Paul 
Paul  is  a  47-year-old  man  who  lives  in  NSW,  Australia.  He  says  his  vision  was  always 
somewhat impaired due to a premature birth, but that he ultimately became legally blind at age 30.  He  originally  resisted  acknowledging  his  problem  until  he  almost  had  a  head  on  car 
accident. After that he gave up driving and eventually lost his ability to work. He says that his 
marriage broke up because he was a “workaholic” and that, since then, he has not been able to 
meet another partner because his blindness causes such severe problems with socialising. He 
tells a great many jokes and makes light of things, but is obviously disappointed with how his life 
has turned out due to his blindness. 
 
Peta 
Peta is a 26-year-old PhD student who lives in London. When she was 12 she developed a 
visual impairment which ultimately led to blindness. Her greatest identity issues have revolved 
around  the  negative  attitudes  of  others,  something  which  she’s  been  able  to  resolve  by 
understanding  disability  as  a  matter  of  social  exclusion.  She  says  that  she  didn’t  consider 
herself as disabled until she came to see disability as a social construction and she now feels 
that affiliating herself with other disabled people is part of an extremely emancipatory process. 
 
Rita 
Rita is a 53-year-old woman who lives in NSW, Australia. She developed CFS five years ago 
and has lost her ability to engage in any of her usual household tasks. She feels very depressed 
that she has to rely on her husband for everything and demoralised that her 8-year-old child 
thinks of her as lazy. 
 
Robert 
Robert is a 49-year-old Australian man living in NSW. He has developed a range of chronic 
illnesses and impairments over the past ten years which have made it very difficult for him to 
work. He is extremely proud of his ability to continue working despite his physical problems and 
he speaks strongly of the need for stoicism. 
 
Stan 
Stan is a 64-year-old New Zealand man who began to develop Multiple Sclerosis at age 32. 
Although  he  soon  needed  to  use  a  wheelchair,  he  did  not  have  to  give  up  work  and  he 
continued  to  travel  extensively,  including  a  trip  he  won  as  a  result  of  gaining  a  Churchill 
Research  Fellowship.  He  is  a  disability  rights  activist  and  focuses  on  issues  of  increasing 
access in relation to transport and buildings. 
 
Susan 
Susan is a 42-year-old PhD student who lives in the south west of England. She first began to 
develop the symptoms of Multiple Sclerosis 8 years ago and now uses a stick and a scooter to 
aid in her mobility. She feels driven to work harder than most people to prove her capabilities 
and has taken on a social model perspective to better understand her marginalisation and how 
to overcome it.  
Tanya 
Tanya is a 32-year-old woman from Victoria, Australia who developed CFS six years ago. She 
lost her marriage and her ability to work and feels incapable of rebuilding her life when she has 
barely enough energy to get dressed in the morning. She is beginning to question her process 
of  self-definition  and  to  challenge  the  normative  prescriptions  which  have  made  her  feel 
worthless because of the loss of her occupational identity, independence and active citizenship. 
 
Terry 
Terry is a 42-year-old Australian man who moved to New Zealand five years ago. He became 
profoundly blind in a instant due to a car accident 14 years ago. He still talks sadly about the 
loss of his career, but jokes about everything else relating to disability. 
 
Wally 
Wally is a 22 year old man who lives in NSW, Australia. He became blind in a work related 
accident 5 years ago and feels that he has not been adversely affected by his impairment. He 
makes a joke about the whole thing and says it has made him a better person. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX TWO 
 
Variation in Attributes Represented in Sample 
 
 
·  Time since onset of impairment. 
 
·  Nature of condition, e.g. stable, fluctuating or periodic. 
 
·  Incidence and level of pain. 
 
·  Affect on cognitive ability. 
 
·  Type of support available, e.g. family members, friends, professionals etc. 
 
·  Degree of validation in relation to diagnosis. 
 
·  Place of residence, e.g. own home, parents’ home, institution. 
 
·  Presence of illness. 
 
·  Employment status. 
 
·  Source of income, e.g. occupational, welfare, compensation, family. 
 
·  Ability to walk. 
 
·  Level of self-reliance. 
 
·  Relationship status and how disability affected it, e.g. married before or after onset of 
impairment, loss of relationship due to impairment, loss of ability to develop relationship. 
 
·  Nature of onset, e.g. gradual or sudden. 
 
·  Visibility of impairment and, if “invisible”, the tendency to “pass”. 
 
·  Age. 
 
·  Level of education.  
·  Ethnicity. 
 
·  Location. 
 
·  Access to resources. 
 
·  Involvement in disability politics/activism. 
 
·  Tendency to refer to oneself as disabled  
 
·  Adoption of social model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX THREE 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Division of Social Sciences, Humanities and Education 
School of Social Inquiry 
 
Consent form for participation in the research 
conducted by Rose Galvin 
and referred to as: 
 
Disability as a Challenged Identity 
 
I am a PhD student at Murdoch University investigating the effects that disability has on identity. 
The purpose of this study is to find out how disability changes both the way people feel about 
themselves and how other people view them. It is hoped that the results of this research will 
lead to a better understanding of how disability affects self-image so that negative feelings can 
be challenged and changed.  
 
You can help in this study by consenting to one or more interviews. It is anticipated that the time 
to complete the first interview will take no more than one hour, and, if both parties agree, further 
interviews may be arranged. Contained in the interview are questions about the experience of 
illness and disability and other questions which may be seen as personal and private. 
Participants can decide to withdraw their consent at any time. All information given during the 
survey is confidential and no names or other information that might identify you will be used in 
any publication arising from the research. Feedback on the study will be provided to 
participants. 
 
If you are willing to participate in this study, could you please complete the details below. If you 
have any questions about this project please feel free to contact either myself, Rose Galvin, on 
0266548256 or my supervisor, Dr Trish Harris, on 08 9360 2252.  
 
My supervisor and I are happy to discuss with you any concerns you may have on how this 
study has been conducted, or alternatively you can contact Murdoch University's Human 
Research Ethics Committee on 08 9360 6677.  
 
                   *********************************************************** 
 
 
 
  
Division of Social Sciences, Humanities and Education 
School of Social Inquiry 
 
 
 
 
 
I (the participant) have read the information above. Any questions I have asked have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I agree to take part in this activity, however, I know that I may 
change my mind and stop at any time.  
 
I understand that all information provided is treated as confidential and will not be released by 
the investigator unless required to do so by law.  
 
I agree for this interview to be taped. 
 
I agree that research data gathered for this study may be published provided my name or other 
information which might identify me is not used. 
 
By returning this completed form by email the applicant consents to the above conditions. 
 
Participant/Authorised Representative: 
 
Date:                                             
 
Researcher:  
 
Date:  
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 APPENDIX FIVE 
 
Annotated Bibliography of Sexual Rehabilitation Texts 
 
1) Texts aimed at educating health professionals 
 
Comfort, A. (1974) Sexual Consequences of Disability. Philadelphia: George F. Stickley 
Company. 
 
This  is  a  compendium  which  is  written  by  doctors  to  educate  doctors  in  the  matter  of 
incorporating  sexual  guidance  in  their  caregiving  role  in  relation  to  disabled  people.  Some 
chapters  deal  with  general  issues  surrounding  disability  and  sexuality,  but  most  deal  with 
specific  impairments  and  focus  heavily  on  physiology  and  its  bearing  on  psychoanalytical 
issues, often referring to psychosomatic problems.  
 
Cooper, E. & Guillebaud, J. (1999) Sexuality and Disability: A Guide for Everyday Practice. 
Abington: Radcliffe Medical Press. 
 
This is a very short and simple guide written by a consultant advisor on sexuality issues and a 
family planning counsellor with the aim of educating health professionals such as doctors and 
nurses  in  general  practice  and  family  planning  counsellors,  physiotherapists,  occupational 
therapists, health visitors and social workers. It makes brief mention of emotional issues, but 
focuses mainly on anatomical issues and practical concerns such as contraception. 
 
Greengross, W. (1976) Entitled to Love: The Sexual and Emotional Needs of the Handicapped. 
Guildford: Malaby Press. 
 
Written by a GP who is also a marriage guidance counsellor and a member of the committee on 
Sexual Problems of the Disabled and aimed at those who care for disabled people. It is mainly 
focused on those who live in institutions and rests heavily on a normalisation theme. It is based 
on a pity model rather than one which promises to empower. 
 
Mackelprang, R. W. & Valentine, D. (1993) Sexuality and Disability: A Guide to Human Service 
Practitioners. New York: The Haworth Press. 
 
 A compilation written by social workers and those who research in the area of social work, 
aimed  at  educating  social  workers  in  the  belief  that  they  are  placed  in  many  areas,  both 
institutional  and  in  the  community,  where  sexual  counselling  would  be  helpful  to  disabled 
people. It describes various training programmes that could be developed to serve this purpose and focuses on some special problem areas such as sexual abuse and intellectual disabilities 
(referred to as mental retardation). 
 
Neistadt,  M.  E.  &  Freda,  M.  (1987)  Choices:  A  Guide  to  Sex  Counselling  with  Physically 
Disabled Adults. Malabar: Robert E. Kreiger Publishing Company. 
 
The authors are occupational therapists and they direct their book at the training of rehabilitation 
professionals in general, the aim being to educate them in the basics of sex counselling with 
disabled people.  
 
Schover, L. R. & Jensen, S. B. (1988) Sexuality and Chronic Illness: A Comprehensive 
Approach. London: The Guildford Press. 
 
This text is written by a psychiatrist and a psychologist and aims to educate doctors, mental 
health professionals, nurses, occupational therapists and physical therapists. It argues against a 
purely biological approach and advocates a psychosocial perspective. Rather than getting away 
from  the  medical  model,  however,  it  constructs  disabled  people’s  sexuality  in  terms  of 
psychological problems rather than biological ones. 
 
Sha’ked, A. (1981) Human Sexuality and Rehabilitation Medicine: Sexual Functioning Following 
Spinal Cord Injury. London: Williams & Wilkins. 
 
The  editor  of  this  comprehensive  compendium  describes  himself  as  a “sexologist” and the 
authors largely come from a psychology background. It is their aim to provide a text which will 
help rehabilitation practitioners to counsel and educate their disabled clients. It is based on a 
very strong medical model view and relies heavily on quantitative research methodology. 
 
Sipski, M. L. & Alexander, C. J. (1997) Sexual Function in People with Disability and Chronic 
Illness: A Health Professional’s Guide. Maryland: Aspen Publishers. 
 
The book is a dense and comprehensive text edited by a doctor and a psychologist. It covers 
the physical and psychological impact of disability on sexuality and traces the various laboratory 
tests and treatment programmes that are available. It is a very strong example of the medical 
model approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2) Self-help literature 
 
Kahane, D. H. (1995) No Less a Woman: Femininity, Sexuality and Breast Cancer. Alameda 
CA: Hunter House. 
 
 Deborah Kahane is a cancer survivor and social worker who aims to combine her experiences 
in both areas with the objective of filling the need for  ‘psychosocial and sexual information’ 
relevant to the experience of breast cancer and mastectomy. The first half of the book presents 
the  stories  of  women  with  breast  cancer  in  which  they  discuss  the  effects  of  their  cancer 
experience on their self esteem, while the second half draws from the stories the main themes 
which the author believes demonstrates why these women have such a strong sense of self 
esteem despite the challenges they faced.  
 
Kaufman, M., Silverberg, C. & Odette, F. (2003) The Ultimate Guide to Sex and Disability: For 
All of Us Who Live with Disabilities, Chronic Pain and Illness. San Francisco: Cleis Press. 
 
This book is written by a sex toy retailer, a disabled women who trains and educates service 
providers in the issues sexuality and disability, and an educator in the field of adolescent 
medicine. They certainly have an emancipatory view on sex and disability and are very keen to 
challenge normative boundaries, yet, at the same time, the format of the book is very 
prescriptive, structured in the form of a recipe or set of guidelines and it is heavily laced with 
self-actualising language and concepts. 
 
Kroll, K. & Klein, E. (1992) Enabling Romance: A Guide to Love, Sex and Relationships for 
People with Disabilities. Horsham: No Limits Communications. 
 
This book is a self-help book in that it is a “guide” but, unlike Kaufman et al. (2003) it is less 
prescriptive and more inclined to lay out the options so that the reader can do what they will with 
them. It is based on in-depth interviews with 75 disabled people and offers detailed stories of 
their insights, experiences and problems. Instead of then listing a guide for what to do, it lets the 
stories speak for themselves, unlike Kaufman et al. (2003) who used uncited “quotes” to prove 
each point they were making. Each book is valuable in its way, but this one appears to be far 
more emancipatory in a poststructural sense because it avoids peddling “truths” and allows for 
infinite ways to view disabled sexuality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 3) Borderline between expert texts and self-help 
 
Mooney,  T.  O.,  Cole,  T.  M.  &  Chilgren,  T.  A.  (1975)  Sexual  Options  for  Paraplegics  and 
Quadriplegics. Boston: Little Brown Press. 
 
This  startling  book  was  put  together  by three doctors who specialise in the field of human 
sexuality. They aim it at both disabled people and the rehabilitation professionals who work with 
them. It is based on the belief that people who have spinal cord injuries have the right to free 
sexual expression but that they have been denied the information and resources with which 
they can pursue this right. It is filled with extremely explicit photographs of the issues that face 
people with SCIs when they approach sexual situations such as how to deal with catheters, 
poor bladder and bowel control and which positions facilitate different functional limitations. 
 
Sandowski, C. L. (1989) Sexual Concerns When Illness or Disability Strikes. Springfield IL: 
Charles C. Thomas. 
 
This book is written by someone qualified in the area of social work who aims to bring the 
information which has been developed by doctors and psychologists in relation to disability and 
sexuality into an accessible form for those whose impairments have affected their sexuality. It 
obviously draws on the medical model research into the physical and psychological effects of 
disability on sexuality and presents it in a clear and sensitive manner. I place it in the borderline 
category of texts because it does not follow a self-help, recipe-driven format. It is more like the 
texts directed at experts, but the language is more accessible and it is directed at disabled 
people themselves. 
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